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# NOTICES

THE Assistant Secretary will be at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday mornings, and on Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday afternoons.

All Members home from abroad are asked to notify their change of address.

Members are recommended to correspond, except under special circumstances, about lecture tickets, the Journal, and the election of new members, direct with the Assistant Secretary and not with Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, who is mostly away in Shropshire. By doing this both time and postage will be saved.

# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at No. 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W., on Thursday, November 10, 1921, when a lecture was given by Captain L. V. S. Blacker, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides, Frontier Force, on "Wars and Travels in Turkistan, 1918-1919-1920." The Rt. Hon. Lord Carnock, Chairman of the Society, presided. In opening the proceedings,

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I hope the change of lecture hours will meet with the approval of the Society, and I think, judging from the attendance to-night, I may confidently say you will approve it. We had to do it because many of our members served in public offices or other businesses, and found half-past four too early for them to attend; so, with your approval, we thought it would be well to change the hour to half-past five. Before introducing Captain Blacker, I will ask Colonel Yate to make a statement.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate): Since July last fifty-nine new members have been elected. I do not propose to read the whole list, because time is valuable. I may mention that there are, in addition to several ladies, Viscount Chelmsford, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Sir R. T. Coryndon, Governor of Uganda, Sir Alfred Hamilton Grant, late Foreign Secretary in India, Sir William S. Meyer, High Commissioner for India, Sir Verney Lovett, late Member of the Viceroy's Imperial Legislative Council in India, General Sir Claud W. Jacob, Chief of the General Staff in India, and six other officers of General rank. I will limit myself to that.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now my pleasant duty to introduce to the meeting Captain Blacker, who has kindly consented to read us a paper upon "Wars and Travels in Turkistan, 1918-1919-1920." Speaking for myself, my own information on what passed during those eventful years in that remote district is exceedingly scanty, so I am sure I am echoing the feeling of all here that we are exceedingly pleased to have first-hand information from the gentleman who took most adventurous journeys in those regions. I will now ask Captain Blacker to read his paper. (Applause.)

# WARS AND TRAVELS IN TURKISTAN, 1918-1919-1920

BY CAPTAIN L. V. S. BLACKER,
Q.V.O. Corps of Guides, Punjab Frontier Force.

VERY many people have ascribed a still greater number of explanations and reasons for the outbreak of the War of August, 1914. I venture to put forward to you one of my own which I do not think has yet been demonstrated in public. This map * which you now see on the screen is one which I hope will make clear my meaning. The part coloured red indicates the countries ruled by a predominantly Aryan race, and I think it may fairly be said that the Aryan race is characteristically the European one. The line dividing this from the yellow is, I think it is reasonable to say, the real racial frontier between Europe and Asia, and may I be pardoned for suggesting that such a frontier can be drawn only on a racial basis? You will notice that the yellow colouring which I have used to indicate the Mongoloid strain, and those countries in which the dominant race is Mongoloid, extends over most of Prussia, all of Hungary, Bulgaria, and the territory of the Turks. I think no one will deny, least of all anyone who has confronted Saxon—that is, Aryan—troops on the Western Front, that these four races were the backbone of the hatred, and hence of the murderous fighting, against the Aryan in the war. It also accounts for the wonderful and spontaneous goodwill with which the Moroccan Berber, the Circassian of the Caucasus, and the fair-skinned Punjabi and Pathan, came in on the side of their Western Aryan cousins and against the call of religion. Few people realize that the best districts of the Northern Punjab lost as big a percentage of their voluntarily enlisted men killed in the war as any English county did under conscription. Ulster and New Zealand are the only countries to which we can look for a rival to this record.

In the autumn of 1917 great things were happening in Central Asia, the home of the Mongoloid races. The Prussian, having been spurned by Islam and the Aryan wanderers of the plains, remembered Attila, his forbear, and harked back to the Steppes of Turan, to the "White Wolves" of Hulaku, and the monstrous iniquities of Chingiz Khan before the Arab brought a Moslem civilization to Samarkand and the heart of Asia. The "Drang nach Osten" changed its line from Bagdad and Basra to Batum, Baku, and Bukhara. Many

* The map illustrating his lecture which Captain Blacker showed on the screen has been reproduced at the end of vol. lviii., No. 3, of the *Geographical Journal* for September, 1921.—A. C. Y.

factors favoured the enemy. Enver Pasha dreamed of collecting sheep-skinned hordes of Kipchaps, Kirghiz, Kalmuks, and Usbegs; enemy agents worked in the cities of Afghanistan against our ally, Habibullah, the King of Kabul, and by a strange chance nearly 200,000 prisoners of war of the late Austrian Army, the bulk of whom were Mongoloid Magyars, had been behind the barbed wire in the camps and cantonments of Russian Turkistan. The revolution had added a fresh element of disorder and instability, and the Soviets had released this great mass of trained soldiers. Some of them had found their way to Afghanistan, where Osmanli drill-sergeants and Magyar gun-layers lent a new skill to Afghan regiments and batteries. Three Missions were sent to investigate and find out what effect there might be on the Great War from these unchained forces that dreamt of sweeping through the passes of the Hindu Kush to the rich valleys of India, as so many of their forbears had done in days gone by. My own regiment has had for the last eighty years a very strong connection with mid-Asia, and there are no cities of consequence from Lhasa to the Caucasus and from Mombasa to Moscow that have not seen a man of the Guides. Those who have read of the doings of the Légion Étrangère at Sidi-Bel-Abbés will at once call to mind the many Central European princelings who have served in the ranks of that gallant regiment that lent a share to make the glory of "La Première Division de la France." In the same way not a few scions of ruling houses of Central Asia have worn, and wear, the silver shoulder badges of the Guides. Among these was even the heir in direct line of the mighty Tamerlane, who but a few years ago wore the sword of a simple trooper.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the most easterly of the three Missions that plunged into the blue of Turan in the spring of 1918 included as the military element sixteen soldiers, of whom all but two were Guides.

Our first objective was Kashgar, where the Mission came under the command of Sir George Macartney. The men remembered that their regiment had, as far back as 1873, had the honour of carrying the Queen's badges into the unmapped and unexplored North, into the region that later became part of Russian Siberia—I mean the vast fertile province of Semirechensk. There were many interesting things to see during our long march over the snows to Gilgit, to no less hospitable Hunza, and over the Pamirs—where, again, we met a detachment of the Orenburg Cossacks, loyal troops in the midst of a sea of Bolshevism—to Kashgar. We spent a few weeks in the city, and it became very clear that distances were too great and veracity too uncommon to collect from there any useful information, and to transmit it to India in time for it to be of service in influencing the progress of the Great War.

At last we got permission in June to go ourselves to Tashkend, the seat of the Turkistan Soviet, that had already spread the Red Terror into the flourishing cities of Bukhara and Kokand, whose narrow streets had run with the blood of thousands of the faithful. Kolesof, the "Anacharsis" Klootz of Turkistan, had massacred many thousands by machine-gun fire in Kokand alone, and had razed the city to the ground by shelling with high explosives. Those of you who have seen the ruins of Ypres must multiply it by four to get an idea of what the Bolsheviks did to Kokand in February, 1918.

We reached Tashkend early in July, after a journey devoid of any special incident; for, indeed, it was so unexpected to the various Soviets that we passed *en route* that they did not quite know what to do with us, and characteristically allowed the matter to lapse into the hands of the Headquarters of the Turkistan Republic. Not only were the politics of Central Asia in a very curious state about then, but our own relations towards and dealings with the various revolutionary councils could scarcely be described as clear-cut or crystallized. Officials of our Embassy, including the gallant Captain Cromie, had been massacred without reparation or amends in Petrograd. British troops fought the Reds in Archangel, and a British battalion had found its way into Siberia. Moscow was wholeheartedly hostile to the Western Allies, but Tashkend was cut off from Moscow by a loyalist army of Orenburg Cossacks that operated on the Steppes by the Sea of Aral. Another Cossack army held the Reds between that Sea and the Caspian, whilst a handful of the Semirechensk Voisko carried on a guerrilla warfare near the Mongolian frontier. In the south-east, in the rich valley of Ferghana, the descendants of the Emperor Baber fought, and still fight, any parties of the Red Army who left the protection of their armoured trains. In the south-west, in the deserts of Transcaspia, a wonderful motley assemblage of Tekke Turkoman, sheep-skinned, bonneted, and red-cloaked, dissolute mechanics from the big railway workshops of the Central Asian at 'Ashqabad, and a handful of loyalist Russian gunners and troopers, mostly officers and N.C.O.'s of the old imperial army, had driven the Reds out of their city and established touch with Sir Wilfred Malleson's Mission and the tiny British force in North-East Persia. This was the second of the British Missions that I have alluded to, whilst the most westerly one was the biggest, under Major-General Dunsterville. Its arrival and its doings on the Caspian and in Baku have been admirably described by him in a recent book. The Bolshevik Soviet was somewhat bewildered, then, when we unexpectedly called upon them in their Foreign Office. To us, fresh from the Western front, it gave a sort of Alice-through-the-Looking-Glass feeling to walk in the streets through a jostling crowd in field grey. Of course, we had to explain that we were semi-official to a remark-

able degree, and that our reasons for being in that capital were other than they really were. The "Lewis Carroll" sensation was intensified in their case when three companies of the 19th Punjab Infantry, plus some of the 28th Light Cavalry, irrupted into Turkistan in response to an appeal from the Turkoman General, Oraz Sardar, and the 'Ashqabad Provisional Government. This was a great surprise to us, and we hardly believed it when the Foreign Minister confronted us with the news. Needless to say, the Reds forthwith decided that we were English spies, and talked very pointedly about blank walls and firing-parties. Fortunately the atmosphere of bewilderment was very much on our side; though wireless messages came from Lenin insisting on the early "liquidation" of all British and French officers, and though the extremist element, headed by the Hebrew Tobolin, kept on clamouring for our blood, yet the Soviet as a body were too nervous of their own security to take a step which they thought would certainly compromise them with the British Government. The five fronts on which their armies then fought were as much as they could do with, and they had reasons to think that the Afghans too might attack them. And hence they preferred not to be too ready to fall in with the fiery demands of the despotic Duumvirs of Moscow. The Punjabis, on whom fell the brunt of the hard knocks, as is always the case where Punjabis are concerned, caused us intense joy by tumbling the Red Army into rout every time they met them. This joy, however, had to be concealed from the Soviet during our various interviews with them, and with some care. In fact, we had to disown our very good friends the 19th by explaining to the Soviet that they were not His Majesty's troops at all, but pensioner and discharged Hazaras, Afghan subjects who had left the British service and were fighting purely as mercenaries for Denikin and the Mensheviks of 'Ashqabad. The Soviet, by no means a highly educated or enlightened coterie, accepted this explanation with some misgivings, since their imagination boggled at the idea of a British Mission coming to an enemy capital in the same week that a British army invaded the country, as well it might. We remembered what a tangled web we weave when first we practise to deceive, as one of the hospital trains back from the 'Ashqabad front, just after the action of Artik, brought, wounded, to Tashkend—amongst others—a well-educated Austrian *Gefreiter*. He, with his patrol, had been fallen upon by a patrol of Punjabis and smitten hip and thigh. Though much out of breath, he had managed to escape with a mental picture of the Punjabis' ragged khaki uniform and accoutrements that bid fair to give the lie to us when the Soviet heard about it. Tobolin, the leader of the party of the Two Tribes that unfortunately were not lost, himself ran a newspaper called *Sovietski Turkistan*, and in his leading articles he permitted himself to use some deplorable

expressions in our regard, whilst he clamoured for that firing-party to attend to us. This made the matter of the Austrian lance-corporal somewhat ticklish, but personal contact with him, sweetened by some hardly got beer and palm oil, caused him to go back on his story, and we breathed again.

Anyone who did any fighting for the Bolshevik in Asia was almost certain to be an Austrian or a Magyar at this time. The riff-raff of the bazaars who made up the numbers had no use for anything like fighting at all. The very few Regular officers and N.C.O.'s of the old army, to their credit be it said, held aloof from it; the hundred or so self-styled Cossacks of Semirechia, who had gone renegade, filled up their time posing picturesquely and singing charming part-songs.

The strong Israelitish element had all its time taken up with "indispensable" departmental and political work beyond the reach of Punjabi bayonets. Meanwhile we continued our parleying with the Soviet, and one of our principal tasks was to see that the many thousands of pounds of baled cotton that had accumulated for the last three years on the wharves and sidings of Turkistan did not reach Germany. Cotton is an indispensable raw material for the manufacture of propellants, and there is no doubt that had this vast store come into the hands of the enemy the collapse of the Central Powers would have been postponed. We came into contact with many curious comic opera matters during our stay in Tashkend, but with none less so than the half-dozen secret societies that plotted in true South American style to upset the Government, though, of course, we had no direct concern with these.

First-hand acquaintance with the Red Army, especially when they were fighting against our own men, was a curious business. One of their crack regiments, composed of ex-convicts from penal settlements in Siberia, was called the Zhlobinskis, and this was hastily withdrawn from the Northern front to endeavour to stay the victorious progress of the Punjabis, who had already driven 5,000 excellently gunned and equipped regular Austrian soldiers back nearly to Merv. This regiment, even in the Red Army, who were by no means Little Lord Fauntleroys, were conspicuous for a cut-throat ruffianism. They detrained at Tashkend and marched straight to the White House, the seat of the Soviet, demanding 5,000,000 roubles. The haggle that followed was seasoned by a few pistollings, but at last the regiment got the money, on condition of going straight on to the South-Western front. They agreed, but changed their mind at the next station south of Tashkend, and marched back to prise away another 5,000,000 from the frightened Soviet. At last they met the Punjabis, but were cut to pieces by them at the battle of Kaakha. The regiment ceased to exist and their commander died of his wounds. During the second visit one of the Zhlobinskis

resolved to call upon the War Minister to discuss some small grievance with him. The private took with him a stick-grenade to emphasize his arguments, and a bellyful of vodka to lend him eloquence. Quite understandably, the Minister was not at home, and the secretarial staff projected the visitor down the steep stairs. When the broad road seemed to have settled down a bit, he found himself sitting on the edge of the high pavement with his fevered brow against a cool white-stemmed poplar, the grenade still in his hand. An unoffending aborigine was sweeping the road a dozen yards or so away. He decided not to waste the bomb, so withdrew the pin and hurled it at the scavenger. The bomb burst, and the stick came back and, with poetic justice, killed the thrower. The native remained unscratched. The Red Army of 1918 did not suffer from a too pipeclayed discipline.

We now found ourselves up against the difficulty of getting the information that we had gathered back to where it would do most good; many messengers volunteered to go to Kashgar, had taken our money and slipped our communications into their great jack-boots without tangible results. An attempt to employ another means had failed, coming literally within exactly half an inch of costing a very useful life; and as it was clear that we could now do nothing more in Tashkend towards winning the war, there was nothing to keep us there any longer, however picturesque our adventures might have been had we stayed.

After some remarkable interviews between us and the Soviet, Sir George Macartney secured a special train, which took the Mission back to Andijan. We had been nearly three months in Sovdepia, and even at the last the Reds attempted to bring off some treachery against us.

In about twenty marches, moving by little-known short cuts, we had got back to the Chinese Pamirs, where most of my soldiers, after some adventures of their own, had managed to concentrate. This was already the end of September, and news of an impending German break-up in the West had filtered through to Central Asia, and clearly German emissaries and agents in North Afghanistan were on the move. We got news at Tashkurghan, early in October, that an armed party of some 200, comprising Germans, Turks, and Afghans, had moved across from the Russian Pamirs down the wild, menacing gorge towards Yarkand. I gave chase with eight of my own men and seven of the Orenburg Cossacks, and after three days and three nights of scrambling over cliff faces and marching in almost untrodden valleys, found that we were on the wrong trail. Meanwhile, Sir George had pushed on towards India to get the results of the Mission's work into the hands of the Foreign Office as quickly as possible. My little force overtook him a couple of marches farther

on, at a place called Dafdar, where we struck a fresh trail. I received orders to follow this trail leading up into the desolate, uninhabited valley of the Oprang, which abuts on to the greatest mountain barrier in the world. If I came on any definite signs I was to follow the trail and capture the party that made it, since it was quite clear that no one but enemy agents would use such a route. Sir George continued towards India, and I exchanged the Cossacks for half a dozen deep-chested, iron-limbed men of the Hunza Scouts. We pushed on into the snow, a long march, to a couple of tiny tents, where the wife and sister of a wandering shepherd awaited the gathering of the flock to proceed to more genial climes at lower levels. That night the two girls confirmed the midnight passage, seven or eight days before, of fifteen mounted armed men. We followed them over the very difficult Ilisu Pass in snow-storms, over ice-bound rock faces and snow-fields, which showed unmistakably their tracks; then two days down the long valley to the great Raskam. We crossed the swollen river with very little to spare, and then began a series of mighty passes. We crossed six of these in four days, only one of them under 16,000 feet, whilst one or two had snow cornices on their summits and verglas on their slopes that killed not a few of our wretched ponies. We had no kit beyond the clothes the men stood up in, their sheep-skin cloaks and saddle blankets, plus a small bag of flour and tea in their wallets. Some of our bivouacs, waterless, fuelless, and devoid of grazing, in holes scraped in the snow, in open valleys at 14,000 feet, were unforgettable. If the Pamirs are the "roof of the world," here in the crags of the Kuen-Lun we were certainly amongst its chimney-pots. At last, having seen no living thing for several days, we dropped down from the great height into the jungle and brushwood-filled valley of Kulan Aghil, where we found human beings and secured a bag of flour and a sheep in time to stave off starvation. Better than this, even, we had caught up four days on the enemy, who, strangely enough, instead of marching straight into Yarkand over a single pass, turned sharply to the eastward into the great unknown, unmapped valley of Chup. We followed them, exchanging our worn-out ponies for the fresh animals of a few Kirghiz whom we met. We had long been down to one meal a day, cooked on flat stones, at the short midday halt, since we had neither time nor food for more. From Chup we climbed over a great weird pass into the equally unknown valley of Bulun, where was a hamlet whose inhabitants told us we were now only forty-eight hours behind the pursued. Unfortunately, here we lost the track, and had to make a nightmare march through unexplored Shaksu and Pokhpu over four great unmapped passes, of which I never even found the names of two, since we met no human being in all those great valleys and deep, cliff-walled canyons. I estimate that we climbed up

and down something like 30,000 feet on that memorable day. At the little clump of deserted huts in the waterless valley, named after the Archangel Gabriel, we were still off the trail. Now we were in the sandy foothills. Our first drink for forty-eight hours was one we got from a woman at Ak-Masjid; it was one of those drinks one never forgets. A very few hours' sleep and then a night march by compass over the sandy range into the next valley of Tiznaf. Then a long nightmare march through the whole of the day and the whole of the night took us to Khan Langar, where we again met the mighty Raskam River where it debouches into the plain. Again a few short hours' halt, and very early next morning we found ourselves in a garden before the walls of the ancient city of Yarkand.

A few discreet inquiries, and then we were mounted again and, trotting quickly through the narrow alleys, burst through the great iron-studded gates of the Badakshi Sarai. The first rays of the morning sun gleamed on the men's bayonets as they rushed in, and nearly a hundred extraordinarily startled Afghans put up their hands above their heads with unwonted suddenness. It only remained to search out the ones we wanted, and to divest them of their Austrian rifles. To our great disappointment, there was no German amongst them, but, at the same time, there was no doubt as to the true character of the gang. Three days later we had handed over our prisoners to the Chinese Tao-Yin in his Yamen at Kashgar, and were hastening back on our Arctic march over the Pamirs in December.

I remember how it gave me a queer little pang to hand over Aryan Afghans, scoundrels though they might have been, fettered and manacled, into the hands of Mongoloid Chinese, however cultivated, *instruit*, and courteous, as these were. We lost no time over the return march. It was so cold that once in the middle of the day on the highest part of the Pamirs a leg of mutton, which my young orderly had tied to his saddle, froze solid so that fragments broke off it.

After the men had had a very few days' leave, and after I had handed over the results of my work in Tashkend to the General Staff at Delhi, I received orders to proceed with my detachment to the Merv front. This meant a railway journey to railhead on the frontier in Persian Baluchistan, and then an 800-mile march over the deserts and rocky, barren mountain ranges to the Central Asian Railway, which we struck at Dushakh, the scene of the Punjabis' victory in September. We were soon at the front at the eastern edge of the Merv oasis, where matters had settled down into a sort of static warfare. The force had expanded and regularized itself a little from the band of insurgents it had commenced as, and it was a pleasant change to find oneself on the correct side of the front. The Reds summoned up enough audacity to attack us during

February, but their troops were driven back to Repetek, only a very short distance from the Oxus, by a well-timed counter-stroke delivered by one of the companies of the Punjabis. Orders from home forbade us to follow up the Red Army any farther, or to go on and complete the conquest of Turkistan, which was far from being beyond the bounds of possibility. For this reason a counter-revolution which was brought off in Tashkend by one of the many secret societies we had known, under one Osipof, came to nothing, and the resulting Red reprisals cost a great number of lives.

We had time to look round and familiarize ourselves with the ruins and historic buildings that told us the story through the ages of the wonderful city Merv, that had been the queen of the world. Besides this, it was a great pleasure as well as a duty to get acquainted with the Turkoman, and especially with their courteous and venerable chiefs. The Turkoman are a fine race, and genuinely pro-British, besides being devoted in their allegiance to their Crown. A great deal could have been done had this spirit of loyalty been developed and utilized on the right lines. My non-commissioned officers were utilized as instructors to the regiments of Turkoman horse and battalions of foot levies. They carried out their drills actually upon the position itself, and once they were even bombed by a Bolshevik aeroplane whilst at work. Armoured trains were the mainstay and pivot of manœuvre of either side, since they alone could carry guns through the sandhills and dunes of the desert. Naturally, great ingenuity was displayed on the subject of mines. First of all, the line would be blown up in the rear of the enemy's armoured train by a half-squadron that had to make a long and very thirsty detour for several days to carry out its object. Then a contact mine showed better results. This was countered in the usual way by placing an empty truck to take the force of the explosion. The attack put on their thinking-caps and devised a mine that only responded to the tender caress of something that weighed several tons, such as a gun-truck or a locomotive. This was a trump card that took several tricks, till the eyes of both sides became so wonderfully penetrating that they could spot a mine, however well concealed, several hundred yards away in time to stop the train. Then a truck loaded with old rails was pushed in front of each train to take the bump, and this was countered by a mine with a delay-action fuse. But the most effective of all was the last act, in which a half-squadron removed the rails in front of the Bolshevik train and spiked them down again an inch farther apart. They did this over a length of a mile or so and retired, covering up their traces. Next time the Bolshevik train advanced the engine-driver found himself bumping along the sleepers though his wheels were still between the rails.

Another item of interest was the development by irrigation of the

Tsar's estate that formed the Canal Colony of the Murghab at Bairam Ali. Two or three of the men of my regiment actually held land there as tenants of the Tsar, and the chances and changes of war had taken them back over scores of weary marches to their own homesteads. The men were Hazaras, and incidentally it was to my platoon that the honour fell of realizing Kipling's dream, put into the mouth of the British soldier of the 70's and 80's, of cooking their camp kettles in the palace of the Tsar, where they were billeted.

In April we were relieved by Caucasian troops of General Denikin's Volunteer army, and we marched back into Persia. The officers and N.C.O.'s of this force were good enough, but the men were nearly all Armenians. For some time they held on to our old position, whilst we considered the defence of Persia against the Bolsheviks. During April the commander of the force and myself paid a visit to a very marvellous place, Kelat-i-Nadiri, the wonderful natural stronghold of the Emperor Nadir, the forbidden fastness of Khurasan. Very few Europeans have ever set eyes on this remarkable place, ringed round as it is by a natural perimeter of some 50 miles of 1,000-foot cliffs, inaccessible even to goats. Four or five narrow gorges and rough tracks give access to the interior, which we were able to photograph. Curiously enough, it is held by a tribe of Turks, whose Khan holds the fief in return for defending this frontier against Turkoman raiders. We had only been inside a few days, and were still wondering where Nadir could have concealed the £7,000,000 worth of treasure from Delhi that he buried somewhere in this stronghold, when we were surprised by the sudden outbreak of the Afghan war and hastily recalled to Headquarters at Meshed to cope with another "Alice through-the-Looking-Glass" situation; for our tiny army was on the wrong side of Afghanistan altogether, and confronted by a whole Afghan division. Fortunately, perhaps, for us, no important military operations took place, though my N.C.O.'s again occupied the place of honour on the actual Afghan frontier and in close contact with the Afghan outpost troops. This lasted for several weary months, and in the meantime the rest of my detachment was employed all over Northern Khurasan mapping the wild, rocky valleys, in many of which no surveyor had yet set foot. During this summer of 1919, next winter, and all the next summer, two or three N.C.O.'s managed to map some 14,000 square miles, a good proportion of which was previously unexplored.

In July and August the Mensheviks lost Bairam Ali and Merv, and were retiring towards 'Ashqabad. In October they lost this city itself, thereby laying bare the head of the only metalled road really fit for wheel traffic that leads from Turkistan into Khurasan. The Afghan war was no longer of importance, and so my detachment was moved back again to the north to watch the road and 160 miles of

rugged frontier-line in view of the incursion that the Bolsheviks were certain to make into Persia.

That winter was a very busy one; the topographical portion of my little force was busy through blizzard and snow-storm, mapping the many inhospitable valleys, inhabited by unruly tribes, over which fighting was likely to, and eventually did, take place. The remainder of the men, expanded by some fifty-six Kurdish levies, patrolled the stern rocky defiles of that rugged frontier, and caught many a hireling Armenian and greasy Tabrizi Turk carrying packets of Red leaflets, Communist brochures, and propaganda of every sort, into Persia. In January a Mission from Moscow came to Tashkend with the avowed intention of making the Red Terror still redder. Over the doorway of Army Headquarters of the first Red Army in 'Ashqabad was inscribed the legend: "Our Mission is to Set the East in Flames." There is no doubt that the Jew, Broido, his colleague, Eliava, and the puppet General Novitski kept this ever uppermost in their minds. And Tashkend became a happy hunting-ground for revolutionaries of all sorts, hailing from any slums between Stambul and Calcutta. An interesting poster that one of my men secured depicted a typical John Bull with projecting teeth, ginger whiskers, and bull-dog pipe, in white drill clothes and sun helmet, standing at the tail of a plough, into which were harnessed three naked, emaciated Dravidians. He brandished in one hand an automatic pistol and in the other a nagaïka. Russian, Turkish, and Persian texts told us that this is how the English plough in India. Even the stodgy and unimaginative Turkoman laughed immoderately at the sight of it. Meanwhile crowds of deserters of every nationality came to us, expanded by refugees of both sexes, escaping from the Red Army and the Red Terror. Our tiny village received Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Wallachs, Slovenes and Italians, Rumanians and Poles, Austrians and Germans, Tatars, Kalmuks, Kirghiz and Circassians, Usbegs and Armenians, Georgians and Cossacks, but the bulk were Magyar officers and soldiers. It was no little problem to deal with this extraordinary influx of almost every European nationality; but well as I thought I knew the Punjabi, I was surprised at the wonderful capacity with which my trusty Awan, Subadar Waris Khan, and no less capable Squadron-Dafadar-Major, Ahmad Shah, dealt with the situation. One would think that they had spent half their lives in feeding, clothing, dry-nursing, and cheering up the moral of a dozen Central European nationalities. My own task was to separate the sheep from the goats—Bolshevik spies from bona-fide prisoners of war and genuine loyalists. In February the Red Army took Krasnovodsk from the remnant of the Volunteers, and the Reds were now free to devote their attention to their incursion into Persia. The volatile Afghan, however, provided a diversion which kept them

busy for some time, and drew off their troops to Panjdeh and the neighbourhood of Khushk. The Red Political Department could no longer get spies to go to Persia, as the ever-active patrols had made it too dangerous, so they adopted another method. Remembering the modicum of success that the puppet Kuchik Khan had had in Gilan and Madanderan and the subsidies that another Red assembly had sent to "citoyen" Tippoo, they bethought themselves of one Khuda Verdi Sardar. He was a disgruntled petty Kurdish chieftain who found himself in 'Ashqabad. Before our troops and the Cossacks had come into Khurasan he had plied a flourishing trade as the Macheath of those parts, and the deprivation of his means of livelihood gave him a grievance against the forces of law and order, and made him a ready tool to the hands of the Soviets. They supplied him with several hundred magazine-rifles, some machine-guns, and even, it was said, a couple of quick-firing mountain guns. These convoys were run through the precipitous mountain paths of the Kupeh Dagh; and though my N.C.O.'s managed to keep in touch with their movements, they were not allowed to interfere, since the matter was justly considered an internal Persian affair. This gun-running was spread over April, May, and June, and during the latter two months the Red General Staff, now manned by conscripted ex-Regular officers, made every effort to concentrate a full division of their troops on the metalled road that led through Bajgiran into Persia. This would give them scope to utilize their armoured cars, heavy artillery, motor-lorries, and aircraft, to which we had nothing to oppose. The insurrection that they reckoned Khuda Verdi Sardar would be the leader of was intended to divert our troops and our attention from the decisive point. Meanwhile, the influx of deserters and refugees, often frost-bitten and in the sorest straits from hardships and privations, continued. We even got a young Serbian officer from Siberia, who explained to us the real meaning of an extraordinary piece of Bolshevik propaganda. After Kolchak's retreat from Perm, the Reds secured a number of prisoners, whom they paraded in the streets of Tashkend in British uniforms, with the lion and unicorn on their buttons, and in our web equipment. The Soviet newspapers made great play with this in their leading articles, calling the thousand or so captives "Tommy from Tomsk." The ignorant Sarts and other natives of Turkistan, and even the Austrians and Russian mujiks who saw them, seemed to believe they were British soldiers. The Serbian lieutenant explained that they were Mongol Buriats (Kara-Buruts) of the Menshevik Army clothed and equipped by the Allies, and their ignorance of any language but their own had helped the Bolsheviks in this very typical piece of deceit. In February a quaint incident happened which threw some new light on Kurdish temperament. The Kurds were always very friendly and cheery towards us,

no doubt from a subconscious recollection of their Nordic ancestry. One morning I was riding round the outposts with the new commander of our Kurdish Mounted levy, accompanied by three or four men. Half a mile outside a Kurdish village that we had often visited we came upon, sitting under a boulder by the side of the track, a bevy of some forty comely Kurdish maidens, all in their very best Sunday-go-to-meeting clothes, and coiffed with the snow-white voluminous headgear that reminds one of the ladies of a medieval court. When we got closer they suddenly sprang out at us with loud cries, seized our bridles and stirrups, and hauled us off our horses by main force. My old mare, who would have eaten the face off any man who ventured to lay violent hands on her bridle, took it all quite calmly from her own sex, doubtless being in league with them. When the din and chatter subsided it was explained to us that this was a Kurdish New Year custom; for the first ten days of the year the ladies chased the men of the village out to roost on the hill-sides, whilst they picquetted the track, seized any stranger and made him pay his footing. This little ceremony over, we were allowed to go upon our way. My patrols and mapping-parties seemed to fall into a good deal of this sort of thing during this ten days. By a strange chance one morning a patrol, under a N.C.O., a Yusafzai, who had served in the Salient during the first gas attack, came suddenly round a corner to encounter a little tattered, footsore group in *bleu horizon*. They saluted the N.C.O. with a "Bon jour." He replied in the same language, which rather startled them. Then it turned out that these were several Algerian and Moroccan soldiers who had escaped from the Reds, and of whom three had served in the Salient in April, 1915, alongside our own division.

In July the Afghan menace had been lifted from the Soviet, and Khuda Verdi Sardar's insurrection was allowed to blaze out. One of our young subalterns and the doctor were visiting a detached post some 22 miles over a rough, rocky pass from Headquarters, and that evening they found themselves in the midst of one of the gun-runnings of Khudu, as we now called him familiarly and for short. A night scuffle was the sequel in a narrow defile, in which the subaltern became the first casualty. In a few hours the whole countryside was in flames, and every ragged adherent of the chief's that owned a three-line rifle or a Territorial Lee-Enfield hurried on his shaggy stallion to join the standard of his leader. My little patrols, dotted all over the countryside, moving boldly, yet warily, through hostile valleys, concentrated at Jiristan, where the subaltern's skirmish had taken place. Hustled by their two or three Regular Pathan N.C.O.'s, our Kurdish levies, who to a man remained true to their salt, soon had the ramshackle buildings put into a state of defence. In a day or two they were reinforced by a couple more

troops of the levies under Captain Cassim Shah. Meanwhile the Red Army and a Pan-Turk force called the "Adalat" continued to mass in our front. Jiristan was invested by several hundred of Khudu's Kurds, and the Red Army waited for an opening. Soon the garrison at Jiristan began to come to the end of their scanty stock of ammunition. An overbold young Punjabi Lance-Dafadar attempted to bullock his way through the defile with a couple of new loads for them, but lost nearly all his half-dozen men in the first close-range burst of fire from the well-armed Kurds. The arrival of a company of young Punjabi infantry reinforced the company of Indians already at outpost Headquarters, and made things a little easier. It was urgently necessary to relieve Jiristan. On account of the imminent advance of the Soviet forces, none of the unwounded British officers could leave Bajgiran. The platoon commanders of the Indian company had no experience of hill fighting, while those of the newly arrived Punjabis did not know the country; so it fell to my Wurdi-Major (Assistant Adjutant), a very capable Pathan officer of the Kuki Khel, to lead the tiny relieving column.

He disposed of a couple of sections of Kurdish horsemen as his cavalry; his artillery was represented by a Lewis gun and its team of Regular Khatak gunners, and a bombing squad of my own men of the Guides; the infantry of the force was a platoon of Mongol-Hazara foot levies, whilst his chief of staff was a scarred Yusafzai N.C.O. of few years but many campaigns.

They marched out in the afternoon of July 12 at twenty minutes' notice. A very few miles brought them into the mouth of the valley and in touch with the enemy, and here they picked up the wounded of the first patrol. Covering their advance with a Lewis gun, bayoneteers and bombers cleared spur after spur and knoll after knoll, driving the Kurds up the cliff-walled valley before them. The situation was very ticklish, since just over the frontier a few miles to the Wurdi-Major's right was a force of 4,000 under Turkish officers, adherents of Enver Pasha; to his left was the tumbled, tower-dotted valley of Ogaz, the hotbed and nest of the revolting tribesmen. The Pathan officer accepted his risks and devised a new method of minor tactics to deal with the new situation, for picquetting on the recognized frontier plan was clearly impossible from the very few men he had in his force. Instead of this he used his Lewis gun from alternate positions on each side of the valley to fire obliquely across it, and to cover the advance of his bayonet-men to drive the Kurds successively out of their sangars.

They fought and marched all that night, and it was early morning before they could snatch a few hours' sleep under cover of their sentries, still within shot of the enemy on the slopes of the pass itself. Next day they made good the pass and spent many weary hours,

panting and sweat-stained, hunting Kurds out from crannies and behind rocks on the western slopes. Very early next morning they stormed the little thatched village of Namanlu, Khudu's headquarters, and the flames of the burning homesteads lit up the narrow valley. The youthful Khatak Lance-Naik, who commanded the Lewis gun, judged a range of fully 800 yards to a hair, and a well-aimed burst of fire from his weapon killed seven Kurdish leaders, the mainstay of the besiegers. This broke the back of their resistance, and in a few minutes the mounted men of the relieving column were galloping across the mile or two of level fields that separated them from Jiristan. The bold action and excellent tactics of the Wurdi-Major were a death-blow to the revolt; most of the young Kurdish chiefs who had followed him now came to us and explained naïvely how they had been led astray. Khudu fled to his castle, buried away in the rugged hills near Shirwan, where he was surrounded by Persian troops. Red Army Headquarters were sorely disappointed, and got rid of their spleen by means of rude messages to Khudu. The whole affair was irregular in the extreme, and a charming change from the formalism and cut-and-dried, unskilled warfare of the Western front. I went out myself a day or two later with a little column that was sent to clear up any remains of opposition in the Bardar Valley, and as we came back after a long day at dusk I tramped through a Kurdish hamlet at the head of a wild-haired platoon of Khataks; suddenly a tall, sheep-skin-bonneted Kurd happened suddenly upon us from round a corner. He looked at me and ejaculated in Turkish: "Janum! Aghri Bashi!" as one who should say: "Good Lord! Here's the head brigand himself!"

Very soon Khudu fled to 'Ashqabad, and we received orders to evacuate North-East Persia. We said good-bye to our many friends, Persian, Kurdish, and Turkoman, sorrowfully, for we had had many pleasant times together, even if events had been somewhat exciting, and even if we did not always see eye to eye with everybody.

The last stage in our wandering was the march of nearly 800 miles back to the single-line railway that now traverses Western Baluchistan. We soon forgot the scorching desert and the weary climbs over the devastating and barren backbones of the mountain ranges of Khurasan in the fleshpots of Quetta.

During its three years' campaigning my little detachment had marched nearly 9,000 miles in many remote regions of Central Asia. Yet I think that it is not overstating the case to say that all these hundreds of marches and these visits to strange cities and to uncharted valleys and lung-racking climbs, over untrodden ice-bound passes, was yet but an infinitesimal portion of the great and unsung work that has been carried on by the Corps of Guides incessantly and unremittingly during the last eighty years, and one that is not fully

known to most officers of the Frontier Force itself, let alone those new arrivals into the higher spheres that "know not Joseph."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before asking you to join in the vote of thanks to Captain Blacker, I should like to know if there is anyone present who wishes to make any observations, or ask any questions on the very interesting lecture we have just heard.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. YATE: I would like to say a word or two. Our lecturer mentioned Kalát-i-Nádiri. He said, I think, that during the last 150 years very few Europeans had been inside it. As I happen to be one of those few, I thought I would rise for a moment. I would also like to refer to what ought to be interesting to this Society—that is, the reference the lecturer made to the Mission to Kashgar in 1873. The only member of that Mission who, to my knowledge, survives to-day is General Sir E. F. Chapman, K.C.B.,* Colonel-Commandant R.A., for a number of years a member of this Society. Two others—General Sir Thomas Gordon and Colonel Sir Henry Trotter—have been Chairmen of Council, and therefore this Society is well associated with the first British Mission sent from India to Kashgar. At that time an adventurer named Yakub Beg was endeavouring to substitute Mahommedan for Chinese rule in that quarter, and we, in view of Russian ambition, thought it politic to send a Mission up to him. That was the Mission of 1873, under Sir Douglas Forsyth.

With regard to Kalát-i-Nádiri, I had in June, 1885, left the Afghan Boundary Commission near Herat, having to go back to India via the Caspian, Caucasus, Constantinople, and the Red Sea. I was very anxious to see Kalát-i-Nádiri, which from a physical point of view is a singular formation, and is also of great interest as being associated with the great conqueror Nadir Shah. I stopped a day or two with Abbas Khan, who was then the British agent in Meshed, and to him I said: "Do you think it is possible for me to get admission to Kalát?" He replied: "I will give you an introduction to the Commandant." With that introduction I marched up about 80 miles, camped outside the Arghawan Shah Gate, and sent it in to the Commandant. To my great satisfaction, I received a most polite invitation to come in. I went in, and spent three very pleasant days there, my host, Sartip Abdullah Khan, a Persian of rank and wealth, treating me with all courtesy and kindness. I wandered freely everywhere, and was specially taken to the northern slopes of this curious natural fortress, which is an oblong of about 50 miles in circuit, and from thence I looked down upon those plains of Central Asia of which Captain Blacker has set before us some excellent pictures. My description of Kalát-i-Nádiri appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on

* I have since heard from General Sir E. F. Chapman that Colonel John Biddulph is also living.—A. C. Y.

August 27, 1885, and is buried there. Lord Curzon of Kedleston refers to it, as also to those of MacGregor, O'Donovan, and Valentine Baker, in his "Russia in Central Asia" and in his "Persia," vol. i., p. 123, where he tells us of his great disappointment at not being admitted to see the interior of this Nature-built fortress when he went there in the autumn of 1887. Lord Curzon's description of Kalát-i-Nádiri in his "Persia" (vol. i., chap. vi.) is *the* best. It is, of course, a compilation from all available sources. Among descriptions by travellers who have visited Kalát, that of MacGregor is the most thorough. The rough plan which I put in my "Afghan Boundary Commission" map of 1886 gives, I think, a fair idea of the place.

The CHAIRMAN: If nobody else wishes to address the meeting, I think I shall meet with your full concurrence in expressing our very best thanks to Captain Blacker for the interesting lecture which he has given us. He has related episodes and adventures which I think none of us had heard of before, and the results of which, and the manner in which he undertook them, reflect the very greatest credit on himself and the small force under his command. (Applause.) I wish to present our most hearty thanks to Captain Blacker for the lecture he has been good enough to give us this evening. (Renewed applause.)

This ended the meeting.

# THE QANUN AL ARADHI*

By E. B. Howell, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

The words "Qanun al Aradhi" mean the "Law of the Lands," or the "Land Code." They are Arabic words, and I prefer to pronounce them in the Arab fashion, as they became familiar to me in that guise during the four and a half years which I spent in Iraq (Mesopotamia). For the last two years of that period I was in charge of the Revenue Department, which is directly concerned with the land and the public revenue derived from it. The name is an Arabic name, but the legislation to which it applies is, of course, Turkish legislation. The object of my paper is, then, to give you some account of the Turkish land and land revenue system as we found it in Iraq, and to draw some comparisons between it and the system which has been evolved in British India.

"Land revenue," I know, has a repellent sound about it, and those who have turned out on a cold winter night to listen to a lecture on so unattractive a subject deserve at the outset the cordial thanks of the lecturer. Land revenue seems to us a thing altogether remote from our daily lives. We inhabit an island richly endowed with minerals. Harbours abound upon our coasts, and our geographical situation offers almost every imaginable advantage. Our national prosperity therefore depends, or perhaps I should say, used to depend, mainly on the sea, on coal, on shipping and on commerce. Comparatively few of us own any portion of the earth's surface or take any direct part in the cultivation of crops. Amongst us the days are wellnigh forgotten when the State, or the Sovereign as the embodiment of the State, was the universal landlord, although, as you are aware, there are those in our midst who desire to restore that condition. For the present, however, it is not so, and it is not the proceeds of any land tax that form the sheet-anchor of our national finances. Our position in this respect is exceptional, and for us it requires a strong effort of the imagination to conjure up a picture of conditions as they are in countries where the State takes the direct interest of a partner in all the operations of agriculture. It does so in most Eastern countries, and the revenue systems of those countries have therefore an enormous political importance. "The Political

* Lecture given before the Central Asian Society on December 8, 1921, Lord Carnock in the chair. Before Mr. Howell commenced his lecture, the Honorary Secretary, Lieut-Colonel A. C. Yate, read out the names of sixteen new members who had that day been elected to the Society.

Officer," as it has been written, "may reserve his suavity for princes; the magistrate has terrors only for the breakers of the law; the wisdom and integrity of the judge are of little direct benefit to those who have sense enough to compose their differences at home. But the tax-gatherer, like death, knocks at every door, and upon those who control that unloved functionary chiefly depends the stability of every Oriental administration."

Nor is this true only of Oriental governments. It is generally admitted that an oppressive taxation, of which the chief burden fell upon the land, largely contributed to the decline and fall alike of the eastern and western empires of Rome. Now we know surprisingly little about the details of the finances of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, but we do know that land revenue was one of the chief heads in their budgets, and we do get a glimpse here and there of their methods. The Greek historian Dio Cassius (A.D. 487) records that the dictator Julius Cæsar, shortly before his death, passed an order for the commutation into a fixed money payment of the tithe and other dues paid upon their lands by the provincials of Asia, and so he "got rid" (ἀπήλλαξεν), or perhaps only hoped to get rid, of the tax-farmers, whose operations during the later years of the Republic had been such a crying scandal. It may be remarked in passing that this order is possibly by no means unconnected with the Dictator's murder. For the Roman nobility, the honourable Brutus prominent among them, were much mixed up with the tax-farming syndicates, and made huge sums of money out of the connection. Be this as it may, Cæsar gave the order, and was duly murdered. A period of civil war followed upon his death, in which, as we may suppose, effect was not given to his benevolent intention. It fell, therefore, to Augustus, after he had consolidated his position, to carry out the scheme, and thus "It came to pass in those days that there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed. And this taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria." The passage means, of course, not that taxation and Christianity came simultaneously into a world previously unacquainted with either, but that the birth of the Founder of Christianity happened to coincide in time with what in Indian official parlance we should call "the first summary settlement of land revenue" in the province of Syria.

Whether it was devised in this settlement or not, in later times the Romans took as the unit of assessment a thing which they called the "jugum." Jugum is the same as our word "yoke," and from the point of view of the settlement-officer it meant a piece of land—

> "As much as two strong oxen
> Could plough" . . .

not from morn to night, but in the ploughing season for the crop under

preparation. Consequently, though for assessment purposes a fixed unit, in terms of land it denoted a variable quantity, according to conditions of soil, climate, and crop. I mention this jugum because I believe that it may turn out to be a good instance of the tenacity of life with which land revenue arrangements seem to be endowed. The jugum was the basis of assessment in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, Iraq among the rest. When these regions passed from beneath the eagles to Persian or Parthian hands I believe that the jugum survived, and that the Persians translated its name by their word "juft," which has the same meaning. This name later on the Turks in turn took over, and the curious may find what seems to be the Roman jugum defined in Art. 131 of the Turkish Qanun al Aradhi, which deals with the "chiftlik." In parts of Iraq the equivalent Arabic word "fiddan" still preserves the same meaning, and is still used as a basis of assessment.

I am inclined to admit the identification of the Roman jugum with the Turkish chiftlik and the Arab fiddan, and I believe that in other points too the Turks have preserved the nomenclature and the practice of Rome and Byzantium. But I am aware that identification on grounds of resemblance can easily be overdone. Similar problems give rise to similar solutions all the world over, and because two civilizations have found the same solution it does not always follow that one borrowed from the other.

The general resemblance between the Roman and the Turkish systems of land tenure is, however, I think, too close to be ascribed wholly to coincidence. The basis of both systems really consists in the recognition of varying degrees of limitation on the plenary right of ownership and the division of land into classes accordingly. The classification of lands on this basis which is given in the introductory articles of the Turkish Qunan corresponds very strikingly with that set forth in the second book of the Institutes of the great Roman lawyer Gaius, who lived in the third century of our era. At one end of the scale under this classification we find land in which the plenary right of ownership has been recognized by the State as vesting in an individual proprietor. The Turkish law, using the terminology of the religious law of Islam, calls such land "mulk"—*i.e.*, "property" in the full sense of that word. Mulk land remains subject to a land-tax, unless specially exempted, and on the failure of all heirs reverts to the treasury. Otherwise the State has nothing to say to it, and the proprietor can dedicate, sell, pledge, mortgage, or give it away at his pleasure. The next class is that which the Romans called "ager publicus" and the Turks "aradhi amiriyah," or, more shortly, "miri." The title of the State originates by conquest, and the bare ownership—Roman "dominium," Turkish "rakbah"—remains vested in the State. A private person can only acquire a right of

possession (Latin " possessio," Turkish " tasarruf ") in such land. Under the Roman law he could not acquire this by user as against the State. Under the Turkish law he can, unless he is incautious enough to admit " that he took possession of the land without any right when it was vacant." He has to pay the State dues on such land, and these consist of " the tithe and other taxes." If without valid excuse he leaves his land uncultivated for three continuous years, his right perishes, but he has the option of buying in again at a figure below the market price. With the permission of the State, a possessor whose right has been recognized, though he cannot sell, can " vacate " for a price paid by another party, who thereupon receives the vacated right. He cannot mortgage, but, with official permission, he can make temporary transfer of the land to a creditor, either for a fixed period or until the extinction of the debt. Foreclosure may result from this, and the temporary transfer may become permanent. Without official permission the possessor cannot dig clay for bricks or tiles, build, plant trees or vines, or bury a corpse. I do not say that all these rules applied also to the Roman possessor, but parallels here and there can be traced. The table of succession prescribed in the Turkish law for the devolution of rights in State land is altogether different from that laid down in the religious law for succession to private property. The circle within which a right of succession is recognized is narrower, and on the failure of heirs within the prescribed degree the State resumes, though it recognizes what is in effect a sort of right of pre-emption on favourable terms—first, to those who have inherited from the deceased mulk trees or buildings on the land; second, to co-possessors; and third, to inhabitants of the same locality who are in absolute want of land.

The third class of land is land in respect of which a dedication to some pious use has been made. The Turks call this " mauqufah," and it corresponds pretty closely with the Roman " ager sacer " or " religiosus." With regard to mauqufah land it must be noticed that the dedication may be in respect either of the State right in it or of the individual right, or both. No dedication purporting to affect the State right can be made except by or with the permission of the head of the State, whether the Roman Cæsar or the Turkish Sultan.

There remain two classes under the Turkish law—" aradhi matrukah " and " aradhi mewat "—for which the Roman law had no especial names, though it recognized them both. Aradhi matrukah comprises two classes—(1) lands left for public use, such as highways and the like; (2) the common lands of a village or other community. Aradhi mewat means dead lands, and is thus defined as " land which is not in the possession of anybody and has not been left for the use of the public. It is such as lies at such a distance from village or town that the loud voice of a person from the extreme inhabited spot

cannot be heard—that is, about a mile and a half to the extreme inhabited spot, or a distance of about half an hour." According to this standard the bulk of the land in Iraq would be correctly classed as mewat, but the term is not in general use there. The definition, I may say, is taken from the translation by Mr. F. Ongley, which has the merit of having been made direct from the Turkish original.

With regard to such things as mines, quarries, salt-pans, fisheries, and forests, the Turkish law generally follows the Roman in classing them as State property. As under the Roman Empire, they are usually worked by contractors to whom some sort of monopoly is often given. Pastures, too, are as a rule treated as public property under both systems, and a grazing tax at so much a head is recovered from those concerned on account of animals using them.

In Republican times the management of the Roman ager publicus was in the hands of the censors, who fixed the rate of assessment by what was called their "lex dicta." This held good for the "lustrum" for which it was made, a period which very early came to be set at five years. In the eastern provinces, where Greek was the official language, *κάνων* was the accepted equivalent of lex, and it is perhaps not unduly fanciful to detect the same term still surviving in the title of the law which I have chosen as my subject to-night. One may even catch an echo of it in India in the name "qanungo," the title of a class of land revenue official. Under the early Roman Emperors, when the administration was at its best and direct collection was the rule, the public domain throughout the Empire was carefully surveyed and mapped and a record of rights of some kind was made. The office where these documents were preserved was known as the "tabularium Cæsaris," which I should like to identify with the Turkish "daftar khaqani." This organization postulates a numerous and reasonably efficient staff, which, as we know, was maintained throughout the Byzantine period, though its efficiency naturally varied greatly at different epochs. The Byzantine bureaucracy, in so far as it was non-military, survived the Turkish conquest, and the French scholars Rambaud and Diehl have shown that in many cases Turkish official titles are but translations of those borne by their Byzantine predecessors.

There is another respect in which the revenue systems of the Roman and the Turkish Empires are alike, and that is the constantly recurring tendency to farm the taxes. There are some taxes which, I agree, can best be recovered in this way, but resort to it in connection with land revenue seems to be the hall-mark of a weak executive, served by officers whom it does not trust, and perhaps further perplexed by currency fluctuations. No other origin than pure coincidence need be sought for this resemblance. But it is instructive to note how strong is the tendency under both empires, as also under

the Moghal Empire in India during the period of its decline, for those who begin by making themselves responsible for the land revenue, whether mere tax-farmers or not, to develop into territorial magnates.

Enough has, I think, been said to indicate the main source whence the Turkish system is derived. But it is not the sole source. During the period while the Turks of various hordes were rising to the mastery of the Middle East, they were exposed to another and a wholly different set of influences. They enter the limelight of history pagans. They hold the stage as the bulwark and the champions of Islam—a position which, as we have cause to know, they have not even yet wholly relinquished. Now, the religious law of Islam, perhaps through the influence of the famous schools of Berytus (Beirut) may, in administrative matters, be under some obligation to Roman models. But it is animated by a wholly different spirit, and naturally the two influences have often been in mutual opposition. In matters connected with the land, as in other spheres, the Turks have found it convenient to develop ever more and more the Qanun, the law of human origin, which can be amended when necessary, and to circumscribe the activity of the other. A third influence, which has been increasingly potent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, is the desire to imitate modern Europe. France especially has been taken as a model, and the Turkish Land Code, like the Majallah or Civil Code, the Administrative Code, and the Code of Commercial Law, all of which appeared during the middle part of the century, owes a great deal, at least in form, to the Code Napoléon.

The Land Code consists of the Land Law itself, which was promulgated in 1858, and a number of subsidiary enactments, which appeared during the next twenty years. The objects aimed at in this body of legislation seem to have been fourfold:

1. Security to the cultivator—the keystone of agricultural prosperity.

2. The resumption by the State of the right and duty of direct dealing with all possessors of State lands.

3. The removal, so far as State lands are concerned, of distinction between Moslem and non-Moslem revenue-payers.

4. The more efficient protection of State rights and interests in such lands, in the management of which the State, acting through the Ministry of Tapu, obviously contemplated taking an active part.

Before we proceed to such further examination of the code as is necessary, a word of explanation as to this Ministry of Tapu is unavoidable. As we have seen, the Turks inherited an elaborate Department of Land Records from the Byzantines. Sultan Suleiman, called the Magnificent (A.D. 1520 to 1566), whose reign marks the zenith of the Turkish Empire, and who was in his day beyond question the most powerful ruler in the world, caused this machine to be thoroughly

overhauled and reorganized. At the same time he divided his dominions into twenty-nine governments, over each of which he set a Pasha, and each of which, in matters affecting the land at least, he allowed to maintain its own separate Qanun-Namah, or book of customary law. At the same time something like a survey was carried out, and the chief archives of the Doomsday Book thus brought into being were housed in the head office of the department, the Daftar-Khanah, at Constantinople, while documents of less importance were filed at the local centres of administration. The instrument thus prepared by Suleiman naturally shared in the general decline of Turkish institutions which followed his demise, but two attempts to revive its efficiency and to codify the divergent Qanun-Namahs had already been made before that with which we are now concerned. These had proved abortive, and it was hoped that on this occasion, by placing the department in the charge of a special ministry, better results would be obtained. An Arab official of my acquaintance has suggested that the name of the ministry may be derived from the Greek τόπος. We know that in the eighth century A.D. the word τόπος was used to denote a man's "holding" of land. For it occurs in this sense in the famous Νόμος Γεωργικός, or Farmers' Law, which is attributed to that century. Nevertheless, the derivation seems to me fanciful. But whether it is correct or not, the connotations of the word Tapu are of such importance that I shall quote to you in full the article *sub verbo* "Tapu" in Redhouse's Turkish Lexicon:

"*Tapu.*

(1) An act of homage.

(2) Acknowledging oneself a vassal, accepting conditions of service of a lord, sovereign, or government, especially by the acceptance of a feudal fief.

(3) A title-deed of a feudal fief, formerly given to a yeoman by his superior lord.

(4) A title-deed of the freehold of a landed estate delivered by the office of the Ottoman Doomsday Book (Daftar-Khanah).

(5) The fee payable for a title-deed.

*Tapu-sanade.*

A copyhold title-deed of a landed estate held under the Ottoman Sultan or Government.

*Ardh tapu.*

Crown land held by any proprietor in fee simple.

[*Ardh*] *ba tapu.*

(Land held) under a title-deed delivered by the Daftar-Khanah authorities.

*Haqq tapu.*

(1) The rights and conditions on which crown land is held by a proprietor.

(2) The fee for delivery of a title-deed called Tapu."

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I hope you all clearly understand what Tapu means. At any rate, if you do not, you have the satisfaction of reflecting that you know as much about it as Redhouse.

The Land Law is not long. It contains 132 articles, divided between the introduction, which we have already examined, and three books. Its provisions are not applicable to mulk land and true waqf land—*i.e.*, mulk land dedicated to pious uses. The first book deals with State lands in four chapters:

1. Concerning the Nature of Possession.
2. Transfer of State Lands.
3. Devolution of State Lands by Inheritance.
4. Escheat of State Lands.

Book II. similarly treats of land classed as matrukah and mewat. Book III. contains miscellaneous provisions. I have already given to you the substance of Book I. To what I have said I have now only to add that the declared object of the statute, read in conjunction with the other Acts above mentioned, is to compel every occupant of land or immovable property, whether he is a plenary owner of mulk or a possessor of State land, to take out a proper Tapu sanad for what he occupies; second, that no penalty is attached to the omission to comply with this direction; and third, that since ten years' undisputed occupation of State land entitles the occupant to a title-deed free of charge (other than departmental fees), there seems to be no great need for anyone to bother himself about getting one. I would also say that while the Imperial Government declared the statute to be in force from date of promulgation throughout the Ottoman Dominions, the Minister of Tapu, by subsequent departmental circular, interpreted the articles relating to the acquisition of title by ten years' undisputed occupation to be inapplicable, both as against the State and as against a third party, in Iraq. Finally, the articles which restrict the powers of the possessor of State land have all been repealed by subsequent enactment, though this was not generally known in Iraq. The Act therefore, although no doubt an honestly conceived attempt to improve conditions of land tenure, has to a great extent in practice broken down. So far as Iraq is concerned, it seems to have had just enough spark to enable it to backfire, as well-intentioned measures so often do in the East. For Iraq it would have been better if it had broken down altogether and at once, for its operation there has wrought incalculable mischief. I should explain

that, although this is not stated in the Act, the intention seems to have been that a Tapu sanad should not be issued until all disputes regarding the land in question had been finally settled, and that a sanad, once issued, should be indefeasible. Whether such a result would have been possible elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions—or, indeed, in any old inhabited country—or not, I cannot say. But in Iraq it was lunacy to expect any such thing. Conditions in Iraq may be summed up in one word—Instability. In the first place, the two rivers on which the life of the country depends are and have throughout the historic period been in a state of highly unstable equilibrium. Subject to a violent annual flood, heavily charged with silt, they run upon causeways of their own making, and the minimum of human interference, with a view to irrigation, is apt to have the most devastating consequences. Over a great part of the country agriculture is no less dependent on flood protection than on irrigation, and flood protection is an arduous and risky business. Even where irrigation and flood protection have been combined, the agencies of salt and silt are at once let loose to set a period to the term for which the same lands can be cultivated from the same canal. Altogether apart from floods and from the chances of the river wholly changing its course, agriculture is also unstable by reason of the numerous pests to which it is exposed. Again, there is economic instability. The Arabs, before they settled in Iraq, had been nomads for generations, and they have never wholly divested themselves of the nomadic instinct and habit. There is no pressure of population on the soil. On the contrary, the possible cultivators are all too few for the limitless acres capable of cultivation. Finally, there has always been political instability. It was not until the middle of the sixteenth century that the Ottoman Turks conquered the country, and they have since more than once had to dispute with Persia for its retention. At times of crisis they have been able to put strong forces into the field, but they have never held the country in such strength as to be irresistible. They have never made any real attempt to break the power of the Arab tribes, or to render the tribal system obsolete by securing life and property without it. Iraq is a country of vast spaces, unmapped, unregistered, and unknown. Here with their herds of camels and their flocks of sheep dwell the Arabs, often at war, and always at feud, amongst themselves. Here and there they scratch the ground to grow sufficient wheat and barley for their needs; but the cornlands of one year are often the desert of the next. There are thousands of date-growers, it is true, and a few favoured regions where rice can be grown. But even here the water-supply is always shifting to and fro, and its movements provide a never-failing bone of contention, should other causes of quarrel fail. Numerous small towns dotted about the country furnish the markets which the tribesmen need; but these are scarcely

less ephemeral than the cultivation. They spring up in a season, and flourish for a generation, perhaps, or less. Then the river takes a turn and goes elsewhere. Forthwith the town is deserted, and in a few years its buildings of mud and brick have crumbled away into shapeless mounds, strewn with broken pottery, and only to be distinguished by the expert eye from the ruins of ancient civilizations. Still, if the Turks had had the wisdom to confine the operation of their precise code to the towns and to the belt of gardens by which most towns are surrounded, and if they had provided a skilled staff to work the system, it might conceivably have been of benefit. As a matter of fact, for reasons which we shall examine shortly, it did not work well anywhere. But in the tribal area such a system was unworkable, and any attempt to introduce it was bound to do harm.

It is Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872, who is generally held to blame for the trouble. Midhat was an honest man, a sincere patriot, and, as you know, a prominent reformer of the doctrinaire school which was in his time predominant in Turkish politics. He had received instructions to reduce the amorphous province to which he had been appointed into shape more in conformity with the symmetrical arrangements which the Turks were then endeavouring to introduce elsewhere. He saw that instability was the curse of Iraq, and, acting according to his lights and with the best intentions, he addressed himself to the correction of the evil. He saw that the tribes lacked security of tenure and had no motive for cultivating properly. He tried to benefit them, and he thought to do so by setting up the Tapu system. But the Arabs had good cause for looking on the Turks and the gifts of the Turks with suspicion. They feared conscription or some other plan for their undoing, and, with few exceptions, the tribesmen took no advantage of the facilities held out to them. What followed is instructive. The tribesmen held aloof. But others were not so backward. Rich merchants and other men of influence of all kinds, by the payment of small sums, which did not always find their way into the Treasury, obtained title-deeds for huge tracts of agricultural land, with boundaries and areas filled in pretty much at their discretion, regardless of the tribes who all the time remained in actual occupation of the soil. Townsman and tribesman in Iraq had for generations been at daggers drawn, and the creation of a large class of possessors of State lands from among the townsmen, with a perfectly good legal title, which relegated the tribesman to the position of a tenant at will, greatly increased the mutual hostility of the two classes. But the tribes lacked cohesion, and were not always ready to be openly defiant of authority. The Shaikhs, their natural leaders, were often bought with the land, and the purchaser was often content at first to bide his time. When the authorities were complacent and strong enough to enable him to

recover the share of the produce due according to custom to the landlord, he recovered it or something less. When times were adverse, he would come to terms with the tribal Shaikh, to whom very often he would lease his rights for a fraction of their nominal value. In some areas, such as the neighbourhood of Basrah and Baghdad, where the tribal system had disintegrated, as it does in the vicinity of large towns, the new possessor was generally able to consolidate his position. Here we found a large class of "absentee landlords," very few of whom had ever visited their properties. They were content simply to lease their rights from year to year to middlemen and enjoy the proceeds. Elsewhere, as at Hillah, the tribal element had remained strong, and the possessors, with a few exceptions, who laid themselves out to be good landlords and develop their estates, had existed only on sufferance. On the lower Euphrates events took a slightly different turn. The Muntafiq tribal confederacy, who dwell in that region, had for centuries acknowledged as their overlords a widely ramifying family of Saiyyids from Mecca, known as the "aulad Sa'dun." The tribesmen, who are Shias, while the aulad Sa'dun are Sunnis, had long been content to follow their banners in war and in peace to acknowledge their existence, as being of superior clay, by a not overburdensome tribute from the produce of their fields and gardens. The Sa'dun took out Tapu papers for the tribal lands in the same fashion, and perhaps to some extent in the same spirit, as some men take tickets for a lottery. They bought them in books a hundred at a time. Thus armed, they began to enlarge their old customary dues into a claim for the full fifth, which is the landlord's share in that region. This the tribes would not stomach. They rose in revolt and drove the Sa'dun from their lands. But the rising, in true Arab fashion, was neither simultaneous nor universal. Not all the Sa'dun were expelled. Those whose good sense outweighed their rapacity—a temperament rare amongst Arabs—remained unaffected. These are still living amid the tribesmen, out of whom, in one way or another, they get enough to keep them in considerable state. The rest were at the time of the British occupation of Basrah still in exile—a thankless, thriftless, unamiable crew, who continually brandish their precious Tapu deeds under the noses of all comers, and have only two ideas in life—camels and "mellakiyah" (rent).

In the Mosul Wilayat, which, I suppose, must be counted as forming part of Iraq, the Tapu system did not have such dire results. Conditions there are not so unstable as in the Land of the Two Rivers. But even there it did not benefit the peasantry, as it was intended to do. On the contrary, there, too, persons of influence were able to secure deeds giving them rights of possession in large tracts of country, where they had no real claim, to the detriment of the peasantry. But at least the chaos which now reigns in Basrah and Baghdad has been

avoided. It is difficult to imagine anything more fantastic than the condition to which the Department of Land Records has been reduced in the two last-mentioned wilayats. I have myself seen one Tapu-sanad of a date-garden on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab near Basrah, whose western boundary was given as the Red Sea. The Syrian Desert, without further definition, occurs quite commonly as a boundary. I have seen another deed whose boundaries are stated as follows: "On the north, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the west, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the south, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the east, 'al hor' (the marsh)." The marsh in Southern Mesopotamia, it must be remembered, advances and recedes many hundreds of yards every season, and apart from these seasonal variations most marshes in the country are on the move, so that one thing at least can be predicted about them twenty years hence, and that is that, wherever else they may be, at least they will not be where they are now. Fraud as well as ineptitude is often glaringly apparent. According to the Turkish law, if the boundaries of an estate are mentioned in the title-deed, and can be identified, a misstatement as to area in the document is of no consequence. This provision, sound enough in itself, has produced fraud in two different ways. A document will either cite as boundaries insignificant natural features or other things incapable of identification, and will give the area as many thousands of donums. This means that the Tapu clerk was of an accommodating disposition, and was for a consideration willing to add ciphers *ad lib.* to the figure of area without enhancing the price. Alternatively the boundaries will be given as well-known and unmistakable landmarks, lying many miles apart from one another, and the area will be given, with an appearance of great exactitude, as three donums eleven dhras, say two acres one rood and five perches. This means that the clerk, or some higher official, was stupid and knew nothing about the natural features, so he was content to accept the area given as the basis on which fees should be paid. Nevertheless, these preposterous documents, unless fraud can be proved—which, in the absence of the Turkish officials who committed it or connived at it, is practically impossible—are treasured by all the most influential men in the country, and generally regarded as being unassailable in law.

Even State lands where no possessor has been recognized present problems of their own. For the tribal occupants recognize amongst themselves a sort of quasi-right to these, which they call sakaniyah (squatters' right). This they are accustomed to sell or mortgage amongst themselves. The transactions are quite equitable, but were never recognized by the Turks.

So much for estates affected by the tribal question. Now let us turn to the small properties and holdings in the regions near the towns, where better results might have been expected. I quote from a report written by the Baghdad Land Settlement Officer early in

1920: "One reason for the non-existence of Tapu documents is clear. The holdings are so small that the expenses of procuring a sanad bear an altogether unreasonable proportion to the value of the holding. One owner of a small plot, which he valued at Rs.200, pointed out that it would cost him Rs.51 to get a Tapu sanad. If this is the state of things to-day, it is scarcely surprising that in Turkish times sanads were not taken out for small freeholds. In spite of this there is one instance of a document for a single tree. But the absence of documents is not the only difficulty. Disputes are not more frequent where they do not exist than where they do. Even where no dispute exists and the facts of the case are quite clear, the Tapu sanads can rarely be made to fit the ground. At the outset it is necessary completely to disregard the points of the compass as given in the sanads. Even the river itself is more often than not incorrectly placed. Nor is the description of the boundaries much better, owing, in the first instance, to the absence of any attempt to keep them up to date. If the eastern boundary of a property is shown in a document 100 years old as 'the garden of Haji So-and-So,' it will almost certainly be the same in the most recent document, though Haji So-and-So's garden has changed hands many times in the interval. A striking instance is one of the Dabbaghiyah sanads, which gives the boundaries as follows: 'East, North, West, and South, Haji Hassan Beg's garden.' Unfortunately, no one now knows which is the garden of Haji Hassan Beg. Nor does any attempt ever seem to have been made to co-ordinate the documents of neighbouring properties. A striking instance is to be found in the sanads for Jaibachi and the surrounding miri lands—Zuraijiyah, Hulaijah, Awairij, and Kuwairish. These all have Jaibachi as one of their boundaries, but no single one of them is mentioned in the Jaibachi sanad. Areas are practically never mentioned. Where mentioned, they are, without exception, incorrect, often to an incredible extent. Length and breadth measurements are sometimes given, but they, again, are always inaccurate."

Land tenure has detained me for so long that I have but little time left to give to the principles on which land revenue is assessed or the methods by which it is collected. A brief comparison between Turkish principles and methods and those evolved in British India may, however, be instructive. In British India, or at least in the northern provinces, with which alone I can claim some measure of personal acquaintance, the unit of land revenue administration is the "mauza," or estate. In the Punjab this is usually a village inhabited by a homogeneous community who cultivate the surrounding lands themselves. Historically these lands are State lands. The members of the village community originally had no right in them, except on condition of paying the land revenue, which meant theoretically the whole surplus after the cultivator had got his livelihood out of the land. What exactly constitutes a livelihood and how much surplus there

may be naturally becomes a matter for bargain between the representatives of the State and the cultivators or their representatives. Hence the use of the word "settlement," and hence also the middleman, who comes between the "raiyat" and the "raj," and contracts for the cultivation of the lands pertaining to one or more villages for a fixed sum, making himself what he can out of the cultivators. As we have already remarked, during the decline of the Moghal Empire resort was had more and more to this practice of farming the land revenue. Those who entered into engagements of this nature were called "zamindars," a name which, strictly speaking, does not mean "landowners" in our sense of the word, but persons responsible for the payment of land revenue. These zamindars were naturally persons of very various origin. I quote from Mr. Briggs, an officer who wrote a book on "The Land Tax in India," published in 1830. "We find the hereditary descendant of a line of princes," says this authority, "the feudal Thakur or Baron, the district collector, the farmer of the revenue, the elderman or mucuddum of the village, and member of the village copartnery, each styled zamindar." On this chaos entered the servants of the Honourable East India Company, their minds quite naturally obsessed with the English notion of private property in land. They found zamindars, and they left landowners, subject always to the obligation of paying the land revenue. The land revenue demand under British rule has been reduced from the whole to half the net assets, and as a matter of practice assessing officers are generally careful to leave a considerable margin even on this standard when framing their calculations. The demand, on this basis, is assessed as a lump sum on the "mauza," or estate, as a whole; and where no intermediary has been recognized, an agreement is made with the representatives of the cultivators, usually the "lambardars," or headmen of a village, for its due collection and payment. In theory each member of the cultivating fraternity is jointly and severally responsible with all his fellows for the payment of the whole sum assessed upon the estate. But the individual share of each member is worked out with great nicety, and though the headmen remain responsible for the whole, in practice joint responsibility as against individuals is seldom, if ever, enforced. As may readily be imagined, it is not possible to determine what are the assets—*i.e.*, the surplus over and above the expenses of cultivation—without exhaustive inquiries and elaborate calculations. If the agreement is not with the cultivating body themselves, and the zamindar, now recognized as a landowner, takes what we may now call his rents in cash, the rental represents the assets, and the determination of the State demand is comparatively easy. But where there are no cash rents it is exceedingly difficult. A huge and ubiquitous staff of "patwaris" and "qanungos" (village recorders and supervisors) is kept to maintain voluminous and comprehensive statistics, and in the light of con-

clusions drawn from their figures the demand is revised from time to time by officers specially appointed for the purpose. Revision is periodic, and the intervals are usually from twenty to thirty years. A record of rights for every estate is maintained, but it is a record of possession intended primarily for the use of the revenue collector, who must know from whom he is to recover. It is not, and does not profess to be, a register of title. Questions of title are decided by the civil courts, and entries in the record of rights have to be altered, when necessary, in accordance with the decision of the court. Where an intermediary has been recognized and has become a landowner, it is not uncommon to find certain classes of cultivators protected against him by the grant of what is known as an occupancy right, which means that the occupancy tenant cannot have his rent enhanced except by order of a revenue court, and cannot be evicted as long as he pays it. All this seems to presuppose four things:

1. The State is prudent, and by giving security to the cultivator and time for him to reap the reward of any improvements which he may make, aims intelligently at keeping the land in good heart.

2. The State is moderate, and endeavours to make others follow its example.

3. The State is prepared to take infinite pains to arrive at an equitable assessment and to distribute the burden of the assessment when made as fairly as it can.

4. It has complete confidence in the integrity of the officers by whom the system is controlled.

A great deal of the credit for these things is no doubt due to the British administration; but though they have improved, they did not create. The model was there before they came, and the same principles upon which they work may be discerned underlying the revenue policy of Akbar. The Turkish Empire never had an Akbar, and the lack of such a one is painfully apparent.

There is no unit in the Turkish system. Their principles of assessment rest upon a decimal basis. How, when, and where the tithe arose is a question of acute controversy into which we need not enter. The prophet Muhammad gave it his sanction, though I have been unable to trace any reference to it *totidem verbis* in the Quran. However, having been accepted by him in practice, it thereby became the standard as between rulers and their subjects when both were followers of the faith of Islam. Before the hosts of Islam had gone very far on their career of conquest, however, statesmanship and religion came into conflict. Their commanders began to give protection to those who submitted but did not embrace the faith. This, naturally enough, they did upon terms, and it was felt as only proper that non-Moslems admitted to protection should pay at a higher rate than the faithful. Hence arose the imposts known as the "kharaj" and the "jiziyah," which, we may suspect, in provinces that had been

Roman, were only the Roman "census soli" and "census capitis" under a new name. Then emerged a further difficulty. If land passed from the hand of a non-Moslem to a believer—a thing desirable in itself—the State lost revenue. It was therefore decided that land once liable to the kharaj remained so, whether it passed into Moslem hands or not, and no less a person than the Caliph 'Umar himself declared that this applied to all lands in Iraq. So the Turks, while preserving a nominal respect for the tithe, had pretty good grounds for weaving embroideries upon it, and this they proceeded to do in a fantasia which makes the uniformity of the Indian half net assets seem very cold and tame by comparison. It should be premised that there is no agricultural land classed as mulk in Iraq, and that the Crown properties, the Aradhi Sanniyah, latterly known as Aradhi Mudawwarah (Transferred Lands), are a law unto themselves. The late Sultan Abdul Hamid acquired enormous areas in Iraq as Crown land. His methods of acquisition were sometimes dubious, but once he had got an estate, he looked after it well, and his memory is highly venerated as a model landlord and father of his people—so differently do the same men appear in different aspects! When in 1908 the constitution was established, the revenues of these lands were transferred from the Civil List to general revenues, but the rates at which the tenants paid remained unchanged. This was never less than 40 per cent. of the gross produce, seed being advanced by the management, and the whole administration of these lands was a curious blend of rapacity and benevolence. Even apart from these, however, the assessment was sufficiently various. On lands watered by rain alone the Turkish Government demanded only the tithe, though towards the close of the nineteenth century they added to this a cess of 2½ per cent., the proceeds of which were to be devoted to the cost of public education and military equipment. They observed the same rule on lands irrigated by mechanical contrivance. From lands upon the Tigris watered by flow they took a double tithe, presumably one for the land and one for the water, though the proportion may perhaps have been derived from the share set aside by the early Caliphs for the Treasury from the spoils of war. On the Euphrates, or at least on that part of it commanded by irrigation from the Hindiyah barrage, on lands where no Tapu possessor was recognized, they seem to have recollected that the State as landlord was entitled to the landlord's share, one-fifth, as well as to tax. So they claimed 40 per cent., and sometimes got it. The basic fact seems to have been that in a country where land was unlimited and cultivators few; where the silt brought down by the rivers entailed heavy annual labour on the clearance of canals, and the annual flood necessitated even greater toil on the erection and maintenance of flood-banks, a population of nomadic origin could not be brought to cultivate at all, unless the cultivator, the fellah, were secured at least a half-share

in the proceeds of his labours. Thus two fractions became rigid—a "cold half" ("nusf barid") to the cultivator, and 20 per cent. payable as tax to the Government ("khums al miri"). The remaining 30 per cent. has always been debatable. Two-thirds of it, or 20 per cent. of the gross produce, are commonly regarded as the owner's share, whether that owner be a private person or the State or the Sultan. The remaining 10 per cent., with or without a slice of the owner's share, is the perquisite of the tribal headman, who alone was in a position to organize labour for common purposes and alone could give protection against aggression. This theory, I think, provides the key to the bewildering variety in the shares of the crop claimed in different parts by the State and the other parties concerned.

The amount to be taken by the State having been somehow or other determined and expressed in a vulgar fraction which everyone could understand, the game of collection could begin. Here, again, methods were multiform. There were few fixed rules, and I believe that most of those who took a hand in the game rather enjoyed it than otherwise. In Basrah and part of Qurnah the virtuous Midhat Pasha had placed a fixed assessment on the date-gardens at so much per jarib of planted land. That was fifty years ago. Many gardens have since come into bearing, and many have disappeared. But Midhat's settlement carries on unchanged. On the Middle Euphrates, when the Government was strong enough for officials to exercise authority without danger to their lives, it was customary to measure the crop. The system of measurement, as may be supposed, was not scientifically accurate. Each donum measured was then assumed to yield a fixed quantity. The yield assumed for wheat and barley was 500 kilos (half a ton) per donum. Allowance for variation of quality was then made, not by reducing the assumed yield, but by proportional deduction from the area measured. In practice this system, which was called "tajbir" (deduction), penalizes the good farmer. One tribe in this region once thought to steal a march on Government by cutting lengths off the measuring ropes. They worked the fraud successfully, but confessed to it afterwards when they found that it had the unexpected effect, not of reducing, but of greatly enhancing the demand. Another common method was that of estimation, like the Indian "kankut" or "tip." The crop was examined by impartial experts, who looked either at the standing corn or at the "baidhar," the heap upon the threshing floor, and calculated the gross yield from that. Given goodwill on the part of the experts, they could produce results of surprising accuracy by this method. But goodwill was not always there. I remember one estimator who came sobbing to the Political Officer to complain that he had been called "Isa bin Miriam" by a Shaikh whose bribe he had refused. When the yield had been calculated, the Government share, one-tenth, one-fifth, two-fifths, or whatever it might be, was put up to auction.

In the wheat belt of the north and east, where there are sturdy village communities, the revenue-payers themselves would often buy in the right to collect their own revenue. It may sound complicated, but in practice this was one of the least objectionable methods used. If the share was not auctioned, the threshing-floor was put under guard, and the corn, or what was left of it after the guard and the cultivators had come to terms, was divided when threshing was finished. Near Baqubah there were traces of assessment on the plough—the fiddan—as already mentioned. In Amarah the country was parcelled out into large tracts, and the right to cultivate, or at least to collect the Government revenues off, these, was auctioned for a fixed term, usually five years. As this was something approaching a fixed demand, it was called "muqata 'ah," and the name was naturally extended to cover the tract included in the agreement. Frantic bidding between rival Shaikhs was encouraged, and default was not rare.

A word as to the Turkish administrative system is necessary. Mosul was one wilayat or province, Baghdad a second, and Basrah a third. The Wali, or Governor, of Baghdad, where in the old days the ruling Pasha had been a very important personage, almost an independent potentate, as a rule, but not always, had supervisory control over his colleague at Basrah. Sometimes, indeed, the two wilayats were merged into one, with headquarters at Baghdad. Each wilayat was divided into a number of sanjaqs or liwas, each under a Matasarrif, and qadhas, each under a Qaim Maqam. There were smaller subdivisions inside the qadha. The Turkish mind apparently did not grasp the principle of subordination in civil administration. So local affairs pertaining to the headquarters of a wilayat were, in theory, dealt with by the Wali himself. It was as if, for example, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab were also ex-officio Commissioner of the Lahore Division, Deputy-Commissioner of the Lahore District, and Subdivisional Officer as well. If we are tempted to laugh at them for this, however, we should recall that until the time of Lord Dalhousie the Governor-General in India was also Governor of Bengal, and that the title Lieutenant-Governor owes its origin to this circumstance. To return to the Turks, the Wali, Mutasarrif, and Qaim Maqam, were executive officials corresponding in status with an Indian Lieutenant-Governor, Commissioner, and Deputy-Commissioner. Each had general control of the non-special branches of the Administration within his area, but to what extent they actually decided revenue questions is not quite clear. The Wali had a revenue official called the Daftardar as one of the departmental chiefs under his orders, and similarly the Mutasarrif or Qaim Maqam had a Mudir Mal under him; but the principles on which they worked are not known to me, or to any authority whom I have consulted. I am also not quite clear as to the functions of the Daftardar and his

subordinates. One thing, however, I am sure of about them, and that is that they had no official connection with or control over the Tapu office, which went about its mysterious business independent alike of the executive and the revenue, regulated only by circulars from the head office at Constantinople. Every executive official had a council, nominally elected, except for the official element, to assist his deliberations. But the council was purely advisory, and had little real power. The elections, of course, were an utter farce.

Land revenue proper appeared in the accounts under two heads—" muqata 'ah " (fixed or farmed revenue) and " 'ushr " (tithe). The latter was used irrespective of the real rate of incidence. Besides this there was a wilderness of other taxes, some of which fall within the scope of my paper, while others do not. There was the Wirgiu, or tax on immovables (not collected in Basrah); the Kodah, or grazing tax; the date tax; the fruit tax; the melon tax; the vegetable tax; the wood tax; the fish tax; the tax on reeds and mats; the tax on lime, bitumen, and other minerals, including salt; the tax on oil; the tax on liquorice, gall-nuts, gum tragacanth, and other forest produce; the tax on tobacco; the tax on brick-kilns, and others. There is also the whole subject of municipal taxation. But enough is as good as a feast. We will let them go.

The general Arab verdict on the Turks is "Ma 'indahum al siyasah." (They had no " siyasah.") Siyasah means all or any of those qualities which are apt to accompany intellectual quickness, and may include anything from sympathetic insight to that discretion that is the better part of valour. This may be true. They had their faults. From the economic standpoint their land and land revenue system was about as bad as it could be. But it was congenial to those who worked it, and those who lived under it did not dislike it. Apart from the Tapu nightmare, it was easy to understand and cheap to operate. Under Turkish administration, it must be remembered, Basrah and Baghdad brought in more than they cost, military charges included. Law and order of a kind were to some extent maintained, and when one reflects on the very exiguous means which they employed one must allow to the Turks a " siyasah " of a very high order, which enabled them to keep their end up year after year in so difficult an environment.

On the motion of the Chairman, a most cordial and appreciative vote of thanks was accorded to Mr. Howell for a lecture which exhibited exceptional research and knowledge.

NOTE.—It is regretted that the report of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's important speech commenting on the subject of Mr. Howell's lecture has not been received in time for publication in Part I. of the Journal for 1922. It is hoped it will appear in Part II.—A. C. Y.

# THE SOUTHERN KURD

By Major E. B. Soane, C.B.E.

Little known, feared by his neighbours, a slayer of Christians, merciless in the raid and morose in peace, a creature of lowering brow and dark thoughts, a hater of government and a lover of strife.

In a word, Kurd, with moustachios, cloak, and bloodstained dagger complete—the costume in which most travellers dress him for popular display. Such, indeed, may be his stage properties, but—like many an actor—he is not necessarily in real life the man he appears when made up for the part by imaginative writers who know him little or have but made his acquaintance as a brigand.

As a matter of fact, he is very much what his country makes him. Living among high and difficult mountains, in the deep valleys or up among the crags, in a climate intensely cold throughout a long winter and not unpleasantly hot in the summer, he has the characteristics of most highland people. Society is divided into nomad and settled peasant, the latter predominating in the south. Insecurity has always been a feature of such a life, raids from mountain to mountain one of its component parts. It would seem that comparison with Highland Scotland of the fourteenth century is the nearest parallel to Kurdistan of to-day, and the following disconnected notes and anecdotes may give an idea of some aspects of Kurd character and habit.

Apropos of the Kurd as brigand. When in late 1917 the British occupied Khaniqin (in the extreme south of Kurdistan) a number of brigand bands had to cease operating, to their considerable dissatisfaction, and the outcome of deliberation among them was a deputation to me of large-turbaned individuals in riding-boots, empty bandoliers, and heavy overcoats with scarlet lapels, who sat around the office in the dead silence which in Kurd society takes the place of the compliment-overture of neighbouring peoples.

With characteristic directness Mahmud Beg began:

"Years ago, when you were travelling light and rapid, you were my guest at my little castle of Kanibiz. You know, placed there astride the border, how well I lived. Persian pilgrims going to Baghdad, caravans of goods coming from it, and an occasional raid on a Turkish or Persian post for rifles and ammunition, kept me and

mine in an affluence which enabled me to have the pleasure of adequately entertaining the passing guest, and of sending him on his way with some souvenir.* You lived among us for some years; you know that the most honest and most hardworking section of the people were the brigands. They tilled their fields in peace, kept among the people the taxes the Government would have devoured, and brought in a steady stream of wealth. It was a hard life, but an honest one. Now the canons of your code abolish us, and I find myself looking upon a dismal future, made blacker by reflections upon my responsibility to the rest of the party here, my faithful assistants, some of whom are known to you personally. Since, then, you have made our trade unlawful and taken the bread out of our mouths, you are naturally the man to whom we turn first for assistance. We know that you will want irregular cavalry. We are cavalry, and prepared for any degree of irregularity you may order, and have therefore come to enlist. If it is necessary to refer to the General, you yourself can give the best testimonials on our behalf."

Which said, he lit a cigarette at his own mouth and handed it to me, and the company, after remaining in silence for some minutes more, filed out with no further word than *Khwafiz*, the Kurdish "Good-day."

I engaged them; their irregularity was comprehensive and sometimes embarrassing, but it is fair to mention that they ended by gaining the commendation of a critical G.O.C. It is also fair to mention that they returned to their ancient profession when the Arabs revolted in 1920.

Brigandage and outlawry are naturally closely connected. The one is not less worthy than the other. The brigand is a potential outlaw, and it is part of the outlaw's duty to be a practising brigand. Moreover, there are cases where a farmer, feeling himself oppressed or offended by the local government, may declare himself outlaw, and send a message to the local authorities advising them of the fact. Such was the case of one Mahmud Khidhr in 1920, who, having declared himself outlaw, satisfied tradition by formally appearing near the "county town" and carrying off a few worthless animals from a field. When in the course of his wanderings as an outlaw he needed supplies he raided in a neighbouring administrative division. This was quite in order, and should not, under the unwritten law, have been considered a crime. His indignation was therefore bitter when he was pursued across the border one day and attacked. He retaliated by falling upon some Kurdish troops escorting a convoy outside their own division, and thus established precedent for the widening of an outlaw's operations. In another case, an outlaw, who

* On the occasion to which he referred he had pressed upon me a mare, and a typewriter which had been consigned to a missionary in Persia.

had been kept on the move throughout the summer and autumn, pleaded for forgiveness as winter came on, and advanced as a reason the consideration that he had not consummated official outlawry because he had not raided during his term as a fugitive.

The outlaw's life is not a merry one, but at the same time he is fairly secure from capture. The countryside is with him; no village will refuse him a night's lodging and food and information of the movements of Government forces. With a perfect knowledge of the mountains and the extraordinary mobility granted him by his catlike little horse, he usually continues till he is pardoned. If, on the other hand, pardon does not seem to be forthcoming, he will, as winter comes on, descend to the plains and join one of the Kurd aghas there for the winter brigand season, hoping for better times next year.

Such is one class of the Kurd community, the class which has conferred the popular character upon the race. It is inferior numerically, and in parts like Southern Kurdistan, with a predominance of villagers as against nomads, the class is not important nor powerful.

Except for occasional outbursts of temper, the settled Kurd is usually a somewhat stolid fellow, suspicious of innovation, generous and humorous, little touched by the nominal Muhammadanism of the country, living a life centred in his own valley, but seldom selling the rifle which is hidden under the bedding. He is a very poor liar, from whom the truth is easily extracted if he talks at all—and he is the first to admit on discovery that he had tried to lie and failed. If, however, he is determined not to reveal the truth, he stands in a sulky silence and suffers punishment sooner than break it.

Murder is not regarded as a very heinous crime, and quite frivolous reasons are frequently sufficient for its perpetration. I have known of a man killing a total stranger in order to try a new rifle. Fortunately, this is not the usual method of testing firearms.

In the winter of 1919-1920 two men were snowed up in an outlying house of a hamlet near Sulaimani, the capital of South Kurdistan. The house contained the usual store of firewood and some flour, and the two existed till supplies grew low, but, like most humans in similar case, tiring of one another's society. Supplies decreased, the snow still fell, and the day came when the flour was finished and nothing remained of the wood-pile but two pieces of oak. The depressing prospect of cold and hunger worked them up to the point of mutual hatred, and one fell upon the other and succeeded in killing him with one of the last pieces of firewood. The murderer was then seized with remorse and the fear of pursuit (the latter probably predominating) and attempted to escape through the deep snowdrifts. His frozen body was found later near by. The villagers did not con-

sider this affair anything but rather unfortunate, and spent more sympathy on the frozen man than upon the murdered one, who, at least, died warm.

On the other hand, it is pleasant to be able to relate that on the occasion of another and very foul murder by a hedge priest of his mother-in-law, the man's own brother denounced him, and all the villagers who possessed information gave it readily and with a sincere desire to see punishment overtake the criminal. The attitude of the wife was peculiar in this instance. She escaped from her husband and, taking up a position on the main road, intercepted a passing motor-car and demanded a lift into town, where she reported the matter to the police, making a very clear deposition, subsequently proved correct. She accompanied the police to the scene of the murder on the mountain-side and assisted them to find clues, providing such evidence as convicted him at his trial. Her attitude had been one of quiet determination to avenge her mother. Once, however, vengeance was assured by the death sentence, she considered the matter ended, and insisted on feeding and looking after the prisoner till he was executed. She finally married one of his brothers.

Enough, however, of lugubrious reminiscences. Here is a story which shows at once Kurd simple-mindedness and love of a practical joke.

During the deepest snows of 1920, at Halabja in the extreme south, a party was seated round the fire chatting. Conversation turned on the large numbers of sparrows driven into the little town by the cold, and one present, an Englishman, gravely described how in his village the sparrow pest was combated. The principal man present was a local notable named Micha Agha. To him was detailed the method of sprinkling pepper upon stones. By this system the sparrow, mistaking the pepper for food, investigated it, and, inhaling some, sneezed violently and became insensible, when he could be destroyed. No one present had ever had occasion to study the habits of sparrows or to observe the effects of pepper upon them. It was not unnatural, therefore, for Micha Agha and his friends to make considerable purchases of pepper next morning, which they planted upon stones carefully cleared of snow, some of them, like the sparrows to come, sneezing freely. The trap set, the party retired to an upper window, and after watching for some considerable time, they perceived that they in turn were being watched with considerable amusement by the Englishman, with some initiated friends, and realized the nature of the incident.

Some months after, in April, the same party was again assembled. The Englishman, who occupied a little house adjoining that of Micha Agha, was complaining of the hordes of spring fleas in his house, which, as he said, had pushed him out of bed and stamped on him

all night long. Micha Agha expressed some surprise at this, as he said his house was singularly free from fleas—the reason doubtless being that the Englishman's was a very old building of poor brick.

"But," he said, "I am thinking of going to one of the other villages in a few days, and if you like I will try and get Qadir Agha, the landlord of my house, to let to you till I return."

This was arranged after some negotiation and the lease duly signed. The Englishman moved in one evening, after having bid farewell to Micha Agha. In the morning he arose—not awoke, he had been awake all night—and surveyed the floor and walls of his chamber, undulating with multitudes of fleas—surveyed also the tumbledown, tiny place he had exchanged for his new and larger one, and while ruminating upon his folly in being so precipitate, and vowing vengeance upon Micha Agha, was hailed by that same over the dividing-wall.

"Ha! Good-morning!" he beamed, "so we shall not be parted after all; I found I had to stay in Halabja, so took the opportunity to hire your empty house. If you find any fleas in your new abode, why not try a little pepper on the stones?"

No description of Kurdish life would be complete without mention of the status of women in Kurdistan.

Not only are women sometimes farmers and landholders in their own right and as employers, but are on occasion village "headmen." One such was actually appointed as a local official in 1918 in the Piran country, and carried on with great success. The status of the famous Adela Khanum of Halabja, who was publicly decorated in 1919, is renowned. Practically owner of Halabja, and largely responsible for its progress in recent years, she exerted her great influence in British favour in the rebellion of 1919, and after it was quelled received and entertained British Generals openly and with uncovered face (the veil is unknown in Kurdistan), and I recollect her gratified interest at seeing her photograph in *The Times* Illustrated Supplement.

Both in such walks of life and in humbler ones the woman can often do more than hold her own.

A few months ago a local governor sent in a woman under arrest on a charge of wounding her husband by hitting him with a stone. The pair had been harvesting their little wheat-patch together, and the man had called her by an objectionable name during a squabble, whereupon she threw a stone and hit him on the head. She then caught up the sickle and chased him up the hill-side till both breath and anger evaporated. The man himself had not dared to complain, and the woman told the court that, so far from being penitent, she would give him a good flogging if the rest of the wheat was not in when she returned.

However, such incidents are fortunately rare; husbands and wives in villages usually get on very well, and, indeed, are restrained from violence by the danger of individual fights developing into village uproars owing to relatives taking part.

Labour in a mountain village is fairly divided, and one seldom sees the sight, so common among the Persians and Arabs, of the male population loafing while the women drudge. The man has his ploughing, the care of his beasts, his tobacco and fruit culture—in short, all the heavy outdoor work, while he has to carry his fruit and tobacco to market, often involving a journey of two or three days over difficult mountains. In the winter he carries firewood to the town, and these journeys, in deep snow and over passes infested with the grey wolf, are often little short of heroic. The woman's part is the dairying, tobacco-drying, preserving fruits, walnut-picking, and making and mending of all descriptions. The life is hard but healthy, and the food is good, though of the simplest.

There is naturally little amusement in such a life. The only general pastime is the national dance, a slow step-dance in which all join, men and women alike, linked arm in arm in a long crescent-shaped row, which slowly circles round the drum and fife band in the centre.

I suppose the Kurd is unique among Muslim peoples in countenancing and practising mixed dancing for adults, at which the local priest is often present; in fact, in one village I saw it being performed in the yard of the mosque. But in this, as in many other characteristics, the Kurd is very un-Oriental. His mentality and habits are very much more those of the East of Europe than Asiatic.

The lack of fanaticism is most remarkable. The European official is expected to put up for the night in the mosque (if the village possesses one), and the village priest performs his official duties in the same room, undisturbed by the presence of his Christian guest. Nor is the latter asked to vacate on a Friday when the people assemble for public prayer, though as a rule he contrives to be absent. Such freedom of mind is in very striking contrast to the dour fanaticism of the neighbouring Persians, who consider the mosque defiled by the mere glance of a passing European.

Among Muslim communities the removal or destruction of a grave is considered to be highly sacrilegious, but here again the Kurd is not exacting. Last year, in the course of road-making, the alignment was interrupted by a large erection of stones marking the grave of a man fallen in fight. Enquiries led to the discovery of some relatives of the deceased, who were quite willing that the monument be removed and bones displaced if the road-makers would re-erect the cairn somewhere off the road, which was done to their entire satisfaction.

The hospitality of the villager, and indeed of all classes, is of the

highest quality. In touring it is often difficult to proceed more than a few miles each day, for it is impolitic to pass a village without accepting its hospitality, which may range from a cup of tea and some fruit to a heavy lunch or dinner, which, when the party is large, is a very serious strain on the resources of a little community whose wheat has to be fetched from a distance and whose daily life is of the simplest. And if to pass by without partaking be a slight, to make an offer of payment or presents is to arouse real enmity. The habit is so developed that in many villages the headman or local official is kept in a condition of permanent impoverishment.

As the country produces practically everything necessary for life, including homespuns and shoes, there is little marked poverty, and one is often surprised at the extreme paucity of worldly possessions which actually appear to be sufficient to maintain the humbler families.

A case illustrating this came before one of the administrative officers during a tour in the mountains. The man lived in a minute half dug-out, half hut, high up on a crag beside a trickle of water. A sprinkling of soil on the steep slopes afforded space for the cultivation of a crop of wheat amounting to about 4 hundredweight. His tax on this was some 40 pounds of grain, payable at the Government granary. This he conveyed across fifteen miles of very rugged mountain by loading it on his nine-months-old calf.

His principal possessions were a rug, two saucepans, two cows, and the above-mentioned calf, besides a few odd tools. He related how he had had a hen, but had lost it to a roving jackal. His family consisted of his wife and two daughters, and with the aid of the wheat-patch (upon which rice was sown in the summer), the cows, and the not inconsiderable natural products of the mountain-side, they lived somehow. He also possessed a dog, upon which he placed great value, and he described with feeling how it had, during the snow, been attacked by the wolf. He had gone to its rescue with an axe, to little effect, for the savage animal turned upon him, and the situation was only saved by the timely arrival of his wife, who attacked the wolf with a sickle and drove it off.

Not even this simple family was free from domestic trouble. Two years previously the wife had run away and taken refuge with one Nasir Agha, who had eventually reconciled them. This Nasir Agha had fallen in love with one of the girls, and this circumstance, while gratifying enough to the father, was at the same time one of his greatest worries. Nasir Agha being a man of some substance, it would be necessary not only to provide a suitable dot for the girl, but a worthy entertainment at the betrothal feast. The good man's perturbation was not lessened by the proposal of Nasir Agha (who was by way of being a wag) that he would so regulate the numbers at the

party as to make the two cows and calf just suffice, and would then forgo the dot.

It is not unnatural that in this secluded little world ideas of the outside are very hazy. It was not a generally accepted fact that hostilities between Turkey and the British had ceased till well on into 1920, and though in the towns people were moderately well informed as to events in Baghdad, the great bulk of the country-side did not even realize that South Kurdistan was politically connected therewith, many still believing that the country was in the government of Mosul, as in Turkish times.

Nevertheless, with all their backwardness and ignorance, it stands to their credit that in the widespread rising in Mesopotamia of the summer of 1920 it was these people who remained quiet, continued paying their taxes, and even offered assistance against their turbulent neighbours.

# REVIEWS

The Raiders of the Sarhad. By Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B. London: H. F. and G. Witherby. 1921. Price: 15s. net.

As time goes by, books are published which shed light on campaigns waged during the Great War in remote corners of Asia by small bodies of Indian troops, which generally lacked most of the adjuncts of modern warfare. However, local difficulties, scarcity of men and munitions, have merely brought out the dominant personality of the British officer, which, in war-time, has been proved to be among the most valuable assets of the State. Of this the campaign of General Dyer is a notable example.

In 1916, the British were rightly alarmed at the serious results that would happen if large German missions reached Afghanistan across Persia. A cordon was therefore formed, running from the British frontier at the point where it meets Persia and Afghanistan on the hill termed Kuh-i-Malik-i-Sia, along the Perso-Afghan boundary to Transcaspia, a distance of perhaps 600 miles. The East Persia cordon, as it was termed, was divided into two sections, the smaller or northern being guarded by Russia, and the southern by the British based on Quetta.

In the previous year, the Germans had swept the little British colonies, composed of consuls, bankers, and telegraph officials, out of Central and Southern Persia, and had occupied various centres, among them Kerman. They had sent emissaries in every direction, and especially to the Sarhad, a wild, bandit-infested land, to the south of Sistan, marching with the desert which runs from the Perso-Baluch border, almost to Quetta. The Sarhaddi tribesmen, whose occupation was raiding, were only too delighted to be paid for following their hereditary occupation, with the result that convoys, on which the cordon depended, were cut up, and finally the service was stopped. Unless this state of affairs was speedily changed, the cordon would have collapsed.

Dyer was sent to put matters right. His success was almost miraculous. He gave out, through his secret agents, that the handful of men at his disposal formed the advance-guard of a resistless army. He attacked the Sarhaddis with two guns (they fear guns intensely), and they surrendered. But, in due course of time, they saw through

the bluff, turned nasty, and besieged Dyer in the Persian fort of Kwash, which, until then, had been visited by only two or three travellers, so remote a country is Sarhad. Small but welcome reinforcements of Indian troops arrived in the nick of time, and Dyer immediately reassumed the offensive, and finally forced the wild tribesmen to submit and accept service as " levies."

The whole campaign is a thrilling drama, and will appeal strongly to members of the Central Asian Society.

P. M. SYKES.

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TWO YEARS IN KURDISTAN: EXPERIENCES OF A POLITICAL OFFICER, 1918-1920. By Captain W. R. Hay. (Sidgwick and Jackson.)

In the manner in which this book is written there are faults which the matter—good as some of that is—will be hard put to it to counteract. The author's rather naïve wonder at the multifarious nature of his duties is merely absurd, but his assumption of the tone of a despotic monarch is a serious blemish. No servant of Government should speak of " *my* police " or of " *my* terms " (to rebels) ; and it is unpardonable to write such sentences as this: " I assured the new chief that as long as he remained loyal to me, I would regard him with the same devotion and treat him with the same favour as I had shown to his predecessor." And finally there is an accumulation of exact detail, important and unimportant, which, admirable as it might be in an official report, will not please the general reader. Even one acquainted to some extent with the places and people found his spirits flag, in the midst of an otherwise exciting story, on being told what Mr. So-and-so did on a given date at three o'clock in the afternoon.

These defects are the more to be regretted in that they probably do a gross injustice to the author, who had a very difficult task to perform, and acquitted himself " to the satisfaction of his superiors." The area with which the book deals is not all, strictly speaking, in Kurdistan, but on the very fringe of Southern Kurdistan, and the author's headquarters were at Erbil, a town mainly " Turcoman " in population. Nevertheless the country population is almost exclusively Kurdish, and the title may be allowed to pass. The book gives a detailed description of these Kurds, their country, their customs and their way of living, and an account of various incidents—some of them too exciting to be agreeable—in which the author took part. The book will be essential to any student of the British occupation of Iraq up to the establishment of the Provisional Arab Government in October, 1920. It gives a glimpse of the good work done by a few of the officers who were flung by force of circumstances into positions of responsibility, often without any training in administrative work, and often—as in Captain Hay's case—entrusted with a district where

the leading officials, being Turks, had fled, and the whole machinery of government had broken down. Captain Hay had the additional disadvantage of being on the border, with tribes wilder than his own as neighbours. There were no troops to enforce the order " of him whose was the order "; and all the time there was wild speculation about strange things called Leagues of Nations, and about a quite new commodity called liberty, which, it seemed, meant no punishment for crime and no taxation. Finally there was a rising in the adjacent districts which shook the power of the Government to its foundations.

A pleasant trait in the book is the author's personal attachment to some of the leading figures in his district. Attractive pictures are given of the Kurdish Agha who, when Government authority broke down, took control in Erbil and saved the situation; and of other Kurdish and Turkish friends of the author; and there is a moving description of the death of Kanabi, the coffee-man, who when he might have escaped the ambush set for his master preferred to proclaim himself the Governor's man and be killed.

The book contains a tribute to Colonel Leachman and other members of the Civil Administration (but J. S. Mann, in some ways the most remarkable of them all, should not have been omitted) who lost their lives in the execution of their duties in Iraq; but the story itself is a tribute to more than one man—British and Indian—who played a gallant part in these troubled regions, and who, if they escaped with their lives, lived in constant risk of losing them.

The book is illustrated with excellent photographs. There is one—a stony hill path " alluring up and enticing down "—which helps to explain the fascination which the country has for Captain Hay.

W. R. B.

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An Administrator in the Making: James Saumarez Mann, 1893-1920. Edited by his Father. Longmans, Green and Co. 1921. Price: 15s. net.

Of the many biographical books having for their subject a young officer whose life has been lost in the past few years, this is one of the best.

Captain J. Saumarez Mann was one of the later recruits to the Administrative Service of Iraq, and did not join it till 1919. He was one of many sacrificed to the result of what he well describes as " the delays of the Peace Conference, and the well-intentioned self-determinators who knew no facts, no Islamic doctrine and no ethnology."

His letters, from the time of his going to France till his last from Iraq in 1920, picture the very rapid development of the man from the youth, and the courage to admit the prejudices of inexperience. The most noteworthy example of this was the wholesale abandonment of

high theory on nationalistic matters acquired in a university atmosphere when he met real life.

Few young men have the application to write frequently, and still fewer the ability to write well. Mann had both. Though his letters on arrival in Mesopotamia indicate that his first impressions were in no way different from those of most first arrivals in that unbeautiful land, when he arrived at his post at Umm Ba'rur he commenced a series of thoughtful, illustrative letters which enable the reader to see, not only the Arab, his characteristics and country, but the development taking place in the young man set alone to initiate an administration under great difficulties. The fact that he was a born linguist must have facilitated matters for him, but the characteristic by which he is best remembered, his power of converting into active support the liking he inspired in the Arabs, did most for him. Many other officers have been liked well enough, but few could, in time of trouble, reckon upon that feeling moving the Arab to tangible support or assistance.

His letters contain such a mass of well-conveyed impressions of people and life that it is difficult to select from them.

He began by being vastly impressed by Sir Arnold Wilson, and those who know the latter will appreciate the description of him as " very strong, and with a truly Homeric joy in his strength."

The greatest difficulty of the stranger in Mesopotamia was solved for him immediately on arrival at his district. He began by liking the place and people and seeing their humours. There is no other specific for the discomforts and disappointments of life in Iraq.

Of Arab sheikhs he very truly writes: " They are a marvellous mixture of culture and savagery, these old gentlemen, and as they all sat around they formed a pretty picture of crime, intrigue, vice and cruelty." One very wealthy one was soliciting a loan in the hope the British would evacuate before repayment time. Another, equally rich, had been deported for refusing to pay taxes. His neighbour, a most pleasant fellow to meet, " was famous for a vice not mentioned in England, and other notable crimes." Another with seventeen wives and an indeterminate number of sons; and his friend who, having been given sixty thousand rupees to build a dam with the labour of his tribe, built the dam and forgot to pay the labourers. So, as Mann says, " my neighbours are interesting people, even when taken singly."

The first impression of Najaf, that most holy city of the Persians, is an admirable pen picture, but too long to quote. The second impression is irresistible and wholly true: " A city so vicious that the most sober account of it could not be printed in England: one can only say that every vice known to the most unpleasant Greek and Roman authors . . . flourishes there publicly."

" A city of corpses, the bazaar seeing all day an endless stream of bodies, many reeking abominably, uncoffined and only wrapped in rough cloths, being carried from the temple to burial or from the road to the temple."

Shortly after his arrival he unexpectedly met an English lady who is very well known in Iraq. His portrait of her is so true that it is unnecessary to mention her name:

" She was in great form and talked the whole time, full of the most interesting information, for she knows, of course, all the secrets from Constantinople to Afghanistan. . . . It gives quite a new direction to one's views on one's own individual problems to hear her talking about the big general questions of Baghdad, etc. . . ."

His reflections upon the Arab and self-government were interesting, though his conclusions were not always right. In fact, he had believed it impossible for a rising to occur in his own district.

Writing some months before the rebellion, he says: " Any idea of an Arab State is simply bloodstained fooling at present, and this country cannot be handled without some sort of an army in the background." How true is the last sentence we yet may see.

And to close a long tale of quotations I cannot do better than present the following: " It's a sad country in this way, that it's utterly without any self-consciousness, and utterly without a ghost of public spirit."

Mann was killed by a stray shot at the siege of Kufa, and the Administration was deprived by the bullet of one of its cleverest officers and most whole-hearted workers.

The book is fairly illustrated, and the editing, which is admirable, is obviously the work of an accomplished hand.

E. B. S.

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# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, January 12, 1922, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., presiding, when a lecture was given by Mr. Frank Grove, O.B.E., M.Inst.C.E., entitled "A Railway Engineer's Journeys in Persia." In opening the proceedings—

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I must first of all apologize for the unavoidable absence of Lord Carnock. In his absence I have been suddenly asked to take the chair. I must first ask Colonel Yate to read to you the list of members who have been recently elected.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate): We have to-day elected the following fourteen members of the Society: Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., etc., Brigadier-General C. H. Uvedale Price, C.B., D.S.O., I.A. (retired), Colonel Alfred Rawlinson, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Mrs. Rawlinson, Mr. George Milne, I.C.S., Lieutenant-Colonel A. Olver, C.B., C.M.G., Major J. U. F. C. Alexander, Mr. Sydney Armitage-Smith, C.B., Mr. V. H. W. Dowson (Mesopotamian Agricultural Department), Captain L. A. Lynden-Bell, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders, Captain Campbell, I.A., Captain Renshaw, I.A., Captain Thompson, 15th Lancers, I.A., Captain E. S. Storey-Cooper, M.C. There have during the past year been altogether eight resignations and one death among the members of the Society.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before introducing to you the Lecturer, I think the members of the Society would like to express their gratitude to the Royal United Service Institution for placing their theatre at our disposal to-night, and at future lectures. I believe it will be more convenient for a large number of our members here to come to this theatre rather than to go to our very inferior lecture room in Grosvenor Street. (Applause.) The subject of the lecture to-night is, as you know, "A Railway Engineer's Journeys in Persia," and we have been fortunate enough to secure for the purposes of this lecture Mr. Grove, who was a servant of the Persian Railway Syndicate connected with Messrs. Pearson and Co.; and he, having spent two years since the Armistice in prospecting for railways in Persia on behalf of those Syndicates, is as well qualified as anyone to address us on the subject. I hope there are also a few members of the audience who know the scene of operations sufficiently well to join in the discussion after the lecture is over. I beg to present to you Mr. Grove, O.B.E. (Applause.)

# A RAILWAY ENGINEER'S JOURNEYS IN PERSIA

My journeys in Persia during 1920 were over well-beaten ground on and near the British lines of communication from Quraitu through Kerind to Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Kasvin. This country has been frequently described, and is probably well known to many now present, but I shall show a few lantern-slides which I hope may be interesting. In August of 1920 I made a journey by pony and mule transport to Tehran via Noberan, or by the direct road from Hamadan, which is now little used, and then went on for a short distance into the Elburz Mountains and examined the coal mines in the Demavend area.

In the spring of 1921 I journeyed to Ispahan from Hamadan via Saltanabad and from Ispahan southwards through the Bakhtiari country and the Karun gorges to the oil-fields and Ahwaz.

I should explain that these journeys were made on behalf of the Persian Railways Syndicate and of Messrs. S. Pearson and Son, agents for the Syndicate, and that a survey and estimate has been completed for the construction of a railway from Khaniqin to Tehran, as agreed with the Persian Government early in 1920.

It is intended, so it is understood, that the terminus of the metre-gauge railway through Irak from Basra to Baghdad and onwards to the Persian frontier shall be at Khaniqin Village, and not at Quraitu or Tairuq as at present, and in this event a short length of twenty-three miles would be abandoned.

An approach to the Persian plateau, the higher ranges of which are seen in the blue distance from Khaniqin, is offered by the Helouan or Alwand River valley. This river, a tributary of the Diala River, rises in the foothills near Saripul, and is fed by perennial springs and tributaries flowing from the higher mountains which are there approached. The level plains of Mesopotamia, or Irak, lie to the south and west, and a country of low and eroded hills and broken rocky spurs is entered with little cultivation except near the river, and there only in patches. There are wide grazing areas, however, and in the spring and early summer Kurdish nomads, who in the winter live at Qasr-i-Shirin or Khaniqin, move about with their flocks of sheep and goats. Later on in the summer it becomes only a little less arid and hot than the parched plains of Irak, and the nomadic tribes move to higher pastures.

The villages of Khaniqin and Qasr-i-Shirin, places with a population of 3,000 or 4,000, are distributing centres for the fringe of Kurdistan which lies near, and this latter village has importance by reason of its Persian custom house; also archæological interest in the ruins of the Palace

of Shirin, which was built for the beautiful queen of Kosros II. Some portions of the walls, or fortifications, which surrounded the palace still stand. While the configuration of the country was doubtless the same in the seventh century when Qasr-i-Shirin was in its glory, it seems probable that with a greater rainfall the hills were then clothed with vegetation. It is recorded that the palace walls surrounded beautiful gardens.

From Saripul the road winds through the foothills and approaches the Pai Tak Pass. The vegetation increases, and stunted ilex or scrub oak are scattered on the face of the hills. We are now near the historic highway from Media, which was probably used by the military hordes of Cyrus and Darius in their expeditions against the inhabitants of the plains and since that remote period down through the ages for military and trade purposes until recently reconstructed and improved by our military expedition of 1917-1921. This is part, at any rate, of the mountain front called the "Persian Ladder" by Diodorus Siculus from its abruptness and the succession of terraces rising from the plains.

The motor road at present zigzags up a steep slope which would be quite impossible for a railway, so that a route had to be looked for elsewhere, and a valley known as the Darband Gorge, roughly parallel to the south, provides a practicable ascent on a 1 in 50 grade with some short tunnels and viaducts. From Saripul, which is nearly 2,000 feet above sea-level, an ascent of 3,000 feet has to be made to the Kerind Plain, which is 5,000 feet above sea-level, and this is accomplished in a distance of a little over forty miles.

The Darband Gorge is formed by a stream draining the southern slopes of the Kuh-i-Nau Mountain Massif, the northern slopes of which are followed by the motor road. A dry torrent bed takes an almost straight course through an immense upheaval of limestone and sandstone, and while on one side the mountain slopes are very precipitous, on the other, that followed by the alignment of the proposed railway, they are less abrupt and are covered with good grass and ilex trees with a park-like appearance, though there is no depth of soil above the rock. This gorge in its upper portion is probably a small "cleft-cañon." Such "tangs" or gorges in the Zagros Mountains may be due, as Lord Curzon observes in his book on Persia, "not to the erosive action of water, but to primordial fracture in the crust of the earth." A gap through the hills provides easy access to the Kerind Plain, and from here to Bisitun beyond Kermanshah the motor road, though not closely followed, formed at least a convenient base from which to survey the country and fix the best location for a railway. I should like to mention that the official maps published under the direction of the Surveyor-General to the Indian Government were of the greatest help in enabling me to place our parties of engineers out in the field rapidly for the detail work required.

Kerind, the first Kurdish village to be passed after reaching the higher levels, is romantically situated under a rocky mountain slope and at the opening to a ravine, well wooded with walnut and mulberry trees, through which a perennial stream flows, and as it falls to the lower levels through the village, grinds the wheat in the primitive but effective flour mills by passing through vertical shoots on to wooden turbine wheels. Below the village lies a good mile or two of rich cultivation, and beyond the plain—almost a dead level—surrounded by hills and mountains. This plain, as also others in the vicinity, is almost entirely overgrown with wild liquorice plant, and evidently the Kurdish cultivator has a great struggle to keep his patches of wheat and barley clear of the weed. The soil is dark and loamy and would doubtless yield splendid crops were it possible to exterminate the weed, which is only useful as fuel. The gardens, hedged with wild rose, are typical of those throughout the highlands of Persia. Vineyards are everywhere, and are surrounded by fruit-trees—pears, apples, peaches, plums, and sometimes fig-trees, all yielding rather poor fruit—and walnut-trees, almonds, and pistachios. The vines produce many varieties of grapes, black and white, and are generally excellent either fresh or when dried as raisins.

While the surrounding hills and higher portions of the plains are dry and arid during the summer months, the mantle of snow which covers the country during the winter and the spring rains produce a thin covering of grass, herbs, and resinous bushes. Near the water-courses and villages, poplar-trees and willows are grown for building purposes, and the irrigated portions of the country are bright with wild flowers. Wild hollyhocks, pink and white, spring up amongst the crops, and here and there in the narrower and better watered valleys one sees clumps of hawthorn, blackthorn, dewberry, and common briars. There is a briar with a fine, single yellow blossom which is seen here and there near Kerind and Kermanshah.

The belt of ilex, or scrub oak, is roughly fifty to eighty miles in depth, and fringes the whole edge of Kurdistan and Luristan bordering Irak. The trees are stunted and rarely exceed 18 inches in diameter at the butt. Throughout this belt, which extends to the Bakhtiari Mountains of Arabistan, where there is a wealth of vegetation, there is an abundance of fuel and grazing grass at the higher altitudes, the rainfall probably varying between 11 and 18 inches.

It is an easy run by car from Kerind to Kermanshah, passing the villages of Firuzabad, Harunabad, Hassanabad, and Mahidasht. The railway would avoid the climb near Hassanabad, but would ascend the Chehar Zabar divide. This is the highest point before reaching Kermanshah, 5,500 feet above sea-level, and, in order to provide a gradient not exceeding 1 in 100, a summit tunnel is necessary. This ridge, or watershed, separates the flow of streams to the Kara Su,

which joins the Kharka River through Luristan, from those with a western flow to the Irak plains; but the geography of the head waters of these rivers some miles south of Kermanshah is still very vague.

We now pass through typical scenery of the higher plateaux, arid ridges of eroded sandstone with highly folded and broken strata alternating with nearly level plain sloping towards the mountains. The dominating colour is yellow, but this is relieved by red and purple in the hills, and by the dusting of grey-green bushes and herbs—especially in the spring—and by the oases of cultivation and lines of fruit-trees and poplars near the villages. The whole scene is beautified by the clear air and sunshine and the blue haze of immense distances.

It is apparent that while much is done to conserve and utilize the limited supply of water by open irrigation channels and by "kanats," or underground channels, which I shall describe later on, much more might be done. Thus it is only where water is comparatively easily obtained by gravitation that cultivation appears. There are rivers, especially between Kermanshah and Hamadan, passing through narrow valleys, where water might be conserved by the construction of dams, and not allowed to run to waste on the melting of the snows, as at present. It would also seem that, with enterprise and the introduction of agricultural machinery, such as motor tractors and ploughs, a system of "dry farming" might be successful, and many thousands of square miles be thus brought under cultivation.

The population of the Persian plateau is sparse for apparently the following reasons: A limit set by recurrent specially dry years, when the snow and rain fail and, secondly, by the lack of transport facilities to dispose of to advantage an abnormally large surplus of grain, or even to transfer a surplus from a district well favoured to one where grain is badly needed. I was told by a Persian landholder that a very good year did not pay as well as a moderately good one, for in the latter case there would be a better market and higher prices obtainable near at hand.

These conditions will be modified and improved by cheap railway transport, both by stimulating enterprise and the introduction of machinery, by distributing grain at periods of famine, and also assuring a wider and better market for surplus produce at all times.

Kermanshah, a town with some 45,000 inhabitants, is built on sloping ground at the foot of a ridge, which is avoided by the proposed railway alignment; but the road is graded over a spur behind the town. It looks across a level plain, drained by the Kara Su, towards the Kuh-i-Parau, a fine range of mountains rising abruptly to a height of 10,000 feet above sea-level. At the foot of this range, north-east of Kermanshah and six miles away in a straight line, are the interesting sculptures of Tak-i-Bustan.

A stream of clear and cold water gushes out at the base of the limestone cliff and forms a pond, the stream continuing beyond over the plain, fringed with willows and cultivation. The carvings consist of two archways cut into the solid rock ; the larger and more complete one is 34 feet high, 24 feet wide, and 22 feet deep. On the right of the archways there is a separate panel of four figures, one being prostrate. The larger archway at the back contains a panel above a colossal equestrian figure: these, and also the panels at the sides, are carved out of the solid rock. The panel above the equestrian figure represents Kosros II., or Kusru Parvis, wearing the Sassanian diadem, and two officials presenting him with chaplets. It is thought this group commemorated the double gift by the emperor Mauricius to the Persian King of his Christian bride, the beautiful Shirin, and of his crown. The same monarch is represented by the equestrian figure, the horse and rider being covered with a coat of mail. Above the left-hand panel, at the spring of the arch, there is a comparatively modern representation of Mohammed Ali, son of Fath Ali Shah, Governor of Kermanshah in the early part of the nineteenth century, representing himself sitting in state with his attendants. At the sides of the cavern are beautifully carved panels, that on the right representing a deer hunt, and on the left a wild-boar hunt, in both of which the monarch with his courtiers plays a prominent part. Elephants and camels are engaged in carrying away the game. It is apparent that pigs flew in those days at a convenient range for bow and arrow, and that a band of musicians was necessary at the deer hunt to stimulate the sportsmen and probably also to frighten the game and cause it to break cover. The period is A.D. 599 to 628, some 600 years before the invasion of Persia by the Mongols.

The exterior panel represents two crowned figures standing on the prostrate body of a third, and holding the "cydaris," or royal circlet, while behind the left-hand king is a fourth figure, whose head is surrounded with a radiated nimbus. This is generally accepted as representing the investiture of Shapur I. by his father, Ardeshire Babekan, with a share of the royal dominion, in the presence of the god "Ormuzd." The prostrate figure is thought to be that of Artabanus, the last Parthian king. The smaller cavern is not completed, though some inscriptions have been deciphered, and there are figures believed to be of Shapur II. and III. The period is the fourth century. I am indebted to Jackson's "Persia, Past and Present," and to Sir Percy Sykes's "History of Persia" for the historical details.

These old monarchs were evidently great sportsmen, and the modern Persian is also keen with the fowling-piece and in riding down gazelle or driving ibex, but their methods of disturbing the country for miles round with crowds of beaters and mounted gunmen shooting in all directions at once do not appeal to British sportsmen.

While dealing with this subject, I should mention that there are still plenty of gazelle to be found in the more remote portions of the highland plains, and ibex, also a species of wild sheep, on the higher ranges. Feathered game is restricted to blue rock pigeons, common sand grouse and the imperial sand grouse; also the "kowk," a species of red-legged partridge, is the best game-bird, and to this must be added quail, woodcock, and pheasant, but the latter only on the Caspian littoral. Snipe, duck, geese, and many kinds of wild fowl migrate through the country in the winter seasons, and there are some hares, but not many. Quite a number of wolves come near the villages and towns in the winter, and there are a few foxes.

The plain continues twenty miles from Kermanshah towards Hamadan, and there the valley contracts, and to the north the imposing rock of Bisitun rises abruptly near the road. Upon the face of this rock, some 200 feet above the road, is the very interesting triumphal record of the reign of Darius, son of Hystaspes, in the form of a sculptured panel and cuneiform inscriptions.

The panel or bas-relief depicts Darius receiving obeisance from the nine rebel kings whom he had conquered in battle, and his foot is planted in triumph on the neck of Gaumata the magian. The period is that of 521–485 B.C. The cuneiform inscriptions, which are engraved in three languages—ancient Persian, Susian or Elamitish, and Babylonian—cover an immense area, but are not easily seen unless special ladders are taken to climb the rock. The slide shown was taken with a telephoto lens, and for the negative of this and most of those shown of Tak-i-Bustan I am indebted to Mr. C. E. Matthews, an engineer of our staff. The historical significance of this bas-relief and translations of the script by Rawlinson are so well known that I need only briefly remind you that this grand old monarch ruled twenty-three countries, including Babylonia, Assyria, Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia, and the Grecian Islands of the Mediterranean. He is also believed to have received tribute from the Punjab and Sind.

Beyond Bisitun the proposed alignment of the railway follows the valley of the Gama Siab River to its head waters north of Nihavand, and finally turns in a northern direction towards Hamadan at the village of Nanaj, which is only some eight miles north of Dalautabad, thereafter grading over the Gardaneh Zaga Pass and through Zamanabad. Thus the more difficult route taken by the motor road over the Assadabad Pass is avoided, and the Kuh-i-Alvand Mountains, which rise to a height of 13,000 feet above sea-level, immediately behind the town of Hamadan, are completely rounded.

While a fertile plain lies in front of Kermanshah and for many miles in the direction of the confluence of the Kara Su and Gama Siab Rivers, also towards Kangavar, the head waters of the latter river are shut in between hills and spurs, and cultivation disappears. The

Gama Siab is a perennial stream, and the valley offers a good site for water conservation. Both the rivers named have a large catchment area, and the plains near the road are annually flooded on the melting of the snow. The summit of the Gardaneh Zaga Pass is the highest point on the alignment. It is 6,780 feet above sea-level, and the grade up and down is 1 in 100. There will be a few short tunnels but no special difficulties in this section. The point where the alignment makes a northern trend at the village of Nanaj is important. It is here, or near this point, that a "take-off" would be found for a connection through Burudjird with Dizful, Ahwaz, and the Persian Gulf, through Luristan, though it has been quite impossible during the last two years, owing to tribal conditions in Luristan, to enter the country and to test an alignment in any direction.

Luristan is almost a "terra incognita," although a comparatively well-watered tract of mountainous country lying centrally and in an important position geographically, and Sir A. T. Wilson and Major Edmonds, the most recent travellers, only got through with great difficulty a few years ago. Anything like detailed survey work or railway construction would be quite out of the question until these truculent tribesmen are brought into subjection by the Persian Government.

Hamadan is a town of some 60,000 inhabitants, and is an even more important centre of distribution than Kermanshah. It is now surrounded by a good motor road which it owes to our military expedition. The streets are narrow and dirty and blocked with snow during the winter months, which is pitched off the flat roofs sometimes on to the heads of the foot passengers. It is an amusing sight to see the old men and small boys, by way of useful exercise on a cold morning, stamping on the mud roof after it is clear of snow to make it more or less impervious to moisture. I should explain that the roof is formed of poplar poles laid similarly to floor joists and covered with reeds, brushwood, or mats, and then with 6 or 8 inches of mud, and it is nearly flat. Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the water drips through into most Persian houses, especially during the melting of the snow and the early spring rains. Houses and walls which are built of mud and sun-dried bricks frequently tumble down and crush the inhabitants, but all this is suffered with customary Mohammedan stoicism. Most of the foreign residents have better houses roofed with timber trusses and covered with old Russian oil drums beaten out flat. Sheet iron, so procured, is used very widely in all the large towns in the place of corrugated iron, which is too expensive to import. It makes good stoves and pipes for wood fuel, and is useful in all sorts of ways.

Persian architecture has its strong points in making the most of native material and the local woods, also, as in the brick arching of

covered-in bazaars, considerable ingenuity is shown; but I am afraid British engineers would join in condemning it as most inconvenient and insanitary.

All sorts of nationalities make up the population in these highland towns. The bulk of the successful merchants are Jews, either Persian Jews or Baghdadis. Hamadan was packed with Armenian and Urmian refugees during 1920-21, and a good many Russians drifted down. Large numbers of Armenian and Assyrian Christians are employed by merchants and the public services as clerks, as well as Persians.

The Armenian carpenter is a good workman, and is found at his trade in an amicable manner alongside the Persian, who is clever, too, in his own way, especially as a blacksmith, tin and coppersmith, and wheelwright.

Hamadan is the headquarters in Persia of the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, Ltd., and this firm obtains the bulk of its rugs and carpets for export from villages within a fifty or sixty mile radius. The village people are supplied with wool and cotton yarn and dyes, and are paid for the finished articles less the value of material or cash advanced. The rugs produced in this manner are rather crude in design and colour and go chiefly to America, where a drastic process tones down the colouring and entirely changes the appearance of the fabric. There is a factory at Hamadan where large carpets are made under careful supervision, and these are generally beautiful in design, colour, and workmanship. The whole of the carpet or rug is hand-knotted, and takes three months to one year to make. The women who do this work, and whose fingers move so deftly in tying the knots and clipping the face of the carpet, earn the equivalent of only a penny or two each day.

Hamadan, which is 6,200 feet above sea-level, looks over a vast plain stretching northward towards the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains, which forms the main divide separating this tableland from the Kasvin Plain. The lower mountain slopes behind Hamadan are well cultivated for some miles, and the monotonous colouring of the plain, so usual in Persia, is relieved by numerous villages and large areas of grain, maize, vineyards, fruit-trees, and poplars, which follow almost without interruption for forty miles the perennial stream which drains the lower levels Two miles behind the town the Kuh-i-Alvand range rises abruptly, and is formed largely of igneous rocks with precipitous peaks, and the slopes are strewn with boulders of gneiss and granite.

Near the head of one of the valleys about six miles from Hamadan, known as the Ganj Namah, or Valley of the Tablets, on a huge granite boulder, is the well-known Darius cuneiform inscription. It is remarkably clear, as though it were cut but a hundred years ago. The period is 521 to 466 B.C. Jackson gives the following translation in his "Persia, Past and Present": "A great God is Auramazda, who created

this earth, who created yonder Heaven, who created man, who made Peace for man, who made Darius King, the King of many, the one ruler of many, I am Darius, the great King, the King of Kings, King of the countries which have many peoples, King of the great earth even to afar, the son of Hystaspes, the Archæmenian." An inscription to Xerxes, in identical terms, is by the side, and both are in three languages in parallel columns as at Bisitun. Hamadan, or the classical "Ecbatana," the summer capital of "the Medes and Persians," has another association with Xerxes, or the Ahazuerus of Scripture, in the reputed tombs of Queen Esther and Mordecai in the centre of the town. The tombs are side by side and covered with carved woodwork not very ancient in appearance. The interior of the domed building which contains the tomb is dark and damp. There are some Hebrew inscriptions on the walls, and this interesting relic of the Jewish captivity, whether the site is genuine or not, is carefully guarded by the Hebrew community.

Time will not allow me to describe the route from Hamadan to Kasvin. The barrier formed by the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains would not permit the construction of a railway within economical limits, though, with this exception, it would pass over practically level country, which is the case, also, between Kasvin and Tehran. While it was not possible to carry the survey, or any systematic reconnaissance, north of Kasvin owing to the Bolshevik advance and political situation at the time, a cursory inspection by one of our engineers as far as Mandjil confirms that the gorge of the Yuzbashi Chai and the Shah Rud leading from the high plateau through the Elburz Range to Resht and Enzeli and the low levels of the Caspian presents a most difficult engineering problem, which could apparently only be overcome by a rack section if at any time it were desirable to connect Kasvin and Tehran by railway with a Caspian port.

The proposed alignment of the railway from Hamadan to Tehran takes an almost direct route, and rounds the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains via Zarreh, Noberan, and Asiabeg. No engineering difficulties exist on this route. The country is similar to that already described, and there is a fair amount of cultivation, especially in a group of villages near Noberan and round Asiabeg, and at the latter place a good deal of cotton is grown. This should be stimulated by the approach of a railway, and the establishment of cotton yarn and other factories at a point on the line where water power is available should offer good prospects.

At Chamaroun, near Noberan, the Seif-el-Mamalek, a Persian landowner with the rank of General in the Persian Army, received us most hospitably. He lives in a house having the appearance of a castle of the feudal times though built of mud brick, surrounded by the smaller village houses of the peasantry.

The system of land-tenure in Persia is similar, too, to feudal times in Europe. Very large tracts of country are owned by families of ancient lineage, and usually the villages with water rights are owned as well. The landowner receives roughly one-third of the produce and the cultivator takes two-thirds, the proportion varying according to conditions of water supply, village accommodation, and so forth. It follows that the landowner has a hold on the peasant labour, though it was at no time represented to me that by unfair means were the people deprived of their freedom.

One seldom sees a school in these country districts, but the condition of the people generally seems a contented one. No doubt changes for their betterment must occur, but there seems no reason why this should not be gradually effected, and without disturbance to trade, if agitators are kept out of the way. The Persian Moslem of the Shiah Sect is not a fanatic, and all classes possess a cheerful temperament and a disposition to make the best of things.

The population of the strip of country described, say, forty miles wide, is, including Tehran and all urban population, about thirty-three per square mile, or a total of 650,000 people. The average for the whole of Persia is about sixteen per square mile.

With the exception of a low divide between Zarreh and Noberan, which is not correctly shown on existing maps, and one or two spurs which trend towards the Great Salt Lake, there is a gradual fall to Tehran. The lowest point—3,500 feet above sea-level—is at the crossing of the Rud-i-Shur near Robat Kerim. This river drains the whole of the Kasvin Plain and the northern slopes of the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains, also a part of the southern slopes of the Elburz Range. It lies in a deep depression and flows into the Great Salt Lake. In the dry weather it is a mere stream and intensely salt, but would require a flood opening of at least 600 feet. From this point there is a gradual ascent over nearly level country at Tehran, which is 3,800 feet above sea-level.

Tehran lies on practically level land from which there is a gradual slope to the foot of the Elburz Mountains six miles away. It covers about four square miles and is surrounded by a moat and earthen ramparts. Several gates ornamented with coloured tiles and minarets give access to the city. The main thoroughfares are broad, and there are avenues of trees and large and shady gardens. Its principal streets are in a transition stage between east and west, but there are now many well-built three or four storied houses of a continental type. It possesses six or eight miles of horse tram-line, and a metre-gauge railway. This little line, the only railway wholly operating in Persia, runs out to the town of Shah Abul Azim five and a half miles away, and conveys devout Moslems and "trippers" to a celebrated mosque. The population of Tehran is probably between 250,000 and 300,000.

At the time of my visit practically the whole of its imports came by way of Bushire, Shiraz, and Yezd or Ispahan, an overland journey of say 680 miles. I was told that goods ordered in England or Europe took on an average nine months to deliver in Tehran from the date of despatch, sometimes more and very seldom less. The actual land journey by camel or mule should not be more than eight weeks, but delays occur in transhipment at Bombay, at the custom houses, and various halting centres inland. All merchants and European residents complained of the great delay in getting delivery and the great cost of transport of any goods, no matter what special means were employed or interests were brought to bear on the problem.

In pre-war days Tehran and Kasvin were almost wholly supplied from Enzeli with Russian or continental goods and to a large extent Hamadan and even Kermanshah, exports passing out of the country in the same way. Russian oil from Baku commanded the market to the exclusion of all other brands. In the event of the Russian railways again offering a means of access and egress for merchandise, and competing with the proposed railway from Khaniqin to Tehran, the overland journey by pack animal or cart from Enzeli to Tehran would be 220 miles, to Kasvin 120 miles, to Hamadan 270 miles, and to Kermanshah 380 miles.

The distance by the alignment of the railway from Khaniqin to Tehran is 532¾ miles.

Between Tehran and the Caspian Sea the Elburz Range forms an immense barrier, and it is among these mountains after crossing the watershed that the principal bituminous coal-field which supplies Tehran is located, about forty-two miles away. A good many surface mines have been closed in recent years in the Lar River valley and towards the village of Demavend. Those now working are at the head waters of the Lar River. The elevation of the valley is, at its head waters, 9,000 feet above sea-level, and some of the mines are nearly 10,000 feet, so that the working season is confined to four summer months, and all food has to be packed in for the miners, and the coal packed out by mule or camel in sacks, over a quite severe pass of nearly 11,000 feet. Considerable quantities of produce from the Caspian littoral, such as rice, comes into Tehran by the same route.

The principal mines in this area are Gelli Gatel, Gamrot, Bargarh, and Safidab.

One can approach quite close to the mines without being aware of their presence. The seams are thin--between 1 foot 6 inches to 3 feet —and tilted to an acute angle, the dip in some cases being almost vertical. Methods of coal-cutting are, of course, very primitive, and no tools seem to be used other than a windlass and rope and a pick and basket. The seam is gradually worked out in shafts and stalls from the surface to a depth rarely exceeding 100 feet. When water

interferes, the miners turn on to some other place. The coal is good, but rather soft. Its calorific value averages 13,150 B.T.U., and it is about equal to good Indian coal.

Another coal area now supplying Tehran is at Yangi Iman Kishlak, about eight miles to the north of a point on the Tehran-Kasvin road, fifty-one miles north-west of Tehran, and on the southern slopes of the Elburz Range and fronting the plains, and therefore at a much lower elevation than that just described. Although the Askenan mine—one of the group—is owned and worked by a French company, "The Syndicat Franco-Iranien," and better methods of coal-getting are employed, either owing to the thinness of the seams or the extra distance of haulage, which is probably the governing factor, the output of the whole field does not equal the quantity sent in from the Lar Valley. The price of coal in Tehran in sterling equivalent is now about £7 10s. per ton. The quantity used does not appear to exceed 8,000 tons annually, the bulk being consumed by the little railway, a small electric light station, and the mint. The price, which has doubled in recent years, probably restricts the demand. The subject is of economic interest, especially as geologists agree that coal, in level seams, should be found below the plain near Tehran at a depth of about 2,000 feet.

The time at my disposal necessitates hurrying up from Hamadan to Ispahan, if I am to reserve a few minutes to describe the route followed through the Bakhtiari country.

The journey from Hamadan to Sultanabad can be accomplished by motor car in the dry weather in a day, though there is no properly formed road. I made the journey by pack train in the early part of April, and the floods caused by the melting of unusually heavy winter snow had carried away some bridges, so that the ordinary route could not conveniently be followed for the whole distance. The village people were hard at work ploughing, in order to make the most of the spring rains, and in a part of the Du-ab Valley I counted thirty ploughs busily engaged in one narrow strip. There are some villages in this valley whose inhabitants are Christians of Armenian origin. They are bilingual and seem quite contented.

Sultanabad, a clean town with a good bazaar, has a population of about 25,000 people. It is only slightly lower in elevation than Hamadan, and stands within sight of the Tuzlu-Gol, a shallow salt lake of some twenty square miles. It is an important centre of the gendarmerie, and, like Hamadan, has a carpet factory owned by Messrs. Zeigler's, the old-established Swiss-British firm of merchants.

The usual route taken by cross-country transport between Sultanabad and Ispahan is via Kum and Kashan, although this is some eighty to one hundred miles longer than the more direct road via Khumain, Gulpaigan, and Deh-hak. The reason that the shorter route—which is

quite easy and direct, and might be made into a first-class road, at small cost—is not used, is because of the risk of attack by robbers, who come through the mountainous regions behind Khunsar towards Luristan. Strong gendarmerie posts are established at Khumain, Gulpaigan, and Khunsar, and throughout this journey myself and Mr. C. E. Matthews, who accompanied me, were provided with a guard of twelve sowars and an officer. A little excitement occurred one afternoon when the party split up into two sections, and emerged from the hills by different routes about three miles apart. Each suspected the other of being robbers, and made a great show of galloping across the plains to a strategic point, and then blazing away at a range of two miles or so until the mistake was discovered.

The country passed through between Gulpaigan and Chah-i-Siah, near Ispahan, is flanked by high mountains to the south-west, and is in the nature of a ridge or saddle-back. For 100 miles the average height of the plain is 6,500 feet above sea-level, and the highest point on the trail is 7,240 feet. For the greater part the country is arid, though the Gulpaigan and Khumain plains are fertile tracts of country. Elsewhere the rivers are not perennial, and the widely scattered villages are dependent wholly or partly on "kanats," or underground water channels. A large amount of ingenuity is shown by Persians in the construction and maintenance of these channels, on which the means of subsistence of many thousands of people depends. This system of conducting water is widely applied throughout all the more arid portions of Persia. It consists in boring a number of wells of small diameter, roughly lined with stone, and at a distance apart of about 60 feet, more or less. The bottoms of the wells are joined by a small channel, or tunnel, with a slight gradient, and this is also generally lined with hand-packed stone.

The line of wells stretches sometimes for miles across the country, and usually conducts water not from a defined spring but from saturated strata and at a depth of, say, 25 feet from the surface. The accumulation of water which weeps into the wells and channel from the wet strata is supplied originally by the mantle of snow and the spring rains filtrating through very absorbent soil or rock debris, and attains, in the course of a mile or so, a flow of 2 or 3 cubic feet per second—amply sufficient to support the life of a large village. As a rule the "kanat" approaches, across an arid and sloping plain, the lower portions of a range of mountains, and the supply of water is probably partly derived from fissures below the exposed rocks.

Many Persian landowners are very interested in the possibilities of procuring water by artesian well borings, but up to the present experiments do not seem to have been made. The prospects of successful results, however, are good, and it may well be that herein lies the solution of the water difficulty in many parts of Persia.

Ispahan lies at the edge of a vast plain trending north and westwards, which is 5,250 feet above sea-level. It is well watered by the Zindeh Rud, which surrounds the city to the south, and is bridged by three fine-looking brick structures. Many miles of intense cultivation surround the city and follow the windings of the river and its tributaries. The head waters of the Zindeh Rud offer great possibilities of water conservation which would enable much greater areas to be cultivated. At present all flood water of this considerable river—which is over 500 feet wide, with a depth of 3 or 4 feet at flood times—runs to waste in a salt marsh seventy miles from Ispahan.

The population of Ispahan is about 100,000, and it retains its old-world appearance little altered by modern improvements. As a centre of trade it has great importance and occupies a commanding position, and could be easily connected by rail with Hamadan by the route described.

At the time of my visit the headquarters of the South Persian Rifles had been moved from Shiraz to Ispahan, and a small gymkhana and race meeting was held on the outskirts of the town through the enterprise of the British and Persian officers, encouraged by the principal residents both Persian and European. Competition was keen, and, although apart from the gendarmerie, entries by Persians were not very numerous, there was quite a good and friendly gathering. The Governor of Ispahan, Sirdar Mohtasham, a brother of Sirdar Jang, was present and other leading Bakhtiaris, and a number of Persian ladies were also on the course in specially reserved tents. It is to be regretted from the point of view of both British and Persian interests that the South Persian Rifles, as then organized and officered, has been recently disbanded.

In passing south from Ispahan travellers who are able to arrange motor-car transport take the road by Shiraz to Bushire, though a part of the distance—that over the mountains near the coast—is impassable by car. The track to Ahwaz, through the Bakhtiari Mountains and the Karun Gorges, offers an alternative, but this journey is extremely arduous for transport animals. I passed over portions of this track between Kaleh Madrasseh and Qavarukh and also between the Pul-i-Shalu (the Iron Bridge) and Malamir, and the bad condition of these—the easier portions at either end—shows clearly enough why transport rates are so high between Ahwaz and Ispahan.

The route I followed was first explored by Major—then Captain—Noel and Mr. Sotham of the Mesopotamia-Persia Corporation in 1917. Their object was to discover an alternative route to the existing track and such as would avoid the tremendous gorges of the Karun crossed in succession and might be adopted for a properly constructed motor road, it being readily admitted by those who know the track well that it is impossible of substantial improvement within reasonable economic

limits. It is interesting to note that this track was made where it is, taking the higher spurs and deeper gorges almost on the square, in order to keep as far as possible from the Lurs on one side and the Kuhgelus and Qashgais on the other, professional robbers and raiders with whom it is impossible to come to terms. Toll is collected at barriers erected on the track from the Charvadars in charge of the pack trains, being based on so much for each pack animal. The bridges are maintained by the corporation mentioned in arrangement with the Bakhtiari Government, but very little, if anything, seems to be spent on the track.

It must be conceded that the new route proposed via Urujan, Ganduman, Bichgird, Sini, Lurdagan, Bidela and Bars was well selected and is probably the most practicable route through this country to Ahwaz and the coast, but it is unlikely that the economic conditions and needs of Persia would justify the construction of a railway, owing to costly engineering works which would be necessary. Further exploration is, however, needed east and west before it can be definitely stated that no practicable outlet to the coast exists.

The Ispahan Plain is flanked to the south by a high range of mountains which forms the main watershed dividing the sources of the Karun River from the streams flowing eastwards to the salt marshes of the plateau, and it is here, therefore, that the great fall begins in that river which lower down cuts with great bends through very mountainous country until it finally emerges to the almost level plains near Shushter, and then flows as a sluggish river to Ahwaz and until it joins the Shatt-el-Arab at Mohammerah.

The approach to the watershed, or divide, from Ispahan is over country similar to that described, and follows generally the valley of the Zindeh Rud. There are alternative passes over the dividing range: that most frequently used, and followed by the so-called "Lynch" track, is the Gardan-i-Rukh, which attains an elevation of 7,900 feet, and the other is the Tang-i-Dusdan, of about the same height, leading to Urujan almost due south of Ispahan. Over the divide between these two passes, in an inner valley, is Surkh, the ancestral home of Sirdar Jang, one of the Bakhtiari Khans, and well known to those conversant with Persia as a very capable administrator and Government official. He received us very hospitably, and was most interested in the possibilities of railway development. Through his courtesy in placing two of his personal guards at our disposal, and in sending messengers to the leading Khans on the route proposed to be followed, no difficulties were experienced, and in three weeks the journey was safely and successfully accomplished to Maidan-i-Naftun, the oil-fields of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I was also fortunate in meeting Major Noel at Surkh, as he had just been visiting some little-known parts of the Bakhtiari country and was on his way to Tehran.

The village of Surkh has an elevation of 6,700 feet, and a gradual ascent of 700 feet is made to the head of the valley between Urujan and Ganduman, from which point a stream flows southwards to join the Karun. A feature of the route followed was to avoid, as far as possible, the sudden fall of the larger tributaries of the Karun and especially to minimize the length, which would closely follow a winding river pent up in a gorge-like valley which is so characteristic of this country.

From Bichgird the track takes a short cut, thus avoiding a circuitous river route, and with a comparatively easy ascent over a spur known as the Gushingli Pass then drops down a short valley to the Ab-i-Ganjam. This river was first crossed on the edge of the plateau at Bichgird. The stream which drains the valley from the Gushlingli Spur breaks through a small cañon and joins the larger river, now a mountain torrent—in partial flood when I crossed it by the Pul-i-Carrabast in May, 1920. Up and down this river great mountains overshadow the valley, which lower down is shut in by precipitous slopes, and although it swings into the Karun after some twelve miles of gorge, neither road nor railway could advisably pass by this wild and inhospitable route. The track climbs 600 feet to the Sini Plain above the left bank of the Ab-i-Ganjam and finds a gradual descent by the Ab-i-Lurdagan, past the village of that name, and then to Munj and Bidela, and as the Karun River gorge is approached, the valley is shut in by high mountains until finally the track, which is only a mountain path, passes over a succession of spurs to the Kirsan River, which joins the Karun at Bars.

All this country is covered with scrub oak, and there is an abundance of vegetation and excellent grass. Agriculturally it possesses great possibilities. There is plenty of good timber, a rich and virgin soil and immense grazing areas, perennial streams, and a rainfall of probably 18 to 20 inches per annum, but unfortunately very few inhabitants. The scarcity of population seems to be due to the continual inter-tribal warfare. At least half the adult males spend their time in riding up and down the mountains waving rifles in the air and letting off at everything which takes their fancy. Those who work seem very poor, and are largely semi-nomadic in habit. In the summer they leave their villages and crops practically unguarded and camp on the higher hills with their flocks, and live on very unnutritious bread made from acorns.

Should a road or railway ever be constructed it would follow generally the route described, but it would swing into the Karun Gorge near Bidela and from there follow the left bank of that river, crossing the Kirsan River at or near its junction, and then continue down the main gorge to the iron bridge, where it would rise over the ridges which flank the valley towards Malamir.

Crossing the Kirsan River was an interesting experience. It was in half flood, and a great volume of milky-looking water roared along at a pace, in mid-stream, of 25 or 30 feet per second. Much to our surprise all camp equipment and transport animals were got across without accident or losses. The natives are accustomed to swim the river either supported by a single goat skin inflated with air or a small raft is made with several skins on a light frame. Each time the crossing is made the single skin or the raft is carried up the edge of the river for the length of the drift, which is usually 400 or 500 yards, so that it takes many hours' hard work to put a large party with their belongings across. The animals are usually guided by two men on single skins, one on each side, who hit the beast on the head to force it to swim straight; but even so three or four attempts are frequently necessary before success is attained.

At the Kirsan crossing the large mounted guard of Bakhtiaris provided at Lurdagan returned, and thereafter a rather nondescript following was put up by the Bars men through country said to be infested by robbers.

Some excitement was provided one afternoon when we were supposed to be fired at from a neighbouring hill, and the Bakhtiari clansmen let off their musty old rifles in all directions, each man being armed with a weapon of different calibre; but it looked very much as though our friends had thoughtfully arranged the affair so as to obtain a little extra money at the end of the journey.

There is fine, wild scenery down the Karun to the iron bridge. Between Bars and Sadat there were splendid crops of barley and bearded wheat; both the ears and the straw were the best I have seen in Persia. Some of the villages, notably Behars, are romantically situated on spurs of the mountains overshadowed by a sheer rise of nearly vertical cliff. The track takes a heart-breaking route over ridges and foothills, it being impossible to closely follow the river.

From the iron bridge, which is 2,550 feet above sea-level, is a climb of 1,500 feet over the dividing ridge of limestone which separates the Karun Gorge from the Malamir Plain.

There are alternative routes to Ahwaz from Malamir. The country, which now reassumes its arid colouring, is rapidly descending to the desert level, though it is much broken by ridges and isolated mountains. The route followed was by Mortafie, Kaleh Madrasseh, and the Ab-i-Tambih direct to the oil-fields, and thereafter by motor-car to Ahwaz and Mohammerah over the desert. This sketch of my journeys would be incomplete were I to make no reference to mineral prospects in Persia. I have already referred to the important coal-measures near Tehran. Coal is reported to be in the vicinity of Kermanshah and of Hamadan, but it seems to be a lignite of rather inferior quality. The portions of Persia I have described are not apparently well

mineralized, though no systematic prospecting seems to have been done. The best fields for investigation are doubtless in the district where igneous rocks occur, notably in the Elburz Range and probably also in the Kuh-i-Alvand, south of Hamadan. Silver lead ore and copper in various forms are known to be widely found, and I procured some samples from the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains near Chamaroun on the Noberan route between Hamadan and Tehran. The same ores are reported in the vicinity of Kum, Kashan, and Ispahan.

Only a brief sojourn in Persia is needed to appreciate how greatly cheap transport is needed, and how, until that is obtained, there can be no substantial progress.

The economic importance of a connection by rail is apparent, and a further development would be the construction of feeder roads and the extended use of motor-cars and lorries, which form of transport, it may be remarked incidentally, has not yet proved a serious competitor in Persia to animal transport, though this will doubtless change when petrol becomes cheaper and more efficient workshops are established. In considering the economic value of the scheme both to Persia and Irak, and of its possible developments, one must take into account the large deposits of mineral oil which are at present so valuable an asset both to Persia and to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company near Ahwaz, and to the probable further extension of operations near Khaniqin and south of Mosul.

The gauge question opens up a wide field for debate, and I do not propose to say more than that Persia, both economically and physiographically, requires a metre-gauge railway system.

In conclusion I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Messrs. Bishop, Allen, and Morgan for the use of negatives, in addition to those borrowed from Mr. Matthews, which, supplementary to my own, have enabled me to give a fairly well-connected series of views this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—If there are any members of this Society, or visitors, who are well acquainted with this subject, and would now open a discussion, we should be very much obliged Is General Lubbock here?

Brigadier-General LUBBOCK, C.M.G.: As I was in charge of all the railways in Irak, I naturally took great interest in their extension into Persia. I took a great deal of interest in the survey, and I would have liked very much to hear this evening some sort of forecast of the possible results of the survey, whether anything was going to happen. But that the lecturer did not venture to prophesy.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It occurs to me to mention that the question of railways in Persia is by no means a new thing. I am sure there must be many in this room who remember how, in 1911, the question of the

Trans-Persian Railway was very seriously taken up by the British, Russian, and French Governments. At that time I was not on the Council of the Central Asian Society, but a member of that Council came to me and said that the Society wanted a lecture. The Trans-Persian Railway was just coming to the fore, and, as I had known Persia for about thirty years, I said, "Well, that shall be my subject." You know, some of you at least, that the scheme was to bring a railway down from the Trans-Caucasian line, skirting round the south-west angle of the Caspian Sea, to Tehran, and thence probably to Yezd and Kirman. After that the route was uncertain. The goal was the Indian frontier, but whether via Nushki to the Quetta line or across Makrān to the North-Western Railway near Karachi was not decided. It is curious, now, to think that, when the scheme had advanced as far as it had, it should have collapsed, and that we should now be beginning to consider railways in Persia from an entirely different starting-point—namely, based upon Mesopotamia. As we see things at this moment, we can but wait and see what the issue brings forth. The fact that one great and strongly supported project has simply come to naught gives us the warning so familiar on our motor roads: "Drive slowly." In the winter of 1911-12 I went over to Paris with one or two influential Englishmen who were working in the interests of the Trans-Persian Railway. I was not an influential man myself, but I knew Persia. I attended a meeting in Paris of Russian promoters and French financiers. I was particularly struck on that occasion by the very perfect knowledge which a Russian engineer who was present showed of railway possibilities in Persia and the intimate acquaintance that he possessed with possible railway routes. What Russia had come down to Paris for at that moment was to interest France financially in the scheme, but France at that moment was not in the humour. The Russian representatives did not convince the French financiers that the subject was at that moment ripe for consideration. The great house of Baring took the affair in hand later, but before matters were duly settled the Great War broke out. I have not the slightest doubt that French financiers to-day, who see so very little chance of recovering any of their investments from Russia, are thankful that France did not support the Trans-Persian Railway. (Applause.)

When an entirely new railway scheme for Persia is promulgated before this Society, which for twenty years has been dealing with them, it is as well that the younger school of members, as well as the outside public, should have an outline of what the Society has done. I give below the lectures that have been delivered:

1904. "Railways in Western Asia."—Lieut.-Colonel H. Picot.

1905. "Russian Railways towards India."—Colonel C. E. de la P. Beresford.

1908. "The Future of British Relations with Persia."—Mr. H. F. B. Lynch.

1909. "A Railway from the Mediterranean to India."—Mr. C. E. D. Black.
1911. "The Proposed Trans-Persian Railway."—Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate.
1911. "Railways in the Middle East."—Mr. H. F. B. Lynch.
1911. "The Baghdad Railway."—M. Chéradame.
1919. "The Nushki-Sistan Railway."—Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Webb-Ware.

To these eight lectures should be added articles by Sir Hugh Barnes, Sir Louis Dane, and Mr. A. L. P. Tucker. Many members of the Central Asian Society, notably Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Sir George Lloyd (now Governor of Bombay), and Sir Hugh Barnes, dealt with the subject in letters and articles contributed to *The Near East*. These facts will make it clear that railway enterprise in Persia is a subject that the Central Asian Society has long made its own, and that nothing pleased it more than to invite the Persia Society to join the audience which has listened so keenly to Mr. Frank Grove's lecture and so thoroughly enjoyed his pictures.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is anyone else who wishes to speak we shall be very glad.

Mr. D. MELLOR: May I ask the lecturer about the railway running from Baghdad on the way to Kermanshah? I believe at present it ends at Quraitu. He mentioned that a portion of the line was to be dropped. Am I right in understanding that about twenty miles of the line are to be dropped altogether, or are they taking it twenty miles further on up into the mountains?

The LECTURER: In reply to the point raised as to the diversion of a portion of the existing railway from Baghdad to Quraitu, in order to get an easier gradient, it is generally understood that the joint station and commencement of the proposed railway into Persia would be at Khaniqin Village, and thus about twenty-three miles from Khaniqin Road Station to Quraitu would be diverted.

In reply to other points raised, I may say that the paper accentuated the fact—and it was evident on the map—of the central position of the line. As an extension of the Mesopotamian railways, at any rate, as far as Hamadan, it would be a beginning of a railway system in the centre of Persia, a development, of course, from the Irak railways. Such a railway, it was also evident on the map, would be capable of extension east and west. Further than that I am not prepared at the moment to make any statements. Those who know Persia know perfectly well that the barrier of mountains which surrounds the Persian Gulf forms a very serious obstacle to a line due south. With regard to the point raised by General Lubbock, I may say that the prospects of traffic, both passenger and goods, on the railway that is proposed are quite good. The amount of merchandise

handled by difficult, slow, and expensive transport is very considerable. Everybody must know that a town such as Hamadan or Kermanshah, of fifty or sixty thousand people, receives a very large amount of imported goods, and exports very considerably. The pilgrim traffic is very great; and then there are the prospects of development which I have referred to.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before asking you to give a vote of thanks to a lecturer for his lecture, it is usual for the Chairman to sum up the discussion, but as we have had no discussion, I am afraid I shall find some difficulty in summing it up. I can only say that I regret that I have not even read up the subject sufficiently to make any illuminating remarks. I think it is distinctly unfortunate that we should not have had a discussion on this matter, because the whole question of railway development in the Middle East is a most extremely interesting one, from the point of view not only of strategy but also of commerce; and Persia forms, as it were, the hub connecting the Caucasus, Turkestan, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Irak. As the lecturer has told us, the line that probably has the best commercial prospects is that leading up from Irak to Kermanshah and Hamadan, and so on to Tehran and Ispahan, which would be the eventual objectives of that line. But the real difficulty with Persia is this, that Persia is a country without a stable government, and without a stable government and without a reasonably dense population there can be no great development of any railway system in Persia for a great many years. We must await peace and order in the country before railway development can really have any good prospects. I regret that neither time nor my knowledge of the subject would in any way make it advantageous for me to prolong my remarks, and I therefore now end by asking you for a vote of thanks to the lecturer for describing that portion of the country with which he has been specially engaged, and which is of course the most important portion as regards railway development; though I regret that the part which most of us—at all events those who are connected with the East—know best does not come within the sphere of his lecture—I mean, of course, the Indian frontier line from Nushki with its present terminus at Duzdap in Persia. We, and when I say "we" I mean the Indian Government and the Indian commercial community, are more intimately interested with the eastern provinces of Persia than with the western; but that unfortunately does not come within the lecturer's purview. I will now ask you to record your vote of thanks to the lecturer for the interesting account he has given us. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks was heartily given, and the meeting closed.

# THE QANUN AL ARADHI

In accordance with the note following Mr. Howell's lecture on page 39 of the last number of the Journal, Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speech at that lecture is given here. It is much regretted that it was not received in time for publication with the lecture.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer: Colonel Howell was good enough to suggest that I should open the discussion on his paper, and I do so with the more pleasure as he is an old pupil of mine and one of whom I am very proud. The tables are now turned and we are all sitting at his feet here. We have all learned a great deal from the very lucid, humorous, and graphic account he has given us of the state of affairs in 'Iraq. His account is of great value not only to those who are concerned with the discharge of our responsibilities there, but to all interested in land revenue and settlement, and in fact to everyone interested in the administration of Eastern countries. For as Colonel Howell pointed out, in all the ancient empires the system of land-tenure and the system of land assessment were the two main factors of good government; they are the two tests which are invariably applied. Hence we find that so many of the great administrators of antiquity and of the Middle Ages owe their fame to the fact that they identified themselves with the reform of the system of land-tenure and land revenue assessment. The Gracchi brothers in ancient Rome, and Julius Cæsar and his nephew Augustus in Imperial Rome, were great land reformers. Later on we find Naushirwan in pre-Moslem Persia. I wonder Colonel Howell did not make a reference to him, for in the East his name is a household word; it is symbolical of justice. He was the first to fix the standard of measurement based on that of Cæsar which was to be applied in valuing land, and also the State share of the produce which was to be exacted from the holder of this land. These two measures protected the people from the exactions of dishonest officials. Passing on from him, we find the great Khalif Omar, who also identified himself in a remarkable degree with land reform by carrying on the principles of Naushirwan; and later on Akbar the Great owed his name and his fame in India very largely to the just and far-reaching land reforms which he inaugurated there. Coming to our own day, I suppose that Napoleon's reputation as an administrator rests to no small extent on his handling of the agrarian system in France and the establishment of a peasant proprietary.

On the other hand, I think we are all justified in accepting Colonel Howell's conclusion that where the empires of antiquity have failed, it is due mainly to the fact that they have not properly handled the two great problems of the system of land-tenure and land assessment. We have only to look to recent events to find that the French Revolution was brought about largely by a bad agrarian system, and the Russian Revolution we know was largely due to the fact that the Russian soldier at the Front was informed—rumours were brought to the effect —that the lands of the nobles and the Church were being divided, and the soldiers, being mainly peasants, bolted from the Front to go back to their villages and get their share of whatever land was going. There we have examples of two great revolutions of modern days largely precipitated by this agrarian question.

It is particularly interesting to find that in 'Iraq the system of land-tenure was hardly at all influenced by the Islamic religious law. In all Mohammedan countries we are accustomed to find Islamic religious law dominating everything; in 'Iraq it was calmly pushed aside and the matter left to local custom or the civil law. Exactly the same thing has happened in India, whether among Mohammedans or Hindoos. You will find those who live in the towns following with the greatest closeness the Hindoo or Mohammedan religious law. But the same people, directly they become associated with the land, throw the religious law aside and adopt the law or custom of the country. You ask a Syed what custom is followed as to the inheritance of land —whether that of the Sheriat which gives a share to women, or that of the country, which denies all share to women—he will say at once that he follows the custom of the country. In other words, though he won't say so, he disregards the Sheriat. It would be very interesting to have seen what system of rights in land would have been evolved by the nomadic tribes of Mesopotamia if they had been allowed to develop on their own lines. That development was retarded by the instability—economic, social, and political—which prevailed in Mesopotamia. But had they been given a chance it is not improbable that they would have evolved a system suited to local needs, a system somewhat similar to that of the nomadic tribes in North-Western India. Unfortunately one of those well-meaning doctrinaires who have done so much mischief in the world intervened with laws based not on what the people wanted, but what it was thought they should want, and Midhat Pasha thrust from above on the unfortunate 'Iraq the system of *tapoo*. A more unsuitable and unworkable system it would be hard to imagine. It was devised apparently in the interest of the bureaucracy of Constantinople or elsewhere, and imposed from above absolutely regardless of the wishes and traditions of the local people. Compare that with what we did in India. In India we have made many mistakes, but in this particular

matter I think we can comfort ourselves with the reflection that we have gone on the right lines. In all our system of land revenue assessment and tenures we have accepted and improved on the system we found in existence; we have worked not from above down but from below upwards. Our land records are based on enquiries made locally. The maps and records are prepared locally, in the village, by the expert local agency, and in the presence of and after enquiry from the people whose rights are in question; they are tested, also on the spot, by higher officials, and in the end are a miracle of accuracy. Colonel Howell has suggested that perhaps they are not a complete evidence of title. They are the recognized records of rights in land, and the courts are by law bound to assume, and do assume, that they are completely accurate until their inaccuracy is proved. The result is that they are usually accepted, and rightly accepted, as conclusive evidence of the title of the persons whose names are entered in those books as landlords and tenants, and of their liabilities to one another and to the State. Therefore to Colonel Howell, or anyone accustomed to the cheap and accurate system of land-records in India, it must have been heart-breaking to deal with this appalling *tapoo* system of 'Iraq. I daresay Colonel Howell often said what Lord Fisher said, that the best thing to do would be to scrap the lot and start all over again.

I will only say a few words about the land-revenue system, the Turkish system as described by him. The Turkish method of collection involves practically every form that we are accustomed to in India; and it is very curious to see how exactly those forms reproduce themselves in different countries. We get the form of division of the crop (*batai*), the State taking one-fifth more or less. We get the form of the appraisement of the crop (*kankut*, or tip) where it is valued standing. Then we get the money value of the crop on the ground, after it has been cut and thrashed; and then we go a stage further, and, instead of assessing the money value of the crop every year, we make a fixed cash assessment for a term of years. That is what we term in India a settlement. All these things prevail in 'Iraq as in India, but it is significant to find that the share taken by the actual cultivator in 'Iraq—a half—is almost always the same as in India, although the conditions are so different. It seems to be traditional that the man who cultivates the land shall receive half the crop at least. It is most rare to find him in India receiving less than half; often he receives a good deal more. Another interesting point is this: Colonel Howell has told us that after the cultivator's five-tenths and the headman's one-tenth have been separated off, the landlord takes two-tenths and the State two-tenths. That practically works out as in India, where in theory the landlord keeps one-half of the net assets for himself and pays one-half to the State.

Colonel Howell referred to the fact that our system in India is

largely based on the reforms introduced by Akbar, and he regretted the fact that Turkey, although it may have had a Sulieman the Magnificent, never had an Akbar the Great. I will read a few lines from the "Ain-i-Akbar," showing the lines on which Akbar carried out his reforms; you will be astonished at the breadth of vision and the interesting historical analogies they display. They also throw light on the history of the land question in other Mohammedan countries. These are taken from the Commentaries of Abu-l-Fazl. The first point is that Akbar, knowing the value of old authority in support of what he was doing, took Naushirwan as his model. He adopted the *bigha* standard of measurement, practically the same as the Roman Jugum: the square of a chain in lengths 60 "Cæsar's" yards of 33 inches—*i.e.*, 55 English yards. He took one-third of the produce as the State's share laid down by Naushirwan and followed by Omar. Abu-l-Fazl, in his treatise on taxes, tells us: "In former times the monarchs of Hindustan exacted the sixth of the produce of the lands; in the Turkish Empire the husbandman paid a fifth; in Turan the sixth; and in Iran the tenth. But at the same time there was levied a general poll tax which was called 'khoràj.' Naushirwan instituted a land measure of 60 square 'kaisari gaz,' and computing the produce of such a quantity of land to be a 'kifeez' valued at 3 *dirhams*, he determined that a third part should be the proportion of revenue.

"When the Khalifat descended to Omar he approved of the wisdom of Naushirwan, but introduced a few innovations. Latterly in Iran and Turan, Government has taken a tenth part of the produce of the soil, but at the same time the husbandman is loaded with a number of other taxes, which altogether exceed half the produce. In every kingdom, besides the land tax, Government exacts something from the property of every individual (a long list of these extra levies follows). But this mode of collection is destructive to the country and vexatious to the people. His Majesty therefore abolished all arbitrary taxes. He fixed the *gaz* (yard measure) and the *tenàl* (measuring chain) and the *bigha* ($\frac{5}{8}$ of an acre). After which he ascertained the value of the (produce of the) lands and fixed the revenue accordingly. . . . One-third part of the average produce of a *bigha* of each sort of land—good, middling, bad—is the State revenue fixed by His Majesty. What was exacted by Sher Khan (Akbar's Afghan predecessor) exceeded the present produce of the land."

Akbar took three kinds of land, as in Rome, took an average of what each would produce, and took one-third of that as the value of the produce. But he found it very difficult to assess on those lines from year to year, owing to the fact that the amount of the crop and the cash value were fluctuating. Therefore, after ten years' experience of collecting each year according to crop and prices, he fixed a regular

assessment. Taking the average assessment of ten years as his basis, he fixed that as the amount that each village should pay. That in practice is the origin of the system of land revenue administration which we are following in India to-day. Akbar's equitable system died away after him as the country fell into anarchy; but the roots were there; the tradition survived. It was not difficult to revive it. The system we derive from Akbar was derived by him from Omar, who derived it from Naushirwan, and has much in common with, even if not directly based on, the old Roman assessment and survey. For it is quite possible that the Persians and Arabs copied the Roman system.

The two things which have done most to justify our rule in India up to date are, firstly, we have made just distribution of the rights in the land, and have prepared an extremely accurate record of those rights. In the next place, we have placed on the land an assessment which is just and equitable, and the pitch of which in my experience has yearly been getting lower and lower. Akbar, the great reformer, took one-third of the produce and prided himself on his moderation; roughly we take one-eighth or one-tenth. The Native States of India take about double what the British Government takes. We hope that 'Iraq, under the Government which has now been established there, will be able to obtain and enjoy those two main elements of prosperity —that is, an equitable distribution of rights in the land with a good record of such rights and moderate assessments. For such work knowledge, experience, and sympathy are essential. If the new Government of 'Iraq are in a position to obtain the services of officers like Colonel Howell for work of that kind, they will be very well repaid by the increased prosperity and contentment of the people. (Applause.)

# THE ASSYRIAN ADVENTURE OF 1920

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN, C.M.G.,
Late Director of Repatriation in the Civil Government of Mesopotamia.

THE event forming the title of this paper was inaugurated from the Refugee Camp, Baqubah, Mesopotamia, of which I was in charge from June, 1919.

Prior to going to Baqubah, I had had a lengthy association with the Near and Middle East in various capacities—in fact, since 1912. I had only in the previous year (1918) completed a mission to Central Arabia, involving many months spent with Ibn Saoud, the ruler of Nejd, and to turn from this especial centre of Moslemism (the purest and most strict in every sense of the word) to dealing with Eastern Christians, of which the Baqubah Camp was composed, was indeed a remarkable change.

At Baqubah, twenty-seven miles east of Baghdad, there were assembled some 45,000 refugees of three categories. There were two categories of Assyrians and one of Armenians. The first two categories were mountaineer Assyrians, mostly Nestorian Christians from the mountains north of Mosul, and plainsmen from the neighbourhood of Lake Urmia in Persian territory. The story of how these Assyrians came to Mesopotamia has been related before now.*

The mountaineers having decided to throw in their lot against the Turks, took up arms some time after the war began, and fought the Turks with some success. As time went on, however, these mountaineers went short of arms and ammunition, and as the Russian pressure on the Turks declined, the Assyrians were forced away from their country. They managed, however, to effect a junction with their Urmian brethren, who had actually joined the Russians and had taken up arms with them. After the second Russian retirement from Turco-Persian localities, the united Assyrians were left in the lurch. They defended Urmia with great resolution, but, being assailed on all sides by Kurds, Turks, and even Persians, they had to evacuate Urmia, and made their way, with all their families and belongings, to a district

* Full historical and other details connected with the Baqubah refugees and their movements will be found in the printed reports of the Colonial Office (formerly India Office), under No. 36,170 of December 4, 1919, and October, 1921, compiled by Lieut.-Colonel F. Cunliffe-Owen and Mr. H. L. Charge.

where they hoped to get in touch with the British. On their way they were joined by a large number of Armenians from the Van and Caucasian localities. This combined mass of people eventually got into touch with the British near Sian-Kaleh, and were sheltered behind our lines of communication.

During their retreat numbers of people of both sexes were killed or died, but, as I have said, some 45,000 got through, and, as these people could not be maintained or supplied in the forward area, they were gradually shepherded down to Baqubah. Here they were on a line of railway by which they could be fed, and a vast camp was set up for them on the Diyala River.

This camp was installed on the most approved lines of military management. Water-supply was laid on, ample rations issued, and large supervising medical and administrative staffs established. In the early months these refugees naturally required some rest and recuperation, but when I joined the camp they were in the most healthy and vigorous condition, and the time had arrived when efforts had to be made to reduce the cost of this vast undertaking. Concurrently with my arrival, the supervising staff was reduced to a great extent, and shortly after my arrival I got rid of almost all the expensive European and Indian personnel, and replaced them by refugees themselves. However, this was not enough, and some means had to be devised of either repatriating these people or making them to a certain extent self-supporting. The difficulty about repatriation lay in the fact that the conditions in the country from which they came were still very disturbed. Operations were in progress against various Kurdish recalcitrant elements to the north of Mosul, while in the Urmian Persian localities the conditions were still worse. As for the Armenians, no one would receive them overseas at any spot where they could reach their former homes.

As regards the other problem, that of making the refugees self-supporting, any project on these lines involved a large outlay, and such was not worth while except for permanent habitation. Only a very small proportion was skilled in any form of work other than agricultural. There were, too, comparatively large numbers of women and children and old persons. Generally speaking, the men showed strong disinclination for settled work; any parties that were sent out to work compulsorily with Government Departments were unsatisfactory. However, by the institution of camp industries in a small way, gardens and forage farms, a certain return was being got in by the end of 1919, and the cost of the camp, originally about 18 lakhs per month, was reduced to about 9 lakhs per month. At the beginning of 1920 the position in the Mosul area had improved, and it was felt that some determined attempt must be made for repatriation.

The difficulty about the Assyrians was that they had no reliable

leaders, and no unanimity among the various elements to effect repatriation as a whole. It was possible to place them in a zone of country north of and quite close to our administrative line of the Mosul vilayet, but when this was put to the people no willing acquiescence was obtained. Some of the mountaineers would listen to no plan other than going back to their own particular regions under British protection. Others would not leave the present line of British occupation, and nothing would satisfy the Urmians but to go back to Urmia. None of them could understand why the British were not prepared to send an armed force to install them in their old territories and occupy the country.

The nominal, or rather theoretical, headship of the mountaineer Assyrians had been vested in the Nestorian Patriarchate of the House of Mar Shimmun. This Patriarchate was an offshoot of the old-time See of Antioch, but had diverted from it to follow the tenets of Nestorius. With the Turks, it was customary to deal with the subject races through the spiritual heads, and hence the Patriarchal family came to be regarded as the representatives of the Assyrian communities within the Turkish dominions. The Mar Shimmun, however, who was in office in 1915 was murdered under circumstances of great treachery by Simko, one of the Kurdish chieftains against whom the Assyrians were engaged in the operations around Urmia during the retreat. The successor was not of the same stamp, and was, moreover, an invalid, and incapable of exercising much leadership. This fact, coupled with the wanderings of the Assyrians and their prolonged absence from their old homes, caused the Patriarchal influence to wane. Also, the Urmian groups, being Persian subjects, acknowledged the Patriarchal influence in but a slight degree.

The Patriarch's sister, Surma Khanum, in somewhat less disturbed times, might well have been looked to in a directing sense. Her name is well known to many in England, as she came to this country in the autumn of 1919 to plead the cause of the Assyrian nation. She was received in all the influential circles and remained at home until the autumn of 1920. An educated and exceedingly intelligent lady, she would, no doubt, have achieved great things for her nation had the times been more propitious. As it turned out, however, her prolonged absence rather augmented the disunion of the people, and, after all, what they really needed was a determined and single-eyed male leader, capable of welding all the diverse elements together.

Under these circumstances one Agha Petros came forward. He was by origin a mountaineer from the Baz country, who had latterly travelled a good deal, and finished up by owning property in Urmia. Rather a mysterious personage, he had attained some eminence before the war, and during the war had done some good work in conducting the Assyrian retreat. He was, though, of a different religious per-

suasion to the Nestorians, and was strongly hostile to any temporal power being accorded to the Patriarchate, but as certain sections of people were strongly attached to him he came forward with a project to reconcile the various conflicting wishes by compromise. He proposed that the mountaineers and Urmians should combine to regain part of their former territory and form a combined Assyrian nation from the refugees at Baqubah, who would be afterwards joined by the large numbers who were still in the Caucasus, near Tabreez, and in America. He recognized that it would be impossible to return to their full former mountain habitat, but that it would be possible for the Assyrians, if suitably provided with arms as a precautionary measure, to regain the mountain country from near Gawar eastwards, where they would actually join up with the Urmians who would return to Urmia. It was recognized that this project was feasible of execution providing the Assyrians were united, and if they arrived in these localities they could claim to return to their own homes without necessarily fighting. As for the Persian Urmian subjects, they only asked of the Persian Government to return to their former properties peaceably, and would engage to hand in all arms if the other inhabitants did likewise. Agha Petros stipulated for certain armaments and initial supplies, after which he would be responsible for the movement under the benevolent encouragement of the British. He secured the adherence of the whole of the Urmian community and of about two-thirds of the mountaineers, and under these auspices, and with a hope of obtaining the establishment of an Assyrian nation, the proposal was agreed to.

If some such project were not entertained, it was probable that all hope for a future Assyrian nation would disappear, and, as events transpired, this forecast was correct.

It was decided to give Agha Petros an equivalent of rifles to that which was originally in the possession of the Assyrians when they were disarmed at Baqubah, to fit them out with certain material and transport, and to transfer them as a preliminary measure to a camp north of Mosul.

With the small staff available this was a large undertaking, but such were the assistance and support accorded to me by Sir Arnold Wilson, the then Civil Commissioner, that the first section of the people with their families left Baqubah at the end of April, 1920, and were conveyed by rail and march to a camp at Mindan, on the Ghasir Su River, about twenty-seven miles north-east of Mosul. It was anticipated that all the sections, each one consisting of about 1,200 persons, would arrive at Mindan by about the end of June, and this would give ample time for the men to proceed forward and to prepare a way for the women and children to follow later. Events proceeded according to plan up to the middle of May (when I myself left for Mosul), and

we had then about five sections of people collected. I made arrangements for an advance camp near Akra for the armed men, where, too, a supply dump could be formed for the forward movement. The men were also organized in proper parties, and comprehensive arrangements made for food-supplies and issue of material.

It was at the end of May, however, that a serious hitch occurred owing to the Arab attacks on the Mosul-Baghdad railway line. I managed to return to Baqubah to ascertain the position and returned again to Mosul at the end of June, but it was not until the middle of July that movements were resumed.

After a small respite the attacks on the line commenced afresh, and again matters were held up; however, additional preparations were still made in the forward area. Early in August I again went to Baqubah, and with great difficulty initiated further resumption of movements with all due and necessary precautions, only to be again confronted with further and still more serious difficulties. After a few days at Baqubah, and when the movement was again in full swing, I found a column of troops arriving near our camp, Arab disturbances having apparently occurred beyond the river. It took all our energies at Baqubah to help this column with transport, working parties, and detrainment.

After two days this column, after engaging in some not altogether successful operations on the far bank of the river, suddenly commenced to withdraw to Baghdad. Concurrently with this the political authorities came into my camp and informed me that the rebels were entering Baqubah town, there being merely a small detachment of native infantry left behind to guard the Baqubah railway bridge. No word came from Baghdad as to how I was to defend the camp, nor with what means. The camp perimeter was some seven miles in extent, and a large part of it was under close rifle range from the opposite bank of the river.

By chance a small proportion of the rifles allotted for the repatriation movement had been retained temporarily by me at Baqubah, but the majority of our rifles were discarded Winchester weapons of 1866, with defective ammunition, and of ammunition for the few modern rifles there were only ten rounds per rifle. Soon we came under a continuous and sustained fire from across the river, involving many casualties in the hospital and the transport lines, which for the sake of a convenient water-supply were close to the river. I organized the defence in sections as far as possible, but the difficulty was that at that time of the year parties of Arabs could cross the river both above and below the camp. Parties did so cross, and day and night we had to watch these and drive them off. Added to this, with so few British personnel, it was difficult to prevent the refugees firing away all their ammunition. Telegrams were despatched to Baghdad, in the interval of the line being cut, to get more arms and ammunition. After three

days a consignment was despatched, only to be derailed five miles from the camp station. I took a mounted party of refugees, who succeeded in dispersing the Arabs and rescuing the consignment, which was brought in by hand. From this point offensive measures were undertaken, and the Arabs within a radius of about eight miles learned a wholesome lesson from the refugees; villages were burnt and arms and prisoners were captured. After this the situation was relieved by the arrival of a regiment, only to be again rendered grave by the reports of large fresh assemblages of Arabs arriving, released by the fall of Shah Roban. The defence, however, was successfully maintained, though the supply of rations was becoming a difficulty, and the whole camp was on half scale.

It was now decided, largely on account of the food difficulty, that the camp should be evacuated. The remainder of the Assyrians were consequently sent on up to Mosul, and the Armenians were despatched to near Basrah, where they could await shipment overseas at some future date. With the fighting still in progress, this movement required considerable adjustment, together with the dismantling of the camp and the salvaging of all the stores. Day and night these movements were carried on, with the result that the camp was practically evacuated by the beginning of September.*

Meanwhile, at Mosul, the delay in keeping the refugees at Mindan with large numbers of arms in their hands caused some trouble with local authorities, added to which the interim camp near Akra was attacked by the Surchi Kurds. The Assyrians themselves dealt with these most successfully and chased them back to their villages, capturing large quantities of stock. The Assyrian parties moving up to the line were also attacked at intervals.

After a rapid rush down to Basrah to see the Armenians installed, I lost no time in then hastening back to Mosul, where, notwithstanding the difficulties, I pushed Agha Petros on to complete his arrangements. I found him extremely dilatory, but by my personal efforts, and with those of my assistants, we got some sort of organization into the parties, and fixed a date for the forward movement. Some of the most important material had, however, still been hung up in Baghdad, and I had once again to return to see about this. On my arrival at Baghdad I was informed that, owing to the departure of the Civil Commissioner (whose help and advice had never failed me in all these movements), and the arrival of the new High Commissioner, instructions had been given to suspend the repatriation movement until the actual orders of the latter had been taken.

The season was getting very advanced, and there was no time to

* The above operations and defence of Baqubah Camp were dismissed in the military despatch of the G.O.C. in the following words: "As for the refugees at Baqubah, they were well armed [!] and could look after themselves [!]"

lose if the project was to be carried through. I accordingly went down the river to meet Sir Percy Cox, and put the matter before him. He was most sympathetic, and gave sanction to carry on the policy of his predecessor, and with this sanction I returned to Mosul. I found Agha Petros had again done little in my absence, but I urged him on to such effect that, by October 19, we managed to get all the armed men assembled with transport and with reserve food for three months in the forward camp near Akra. This assembly made really a very good appearance, there being some 6,000 armed men grouped according to their tribes, under their respective banners of red crosses on a white ground, and something like 2,500 pack-mules.

In co-operation and agreement with the local Kurdish chiefs of the immediate neighbourhood we moved forward through Akra and ascended the Akra-Dagh. From there, according to plan, at the limits of our occupied territory, I left the expedition entirely in the hands of Agha Petros ; two British officers, however, remained with it to watch events, and report to me as to progress, according to the lines agreed upon.

The country immediately across the Akra-Dagh was nominally in our administrative sphere, but in reality it was occupied (up to across the Zab) by the Surchi and Zibari Kurds, who were hostile to us, and upon whose leader a price had been set by the British Government for the murder of the late Mr. Bill.

These particular Kurds, as anticipated, opposed the Assyrian advance, but were easily brushed aside, and the expedition moved into the Barzan country successfully. Here was reached the limit of our administrative sphere, and Agha Petros, according to plan, should have moved, negotiating as he went, towards Neri, and thence north-east and east.

Unfortunately, as it turned out, a large body of his mountaineer people got out of hand. The temptation to branch off westwards towards their actual former country was too strong for them, and, in addition, their old habits of pillaging and looting asserted themselves. Agha Petros, in consequence, lost control of this his best category of fighting men, and his weaker Urmian category were left in the lurch. What Agha Petros had in effect actually promised these mountaineers is even now not altogether clear, but it is probable that he had promised one thing to them and another thing to the Urmians. However, the upshot was that, after some weeks, Agha Petros and those who had followed him doubled back to Mindan Camp, and the recalcitrant contingent, after securing various booty among our friendly Kurds, circled round and, unable to make their way to their own Tiari country, percolated back into the Mosul vilayet by way of Amadia.

Thus unfortunately ended this enterprise, upon which so much care and trouble had been expended. We had endeavoured to give the Assyrians a chance of national unity in a suitable zone of their own,

and it was worth making the attempt, as otherwise there would always have been the reproach against us of lack of sympathetic treatment to this small nation, which had, to a large extent, been sacrificed in the war. The result, however, only showed what had all along been seen as the danger, that, as in the case of so many of the Eastern nationalities striving for liberation, there is no cohesion and no unity of aim among the component parts.

Having regard alone to British interests, the establishment of a strong and united element on the borders of our occupied territory must have been a safeguard to us. Their interests are our interests, and there would be an absence of that potential hostility which cannot help being inherent in certain of our Moslem neighbours. This is, of course, not to say that our policy should have been to turn out such of the Moslems as were installed there.

Furthermore, had this Assyrian movement succeeded, the Armenian Christians from Baqubah could have been passed through to unite with the large numbers in the Caucasus, and give added strength and extent to the then existing Armenian Erivan State.

After the return of the Agha Petros expedition, the season was too advanced to do much in the way of alternative repatriation measures, but it was found possible—not, however, without some grumbling—to settle some 1,200 families on the land just north of Mosul. These families consisted of those who were all along averse to Agha Petros' scheme, but it required some moving to get them away from the comforts of the refugee camp. As spring approached preparations were commenced to get the above amplified and so finally dispose of the refugee camp. As was customary each group of persons asked for different settlement. Nothing would induce the Urmians to settle on the land, while, as regards the mountaineers, some only were agreed to follow the above-mentioned families; Agha Petros' following remained obdurate, and would listen to nothing except again to make their way by force of arms to their old homes. On account of the misdeeds of these people in the late expedition it was not possible to let them embark again upon such an adventure.

By the end of May that contingent which was willing to settle down peaceably commenced joining those who had previously gone in the neighbourhood of Dohuk and Akra, and the first-named settlements were extended, by arrangement with the existing Kurdish elements, into country a good way to the north of Dohuk and to our nominal administrative border. The other mountaineer families were cleared out of camp on fixed dates, and given equal allotment of stock and subsistence grant to the "willing" families. After some continued stubbornness these people realized that they must accept the reasonable measures taken for them, and they eventually joined up more or less in the neighbourhood of the others.

As for the Urmians, they would hear of nothing but return to

Urmia. They were accordingly given a grant in money equivalent to what the mountaineers had received, and were left to make the best of their way into Persia via Hamadan. The Persians at first turned these people back, although they were their own subjects, but now they are managing to filter through with a certain proportion remaining in Mesopotamia, where they found suitable work, and others joining relatives in America.

The upshot of the above is that instead of a united Assyrian nation of some 100,000 persons, which the first scheme contemplated, the Assyrians are now split up separately—some 15,000 are congregated in the settlements north of Mosul, where, notwithstanding their former continued protestations, they are living in amity with the Kurds under our ægis, and have provided a substantial contingent for the frontier levies.

As the Middle East resumes more peaceable conditions and the different nationalities see that, notwithstanding their religious differences, it is yet possible to live side by side with one another, these settlements of the Assyrians may yet form the nucleus to which the nation as a whole might attach itself.

As for the Armenian category, so often mentioned in the foregoing, they are at last in transit to Batum, but it is unfortunately the case that they contain at least one-third among their number of incapable persons who must be a permanent charge on some authority or other.

Inasmuch as the upkeep and repatriation measures of the Assyrian and Armenian refugees in Mesopotamia have cost the British Government 500 lakhs of rupees, it is hoped the benevolence of this very considerable outlay is fully appreciated and realized.

# THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO TURKISTAN, 1918–20

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W. 1, on Tuesday, January 24, 1922, the Right Hon. Lord CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.M.G., in the chair, when a lecture was given by Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleson, K.C.I.E., C.B., on "The British Mission to Turkistan, 1918–20."

The CHAIRMAN: I will now call on Colonel Yate to read the names of those who have been elected as Members of the Society.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): I have to announce we have to-day elected thirteen new Members: The Right Hon. the Earl of Lytton, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, K.C.M.G., C.B., Lieut.-General Sir Richard Wapshare, K.C.B., C.S.I., Sir William Sheppard, K.C.I.E., Major Francis Humphrys, C.I.E., H.B.M. Minister at Kabul, Major L. C. Thuillier, I.A., Dr. H. R. Hall, F.S.A., of the British Museum, Major H. M. Wightwick, Bombay Political Department, Captain F. C. de L. Kirk, K.A.R., Captain A. H. Roberts, Mr. Brasher, Mr. A. C. Sampson, M.C.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now my pleasing duty to introduce to you Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleson, who was head of the British Mission in Turkistan from 1918 to 1920. I do not think, as far as I am aware, that much information ever reached the press or public in regard to this Mission; and, therefore, I am sure that it will be with great interest and curiosity that we shall listen to General Sir Wilfrid Malleson on the matter.

# THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO TURKISTAN, 1918-20

By Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleson (*January* 24, 1922).

It will obviously be impossible, in the short space of one hour, to describe the crowded events of two eventful years, on hardly one day of which period there did not happen something both interesting and important. In what follows, therefore, it will only be possible to give you the barest *précis* of the work of the Mission.

In June, 1918, I was summoned to Simla, and informed that I had been appointed head of a Mission to Turkistan, and was to proceed immediately to Meshed, where the Mission was in process of formation. The object of the Mission was to check as far as possible the Turkish and German designs to penetrate, via Baku and Krasnovodsk, with the active assistance or tacit consent of the Bolsheviks then in control of Turkistan, to the Afghan frontier, where their object was to bring pressure to bear on Afghans and tribesmen alike to embark on a religious war against the British in India. The times were critical. In France the German armies had penetrated far beyond the lines held by us in 1917. There was as yet no sign of any counter-offensive by the Allies. Nothing was happening on the Salonika front; Allenby had not yet started on his wonderful campaign in Palestine; whilst the Turk was pushing fast towards Baku, and German troops, with a corps headquarters in Tiflis, had disembarked in the Caucasus as a stiffening to that "Army of Islam" which, hordes of enemy agents had for months been proclaiming through the bazaars of Central Asia, was about to undertake the liberation of the East from the clutches of the brutal English Imperialists. Enemy missions—German, Turkish, and Austrian—were in Kabul and Herat. Great pressure was being put on the Amir Habibullah to declare a holy war. In fact, the opinion of those in high places at Simla was that it needed the appearance of but a detachment of German or Turkish troops on the Northern frontiers of Afghanistan to precipitate a *jihad* against us which, in view of India's commitments in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, would have been extremely awkward. In short, the Government of India could hardly sleep at nights owing to these various possibilities, and the Mission which I was about to join was only one of the steps taken with a view to mitigating the obvious perils of the situation.

Having with some difficulty obtained the assistance of one officer, I started on the long journey to Meshed. At that time the Nushki line had been extended to Mirjawa, close to the Persian frontier. Thence to Meshed the route was difficult, as the magnificent road made by

Colonel Dickson did not come till much later. The heat was intense, as much as 128° in the shade, and there was a great scarcity of potable, or even of any water, along the first part of the route. We travelled in Ford lorries, starting at daybreak, carrying food and water with us, and pushing ahead until it was too dark to go further. Thus to Turbat-i-Haidari, some eighty miles south of Meshed, beyond which it was stated cars could not go. Eventually we reached Meshed in what was stated to be the then record time from India. At any rate, the journey called forth a special telegram of congratulation from the Commander-in-Chief in India, which I particularly desire to mention here, inasmuch as it was the only word of commendation that the Mission received from anyone in authority during the whole of the two years I was with it!

My orders were, roughly, to take all possible steps to obviate the dangers already alluded to. I was to get into touch with any elements likely to be of use to us. I was to give all possible assistance to such elements. My financial powers were unlimited, according to my orders, but actually a very acute lack of cash, both in India and Persia, made them extremely small.

From the moment of my arrival in Meshed events began to move fast. We were already in touch with some Social Revolutionary Russian elements in Transcaspia who were hostile to the designs cherished by the Germans and their Bolshevik allies. But, before these negotiations could proceed very far, the railway workmen of Transcaspia had already taken matters into their own hands and made a clean sweep of all the Bolshevik officials for the whole distance between the Caspian and the Oxus. They had been driven into this action by the bloodthirsty methods of the Bolshevik *commissars*, who, moreover, neglected to pay them any wages. Had this movement, which was unorganized and quite precipitate, been better co-ordinated, it might have altered the subsequent history of Central Asia to a considerable extent. But, as all the anti-Bolshevik elements beyond the Oxus were unprepared for the *coup*, and the Bolsheviks were the only party actually in possession of an armed force, the revolting railwaymen, after crossing the Oxus, soon found themselves on the defensive. At this juncture they appealed to me for military assistance. We had at this time a few troops on the Perso-Russian frontier, and a few more in Meshed, a mere handful all told. Moreover, they were not under the Mission, but belonged to the East Persian cordon, whose headquarters were at Birjand. However, these were now placed at my disposal. They were seriously deficient in important articles of equipment, and had nothing like their proper complement of ammunition, but the troops, the 28th Light Cavalry and 19th Punjabis, were magnificent material and led by exceptionally able and gallant officers. It now became a matter for serious and immediate consideration whether

this little detachment should be launched over the Russian frontier with a view to supporting the workmen of Transcaspia against the avenging Bolshevik hordes. The Simla reply to my references on the subject was that I was on the spot and had a free hand. Now, a free hand from the Government of India as then constituted was in the nature of a gift from the Greeks. If all went well some gentlemen in easy-chairs on a hill-top 2,000 miles away would appropriate the credit. If, on the other hand, the throw miscarried, or if the venture were subsequently adversely criticized in Parliament or the press, then the unfortunate man on the spot might be quite certain that he would be spurned and repudiated and thrown remorselessly to the wolves. Moreover, although not in the least afraid of responsibility, and confident from reports received that our splendid troops would have no trouble in adequately dealing with the Bolshevik rabble, the Mission felt that the issue was too large to be decided by subordinate officers, inasmuch as our crossing the Russian frontier would constitute a definite act of war against the Bolsheviks, and we were not at all certain whether Simla realized this or whether such a course was in accordance with the policy of H.M. Government. However, it was so decided, and our troops crossed the border and were almost immediately engaged with the Bolshevik forces, which by this time had arrived at a spot almost due north of Meshed. I have no time, unfortunately, to describe the military operations. It must suffice to say that four times we were attacked, and each time repulsed the enemy with loss. Our allies were a mixture of railway workmen, a few regular Russian officers, and a motley gathering of Turkman. The latter could have put much larger numbers in the field, but the Russian elements were averse to arming numbers, as they were in doubt whether the Turkman might not subsequently turn on them.

Meanwhile events were moving fast on the Caspian side. The Turks were almost in the suburbs of Baku when General Dunsterville's troops took a hand in the defence of that place. They came too late, were in too small numbers, and generally were inadequately supported to hold the place. Baku fell, and at once the hordes of enemy agents announced the imminent coming of the Army of Islam which was to free Asia from the British yoke. But General Dunsterville's occupation of Baku, short though it was, had enabled him to obtain control of the Caspian fleet, which was decisive so far as enemy plans were concerned. Without the fleet there could be no transport of troops across the Caspian. Nevertheless the situation remained serious. The Turks advanced from the Tabriz direction, and the G.O.C. in Mesopotamia became concerned regarding his long line of communications between Bagdad and Enzeli on the Caspian coast. Just at this critical time, however, the war in more distant theatres took a dramatic turn in our favour. In France the Allies were carrying everything before

them. In Italy the Austrian *débâcle* had begun. From Salonika the Allies were advancing with great success. In Palestine General Allenby was defeating the Turks in a campaign reminiscent of that of Jena. There quickly followed the armistice with Turkey, and the danger from the Army of Islam ceased to exist. On our side of the Caspian, however, we had been not unprepared for the worst. You all probably know that the whole area from Krasnovodsk to the Oxus is a waterless desert tempered by small and widely separated oases. Invading troops, unprepared with the enormous amount of animal transport which would be necessary, would consequently have to depend on the railway. This, had the necessity arisen, we should have been able to deny them. In granting assistance to the Transcaspian people it was an essential part of the terms agreed upon that, in the event of a hostile descent on the eastern shores of the Caspian, the railway should be handed over to us. We were prepared to destroy the wharves, lighters, and other facilities at Krasnovodsk; to evacuate its inhabitants inland; to destroy the reserves of oil fuel maintained for locomotives; and to cut off the water supply, not only at Krasnovodsk, but for a long distance inland. We were to remove or destroy all rolling stock, blow up bridges and culverts, carry away the points, and even as much of the track itself as was possible in the time available. General Dunsterville was our first line of defence against the Turko-German plans; our Mission was the second. Had he failed to obtain control of the Caspian fleet we should have hoped that the measures taken by us would have made it quite impossible, at any rate for many months, for any hostile force to approach within 300 miles of the Afghan frontier.

Time does not allow of my describing in any detail the rest of our experiences in Turkistan. In October our troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the Bolsheviks at Dushakh, and the latter retired hurriedly for more than a hundred miles. We advanced to Merv. The Government of India became anxious that our presence in that area, which was not a bit nearer Afghanistan than Meshed itself—rather further off, in fact—might cause apprehension in Kabul. I was ordered to retire to the districts on the railway near the Persian frontier. I pointed out that winter was coming on; that the whole country between Askabad and Merv afforded no shelter for our troops, having been destroyed by the Bolsheviks; that already the temperature was very low; and that, moreover, any such retirement would have a disastrous moral effect, and would almost certainly lead to an immediate Bolshevik advance. The only reply I got from Simla was the reiteration of former orders and instructions to make the best arrangements for shelter I could. This in a desert of sand, without timber or stone or even water in many places, and without any adequate supply or hospital arrangements! However, the Home Government came to

my rescue, overruled the Government of India, pointed out that our staying in Merv was the best means of supporting Transcaspia, and, in fact, that we were to stay there. And so we passed the winter in Merv and Bairam Ali, where the Brigadier's headquarters were in the private palace of the Tsar.

In January, 1919, the Mission passed from the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India to that of General Milne at Constantinople. That officer shortly afterwards came to Transcaspia and inspected the position at the front and discussed local matters with the Mission. It was evident that we should not remain indefinitely in Turkistan. The British Army was being demobilized, the expenses were great, and it was abundantly clear that the local inhabitants were quite content that we should do the fighting for them whilst they took their ease. The Russians were always claiming that they numbered 250,000 in the province. General Milne countered by asking how it was that out of such a large Russian population there were less than 200 men at the front. In February I received orders that we were to evacuate the country "forthwith." I pointed out that to carry out these orders literally might lead to serious trouble. The Bolsheviks would seize the occasion to advance directly they learnt we were no longer opposing them; many of the Russians at the front would desert to them, the rest would probably bolt. The railway workmen would refuse to work the railway; and local Bolshevik elements, which had always been in our midst, would cause trouble, and we might have great difficulty in effecting a safe and orderly withdrawal. Moreover, I felt that we could not summarily leave in the lurch those who had for so long been relying on us and who, to a man, had interpreted the British declaration to the Russian peoples as being a definite pledge that we were going to support them. Accordingly I asked, firstly, that the orders be kept secret for the present until I had prepared a suitable atmosphere for their promulgation, and, secondly, stated that I anticipated being able to effect the withdrawal, if allowed to carry it out in my own way, by the end of March. General Milne supported me in these matters and the suggestions were approved.

There was much to be done. In the first instance I arranged with the Brigadier to withdraw unostentatiously all surplus baggage, to evacuate all sick and wounded, and to hand over stores too bulky to carry and no longer likely to be of use to us to the local troops. I sent the local War Minister with a portmanteau full of notes to Baku to raise troops—good ones, if possible, but, at any rate, something to send to the front and inspire confidence on our side and lead the Bolsheviks to believe that heavy reinforcements were arriving, and that an advance was imminent. Later, when I had divulged secretly to the local Government the fact of our impending withdrawal—a communication which caused great consternation and the resignation

of three ministers—I caused to be widely spread by the many agents we had in and behind the Bolshevik lines rumours that the British were up to some deep move, which would probably take the shape of an ostentatious departure from the Merv front, but that in reality they were contemplating a wide detour by a line of wells north of the railway, right round the Bolshevik flank, that they would cross the Oxus, then very low, below Charjui, and that, when thus right across the Bolshevik line of communications, the Russians and Turkman on the Merv front, largely reinforced from Denikin's armies in the Northern Caucasus, would advance on Charjui from the west whilst the British descended on it from the east. These stories, and many others which we put about almost daily, evidently made so great an impression on the Bolsheviks that they never attempted to advance when we did leave the front. Indeed, they had packed their baggage and sent it to the rear, whilst their main body at Charjui lived in a state of nervous apprehension for many weeks.

When the time at length came when I had to make public the news of our impending withdrawal, I was inundated every day by deputations from every class of the community, begging for delay, for reconsideration of the orders, and so on. I was not able to give these poor people, who already had suffered much from both classes of Russians, the old régimists and the Bolsheviks, very much in the way of comfort. The Turkman of every class, the Yamuts from the Caspian, the Tekke of the central oases, the Salors from the regions south of Merv, were pathetically insistent on their desire that we should remain. Indeed, a British protectorate was what they all reckoned as their probable greatest happiness. During the months the British had been in the country, despite the disturbed conditions, the high prices and general scarcity, they had enjoyed, they said, greater justice than they had experienced for forty years. Tsarists and Bolsheviks were equally obnoxious to them. They had always heard much of the benign aspects of British rule in the East; now they had experienced it they wished their country permanently to become part of the British Empire. If our troops, indeed, must go, in pursuance of orders from higher authority, surely I alone might stay in their country to see justice done. They would provide an escort; and much more to the same effect. No doubt much of what they said was due to the certain knowledge that our troops alone had saved them during many months from being overrun and devastated once more by the Bolsheviks. But this was not all. I am sure they had a real liking and respect for us. The gallant behaviour of our troops in the field, their good conduct at all times, the fact that we had been able to get altered or altogether cancelled many Russian restrictions which the Turkman found harmful or invidious, my insistence that two out of the five members of the local Government should be of

Turkman race, and many other little things in which we had been able to help them, had begotten a genuine liking both for British institutions and individuals. However sorely they may have felt regarding what they regarded as our abandonment of them and their cause, they bore us no ill feeling regarding it. We were merely carrying out orders. Not only did we part as friends, but I am confident that for many a year to come the prestige of British troops and the justice of British officers will be subjects of conversation in the *auls* of the Turkman deserts.

Our evacuation proceeded almost "according to plan." There was some slight delay in procuring the necessary rolling stock, and one or two palms had to be greased. On the evening of April 1, one day behind schedule, the last Indian troops marched out from Askabad towards the Persian frontier. Simultaneously the last British troops entrained at Askabad for Krasnovodsk. Our withdrawal was accomplished. It had been a difficult and delicate task, carrying the seeds of much trouble and complication. All these had been successfully surmounted. We left without friction, and with the front intact. We thought it might have been somebody's business to say that this difficult operation had been well done. But the move was evidently regarded as being one of no more moment than a change of cantonments in India during peace-time. No one in authority made any sign. It is this sort of thing which does so much harm in the Indian Army. The neglect of the higher authorities to bestow a word of praise to troops who have thoroughly deserved it makes those troops, in their turn, come to the conclusion that the praise of such authorities is not worth having. But Simla has a bad reputation in this respect. More than ever out of touch with the army, it is slow to praise, but quick to criticize and to blame. The difference between serving under Constantinople and Simla, for instance, was most marked. From the former we were always sure of a courteous and sympathetic hearing. Our needs were well attended to. Every branch of the Constantinople commander's staff, as well as General Milne himself, came to see us and do their utmost for us. No one from Simla throughout the whole period I am dealing with ever came as far as Meshed even. And no sooner were we back in that place than once more we became liable to receive the savage and ferocious official messages for which Simla is famous, and which, in the investigations of the Mesopotamian Committee of Enquiry during the war, caused so much surprise in Parliament and the Press.

The day after our evacuation I left Askabad for Meshed. Almost at once we got news of the risings in the Punjab and elsewhere. There followed speedily the Afghan War. Had the Afghans on our side displayed any vigour they might have made things unpleasant for us. With ten or twelve thousand Afghans in Herat threatening our

communications our position might have been serious. However, it is seldom realized in Simla that Western Afghanistan as a rule does not look upon things with the same eye as Kabul. Most of the people are Shiahs, and, as the official Afghans of the East were tactless enough to engage on some serious massacres of Shiahs in Kandahar and elsewhere, we were able to make much capital of this. The Herat garrison was never a danger to us. In fact, I imagine that it was much more afraid of us than we were of it. Now began what was undoubtedly the most important and most interesting task of the Mission. Early in the day we were able to report to India the despatch of letters from the Amir and his Foreign Secretary to the Bolsheviks, announcing the independence of Afghanistan and their desire for friendly relations. The Bolsheviks were quick to seize upon so excellent an opportunity for harming the one country which, in their estimation, stands between them and their dream of universal anarchy. One Bravin, who had formerly posed as Bolshevik Minister to Persia, was selected to proceed on a special mission to Kabul. It became our task to do everything possible to prevent the consummation of Afghan and Bolshevik plans for an offensive and defensive alliance, and as a preliminary we laid ourselves out to "queer the pitch" of Bravin. In a series of communications, which, despite increasingly rigorous guards on the respective frontiers, almost invariably circulated freely amongst the people we desired they should reach, we pointed out to the Afghans that, in view of the notorious faithlessness of the Bolsheviks, they should, before admitting such dangerous people to the God-granted kingdom, extract from them suitable pledges. What more suitable than the restitution to Afghanistan of the Panjdeh district filched from them in 1885? And what more agreeable act of justice to the Bolsheviks than such restitution—the Bolsheviks, who never tired of denouncing the iniquitous, land-grabbing Imperialism of the former Tsarist Governments? The bait was swallowed. Bravin was asked what the Bolsheviks meant to do about it. He promised restitution. The Bolshevik Government, perhaps not going as far as this, at any rate held out strong hopes of such a concession to right, and talked about a frontier commission and a plebiscite of the people of the area. The Afghans, their appetite improving, demanded not only Panjdeh but the whole area almost to Merv, and asked, moreover, for a further realignment of the frontier from Sarakhs to the Oxus at Bosaga, together with further territorial concessions in Southern Bokhara Moreover, determined there should be no doubt about the plebiscite when it took place, they sent important mullahs and numerous other agents to canvass the inhabitants, assuring them at the same time privily of their earnest desire to extirpate from Central Asia, at any rate, not only all infidels but especially the Bolsheviks. Having, through numerous agents in both

camps, a very fairly accurate notion of what was going on, and of how these two interesting parties were seeking how best to take each other in, we made it our business to keep each side unofficially informed of the perfidy of the other. The Afghans about this time, hearing that there was a serious and promising anti-Bolshevik rebellion throughout Ferghana, were *gauche* enough to send special emissaries there with letters and presents for the leaders of the insurgents. This information, too, we felt it our duty to bring to the notice of the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile an Afghan extraordinary mission had proceeded to Moscow, and had been greeted there with much enthusiasm by Lenin, Trotsky, and the rest. The definite word "alliance" was repeatedly used, large offers of military help, not only in arms and munitions of every sort, including aeroplanes, but of instructors and even troops, were made. The Afghan Mission departed confident of having achieved a great diplomatic success. They had a definite alliance, a restitution of territory, and huge promises of arms, munitions, and money. All this evidently induced Kabul, with typical Afghan impudence and aggression, to regard the Bolsheviks as sadly in need of Afghan help. Hence more Afghan arrogance and further demands. An Afghan armed force marched through Kushk without permission and proceeded towards Merv. Afghan consuls and agents appeared in every town in Turkistan. Afghan mullahs were everywhere active. As a result of our bringing these matters to Bolshevik notice there was considerable anxiety. Reinforcements were sent to Kushk. The head of the Turkistan Bolshevik Government went to Merv and Askabad to enquire into Afghan machinations. Afterwards he went to Kushk and was exceedingly annoyed at being insulted by an Afghan officer there. More Bolshevik reinforcements went to Kushk. We informed Herat, who hurriedly sent *their* reinforcements to the frontier. The Bolsheviks were warned of this, and so the game went on. The Bolsheviks became seriously perturbed about Afghan designs and ambitions. Their tone lacked its former affection. The promised help in money and arms was delayed, and finally actually countermanded altogether, because they had become at any rate partly convinced that the Afghans were fomenting a huge pan-Islamic rising throughout Central Asia against them.

Meanwhile we had fought our indecisive and unsatisfactory campaign against Afghanistan. More than 300,000 troops on the frontier had not done one-tenth as much as Lord Roberts with 5,000 men. This anti-climax was very damaging to our prestige in Central Asia, and we found it hard to explain to educated Persians and others why this huge force, with all the advantages of supreme direction from Simla, had achieved so little. In August came the so-called peace, which was no peace. It is true it pleased Simla so to regard it. But all my advices showed that the Afghans themselves re-

garded it as a temporary armistice only, a breathing space during which they hoped to get large support in arms from the Bolsheviks. During actual hostilities the Bolsheviks in Turkistan had been able to offer the Afghans nothing better than promises. They were cut off from European Russia by the left wing of Koltchak's army, and locally they were very short of arms and ammunition themselves. In September, 1919, Koltchak's armies disappeared like melting snow, and the road to Moscow was open. Open, but not working. Years of fighting on the Orenburg-Tashkent line had damaged it enormously. Bridges were blown up. Locomotives were worn out. There was no oil fuel for engines, no lubricants for the axles. Even special trains for high officials took weeks to get through. Troops had either to march or to stay where they were until railway conditions could be improved. All this was well known to Kabul, and it was realized that months must elapse before real help could reach them from their Bolshevik friends. Meanwhile they benefited by the nominal peace, intrigued in India, and agitated amongst the frontier tribes. In very numerous telegrams I reported to Simla my conviction, based on reports from numerous informants, that the Afghans were playing for time. In April, 1920, I reported that rumours were current of an imminent resumption of the war. This was scouted as absurd. A few days later Simla themselves wired me that the Afghans had invaded Chitral, that there were various disturbing signs along the whole length of the frontier, and, in short, the position was such as to make it probable that war would be immediately resumed. Troops in the interior of India were hurriedly sent to the frontier. Matters hung fire for some months, our troops standing on the frontier, and then things just fizzled out.

Why did they fizzle out? At the very time when everything pointed to a renewal of the war, the Afghans had definitely notified the Bolsheviks of their willingness to renew the war and to carry all the frontier tribes with them, provided the Bolsheviks would assist them with certain specified arms, ammunition, and money. But, partly because the raising of the maritime blockade against the Bolsheviks had impelled hopes of recognition by the Western Allies, and very largely because of my Mission's numerous *exposés* of Afghan designs had materially chilled the Bolsheviks' former enthusiasm for them, Moscow had decided not to strengthen the armaments of Afghanistan. Kabul was put off with excuses of various descriptions, until at last the chilling truth was realized that the Moscow "alliance" of October, 1919, had six months later evaporated into thin air. Without Bolshevik assistance Afghanistan was in no position to renew the war, and for this reason only, and not with any regard for the "peace" of Rawal Pindi, the war was not renewed. This Mission claims to have played a large, though an entirely unrecognized part, in averting the renewal of the war. That would certainly have cost millions, even though we

had advanced no further into Afghanistan than the half-dozen miles or so of the previous year. It might have cost many lives from battle, and more from disease. To have taken any part in averting such disasters is something of which the Mission may well be proud.

How were we able to do the work I have described? Well, I had some most excellent officers, speaking numerous languages. I had agents up to distances of a thousand miles or more, even in the Government Offices of the Bolsheviks. I had relays of men constantly coming and going in areas which I deemed important. There was hardly a train on the Central Asian Railway which had not one of our agents on board, and there was no important railway centre which had not two or three men on the spot. Travellers of every sort and description were cross-examined at scores of different places. Intelligence cannot well be improvised. It needs to be slowly built up. But we started with nothing beyond a few agents and ended with a great deal. The organization of this system was splendidly carried out by certain officers of my Mission. I do not think we ever made any grossly inaccurate reports, such as I often received from centres elsewhere. On the other hand, we sent in a stream of information from every part of the huge area for which we were responsible. It was a veritable *tour de force* for the officers I have in mind to have organized and to have brought to such a state of efficiency in so short a time so excellent an intelligence system.

What has been their reward? In May, 1920, when I left the Mission, I wrote strongly in their favour to Simla. No notice being taken of this letter, I wrote again some months later. I was then told to submit recommendations. These went in in October, 1920, for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. They lay for weeks in his office, and he gave up his command, apparently, without seeing them. In May, 1921, I ascertained my recommendations were still lying unnoticed in Simla. In June I wrote to the India Office, and was told a reminder had been sent to Simla on the subject. Later on I ascertained that a report had been received, but no recommendations. Then I was told that names had come through and were being considered. In November, 1921, the India Office informed me that the list of names had been sent to the Army Council for consideration. The Council is still, apparently, considering the matter, if it has not entirely rejected the proposals. At any rate, none of the rewards so richly deserved by the officers whose services I brought to notice have been gazetted. I can only surmise that neither the Commander-in-Chief in India, the India Office, nor the Army Council have the faintest conception of the important work carried out by this Mission, and to the success of which these officers of mine made so constant and so powerful a contribution.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe Colonel Redl is present at this meeting,

and I am sure we shall be very greatly obliged if he could supplement in any way the excellent remarks we have had.

Colonel REDL: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am afraid that at very short notice I am really rushing in after General Malleson has given you a very realistic picture of what took place. I think that the only thing I can do—you are probably all anxious to sample the Arctic conditions of weather which await us outside—would be to give you a very short account of what occurred to us when we were unfortunate enough to lose General Malleson, and he returned to India. The position, roughly speaking, at that time was that the Afghan situation was by no means too stable. We did not know what was going to happen, and the Bolsheviks themselves were in a very much stronger position than they had been for some time before. Even before General Malleson left they had completely succeeded in driving our late allies across the sea—or into the sea into their graves—and, with the exception of Ferghana, they practically had the whole country under their thumb after taking Khiva, Bokhara, and the outlying parts. In Bokhara they seized the opportunity soon after to eat up the country, drive the Ameer out, and create as much chaos and trouble in Turkistan as they could—a task which, if we had been able to carry out our original Mission, they would probably have found difficult to complete; however, having their hands more or less free in the summer of 1920, they turned their attention to Persia. As they operate, if possible, by disintegrating a country, their idea was no doubt to stir up as much trouble as they could in Persia—in fact, to light a fire and then to come in as preservers and put it out. They tried various methods of getting at different elements of the Persians, and they thought that on the whole the Kurds who inhabit the mountain region between Meshed and the Russian frontiers might be the readiest material. Chiefly with the assistance of an ex-robber, named Khudu, of whom this Society heard at Major Blacker's lecture, using this man as an instrument they got these people to put up a rebellion, which completely "flummoxed"—as one might expect it would—the local Persian authorities. The Kurds came into conflict with a small detachment of our troops on the frontier, and not unnaturally were defeated; but the movement itself was not upset. Khudu occupied a very strong position in a mountain valley, which was almost impossible to get at; and the only people to go against him at first were some Persian gendarmerie, commanded by a Persian prince. He arrived, but immediately developed rheumatism, and did not get rid of it for some time—not until he returned to Meshed. While he was indulging in this rheumatism we found matters getting very dangerous indeed. We managed to get pressure put on the Governor-General to send out a further force, which he did. The rebellious Kurds were in a valley surrounded by heights and towers—a very interesting position indeed

to attack. The Persians attacked with some bravery, but did not succeed in getting in. They had good guns but no ammunition, and the guns for which they had ammunition would not shoot. Altogether matters were in a very bad way. A good deal of pressure was put on General Lesslie, who succeeded General Malleson, to place a British column we had at the time on the frontier at the disposal of the Persians to assist them. It was a very difficult demand to resist in a way, but compliance was exactly what the Bolsheviks wanted. These troops were guarding the main line from Askhabad, and of course it absolutely suited the Bolshevik book to move us off that on to a side issue. We regretfully had to decline, and say we could not move; they must find their own salvation. Eventually, through surrounding the Kurds, they were able to do it. They carried the position, and Khudu and his people fled. That left us fairly quiet for a bit. We had been told that the troops were to withdraw to India during the autumn. Just before the withdrawal of these the rebellion of the Kurds took place; there were various incidents of that sort. One day we got a message from the Governor-General that a large detachment of Bolsheviks had arrived, seized Khakistar, and imprisoned everyone. The only thing to do was to send off a flying column which ought to have been going to India instead of to the frontier. That gave us two columns out. In the end it appeared to be only an incursion of about 200 Turkmans, who were rebuked by their Bolshevik masters, and soon retired. But it indicated the ease with which the Bolsheviks could have come in and made things unpleasant. In the autumn of 1920 our troops went down by successive columns by the excellent line of communications made by General Dixon, and they got down to India without much trouble. We had left with us then a "large force," consisting of one and a half squadrons of cavalry and a certain amount of other oddments, twenty or thirty Ford vans and cars, and some thousands of local levies raised in Seistan and Khorasan, and Kurdish levies numbering about 300, whom we kept in Kuchan with half a squadron of cavalry. The way was easy for the Bolsheviks to come in, but they apparently thought that our troops had not really withdrawn, but were hidden behind mountain ranges, and would come out at the right moment. Possibly that had a certain amount to do with keeping them away. Of course, at the time the Persian Government was in negotiation with the British Government for results which did not come off. It is quite possible that the Bolsheviks might have come in if things had been going against their wishes; but as the English-Persian agreement did not eventuate they had no real reason to intervene. In November General Lesslie returned to India, and I remained in command of the Mission and remaining troops until the spring of this year. In the winter we got notice that we should be called upon to retire, and all the levies that we had we were told to

disband. So we gradually disbanded them and got ready to march. I was told to get off when I could find a favourable moment, which occurred at the end of March last. We were stopped by snow, but eventually got away. It was not a particularly easy task; we had to get rid of many tons of stores and material, including arms and much ammunition, and we had to march down by a line of communications from which all personnel had been withdrawn some months before. We had formed dumps of provisions before we started, and managed to keep these and the water supply safeguarded by the help of our Consular authorities in Khorasan and Sistan. The troops started away in very inclement weather. We just avoided frostbite at the one end and sunstroke at the other; so the troops passed through various extremes. I would add that throughout the whole of this period Khorasan was flooded with Bolshevik spies and propagandists. The general tenor of the propaganda was virulently anti-British, and particularly directed to fomenting disorder in India, for which purpose a special propaganda school was maintained at Tashkent. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know if Major Blacker is here. If so, we should be glad to hear him.

Captain BLACKER: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have heard of the excellence of the Bolshevik propaganda, but there was a time when the Bolshevik propaganda was not quite so good as it became in 1919. In 1918 I was unfortunate enough to be on the wrong side of the Bolshevik front, and the Bolsheviks used to put out a good deal of news about the war. The war was still going on. I remember standing behind a little group of workmen who were reading a Bolshevik *communiqué*—this was the time when strikes were taking place in England—making the most of them. But an ordinary Russian remarked that this was pure Bolshevik propaganda, because at that time, when the war was on, every cat and dog in England was mobilized. Again, when the fall of Baku took place the Bolsheviks announced it with glee, but people did not believe it because they thought it was also propaganda. The business of finance is a curious thing; it seems curious that the Bolsheviks, without any money at all, were able to command an army against us in a war where we could not afford to maintain troops at all. At that time in Tashkent we always knew when there was a financial crisis on, because the printing press was driven by electricity, and when a financial crisis took place its acuteness was measured by the dimness of the electric light. It is curious that the German emissaries who were opposed to us in a sense in 1918 in Turkistan were always well provided with actual gold coins for propaganda. I need scarcely say that a gold coin is of much more use to an emissary than paper money or promises. There is one aspect of the whole operations in Turkistan; that is, as I heard a very clever French officer say the other day, that war, like other activities of the

human race, is subject to evolution. First we had war between individuals, then between families, then between tribes, latterly between nations: now we are confronted with a war between races, which one sees sometimes in many distant corners of Asia and even Africa. Of course, he went on to say, this was only preliminary to war between sexes and planets, but I think that is a little too far to go at present.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour we should hardly like to prolong the discussion, interesting as it has been. General Malleson and the other speakers have been good enough to tell us of events previously unknown. It is most unfortunate that those events cannot be more widely known, because those who dealt with them deserve the very highest credit for courage and diplomatic skill. (Applause.) I am sure I am interpreting the wishes of all present when, in your name, I convey to Sir Wilfrid Malleson our most hearty thanks for his very interesting and most humorous recital of those very important events in which he took so active and successful a part.

This ended the meeting.

# REVIEWS

Dates and Date Cultivation of the 'Iraq.

Mr. V. H. W. Dowson, of the Mesopotamian Agricultural Department, on his election as a member of the Central Asian Society, has presented to the library copies of Parts I. and II. of his monograph on " Dates and Date Cultivation of the 'Iraq " (W. Heffer and Sons, Cambridge). Part III. is still in the press.

Mr. Dowson, who was employed in Lower Mesopotamia during the years 1917-20, and thus had an exceptional opportunity of studying the cultivation of the date, was placed on special duty for three months in 1919, during the date harvest, in order that he might make a close examination of the varying conditions under which the date is cultivated in Mesopotamia, especially in the great gardens on the banks of the Shatt-el-'Arab, with a view to the discovery of an equitable basis for the taxation of date gardens.

The monograph, which is lavishly furnished with admirable illustrations, gives proof of the method and care with which Mr. Dowson brought the attention of a trained mind to bear on his problem, and of the pains which he took to find a solution. It also shows that, owing to the great difference in yield and price of the chief varieties of date, among other factors, any attempt at systematic adjustment of the burden would involve such prolonged and scientific enquiry as the industry is unlikely to receive in the near future. Nevertheless, although the primary object may not have been attained, Mr. Dowson's monograph remains as a useful compilation of facts connected with the date industry in 'Iraq, reviewed and analyzed after diligent enquiry at first hand with commendable thoroughness and acumen. One impression which also imparted itself to Mr. Dowson strikes the lay mind on perusal of his work. It seems almost certain that if greater pains were taken with the handling and packing of the best varieties of date grown on the Shatt-el-'Arab, especially the Basrah " khadhrawi," the dates of 'Iraq might compete at least on equal terms with the produce of North Africa in the markets of Europe and North America, and better prices might be realized, to the benefit alike of the Mesopotamian cultivator, garden owner, and exporter.

The attractiveness of the monograph, and even its value, are diminished by methods of transliteration of Arabic names, which are quite unscientific and altogether unworthy of a writer as well acquainted with the spoken Arabic of Mesopotamia as Mr. Dowson. It is to be hoped that in the third part—that dealing with the varieties of date grown in the 'Iraq—this defect will be remedied.

E. B. H.

RIVER CONTROL IN MESOPOTAMIA. By E. B. Howell, C.S.I., C.I.E. *Quarterly Review* for January, 1922.

This very ably written article brings before the public a subject hitherto, I believe, untouched in the press. Mr. Howell speaks with an intimate knowledge of his subject, based upon study of it on the spot during the years of the war. Not only is the consideration of great water problems a fascinating pursuit in any country, in Iraq it is the consideration of the very existence of a spacious land. The story of the investigation by irrigation officers of the mysterious silting up of the rivers, and the curious phenomenon of their continually raising their own beds till they ran on causeways, is well told. The successful outcome of their careful studies, and the equally successful means taken to make the Tigris behave like a normal river by making it do once more for itself what man had hitherto made impossible, are fully and graphically described. It is easy to realize, moreover, that had the steps not been taken, the time was not far distant when the lower Tigris and Euphrates would have ceased to exist as rivers, and have become a number of shallow ditches, feeding enormous wastes of marshes, isolating Baghdad from the Persian Gulf. The article is one of the most interesting on Mesopotamian topics that has appeared for a long time.

E. B. S.

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PIONEERS OF PROGRESS: EMPIRE BUILDERS: SIR ROBERT G. SANDEMAN. By A. L. P. Tucker, C.I.E. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1921. Price: 2s. 6d. net.

In this little study of Sir Robert Sandeman Mr. A. L. P. Tucker has achieved a remarkable feat of selection and compression. In the space of sixty small pages he has given a moving and essentially truthful picture of a character not without complexities in all its surface simplicity, and a career long, strenuous, and filled with controversy and achievement. The feat is the more remarkable since, in order to make his story interesting or even intelligible to a public unfamiliar with Indian frontier history and geography, he has been compelled to devote a full sixth of his scanty space to a setting of the scene and an exposition of the events leading up to his drama. This is excellently done in Chapter II. ("The Indian Frontier"), which, with the aid of the sketch-map,* should enable the least instructed of his readers to follow the story with sufficient understanding.

Mr. Tucker has been well inspired in basing his appreciation largely on the section of R. B. Hittu Ram's Baluchistan Chronicles, englished by General Sir Claud Jacob under the title of *Sandeman in Baluchistan*; for this gives us —what is often lacking to a just estimate of empire-builders whose work lies amongst uncivilized or semi-civilized peoples—a view of its subject's character and achievements as they appeared in the eyes of the people among and through whom the work was done. True, "the Chronicler," as Mr. Tucker calls him, was not himself a Baluch. But he was born and brought up amongst Baluch, though outside the hills; he knew the chiefs and tribes of Baluchistan and understood their feelings as few have done before or since, and, as Sandeman's trusted henchman and confidant, he had been for twenty-six years a close

* Regrettable omissions from this map are the town of Sibi, and the Bolan Railway, now the principal line of communication with Quetta.

eyewitness of all his dealings with the people. When all due allowance has been made for the tinge of hero-worship which renders the Chronicler's work so engaging, his picture of his hero may be accepted as, in all essentials, that which filled the minds of the tribes of Baluchistan.

What, then, was the secret of the power exercised by this man—a man, as Mr. Tucker quite justly says, not brilliantly clever, not highly educated or trained, not even endowed with the faculty of clearly expounding in words the faith that was in him ? What was it that enabled him, in the face of very strong opposition from many of his superiors and fellow-workers, in the face of the frequently reluctant and distrustful attitude of the Government of India, to effect the peaceful conquest of a great province ; to compose the inveterate feuds that had embroiled its tribes from time immemorial, and persuade or compel them to cease from preying on one another and on their neighbours ; to establish a system of self-government which made this new conquest a source of real strength to the Empire in days of stress ; and to leave, in the province he had created, a name that is still, almost literally, "a name to conjure with" ? Mr. Tucker finds the most conspicuous of his great qualities to have been personal courage, deep sense of duty and inexhaustible tenacity and patience, and, above all, passionate "love for his fellow-creatures, especially the half-civilized peoples among whom his life was spent." Personal courage, indeed, is the condition *sine qua non* of successful work on the Indian frontier, and no doubt Sandeman's conspicuous, though never harebrained or uncalculating, boldness did much to establish his fame and authority among the tribes. His tenacity or, as his opponents sometimes called it, his obstinacy, was a proverb both among his colleagues and superiors and among those over whom he ruled. "Sinneman Sahib is not the sort of Sahib that lets go," a shrewd Indian, who had suffered somewhat from this characteristic in him, once said to the writer with immense emphasis and a sort of rueful admiration. And his love for his fellow-creatures, and especially for the people of Baluchistan, undoubtedly inspired and informed that passion for bringing order out of chaos that is writ large across his history. By inspiring him with sympathetic understanding, it gave him that insight into the minds of chiefs and tribesmen, and power of divining the motives which would appeal to them, which at times seemed almost uncanny, but which were in fact due to the vivid realization and unswerving application of a few simple principles.

First, and perhaps most important, Sandeman saw that tribes living on the verge of semi-starvation, and subsisting from of old largely on plunder, must be given bread, or the means of earning it, before any attempt could usefully be made to impose law and order upon them. It was this which inspired his doggerel couplet (an inversion of a similar effort by the Khan of Kalat), which Mr. Tucker paraphrases (p. 41) :

> "When *reasoning* fails,
> Then twist their tails,"

but a more exact rendering of which, both in the letter and the spirit, would be : "When *feeding* fails, Then twist their tails" ; for, though Sandeman believed in reasoning, he knew, as a Scotsman, that it is ill reasoning with an empty belly. It was this, with the knowledge that Satan finds mischief for idle hands to do, that led him to the large employment of tribal levies, so mistakenly denounced by some of his opponents as blackmail. (Doubtless there were

"periwigged lords of London" who cried, "Blackmail!" when Pitt raised the Highland regiments.)

Secondly, he held that most uncivilized or half-civilized tribes, being of highly aristocratic constitution, can only be successfully managed through their hereditary chiefs and natural leaders, and that these should be strengthened and supported by every legitimate means. This principle, it is true, was of full application only in the case of the Baluch and Brahui tribes; but he held, in the writer's opinion justly, that there is much exaggeration in the view which attributes an exclusively democratic spirit to Pathan tribes, and that, particularly among southern Pathans, much better results may be obtained by working through chiefs and headmen than in any other way.

Thirdly, he saw that men, and especially half-civilized men, greatly prefer self-government, however rude, in accordance with their own ancient laws and customs, to the application by strangers of foreign codes and rules, however civilized and excellent. He regarded it as one of the conditions on which the people had accepted our occupation of Baluchistan that they should continue to be governed, as far as possible, in accordance with their ancient customs. Hence his institution of *Jirgas*, which, with the levies as executive auxiliaries, provided the machinery for self-rule. Hence, too, his sleepless jealousy of the inevitable tendency to regularize, to introduce Indian laws and regulations.

In his realization of, and strenuous adherence to, principles such as these, he was helped, rather than hindered, by his lack of academic training. He had no temptation to that pedantry in administration which is a besetting vice of every highly-trained bureaucracy. To him a tribal custom, if not absolutely in conflict with elementary laws of humanity, was as good as any law of the most enlightened civilized State; indeed, in its own place, it was a great deal better. For him the clear light of faith in which he saw his goal was never interfered with by those side and cross lights of varied, more or less irrelevant, knowledge which often confuse the accomplished, many-sided administrator.

But these explanations, good so far as they go, do not, it seems to me, quite touch the heart of Sandeman's secret. They do not fully explain to us his almost unerring sagacity in matters, whether or not connected with his own province, in which human nature, and Oriental human nature in particular, was involved. They do not explain the fact that in almost every case in which Sandeman's views, however apparently ill-founded, were overruled by the Government of India, even on grounds apparently the most incontrovertible, time has proved him to have been right; or why trouble has resulted in every case in which, since his death, his system has been departed from in his own province. They do not altogether explain our feeling that, if something analogous to Sandeman's system had been applied in the early days of the Indian Empire, and if in the history of British India there had been more Sandemans and fewer—shall we say?—Macaulays, we might have been spared the sight of some of the strange and disquieting results that have arisen from our persistent pouring of Western wine into Eastern bottles.

We are finally driven back, as the Chronicler was evidently driven back, on an explanation which amounts to a confession of our inability to account fully for the phenomenon. "Sir R. Sandeman," the Chronicler says, "was created by God, it would appear, for putting in order the distracted country of Baluchistan." We should, perhaps, put much the same thought in a manner more in accord with Western ways of speech if we said that Sandeman was a man

with a strong vocation for rule, and with a touch in him of the divine fire of genius. But if the Chronicler and those for whom he spoke saw in the matter the hand of Providence, who are we that we should gainsay them?

C. A.

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## THE "INDIAN ANTIQUARY"

To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the *Indian Antiquary*, Lt.-Colonel Sir Richard Temple, who for thirty-seven years has been the Editor-proprietor, has written a short account of the history of the magazine, which has had among its contributors many great Indian and Oriental scholars in India itself as well as all over Europe and America. The object of the *Indian Antiquary* has been to provide a means of communication between the East and the West on subjects connected with Indian research, and a medium to which students and scholars, Indian and non-Indian, could combine to send notes and queries of a nature not usually finding a place in the pages of Asiatic societies. The main aim has been to promote and encourage research. The subjects with which the magazine has been principally concerned have been the Archæology, Epigraphy, Ethnology, Geography, History, Folklore, Language, Literature, Numismatics, Philology, Philosophy, and Religion of the Indian Empire and, to a certain extent, of its surroundings. Notable contributions have been published on all these subjects, several of them having been preliminary studies of books subsequently well known to Indian and Oriental students and even to general fame.

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# OBITUARY

## CAPTAIN H. C. DILLON FITZGIBBON, M.C., 13TH HUSSARS.

ON the morning of January 13, 1922, a frontier affray took place near Gul-ambár (165 miles north-east of Baghdad) between Iráq Levies and a party of hostile Kurds. The Levies suffered twenty casualties, and Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon was killed. Gul-ambár is in Southern Kurdistan, near the Persian frontier. Captain FitzGibbon was the youngest son of the late Mr. and Mrs. Louis Dillon FitzGibbon, and received his commission (temporary) on September 30, 1914. He had been awarded the Silver Medal for Military Valour (Italy). It is hoped a more detailed notice may appear in the next number of the Journal.

A. C. Y.

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## SIR FREDERIC W. R. FRYER, K.C.S.I.

The very recent presence of Sir Frederic Fryer at the Council meetings of the Society had but little prepared its members for the deeply to be regretted intelligence of his death on Monday, February 20, 1922. To most, if not to all, the members of that Council, that intelligence came

through the Press notices, which paid a justly appreciative tribute to an honourable and distinguished career and to a very charming personality. We are concerned with him here as a member of the Central Asian Society--a Society which he joined in 1906, three years or so after he vacated the Lieutenant-Governorship of Burma. The annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 had converted that great Province into a chief-commissionership, a post held successively by Sir Charles Bernard, Sir Charles Crosthwaite, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, and (from 1895-9) by Sir Frederic Fryer. From 1897 to 1903 Sir Frederic ruled that Province with the title of Lieutenant-Governor. In fact, with one brief interlude, he gave the last seventeen years of his active service to the administration of Burma, and in 1903 he was succeeded by Sir Hugh Barnes, who is also to-day a Vice-President of the Central Asian Society. When in 1907 Sir Frederic read before the Society a paper on "The Tribes on the Frontier of Burma," we knew well that the lecturer was dealing with a subject on which long experience had made him an expert. When Sir George Scott a few years later dealt with "The Red Karens," we listened to a second expert who had had very special experience of the tribes which dwell between Burma on the west and China and Siam on the east.

In 1911 Sir Frederic was invited to accept a seat on the Council of the Society, and that seat he held until, in 1919, he was elected a Vice-President. He was punctilious and regular in his attendance at Council meetings, and during a period of eleven years he rendered to the Society notable and faithful service, which will be remembered with gratitude. It is of such men, as of his friend Sir Henry Trotter, that the Society genuinely feels the loss.

A. C. YATE.

*February* 25, 1922.

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# LIST OF MEMBERS

OF

# THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

*CORRECTED TO MARCH, 1922*

# OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1921-22

### Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. THE MARQUIS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, P.C., K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., F.R.S., ETC.

### Chairman of Council:

1921. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.

### Vice-Presidents:

1919. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
1920. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
1920. GENERAL SIR E. BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
1921. COLONEL SIR CHARLES YATE, BART., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P.
1921. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.
1921. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.
1921. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1920. **Hon. Treasurer:** SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1921. **Hon. Secretaries:** LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.<br>G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

### Members of the Council:

1920. GENERAL SIR REGINALD WINGATE, BART., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L.
1920. CAPTAIN THE HON. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., D.L.
1920. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.
1920. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.
1920. THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE W. E. DE BUNSEN, BART., P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.
1921. G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.
1921. GENERAL SIR C. C. MONRO, BART., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., A.D.C.GEN.
1921. SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.
1921. MISS ELLA SYKES.
1921. COLONEL C. B. STOKES, C.I.E.

### Assistant Secretary:

MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

OFFICES: 74, GROSVENOR ST., W. 1.

# LIST OF MEMBERS

*The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.*

## A

1910. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, K.C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.-W.F. India.
1921. Acland, Captain P. Dyke, attd. Aviation Dept., Vickers Ltd., Vickers' House, Broadway, Westminster, S.W. 1.
1920. Adye, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. K., K.C.M.G., C.B., etc., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
†Aglionby, Captain A.
1921. Ahmed Bey Hassanein, F.R.G.S., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 7.
1916. Ainscough, Thomas M., O.B.E., H. M. Senior Trade Commissioner in India, Post Box 683, Calcutta.
1919. Alexander, Y. Patrick, F.R.G.S., 2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.
1922. Alexander, Major J. U. F. C., Chantry House, Eccleston Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Allchin, Geoffrey C., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

10 1920. Allen, W. E. D., Commonwood House, Chipperfield, Herts.
1920. Allenby, Field Marshal the Rt. Hon. the Viscount, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., Cairo, Egypt.
1921. Altham, Lieut.-General Sir E. A., K.C.B., C.M.G., Prior's Barton, Winchester.
1921. Antonius, George, Department of Education, Jerusalem.
1922. Armitage-Smith, Sidney A., C.B., 29, York Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
1920. Ashton, Captain F. T., c/o Postmaster, Basra.
1920. Austin, Lieut. A. P. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.

## B

1908. *Baddeley, J. F., 34, Bruton Street, W. 1.
1921. Badger, Kenneth Howard Collins, Goring Heath, Reading.
1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.

20 1910. Bailey, Major F. M., C.I.E., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
1906. *Bailward, Brig.-Gen. A. C., R.A. (ret.), 57, Egerton Gardens, S.W. 3.

1920. Balfour, Lt.-Col. F. C. C., C.I.E., M.C., Caledonian Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Ballard, Mrs. C. R., Hadham Mill, Much Hadham, Herts.
1916. Baluchistan, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta.
1918. Banks, Mrs. M. M., Hornton Cottage, Hornton Street, W. 8.
1920. Bannerjee, Gauranga Nath, M.A., Ph.D., B.L., (Professor of Ancient History, Calcutta University), 107/11, Mechua Bazar Street, Calcutta.
1921. Bannister, T. H. C., Stanmore Hall, Stanmore, Herts.
1920. Barman, Maharaj Kumar J. C. Deb, Comilla, Tipperah.
**30** 1920. Barman, Col. Thakur Mohin Chandra Deb, Agartala, Tripura State, Bengal.
1905. *BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., 29, Campden House Court, W. 8. Vice-President.
1921. Barnett, Mrs. L., 8, Royal Crescent, W. 11.
1922. Barrett, Field Marshal Sir A. A., G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, W. 1.
1913. BARROW, General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1; Artillery Mansions, S.W. 1. Vice-President.
1920. Barstow, Captain A. E., M.C., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Bartlett, P. E., Indo-European Telegraph Department, Persian Section, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
1922. Barrington-Ward, F. T., K.C., 8, Green Street, Park Lane, W. 1.
1920. Base, Edward H., 5, Station Road, Lowestoft.
1919. Bateman, H. G., F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. Booth, Billing and Co., Bradford.
**40** 1920. Beale, Captain C. T., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad; E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Beattie, Dr. J. Hamilton, United University Club, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Beatty, Colonel Commandant G. A. H., 1st Cavalry Brigade, Risalpur, N.-W. F. P., India.
1910. Beauclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Bell, B. H., Law Courts, Baghdad.
Bell, James, 107, Godolphin Road, Shepherd's Bush, W.
1921. Bell, Sir Charles, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1907. Benn, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Resident, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
*†Bennett, Sir T. J., C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent.
1921. Bennett, Captain S. G., M.C., 8, St. Albans Crescent, Bournemouth.
**50** 1921. Bentinck, Major A. D. W., Coldstream Guards, 53, Green Street, Park Lane, W.
1910. Bigg-Wither, Lt.-Col. F., I.A., Fron, Nr. Flint, N. Wales.

1921. Bingham, Captain D'Arcy, 109th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., Bombay.

1921. Bingley, Lieut.-General Sir A. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., Simla, India; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1921. Birch, Lt.-Col. J. M., D.S.O., 20, Bina Gardens, S.W. 5.

1920. Blacker, Captain L. V. S., Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Junior Naval and Military Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1921. Blackwood, J. H., 37, Paternoster Row, E.C. 4.

1916. Bombay, Sec. to Govt. Political Dept., Bombay, India.

1919. Bone, H. Peters, 5, Hamilton Mansions, Kings Gardens, Hove, Sussex.

1921. Bonham-Carter, Sir Edgar, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., 5, Hyde Park Square, W. 2.

**60** Bosanquet, Sir O. V., K.C.I.E., 1, Vicarage Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.

1921. Bourdillon, B. H., I.C.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

1922. Bourke, D. R. S., Indian Forest Service, Feltimore, Harlow, Essex.

1921. Bowman, H. E., C.B.E., Director of Education, Jerusalem.

1921. Braham, Captain G. N., M.C. (Mesopotamian Civil Administration), 61, Oxford Street, Southampton.

1922. Bramley, Colonel P. B., C.I.E., O.B.E., D. G. Police, Palestine.

1922. Brasher, C. G., 23, Victoria Square, Clifton, Bristol.

1920. Bray, Major F. E., M.C., 21, Evelyn Gardens, S.W. 7.

1920. Bray, Major N. N. E., M.C., Political Dept., Govt. of India, c/o Political Secretary, India Office, S.W. 1.

1921. Bridcut, Lieut.-Col. S. H., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St, James's Square, S.W. 1.

**70** 1921. Bright, Captain L. L., Junior Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1; Equatorial Batt., Egyptian Army, c/o Postmaster, Khartoum.

1920. Bros, Major H. Alwyn (R. of O.) Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920. Browne, Claude M., 10, Queensberry Place, S.W. 7.

1921. Browne, Lt.-Col. H. H. Gordon, D.S.O., 17, Bardwell Road, Oxford.

1916. †Bruce, Brig.-Gen. C. D., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920. Brunskill, Major G. S., 135, Sloane Street, S.W.

1920. Buchanan, Sir G. C., K.C.I.E., Kt., 16, Victoria Street, S.W.

†Buchanan, W. A., The Cottage, Knebworth, Herts.

1921. Buchanan, Mrs., 32, Elsworthy Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.

1921. Buckley, Brig.-Gen. B. T., C.B., C.M.G., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

**80** 1921. Bullard, R. W., C.I.E., Colonial Office; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1921. Bunbury, Captain N. L. St. P., 106th Hazara Pioneers, Fort Sandeman, Baluchistan, India.

1919. Bunsen, The Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de, Bart., P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., 3, Portland Place, W. 1. M. of C.

1919. Burdwan, The Hon. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., T.O.M., Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of, The Palace, Bardwan, Bengal, India.

1921. Burn, Major A. H., O.B.E., 59th Scind Rifles, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1921. Burn-Murdoch, Major I., O.B.E., Officers' Club, Aldershot.

1914. Bury, C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.

1920. Busk, H. Gould, F.G.S., Dodnash Lodge, East Bergholt, Suffolk.

1921. Butler, F. H. C., South End, St. Cross, Winchester.

1920. Buxton, Leland W. W., 45, Kensington Park Gardens, W. 11.

**90** 1921. Buxton, Dr. P. Alfred, Dept. of Health, Government House, Jerusalem.

## C

1920. Cameron, Major G. S., M.C., Dy. Director of Agriculture, Lower Baghdad, Mesopotamia.

1918. Campbell, John MacLeod, Glen Saddell, Carradale, Argyll.

1922. Campbell, Captain W. F. C., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

1907. †Carey, A. D., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Carey, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., c/o Director of Public Works, Baghdad; 52, The Close, Norwich.

1920. Carleton, Col. the Hon. Dudley, 21, Upper Berkeley Street, W. 1.

1919. CARNOCK, The Rt. Hon. Lord, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3. Chairman of C.

1922. Carnock, Lady, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.

1921. Carver, Captain F. E., O.B.E., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.

**100** 1921. Carver, Mrs. L. M., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.

1921. Castells, Captain E., 6th Gurkha Rifles, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W. 1.

1920. Chakravati, Professor Nilmani, M.A., 18, Sitaram Ghosh Street, Calcutta.

1921. Chamier, Captain A., O.B.E., 55, Warwick Road, S.W. 5.

1921. Champain, Brig.-Gen. H. B., C.B., Oak Lodge, Ham Common, Surrey.

1921. Chapman, Captain A. J. B., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Lloyd's Bank, 72, Lombard Street, E. 6.

1921. Chardin, Captain F. W., 20, Empress Avenue, Woodford Green, Essex.

1920. Charge, H. L., Mayfair, Upper Terrace Road, Bournemouth.

1923. Chatterjee, K. N., B.A., 12, Madan Mohan Chatterjee Lane, Calcutta.

1921. Cheeseman, Allan, 147, Croxted Road, Dulwich, S.E.

**110** 1921. Chelmsford, The Rt. Hon. Viscount, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., etc., 116, Eaton Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Chesney, G. M., 69, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.

1920. Childs, W. J., The Quadrangle, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1903. *Chirol, Sir Valentine, Kt., 34, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1920. Chitty, Christopher, 24, East Heath Road, Hampstead, N.W.
1920. Chondhurry, R. G. K., M.A., B.L., Zemindar, Tako, 24, Parganaks Dt., Calcutta.
1918. Christie, Miss A., 40, Ovington Street, S.W. 3.
1920. Christie, Miss E. R., F.R.G.S., Cowden Castle, Dollar, N.B.
1921. Churchill, The Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer, M.P., Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. Sir Gilbert F., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
120 1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. W. W., Director Special Section, Public Security Dept., War Office, Cairo.
1919. Coales, Oliver R., H.B.M. Consul-General, Shanghai, China; R. Societies Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Cobbe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. S., V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1; 3, Onslow Gardens, S.W.
1920. Cole, Major J. J. B., F.R.G.S., Rifle Brigade, Travellers' Club, Pall Mall.
1918. Collis, Mrs., 17, Hamlet Gardens, Ravenscourt Park, W. 6.
1921. Colvin, Ian, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1921. Colvin, George, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1921. Colvin, Mrs., 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1920. Connal-Rowan, Major J. F. Meiklewood, Gargunnock, Stirlingshire; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Cooke, Captain R. S., Dalnottarhill, Old Kilpatrick, N.B.
130 1922. Cooper, Captain E. S. Storey, M.C., c/o Eastern Bank, Ltd., Bombay.
1920. Cornwallis, Col. Kinahan, C.B.E., D.S.O., F.R.G.S., Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Baghdad; Carlton Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Coryndon, Sir Robert Thorne, K.C.M.G., Governor and C.-in-C., Uganda Protectorate; Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Costello, Brig.-Gen. E. W., V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
1920. Costello, Mrs. E. W., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
1919. Cowell, Mrs. M., 26, St. George's Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1908. Cox, Major-Gen. Sir Percy Z., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., High Commissioner, Baghdad.
1920. Crawfurd, Lt.-Commander C., R.N., c/o Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1921. Cree, Thomas D., O.B.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 65, Cornhill, E.C.
1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., Queen Anne's Mansions, S.W. 1.
140 1921. Cronyn, Sub-Lieutenant St. John, H.M.S. *Tetrarch*, Queenstown.
1907. Cuningham, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1922. Cunliffe-Owen, Lieut.-Colonel F., C.M.G., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1907. *CURZON OF KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. the Marquis, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants; 1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1. Hon. President.

## D

1921. Daly, Captain T. Denis, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Raford, Leamington; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1908. Daukes, Major C. T., C.I.E., Political Department, Government of India, Loralai, Baluchistan, India.

1921. Davies, J. Fisher, c/o Messrs. the Imperial Bank of Persia, Basra, Mesopotamia.

1921. Davies, R., Standard Oil Company of New York, Rue Rakovska, 127, Sofia.

1906. Davis, W. S., Coglan House, Longhope, Glos.

1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.

**150** 1920. Deedes, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Wyndham H., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Civil Sec. Palestine Government, Government House, Jerusalem.

1921. Dickson, Colonel W. E. R., C.M.G., C.I.E., Caledonian Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1919. Digby, Bassett, F.R.G.S., 49, Elm Park Mansions, Park Walk, Chelsea, S.W.

1906. Dobbs, Sir H. R. C., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., I.C.S., Simla, India; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.

1903. *Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.

1910. Douglas, Lieut.-Colonel H. A., The Vicarage, Langton Green, near Tunbridge Wells.

1920. Douglas, Major-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., Ashmore Lodge, Cold Ash, near Newbury, Berks.

1922. Dowson, V. H. W., Mesopotamian Agricultural Department, Trinity Hall, Cambridge.

1921. Drower, C. Stefana, Credit Lyonnais Bank, 14, Cockspur Street, S.W. 1.

1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.

**160** 1921. Duggan, C. E., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Karachi, India.

1921. Duncan, J. A. L., Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.

1920. Dunsterville, Col. K. S., C.B., 12, Oakwood Court, Kensington, W.

1920. Dunsterville, Major-Gen. L. C., C.B., The Cronk, Port St. Mary, Isle of Man.

1903. *†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 31, Park Lane, W. 1.

1907. *Durand, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmayne House, Rock, Wadebridge, Cornwall.

1920. Dyer, Brig.-General R. E. H., C.B., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

## E

1921\. Edmonds, Major C. J., East India United Service Club, 16 St. James's Square, S.W. 1., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.

1920\. Egerton, Lieut. Gen. Sir R. G., K.C.B., K.C.I.E., 43, Cheyne Court, S.W. 3.

1921\. Elger, L.C., A.M.I. Mech. E., Queen's House, Kingsway, W.C. 2.

170 †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1921\. Elsmie, Major-General A. M. S., 27, Woodville Gardens, Ealing, W. 5.

1920\. Empson, C., 1, Driffield Terrace, The Mount, York.

1911\. Etherton, Lieut.-Colonel P., H.B.M. Consul-General, Kashgar.

1918\. Evans, T. Herbert, St. David's, Lisvane, Glam.

## F

1920\. Fardell, Mrs. H. A., 16, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.

1921\. Farrer, Hon. C. C., 100, Palace Gardens Terrace, Kensington, W. 8.

1919\. FitzHugh, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., M.V.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross.

1921\. Flaxman, H. T. M., O.B.E., Assistant Divisional Adviser, Mosul, Mesopotamia.

1915\. Flower, Hon. E., Durrow Castle, Durrow, Queen's County, Ireland.

180 1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1921\. Forbes, Dowager Lady, Ladies' Park Club, 32, Knightsbridge, S.W 1.

1920\. Forbes, Mrs. Muriel, Naval and Military Hotel, Harrington Road, S.W.

1921\. Forster, M. Courtier, 96, Vineyard Hill, Wimbledon, S.W.

1920\. Fowle, Major T. C., I.A., H.B.M. Consul, Seistan and Kain, East Persia.

1921\. Fraser, Commander Bruce A., R.N., Whitecroft, Nailsworth, Glos.

1921\. Fraser, Captain D. de M. S., Political Dept. Govt. of India, c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920\. Fraser, E., 14, Chester Street, S.W. 1.

1920\. Fraser, M. F. A , F.R.G.S., Beaufort, Knaphill, Nr. Woking.

1916\. Fraser, Sir Stuart M., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

190 1922. Fraser, Major-General Sir T., K.C.B., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W.

1921\. Fraser, W. M., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E. C.

1921\. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel F. E., T.D., O.B.E., M.P., Bedwell Park, Hatfield.

1921. Frost, Lieut.-Colonel F. D., C.B.E., M.C., I.A., 22, The Beach, Walmer.

1920. Fuller, Captain N. B., M.B.E., Cavendish Club, 119, Piccadilly, W. 1.

## G

1908. Gabriel, Lieut.-Colonel Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., Marlborough Club, 52, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1920. Ganguly, Manomohan B. E., M.R.A.S., 50, Raja Raj Bulbul Street, Calcutta.

1919. Garbett, C. C., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

1920. Garbett, Captain R. B. L., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad; c/o The Eastern Bank, Crosby Square, E.C. 3.

1920. Garland, Major Herbert, O.B.E., M.A., Agent for Mesopotamia, The Residency, Cairo.

**200** 1913. Garrard, S. H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly; Welton Place, Daventry, Northants.

1920. Gaster, Dr. M., 193, Maida Vale, W. 9.

1919. Gaulter, Mrs., 152, Earl's Court Road, S.W. 5.

1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.

1921. Geary, Mrs., c/o National, Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ltd., 67, Bishop's Road, W. 2.

1920. Geden, Rev. A. S., Royapettah, Harpenden, Herts.

1922. Gillman, Major-General Sir Webb, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., R.F.A., 17, Hill Street, Berkley Square, W. 1; Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.

1919. Goold-Adams, Col. Sir H. E. F., K.B.E., C.M.G., Jamesbrook, Middleton, Co. Cork; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1920. Gorbold, Captain Roland, R.A.O.C., F.R.G.S , c/o Sir C. R. McGrigor, Bart., and Co., 39, Panton Street, Haymarket.

1920. Gordon, Lieut.-Col. P. J., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

**210** 1920. Gourlay, W. R., Government House, Calcutta.

1920. Gowan, Captain C. H., M.C., 13th Hussars, Cavalry Club, Piccadilly.

1920. Graham, Colonel R. J. D., Dunalastair, North Inch, Perth.

1919. Grant, H. D., F.R.G.S., F.R.A.S., Automobile Club, S.W. 1.

1921. Grant, Sir A. Hamilton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Brooks's Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.

1921. Gray, Lawrence, c/o Irrigation Department, Baghdad.

1920. Gregson, Lieut.-Col. E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E., Buncrana, Rake, Liss, Hants.

1920. Grey, Lieut.-Col. W. George, Solars, Chiddingfold, Surrey.

1920. Grieve, Captain A. McLeod, 3rd Black Watch, 21, Queen's Crescent, Edinburgh.

1920. Griffin, Captain A. C., O.B.E., R.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

220 1921. Grove White, Major M. FitzG., D.S.O., O.B.E, R.E., R.E. Office, Maryhill Barracks, Glasgow.

1921. Gumbley, Douglas W., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

## H

1920. Hadow, Major H. R., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920. Hall, Captain A. H., O.B.E., Annfield, Rothesay, Scotland.

1922. Hall, H. R., D.Litt., F.S.A., British Museum, Bloomsbury, W.C.

1920. Harapvasad, Mahamohopadhyaya, Shastri, C.I.E., F.A.S.B., 26, Pataldanga Street, Calcutta.

1920. Hardinge, The Rt. Hon. Sir A., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Coldharbour, West Hoathley, Sussex.

1918. Harford, Frederic Dundas, C.V.O., 49, Egerton Gardens, S.W. 3.

1921. Harker, O. Allan, Indian Police, 18, Portsea Place, W. 2.

1921. Harris, F. I., c/o Messrs. Imperial Ottoman Bank, Kermanshah.

230 1921. Harris, Captain L. J., O.B.E., 20, King's Gardens, N.W. 6.

1920. Haughton, Major H. L., 36th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

1921. Hauser, Captain S. B., c/o The High Commissioner, Baghdad.

1920. Hay, Captain W. R., Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, N.-W.F., India.

1920. Headley, R. H., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

1920. Hendley, Major-Gen., M.B., C.S.I., Hon. Surgeon to H.M. the King, Caxton, near Cambridge.

1921. Hiles, Major M., O.B.E., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.

1919. Hill, Lt. H. Brian, F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. King, Hamilton & Co., Calcutta, India.

*†Holdich, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., Parklands, Merrow, Surrey.

1921. Holt, Major A. L., M.B.E., M.C., R.E., c/o Director of Railways, Baghdad.

240 1919. Hope, Miss T. M., Crix, Hatfield Peverel, Witham, Essex.

1921. Horridge, J., Haverholme, Bramhall, Cheshire.

1921. Horsfield, Captain R., c/o Director of Railways, Baghdad.

1921. Hotson, J. E. B., I.C.S., Sukkur, Sind, India.

1920. Houstoun, G. L., The Farm, Kyrenia, Cyprus.

1908. Howell, Lieut.-Col. E. B., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1; Foreign Office, Delhi-Simla, India.

1920. Hubbard, Lieut.-Col., Royal Aero Club, 3, Clifford Street, W. 1.

1921. Hughes, J. A., M.C., 67, Castletown Road, W. 14.

1922. Humphrys, Major Francis H., C.I.E., H. B. M. Minister, Kabul, Afghanistan.

1921. Hunt, Captain J. M., 87th Punjabis, I.A., The Red Cottage, Baschurch, Shrewsbury.

250 1921. Hunt, Captain W. E., Hillside, Bath.

1920. Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Aylmer, K.C.B., D.S.O., D.L., M.P., 2, Culford Gardens, S.W. 3; Hunsterton, West Kilbride, N.B.

1918. Hunter, Mrs., 81, Holland Park, W. 11.

## I

1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government, Delhi.

1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

1915. Ingram, Captain M. B., Foreign Office, Whitehall, S. W., Cavendish Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1919. Inman, Miss H. M., 12, Sloane Terrace Mansions, S.W. 1.

## J

1921. Jacob, General Sir Claud W., K.C.B., Chief of the General Staff in India, Simla, India.

*†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge Park, Twickenham. Vice-President.

†Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.

260 1921. Jardine, R. F., Assistant Political Officer, Dohuk, Mosul.

*†Jardine, W. E., C.I.E., I.C.S., The Residency, Gwalior, Central India.

1920. Jeffreys, Major J. F. D., I.A., Political Officer, Kut-el-Amarah, Mesopotamia.

1919. Jeejeebhoy, Lieut. J. P. B., F.R.G.S., Pedder Road, Bombay.

1920. Jhalawar, H. H. Maharaj Rana Sri Bhawani Singh, Sahib Bahadur of, K.C.I.E., Jhalrapatan, Rajputana.

1921. Joyce, Lieut.-Col. P. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

## K

1920. Kay, Professor D. M., "Kildonan," St. Andrew's, Fife, N.B.

1920. Keeling, E. H., M.C., United University Club, 1, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.

1907.†*Kelly, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensington, S.W. 5.

1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.

270 1921. Kennett, Mrs. Barrington, Remenham, Wraysbury, Bucks.

1921. Kerr, Captain E. Teviott, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920. Kettlewell, Captain L., D.S.O., Stourpaine Vicarage, Blandford.

†King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens, S.W. 7.

1922. Kirk, Captain F. C. de L., 5th Batt. K.A.R., Northern Frontier, Kenya Colony, Africa.
1922. Knapton, A. G. H., Rope Hill, Lymington.
1922. Knollys, Major Denis E., 19th Punjabis, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1918. Kuwait, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.

## L

1921. Ladd, W. E., Post Box 39, Baghdad.
1921. Laidlaw, Lieut. R. E. F., Royal Munster Fusiliers, attd. Egyptian Army, c/o Postmaster, Khartoum.
280 1920. Laithwaite, John G., 39, Bryanston Street, Portman Square, W. 1.
1904.†*Lamington, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.
1920. Lane, D. A., R.R. No. 1, St. Anne's, Ontario, Canada.
1921. Lane, Lieut.-Colonel W. B., C.I.E., C.B.E., I.M.S., 35, Addison Way, Golder's Green, N.W. 11.
1920. Lang, Commander G. H., D.S.O., R.N., 13, Abbey Court, Abbey Road, N.W.
1920. Law, Bimala Charan, M.A., B.L., F.R.H.S, M.R.A.S., 24, Sukea's Street, Calcutta.
1920. Law, Narendra Nath, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., 96, Amherst Street, Calcutta.
1921. Lee, W. H., M.C., Wymondham, Hythe, Kent.
1920. Lees, Captain G. Martin, M.C., D.F.C., E. I United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Lees, Mrs. H. L., F.R.G.S., Rowchester, Hale, Altrincham, Cheshire.
290 1921. Lee-Warner, Captain W. Hamilton, S.S.C.S., Singapore.
1920. Léon, M. Henri M., Ph.D., L.L.D., 8, Taviton Street, Gordon Square, W.C.
1921. Leslie, Lieut. L., Shropshire L.I., The Barracks, Shrewsbury.
1920. Leveson-Gower, Col. C., C.M.G., C.B.E., 13, Cottesmore Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
1921. Lloyd, Captain H. I., M.C., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Lloyd, Major C. G., C.I.E., M.C., Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1908. *Lloyd, H. E., Sir George A., G.C.I.E., D.S.O., Government House, Bombay.
1912. Loch, Major P. G., I.A., Political Dept., Government of India, c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd., Simla, India.
1921. Loch, Lieut.-Colonel G. H., C.I.E., I.A. (retd.), United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
300 1920. Longrigg, Major S. H., Political Officer, Kirkuk, Mesopotamia.
1918. Lovett, Major-General Beresford, C.B., C.S.I., Hillside, Harvey Road, Guildford.

1921. Lovett, Sir H. Verney, K.C.S.I., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Lowis, H. R., I.A., Underhill, London Road, Camberley.
1921. Lubbock, Brig.-General G., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., 26, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.
1909. Lyall, Major R.A., I.A., 3rd Kashmir Rifles, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Lynch, Stephen, c/o Euphrates and Tigris S.N. Co., 3, Salter's Hall Court, E.C.
1922. Lynden-Bell, Captain L. A., M.C., 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, Meerut, U.P., India.
1922. Lytton, Rt. Hon. the Earl of, Knebworth House, Knebworth.

## M

1909. *Macartney, Sir George, K.C.I.E., Les Vaux, St. Saviour's, Jersey, Channel Isles. M. of C.
310 1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
1921. McGrath, Lieut.-Colonel A. T., 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
1920. McGrath, Mrs. Rosita Forbes, 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
1920. MacGregor, Lady, Hampton Court Palace, Hampton Court.
1922. Machray, Robert, 78, Cromwell Road, S.W. 7.
1921. McIntyre, Captain H. M. J., I.A., No. 8 Mountain Battery, Landi Kotal, Peshawar, India.
1921. Mackarness, H. J. C., Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1921. Mackay, F. F., Leigh Vineries, Wimborne, Dorset.
1920. Mackenzie, Lady M. M. Owen, 6, Chesham Street, S.W. 1.; Brantham Court, Suffolk.
1920. Mackie, Captain J. B., Castle Cary, Somerset.
320 1921. Mackintosh, C. A. G., Ministry of Finance, Egypt; Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
1906. *McMahon, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59, Pont Street, S.W. 1. M. of C.
1920. McNearnie, Captain H. D., Political Officer, Mosul.
1920. Macpherson, C. F., c/o Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie and Co., Basra.
1920. McRobert, Sir Alexr., Douneside, Tarland, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Makant, Captain R. K., M.C., Gilnow Lodge, Bolton, Lancs.
1903. *Malcolm, Major-General Sir Neill, K.C.B., D.S.O., Singapore, S.S.
1921. Malleson, Major-General Sir Wilfrid, K.C.I.E., C.B., Foxhurst, Ashvale, Surrey.
1921. Marklew, E. G., 23, Richmond Road, W. 2.
1920. Marling, Sir Charles, K.C.M.G., British Legation, Copenhagen.
330 1920. Marrs, Major R., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Marshall, Justice J. E., Egyptian National Court of Appeal, Zamaleh, Gezira, Cairo.

1920. Massy, Col. P. H. Hamon, C.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall.
1921. Mathews, Captain L. Gard, F.R.G.S., Colonial Service, British Somaliland; 2, Napier Terrace, Plymouth.
1920. Mathieson, Wilfred, Minchinhampton, Glos.
1920. May, Major W. R. S., C.I.E., Twyford House, Alnmouth.
1912. Medlicott, Lieut.-Colonel H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Mellor, Donald, 180, The Grove, Wandsworth, S.W. 18.
1920. Meston, The Right Hon. Lord, K.C.S.I., etc., Hurst, Cookham Dene, Berks.
1921. Meyer, Sir William S., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 42, Grosvenor Gardens, S.W. 1.
340 1920. Michell, Roland, C.M.G., 22, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11.
1920. Millard, W. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W.
1922. Milne, George, I.C.S., Craigellie, Lonmay, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Minchin, H. C., Gorsedene, Farnham, Surrey.
1920. Minchin, Captain H. C. Stephens, Gorsedene, Farnham, Surrey.
1921. Moberly, Brig.-General F. J., C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., p.s.c., Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
1920. Mocatta, Major V. E., O.B.E., 14th Hussars, 31, Great Cumberland Place, W.
1920. Molony, Wm. O'Sullivan, Christ Church, Oxford.
1921. Monro, General Sir C. C., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., A.D.C.Gen., 20, Egerton Gardens, S.W. M. of C.
1920. Monteath, D. Taylor, O.B.E., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
350 1921. Monteath, G., I.C.S., Buckerell Lodge, Honiton, Devon.
1920. Mookerji, Dr. Radhakumad, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Mysore University, Mysore.
1903. *Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1921. Moore, Captain J. H., Walton Grange, Swindon, Wilts.
1920. More, Major J. C., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F.F.), Political Agency, Kuwait, Persian Gulf.
1921. Morgan, C. Stuart, c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Ltd., Baghdad.
1920. Morison, Sir Theodor, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Overdale, Lindisfarne Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
1921. Mousley, Captain E. O., R.F.A., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Mukhopadhyaya, Panchanana (Hon. Presidency Magistrate), 46, Bechu Chatterji Street, Calcutta.
1920. Mules, Sir Chas., C.S.I., M.V.O., O.B.E., 29, Bramham Gardens, S.W. 5.
360 1920. Mumm, Arnold L., F.R.G.S., 112, Gloucester Terrace, W. 2.
1920. Murchison, C. K., M.P., Hargrave Hall, near Kimbolton, Huntingdon.
1921. Murphy, Lieut.-Colonel C. C. R., 83rd Infantry, I.A., Cannanore, Malabar, India; Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1921. †Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Murray, Major S. G. C., C.I.E., I.A., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.
1921. Muspratt, Colonel S. F., C.S.I., D.S.O., A.D.C., 12th Cavalry, I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Mylles, Captain C. C., M.C., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, 14, Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C. 2.
1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

## N

1920. Napier, Major A. Harper, I.M.S., c/o Marshall, Terne, N. Queensferry, N.B.
370 1921. Nariman, R. K., M.I.C.E., c/o Messrs. H. S King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Newton, Mrs. Frances E., 156, Sloane Street, S.W. 1.
1922. Nicolson, Major the Hon. F. A., 15th Hussars, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.
1922. Nightingale, Colonel M. R. W., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Noel, Major E., C.I.E., D.S.O. (Political Dept. Govt. of India), Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Noel, Major J. B. L., M.G.C.
1920. Noone, H. V. V., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E.C. 3.
1921. Norbury, Major P. F., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Northcote, D. S., 23, Royal Avenue, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1916. North-West Frontier Province. The Hon. the Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, India.

## O

380 1920. O'Connor, Captain K. K. O., M.C., 14th Sikhs, c/o Deputy Commissioner, Abbotabad.
1921. O'Connor, Captain R. L., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1906. O'Connor, Major W. F. T., R.A., C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul, Shiraz, Persia.
1920. O'Dwyer, Sir Michael F., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 26, Brechin Place, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1905. Oliver, Captain D. G., 67th Punjabis, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Olver, Lieut.-Colonel A., C.B., C.M.G., c/o Messrs. Holt and Co., Whitehall Place, S.W.
1920. Orgill, Captain T. C., 2, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge.
1920. Ormsby-Gore, Major the Hon. W. G. A., M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S., 5, Mansfield Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1. M. of C.
1921. Outlaw, Captain W. H., 40, Charles Street, Berkhamstead.

## P

1920. Parker, Lieut.-Col. A. C., D.S.O., Governor of Sinai Peninsula, Arish, Sinai.

390 1920. Parr, E. Robert, Black Birches, Hadnall, Shrewsbury.

1920. Patranavis, S. C., B.A., Sub-Registrar, Kendua P.O., Dt. Mymensingh, Bengal.

1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.

1921. Pead, T. D., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Pearce, Captain M. Channing, Cintra, Swanage, Dorset.

1921. Peek, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., D.S.O., 2, Clarendon Place, W. 2.

†Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.

1921. Pedder, Captain G. R., 13th Hussars, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1907. Pemberton, Col. E. St. Clair, R.E. (ret.), Pyrland Hall, Taunton; B. 6, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.

*†Penton, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1. Vice-President and Hon. Treasurer.

400 1920. Peralta, Miss Louise, 45, Powis Square, W. 11.

†Perowne, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Woolrych, 82, Lowndes Square, S.W.

1921. Perry, Miss C. E., 185, Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W. 1.

1919. Philby, H. St. John, C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o High Commissioner, Jerusalem.

1921. Phillips, Miss L. B., 9, Rosslyn Mansions, S. Hampstead, N.W. 3.

1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.

1920. Pickthall, Captain C. M., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Pickthall, Mrs. W. M., c/o Ladies' Army and Navy Club, Burlington Gardens, W. 1.

*†Picot, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., Indian Army (ret.), 86, Ebury Street, S.W. 1, Junior United Service Club. M. of C.

1921. Pitcairn, G. D., White Cottage, Amport, Andover.

410 1920. Platt, Sir T. Comyn, 47, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.

1920. Popham, Lieut.-Colonel E. Leyborne, D.S.O., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Bombay.

1922. Price, Brig.-Gen. C. H. Uvedale, C.B., D.S.O., I.A. (ret.), 7, Rothsay Road, Bedford.

1921. Prichard, J., Judicial Department, Baghdad; Wick, Glamorganshire, Wales.

1921. Prior, Mrs. Upton, Ethorpe, Gerrard's Cross, Bucks.

1921. Pulley, Major H. C., O.B.E., I.A., c/o Eastern Bank, 1, Crosby Square, E.C.

## R

1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.

1916. Rajputana, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General, The Residency, Mount Abu, Rajputana, India.

1921. Ralston, Major W. H., 47th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.

1920. Rawlinson, General The Lord, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, India.

420 1922. Rawlinson, Colonel Alfred, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., The Cottage, Oxgate Lane, Cricklewood, N.W.

1922. Rawlinson, Mrs., The Cottage, Oxgate Lane, Cricklewood, N.W.

1921. Ready, Major-General F. F., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., Lynch House, Winchester.

1921. Redl, Lieut.-Colonel E. A. F., C.M.G., C.I.E., The Sycamores, Newick, Sussex ; Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1922. Renshaw, Captain C. M., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Reynardson, Capt. H. Birch, 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I., 14, Lancaster Gate Terrace, W. 2.

1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.

1919. Ridgeway, Col. R. Kirby, V.C., C.B., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1921. Rivett-Carnac, Captain H. G., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1922. Roberts, Captain A. H., 87, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.

430 1922. Roberts, Captain G. H., I.A., Club of Western India, Poona.

1921. Roberts-Goddard A., Royal Aero Club, Clifford Street, W. 1.

1921. Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir William R., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., etc., 88, Westbourne Terrace, W. 2.

1921. Robertson, Algar, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.

1921. Robertson, Miss R., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.

1921. Robertson, Miss V., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.

1920. Robinson, Captain F. A., M.C., R.A.M.C., The Vicarage, Holme on Spalding Moor, Yorks.

1920. Rodd, Major W. J. P., D.S.O., R.A.O.C., 27, Sussex Gardens, W. 2.

*†Ronaldshay, The Earl of. Vice-President.

1920. Rooker, S. K., M.C., 63, St. James's Street, S.W.

440 1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington, W. 8.

1921. Rundle, Captain C. A. Grant, M.C., c/o Messrs. Henry S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

1920. Rynd, Major F. F., D.S.O., R.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

## S

1918. Salvati, Signor M. N., Via Lamarmora 41, Torino, Italy.

1920. Sammadar, J. N., F.R.E.S., Patna College, Patna, India.

. Sampson, A. C., M.C., 1, Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, W. 9.

†Sandbach, General A. E., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.

. Schomberg, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. F., D.S.O., Seaforth Highlanders, Caledonian Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1918. Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali, 33, Cornwallis Crescent, Clifton, Bristol.

1920. Shakespear, Lieut.-Colonel J., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., 15, Alexandra Court, W. 9.

450 1920. Shakespear, Col. L. Waterfield, C.B., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General, Assam Rifles, Shillong, Assam.

1920. Shastri, Professor Ashutosh, 23/1, Beniatola Lane, Calcutta.

1921. Shepherd, Miss E., 66, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.

1920. Sheppard, Captain E. W., O.B.E., M.C., War Office, Whitehall, S.W.

1922. Sheppard, Sir William D., K.C.I.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1919. Silberrad, C. A., I.C.S., "Sunnycroft," Buckhurst Hill, Essex.

1920. Simpson, J. Alexr., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.

1921. Simpson, B. Lenox, c/o British Legation, Peking, China.

1920. Sircar, Ganapati, 69, Beliaghatta Main Rd., Calcutta.

1920. Skrine, F. H., C.S.I., 147, Victoria Street, S.W.

460 1920. Slater, Captain A., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., Charing Cross.

1920. Slater, Mrs. E. M., 13, Dawson Place, W. 2.

1920. Smith, A. L. F., M.V.O., Baliol College, Oxford.

1920. Smith, Captain Godwin, c/o Messrs. Richards, Thynne and Co., 130. Tooley Street, S.E.

1922. Snelling, Captain C. G., I.A., Indian Political Dept., Quetta. Baluchistan ; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1921. Soane, Major E. B., C.B.E., East India United Service Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1921. Spencer, Dr. Gordon, St. James's Vicarage, Preston, Lancs.

1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele, Florence, Italy.

1920. Stanham, Major H. F., R.A., Western Command, Chester.

1922. Stanley, Lieut.-Colonel J. H., C.B.E., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.

470 1917. H.M. Stationery Office, Princes Street, S.W. 1 (Journal subscriber).

1921. Starkie, Mrs. Maud, 3, Aldford Street, Park Lane, W. 1.

1919. Stebbing, E. P., Hawthornden Castle, Lasswade, Midlothian.

1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superintendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.W.F. Province, India.

1920. Stephenson, G. C., 99, Inverness Terrace, W. 2. M. of C. Joint Hon. Sec.

1921. Stephen, Major F. W., M.C., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.

1921. Stevenson, Lieut.-Colonel K. L., R.A.O.C., G.H.Q., Baghdad.

1920. Stewart, C. W., 3, Newburgh Road, Acton.

1920. Stewart, G., M.P., House of Commons, Westminster; Whiteholme, Hoylake, Cheshire.

1920. Stirling, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., The Residency, Jaffa, Palestine.

**480** 1907. STOKES, Colonel C. B., C.I.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1. M. of C.
1903. Stoner, J. J., 19, Kensington Court, W. 8.
1921. Storrs, Mrs. F. E., 65, Chester Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Sutton, Major-General H. C., C.B., C.M.G., 9, Elvaston Place, S.W. 7.
1921. Swan, L. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.
1920. Swettenham, Sir F. A., G.C.M.G., C.B., 43, Seymour Street, W. 1.
1920. Sydenham, The Rt. Hon. Lord, of Combe, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., etc., The Priory, Lamberhurst, Kent.
1920. Sykes, Lady, Sledmere, Malton.
†SYKES, Miss Ella, 26, St. George's Court, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., 29, Trevor Square, Knightsbridge, S.W. 7.
**490** 1904. Sykes, H. R., Lydham Manor, Bishop's Castle, Shropshire.
1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy M., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., Villa Bel Évent, Dinard, Brittany.

## T

1920. Tagore, Profulla Nath, 1, Durpondrian Tagore Street, Calcutta.
1921. Tainish, Lieut.-Col. J. R., Railway Directorate, Baghdad.
1920. Talbot, Colonel the Hon. G. Milo, C.B., Bifrons, Canterbury.
1903. Tanner, Miss, 8, Cavendish Place, Bath.
1920. Tatton, R. Grey, 2, Somers Place, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, c/o Mesopotamia Persia Corpn., Teheran, Persia.
1919. Teague-Jones, Major R., 80, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
1919. Teichman, Eric, C.I.E., Sitka, Chislehurst, Kent; British Legation, Peking, China.
**500** 1920. Temple, Lt.-Col. Sir Richard, Bart., C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., The Nash, Worcester.
1922. Tennant, Hon. Mrs., St. Anne's Manor, Sutton, Loughborough.
1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1921. Thomas, Captain H. Prichard, 126th Baluchistan Regt., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Charing Cross.
1921. Thomas, Major E. C., Ray Lodge, Lingfield.
1921. Thomas, Roger, Agricultural Directorate, Baghdad.
1922. Thompson, Captain David, 15th Lancers, I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1; c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ewart House, Bombay.
1920. Thomson, J. S., I.C.S., c/o Commercial Bank of Scotland, 62, Lombard St., E.C.
1921. Thomson, Colonel Sir W. M., K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C., Cardrona, Dunblane, Perthshire.
1919. Thorburn, Major H. Hay, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., Bombay.
**510** 1921. Thornton, Lieut.-Col. C. E., C.M.G., 16th Cavalry, I.A. (ret.), 31, Sydney Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1922. Thorpe, Miss M., 25, Pembridge Gardens, Notting Hill Gate, W. 11.

1922. Thuillier, Major L. C., I.A. (Survey of India), c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
1908. Tod, Colonel J. K., C.M.G., Standlynch, Four Marks, Hants.
1921. Todd, Captain H. I., Imperial Police, 45, Lee Road, Blackheath, S.E. 3.
1921. Tomlinson, A. G., c/o Messrs. Hills Bros. Co., Basra, Persian Gulf.
1921. Tozer, P. H. S., Junior Constitutional Club, Piccadilly.
1920. Trench, Rev. A. C., M.C., Chaplain's Office, Bolarun, Deccan, India.
1920. Trott, Captain A. C., 5th Devon Regt., St. John's College, Cambridge.
1919. Trotter, Lady, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.
**520** 1908. *Tucker, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex. M. of C.
1920. Tudor Pole, Major W., 61, St. James's Street, S.W.
1921. Tweedie, Mrs. Alec, 2, Whitehall Court, S.W. 1.
1920. Tyler, H. H. F., C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o Imperial Bank of India, Madras.

## V

1921. Välyi, Felix, 115, St. James's Court, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1.
1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1919. Van Ness, Major W. Waters.
1920. Varma, Raj Kumar N. Chandra Deb, Comilla, Tipperah, India.
1920. Vasu, Rai Sahib Nagendra N., Prachyavadya Maharnara, 9, Visvakosha Lane, Bagbazar, Calcutta.
1922. Venning, E. G., Liskeard, Cornwall.
**530** 1920. Vidyabhusan, Amulya Charon, Professor, Vidyashagar College, 82, Maniktola Street, Calcutta.

## W

1921. Waley, A., Alderhurst, Englefield Green, Surrey.
1921. Waley, Captain E. G. S., 14, Oxford Square, W. 2.
1921. Wallace, Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Willoughby, 209, Ashley Gardens, S.W. 1.
1921. Wallace, Mrs. E. F., 64A, Sinclair Road, Kensington, W. 14.
1920. Waller, Major A. G., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.
1911. Waller, Miss D., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W. 1.
1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W., and Moystown House, Belmont, King's Co., Ireland.
1921. Walpole, Mrs. Horace, 15, Bruton Street, W. 1; Heckfield Place, Basingstoke, Hants.
1922. Walpole, C. A., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
**540** †Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1922. Wapshare, Lieut.-General Sir Richard, K.C.B., C.S.I., c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Bombay, India.

1921. Warburton, H. G., I.C.S. (ret.), Holmesdale, Fleet, Hants.
1921. Ward, Colonel J. S., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.B.E., Port Director, Basra.
1920. Ward, Captain W. Kingdon, F.R.G.S., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 7.
1920. Ward, W. R., O.B.E., Union Club, Trafalgar Square, and c/o Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C.
1905. Watson, Lt. Col. John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.
1920. Watson, Sir Logie P., c/o Messrs. Cooper, Allen & Co., Cawnpore, India.
1921. Watson-Armstrong, Captain W. J. M., c/o Bank of Montreal, Vancouver City, B.C.
1921. Webb, Captain W. F., attd. Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
**550** 1920. Webb-Ware, Lieut.-Col. F., C.I.E., F.R.G.S., Fort Anne Hotel, Douglas, Isle of Man.
1921. Weir, Major J. L. R., Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1921. Wellcome, Henry S., 6, Gloucester Gate, Regent's Park, N.W., and Khartoum.
1921. Weldon, Captain S. W., The Retreat, Palmer's Green, Alderman's Hill, N.; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Wheatley, H., Govt. Quinine Factory, Naduvatam, India.
†Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.
1920. Whitehorne, Captain Cecil, M.C., The Welch Regiment, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W.
1922. Wightwick, Major H. M., Bombay Political Service, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
1921. Wigley, Captain P. J. R., M.C., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Wigram, Rev. Dr. W. A., Watling House, St. Albans.
**560** 1921. Wilkinson, Captain L. C. R., R.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co. (R.A. Branch), Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Willcox, Sir W. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G,, F.R.C.P., 40, Welbeck Street, W. 1.
1921. Williams, Robert, 35, Prince's Gardens, S.W. 7; Park House, Drumoak, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Williams, Captain L., O.B.E., 25, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
1921. Williamson, Dr. H., 10, Carlyle Mansions, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1920. Willingdon, H. E. Lord, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Government House, Madras.
1921. Wilkinson, Hon. Mrs., Dringhouses Manor, York.
1921. Willoughby, Brig.-Gen. M. E., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Wilson, Lieut.-Col. Sir Arnold T., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.; c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.

1920. Wilson, Major W. C. F., I.A., Mesopotamian C. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W. 1.

570 1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel James Alban, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W.

1921. Wilson, W., c/o Messrs. The Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C. 4.

1919. Wilson-Johnstone, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., C.I.E., D.S.O., c/o War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

1920. WINGATE, General Sir Reginald, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., etc., Knockenhair, Dunbar. M. of C.

1921. Wishart, G., Muirbrow, Hamilton, N.B.

1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.

1918. Worthington, A. B. Bayley, Town Thorns, Rugby.

1921. Wright, Captain S. A., M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

## Y

*†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, Shropshire. Vice-President and Hon. Sec.

1905. *YATE, Colonel Sir Charles E., Bart., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.L., M.P., 17, Prince of Wales Terrace, W. 8. Vice-President.

580 1916. Yorke, Mrs. R. F., F.R.G.S., M.R.I., F.R.S.A. Ladies' Imperial Club, 17, Dover Street, W. 1; 22, Craven Hill, W. 2.

*†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut.-Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. Vice-President.

1918. Young, General H. G., C.I.E., D.S.O., etc., Tobercooran, Carmoney, Co. Antrim, Ireland.

1921. Young, Rev. R. A., 20, Great Peter Street, Westminster.

## JOURNAL SUBSCRIBERS

Army and Navy Club.
Cairo. Middle East Section, Royal Air Force.
Calcutta. Imperial Library.
London Library.
Mosul-Department of Education.
New York. American Museum of National History.
Rome. Instituto per l'Oriente.
Royal Geographical Society.
Royal United Service Institution.
H.M. Stationery Office.
Tokyo. Dr. G. E. Morrison's Library.
Tokyo. South Manchuria Railway Company.

# RULES

OF

# THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

1. The Central Asian Society was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election ; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign his

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) eight Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the Council.

13*a*. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence by any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, ex officio, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—*i.e.*, the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.

31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the third Thursday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Thursday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.

# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

CERTIFICATE OF RECOMMENDATION.

______________________________________________

______________________________________________

*being desirous of becoming a Member of the* CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, *we whose names are hereunto subscribed do hereby recommend to the Society as a Candidate.*

*Proposer* ______________________

*Seconder* ______________________

# JOURNAL

OF THE

# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. IX.

1922

PART III.

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# THE BRITISH MUSEUM ARCHÆOLOGICAL MISSION IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1919

By Dr. H. R. Hall, M.B.E., D.Litt., F.S.A.

Deputy-Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum

A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Services Institution, Whitehall, on Thursday, February 9, the Right Hon. Lord Carnock in the chair. A lecture was given by Dr. H. R. Hall, Deputy Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum, on "The British Museum Archæological Mission in Mesopotamia, 1919."

In opening the proceedings, the Chairman said: Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to announce that since our last meeting nine new members have been elected to the Society, and if any persons here feel disposed to become members, or put themselves up for election, Captain Stephenson, the Hon. Secretary, will be happy to give any information after this meeting about the Society. I am glad to say that we have the pleasure of the presence here of Dr. Hall of the British Museum, who proposes to read us a paper on the British Museum Archæological Mission in Mesopotamia. I think Dr. Hall is sufficiently well known to all who take the slightest interest in that subject to obviate any necessity that I should introduce him. I will therefore ask him if he will kindly deliver his lecture. (Applause.)

The capture of Baghdad in 1917 and the British occupation of the whole of Mesopotamia, with the exception of the Mosul district, that followed turned the attention of British archæologists towards the possibility of starting active excavation in the mounds of Babylonia again as soon as possible, under direct British auspices and while our forces were in occupation of the country. Accordingly, the Trustees of the British Museum, by arrangement with the War Office, entrusted Captain R. Campbell Thompson, M.A., formerly of the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum, and one of the most eminent British Assyriologists, who was then actually on the spot in Mesopotamia as an intelligence officer, with the task of carrying out the proposed excavations. Captain Thompson was deputed from the Army for this purpose. He began work in the district of Naṣrīyah, and after a week spent on the site of the ancient city of Ur "of the Chaldees," the modern Tell el-Muḳayyar, and examination of other sites in the neighbourhood of Sūḳ esh-Shuyūkh and the Hammar Lake, such as Tell el-Laḥm and Tell ej-Judēidah, he concentrated his efforts on what is in many respects the most interesting site in Babylonia, Tell Abu Shaḥrein, the old Eridu, which the Babylonians themselves

considered to be the most ancient city in their country. Ur and Shaḥrein were sites of old interest to British, and especially British Museum archæologists, as in 1854 they had both been investigated for the first time by Captain Taylor, whose digging results were already in the Museum. At Shaḥrein Captain Thompson worked for a month, using the nomad Arabs who came up to that part of the world in the spring (a sept of the Dhiffir) as his workmen by arrangement with their sheikh, Hamūd, and, by his method of sinking pits all over the mound, and carefully recording the objects found at different depths, has given us first accurate knowledge of the beginning of culture at Eridu. He also collected a rich harvest of the implements of chert, flint, and obsidian, and the fragments of painted pottery that had been in the course of centuries washed by the winter rains out of the lower strata of the mounds on to the surrounding plain, where they now lie for the picking up. His discoveries have now been fully published in *Archæologia*, vol. lxx. (1920).

His season's work finished, he returned to England, and, in view of the promising results, the Trustees of the British Museum, at the recommendation of Sir F. G. Kenyon, K.C.B., the Director, decided to send me out as his successor, owing to the serious illness of my since deceased colleague and friend, Professor Leonard W. King, who otherwise would himself have proceeded to Mesopotamia to take charge of the work. I was at the same time to place my services as adviser in archæological matters at the disposal of the Mesopotamian authorities so long as I was out. I was accordingly demobilized from the Intelligence branch of the Army and, on my arrival at Basrah under the auspices of the War Office, was attached to the Mesopotamian Political Service with my Army rank of Captain.

In this capacity I proceeded, at the direction of my temporary chief, Lieut.-Colonel A. T. (now Sir Arnold) Wilson, the Chief Civil Commissioner, to Baghdad, and, after a visit to Ctesiphon, inspected the ruins of Babylon and Birs Nimrūd. At the former place I carried out certain works of conservation that were necessary, especially in the "Hall of Belshazzar," with the help of sepoys of the Erinpura Battalion, kindly lent me by Brigadier-General E. W. Costello, V.C., then commanding at Hillah, who always showed great interest in the archæological remains in his command. At the same time I made an inventory of the antiquities then in the German house at Kweiresh, close by, which Professor Koldewey, the German excavator of Babylon, had been compelled to abandon in 1917. The house had been plundered by the Arabs before the arrival of our troops from Baghdad, but luckily the antiquities did not appear to have suffered much; the museum-room seemed more or less intact with its contents. But the others, the living-rooms of the house, had suffered a wild *Verwüstung*, as their owners would have called it. Furniture and household

utensils, boxes and books, were all scattered about, and a pile of rubbish in one room was pathetically crowned by the celluloid dog-collar and *Mantschetten*, or cuffs, of some Teuton (fancy wearing such things in Mesopotamia!), for which obviously the Arab had no use. Reverently these relics were reduced to order and the house tidied up; and when the work of making the inventory of antiquities and writing various reports and recommendations to be transmitted to the Government at Baghdad was completed, and a new roof built to protect the stacks of boxes of architectural fragments which lay in the courtyard, the house was again sealed up, to await the day when, as it is hoped, it may be again opened as a local museum for Babylon, and the living-rooms used as a hostel for architects and archæological students.

At Birs Nimrūd I had to report on the stability of the fragment of the *zikḳurrat*, or temple tower, that still stands like a jagged tooth above masses of brickwork, vitrified by some great conflagration, that crown the mound. So fierce must the heat have been that consumed the tower that it may be suggested that crude oil or *mazūt* was used; piles of brushwood soaked in oil were probably heaped up against the tower, and then the torch applied. If, as is probable, the tower was burnt by Elamite conquerors, this seems quite possible.

At Nippur I recommended certain minor works of conservation of walls, etc. On account of the danger of rain and the resulting impassable mud, to get to Sūḳ el-Afej, near which Nippur lies, from Dīwānīyah and back at the beginning of February, was rather a risky proceeding if, as was the case with me, one was hurried. And sure enough after we had got to Afej the rain came down, and I have a vivid recollection of what was probably one of the most sodden, mournful, and miserable days of my life, marooned in pouring rain and squelching mud at Sūḳ el-Afej, which, to say the least of it, does not look its best as a "county town" under such conditions. However, the next day was fine and delightful, and the journey in a *bellam*, with its awning and its picturesque carved prow, *à la* Cleopatra on the Cydnus, up the local canal, and the ensuing ride to Nippur, was an experience as pleasant and interesting as the previons day's had been wretched. But on the return to Dīwānīyah on the following day the Fords stuck in the mud, and only the strenuous energy of Captain Daly, the local political officer, who accompanied us, extricated us from the slough of despond.

Then southwards again, with a Burmese chauffeur at the wheel, beguiling the way with conversation in excellent English about Rangoon and the Shwē Dagōn, *phungyis*, and *pwēs*, and *Nats*, and comparisons between Burma and Mesopotamia, by no means to the advantage of the latter. So to Rumeitha and Samāwa, afterwards notable as chief centres of the revolt on the Euphrates in 1920. A year previously, however, they were peaceful enough, and with their

palm groves and comparatively prosperous look (so different from the miserable Tigris towns on their treeless banks of arid mud, past which I had steamed for so many weary days on the way from Basrah to Baghdad), reminded me more of Egypt than any other part of Mesopotamia ever did.

From picturesque old Samāwa, embowered in its palms on both banks of the Euphrates, to ugly modern Naṣrīyah, looking rather like a new Greek town with its broad shadeless streets crossing at right angles, in a motor-boat, and the scene of excavation was reached. Out in the desert loomed the red bulk of Tell el-Muḳayyar, which was now to be my home for four months. I camped under the shadow of the *ziḳḳurrat*, and got to work on February 14, 1919, with seventy Turkish prisoners of war, kindly lent by the military authorities, and the Arab *reises* whom I had brought from Babylon. The nett results of the excavations were (1) the uncovering of the foundations of Ê-kharsag ("The House of the Mountain"), a palace of the kings Ur-Nammu (or Ur-Engur) and Dungi, of the Third Dynasty of Ur (*circa* 2300 B.C.), and the discovery of Ê-makh ("The Noble House"), a temple of the goddess Ninsun; (2) the clearance of the south-east face of the *ziḳḳurrat;* (3) the discovery of part of the *temenos* wall of the temple, with its cellars or casemates in the foundation; (4) the exploration of some streets of the ancient city, in which later inhabitants had buried their dead in earthenware coffins or *larnakes.* The burnt brick walls of (1) were well and carefully built, usually 5 feet thick, showing that the ancient inhabitants well knew the proper thickness to make a wall in Mesopotamia, to keep out both the heat of summer and the cold of winter. The same people, apparently, who buried their dead in the pottery coffins had re-occupied the site of Ê-kharsag at a later date, probably the Assyrian period (ninth to seventh centuries B.C.), and had built amidst its ruin their own feeble and careless brick constructions, largely utilizing the ancient material. Tablets of this later period, beautifully written in cuneiform, containing legal documents, were found in these later constructions. A deposit of these was unearthed at the moment of a visit from Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., late Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces (then on a mission to Mesopotamia), and his staff; and I was, of course facetiously, accused of having "salted" the dig on his honour! Traces of the great fire, by which, in all probability, Ur was destroyed by the Elamites about 2285 B.C., were everywhere to be seen; and remains of stone statues, smashed to atoms probably by the same destroyers, were also found.

When the desert surface was sufficiently firm to bear the weight of a car, and there was no immediate danger of rain and mud, I went out to Shaḥrein, fourteen miles away, and eventually transferred my work there. From the top of the Ur *ziḳḳurrat* one could see the drab top of Shaḥrein, with its base and ends cut off by mirage, looking like

an airship as it swam in the heat-haze. An hour or so's bumping and lurching over the heath and thorn-covered surface of the so-called desert (in reality a steppe) brought me to the base of the mounds of Eridu, isolated like an island in the centre of its surrounding depression, which was the site of the lake, the "sea" in the midst of which the ancient town of the "beloved abyss" (as the Sumerians called it), once stood. For geological reasons it is improbable that Eridu ever stood on the shore of the Persian Gulf, as used to be thought. The "sea" referred to in the cuneiform texts is this lake.

The top, or rather tip, of this *ziḳḳurrat* rises at the north end of the mounds to the height of 80 feet. It is of crude brick, unburnt, and so keeps its drab hue, whereas Tell el-Muḳayyar, the *ziḳḳurrat* of Ur, is red from the savage fire of the Elamites that once consumed it, like Birs Nimrūd. The fierce rains of winter have worn it down into a curious peaked shape at the summit. All round are the mounds in which Captain Thompson had sunk his pits in the preceding year. I also had the help of his Dhiffīr Beduins, with some of my Turks. My object was not to sink pits for stratigraphical evidence, as Captain Thompson had done, but to select some portion of the ancient city of Eridu itself and dig it out at one level, so as to obtain an idea of the buildings of the city. I accordingly excavated a series of houses and streets of the late Sumerian period, apparently of about the age of Gudea, or perhaps a century or two earlier. These houses were built of rectangular crude bricks faced with coarse lime-plaster, occasionally decorated with horizontal bands of red, white, and black painting. Little was found in them, but the harvest of the surrounding plain, with its stone implements and its painted pottery lying on the surface, was again immense. The stone walls and bastions of the town (an unusual feature in Babylonia) were also explored in part. They are built of a rough coral rag, found not far away to the south, in a ridge which effectively disposes of the view that Eridu once stood on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

The heat at Shaḥrein, for it was now the beginning of May, was great, and it was with relief that I moved away over the desert again, with combined camel and motor-car transport, to the small mound of el-'Obeid, ten miles away to the north and near the railway-line between Ur and el-Khidhr, which was to be the scene of our best discoveries. I had already found this mound in the course of a reconnaissance from Ur, being attracted to it by the identity of the remains lying on the surface around it with those at Shaḥrein, and had tentatively attacked it with men sent out by car from Ur. Now, having shifted camp to it, I set to work to dig out the remarkable "beasts" of copper, the *behaimīn* (monsters) of which we had already found the first traces.

Tell el-'Obeid is what the Arabs of the *rīf* call it; the Beduin name is Tell el-Ma'abed, "the mound of the place of worship," which is per-

haps the original and more correct form. It is the site of a little rectangular building, 110 feet long by 85 feet wide, apparently the platform of a small temple or the base of a small *ziḳḳurrat*, of the earliest Sumerian time, built of the characteristic plano-convex burnt bricks of the fourth millenium B.C., and with the recessed or panelled exterior characteristic of that time. It was apparently a shrine of the goddess Damkina, the consort of Enki, the god of Shaḥrein. At the south-east end of this construction, beneath a brick platform of the time of Dungi, in a confused heap, as if they had been thrown into a *favissa*, were found the *behaimīn*.

The find resembles in nature and circumstances the famous deposit of gold, copper, and stone figures, *etc.*, of the Old Kingdom found at Kōm el-aḥmar (Hierakōnpolis) in Upper Egypt by Mr. J. E. Quibell in 1897.

Four life-size heads of lions with rudimentary foreparts but little else in the way of bodies, one smaller lion's head, two heads of panthers or cats, and two small bulls about the size of greyhounds: these were the beasts. They were of copper, and their cast heads had been filled with bitumen and clay, while their hammered bodies, or what remained of them, had been rudely nailed over wooden cores, just like the Egyptian copper or bronze (?) statues of King Pepi and his son from Hierakōnpolis (Sixth Dynasty, *circa* 2700 B.C.). The fact of the heads being cast, which appears to be generally agreed upon by the sculptors and metal-workers who have examined them, is very surprising, and is important in the history of metallurgy. The bitumen and clay filling of the heads reminds one of the description of the image in "Bel and the Dragon," that was "brass without and clay within" (*cf.* Dan. ii. 34).

The lion heads had inlaid eyes of red jasper, white shell, and blue schist, teeth of shell, and tongues of red jasper. All were in very bad condition, the copper being oxidized through and through, so that hardly any metal remained; and it is lucky that the bitumen cores reproduce for us, as if they were casts, the appearance of the copper heads. They, too, have suffered, but can easily be put together, while the reconstitution of the copper heads themselves is not beyond the powers of the restorer's art, and, it is to be hoped, may be attempted in the near future. Dr. Alexander Scott, F.R.S., is now studying the proper method of treatment.

Of the bulls, one fell to green powder almost immediately after discovery, but not until after it had been photographed; its head alone remained intact. The other can eventually be restored. An isolated bull's head is one of the finest examples of early Sumerian art in this *genre* known. The gold horn of another bull was also found, of thick hammered and polished gold, stuffed with bitumen again to give it strength. Cheek by jowl with these remains were found a small seated statue of a man, about 2 feet high, made of trachyte, of the usual early Sumerian type, with shaven head, prominent nose, and

enormous eyes, and the torso of another, possibly of the same man, but made of white limestone, and inscribed with a dedication in the most archaic cuneiform characters for Kur-Lil, the doorkeeper of Erech, to the goddess Damkina. These figures date the whole find to the epoch of Ur-Ninā of Lagash, about 3200 B.C. or earlier—a date otherwise deducible from the style of the animal heads.

Finally, as a crown to the whole work, was found close by the remarkable copper slab, 8 feet long by 3 feet 6 inches high, on which in high relief are the crudely cast copper figures of two stags, with heads in the round, walking to left and right respectively, whose tails are grasped by the talons of a lion-headed eagle in full face, who occupies the centre of the relief, while his wings fill up the space above the stags. This antithetical group represents Imgig, the mythical bird of the god Ningirsu, seizing his victims. The relief is the largest example of the group yet known, and is a notable relic of early Sumerian art.

Its excavation and removal was a very ticklish job, on account of the terribly oxidized condition of the copper, already so bad when discovered that the figure of the eagle could only be discovered by the eye of knowledge, since where the stags were we knew the eagle must be, but, sure enough, his wings were evident to settle the matter.

However, by careful labour the work was done, and the whole relief transported *en bloc*, without cutting up, to England, where it awaits the needful treatment and restoration. As a beginning the head of one of the stags has been treated, and is now on view, with the other objects described, in the British Museum.

Other interesting objects were found here, such as pottery rosettes, with petals of red, white, and black stones, on long shanks for insertion in crude brick walls, and pillars, originally wooden, faced with mosaic designs of red sandstone, black bituminous limestone, and mother-of-pearl, fastened by copper wire into a bitumen backing. These are quite new to our knowledge.

And the immediately surrounding tract gave us the same prehistoric stone implements and painted pottery as at Shahrein. This pottery is in itself one of the most important results of the expedition. That of 'Obeid differs little from that of Shahrein, but is often finer and with more delicate designs. Both are of the same type as that of de Morgan's "second style," found at Susa, and are identical with that found by Pézard at Bushire. At 'Obeid I found a few bits of the "first style." It is not wheel-made, but belongs to the age immediately preceding the invention of the wheel, and may be dated not later than 3500 B.C., in the chalcolithic period of culture, before metal was exclusively used. It is often highly fired, almost vitreous. This ceramic seems to have been common to Mesopotamia, Elam, Northern Persia, and Turkistan at that period, and connects definitely with similar pot-fabrics of somewhat later date in Asia Minor, while further connections may be adumbrated for it, from Thessaly to Honan.

The Sumerian of the historic period, the full age of metal, used a plain drab ware, which persisted, with the sole addition of green or polychrome glaze, till the end of Babylonian culture. The old black-painted vitreous ware was never revived.

I found also at 'Obeid, as Thompson and I had at Shahrein, the same votive (?) sickles of hard pottery, the strange curved pottery nails, *etc.*, which had already been discovered by our predecessor, Taylor, at both sites in 1854.

It was now the end of May, and the heat unbearable: 116° F. in the shade. El-'Obeid could not be finished, but still awaits the completing spade, while of Ur, of course, but a sample or two had been taken. It was impossible to go on in that season, and I hoped to return before long. Financial and political considerations have, however, denied us the fulfilment of that hope. It is, nevertheless, still permissible to hope that the work thus begun may eventually be taken up again, and the excavation of this interesting group of ancient sites be carried a step further. Completion of the exploration of such an enormous site as Ur is, of course, a thing of the dim and distant future, and work at Shahrein entails peculiar difficulties, notably the want of water, which I had to have brought daily by car in tanks from the railway at Ur Junction, fifteen miles away.

I left Basrah at the end of May, and, after an archæological visit to Upper Egypt and to Jerusalem, reached England again in August, 1919. My work would not have been possible without the help, not only of the Chief Commissioner and his subordinates, but also of the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Sir George MacMunn, whose interest in antiquities is well known, of Brigadier-General C. E. Sutton commanding lines of communication, and of the railway officers to whose ever ready and cordial assistance we owe so much.

I was alone during most of the work, having a British warrant officer, Sergeant-Major Stanley Webb, to look after the prisoner diggers and help on occasion; he, however, remained permanently at Ur. The Commander-in-Chief kindly lent me an R.E. officer, Lieutenant H. D. O'Sullivan, for a week at the end of the work in order to make proper plans of the buildings discovered. These, with photographs, were published in the preliminary account of the excavation which appeared in the Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries for December, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that at this late hour I can venture to invite anybody to make any observations, but I think we must all be deeply indebted to Dr. Hall for having allowed us to pass an hour so agreeably and so profitably among the memorials of an ancient past, which has been so beautifully illustrated by the plates he has shown us. I am quite sure that I shall have your entire concurrence in thanking Dr. Hall most warmly for having come here this evening, and entertained and instructed us during his lecture. (Applause.)

# SOME NOTES ON AEROPLANES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE AIR ROUTE FROM CAIRO TO BAGDAD

By Air-Commodore H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, March 9, 1922, when a lecture was given by Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham, entitled, "Some Notes on Aeroplanes, with Special Reference to the Cross Desert Route from Cairo to Bagdad."

Sir Michael O'Dwyer presided.

The Chairman opened the proceedings by asking the Hon. Secretary (Colonel A. C. Yate) to read the names of the newly elected Members of the Society.

The Hon. Secretary (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) : We have to-day elected as Members of the Society : Lady Carnock ; Major Hon. F. A. Nicolson, 15th Hussars ; Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E. ; Colonel P. B. Bramley, C.I.E., O.B.E. ; Colonel M. R. W. Nightingale, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A. ; Mr. C. A. Walpole, O.B.E. ; Captain C. G. Snelling, I.A., Indian Political Department ; Mr. Robert Machray. I think I might mention with regard to Mr. Robert Machray that he is a very well-known writer on the Middle East, and that his latest article on the subject is in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, entitled, "The British in the Middle East." I mention it because I consider he is a great acquisition to the Society.

The Chairman : We have met to-day to hear a lecture which Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham is kindly giving us, "Some Notes on Aeroplanes, with Special Reference to the Cross Desert Route from Cairo to Bagdad." It is a subject which will interest everyone concerned in increasing our knowledge of Central Asia, and the lecturer whom we have been fortunate enough to secure is an expert who can tell us more about the subject than probably anybody else. I will not waste any more time, but will ask Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham to give us the benefit of his notes.

Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham : 1. Last summer I paid a visit to Egypt and Iraq with the object of finding out the particular troubles that are experienced with aeroplanes and engines in tropical climates. My stay in those countries only lasted for a total of four and a half

weeks in July and August, and that, of course, is quite an insufficient time to get more than a superficial knowledge of the subject. In fact, I feel rather a fraud in presuming to give a lecture this afternoon.

2. First, with regard to wind. For people who move only on the surface of the sea and earth the wind is either abominable or invigorating, according to the state of one's health. On land it only becomes a nuisance when it blows the hat off one's head or a tile off one's roof, but the matter is very different for those who move in three dimensions instead of two. For them the wind is one of the most important factors in their daily life.

When we talk of the speed of an aeroplane, it always means speed through the air. The speed relatively to the ground depends entirely upon what the air is doing at the time. If, therefore, the aeroplane has a speed of 100 miles per hour and is moving east, and there is an east wind of 50 miles per hour, the aeroplane will be only moving at the rate of $(100-50)=50$ miles per hour relatively to the ground, but if the aeroplane turns round so as to fly with the wind, then it will be moving over the ground at a speed of $(100+50)=150$ miles per hour, though its speed through the air will be the same in each case.

If a man is out of sight of the ground he has no direct means of telling how he is moving relatively to the ground; any instruments that he has only tell him his speed through the air, and unless he knows the force and direction of the wind he cannot tell his speed with reference to the ground by any direct means.

The trouble about the wind is that it does not remain constant at different heights above the ground, but varies with altitude. It is practically always stronger at, say, 2,000 feet than it is near the ground, but frequently it changes in direction as well. The most common change is clockwise. A pilot who is flying entirely by compass above the clouds out of sight of the ground, must therefore allow for the variation of wind strength and direction in order to make an accurate course to his destination. I lay stress on the words "entirely by compass" because it is now practicable to navigate aeroplanes by sextant and observation of the sun or stars, as in the case of ships at sea, though this, of course, presupposes a trained observer.

Another point about the wind is that an aeroplane should always get off and alight facing directly into the wind, otherwise it will have a certain amount of sideways movement when it reaches the ground, and this means risk of damage to the undercarriage.

3. An aeroplane depends for its support upon the reaction of the air on its wings, and the amount of this reaction depends, amongst other factors, upon the density of the air. Further, the amount of power given out by an internal combustion engine also depends upon the density of the air amongst other factors. In tropical climates the air is less dense than it is in England, and the result is that the perform-

ance of aeroplanes is distinctly worse in Iraq or India than it is here. This means that aeroplanes take a longer run to get off, climb slower, have a lower ceiling, and land faster. Flying at ground level at Bagdad in the middle of a July day is roughly equivalent to flying at a height of 4,000 feet in England.

There is no difficulty now in flying by night so long as the pilot has a prepared aerodrome to land on.

Flying actually in clouds is very unpleasant, chiefly because a pilot quickly loses all sense of direction unless he has a reference point of some sort to guide him. And remember, in the case of an aeroplane, it is not merely a question of going round in a circle on the surface of the earth, like a man lost in a fog, but also of losing all sense of vertical and horizontal as well.

An expert pilot, however, can fly in clouds with the instruments now available and keep a reasonably accurate course.

With the standard wireless set using continuous waves, as used on aircraft in the Middle East, a range of 500 miles from air to ground and of 300 miles from ground to air can be obtained under normal conditions. Atmospherics are, however, very bad in the afternoon, especially during April and May, and wireless communication is usually impracticable at such times.

It may be noted that direction finding wireless can be used to enable aircraft to locate their position or to fly on to a transmitting station, and also to assist in locating aircraft if stranded in the desert.

It is also possible to communicate between aeroplanes and the ground by dropping messages or picking them up. In the latter case, the message is attached to the end of a string, which is supported on two sticks about 6 feet high, and the aeroplane picks up the string by a small grapnel carried at the end of a wire, and trailing out behind and below the aeroplane.

4. I did not do a greal deal of flying in the Middle East, but so far as my experience went, the eddy currents, etc., in the middle of the day were in no way so violent as to make flying dangerous, or even difficult for an experienced pilot, and I have certainly had far worse bumps during bad rain storms, both in England and in France, than when flying in Iraq in the middle of the day. This, of course, presupposes that one does not fly into a dust storm. These must be horrible, and the trouble is that they go up to very great heights in Iraq, certainly over 12,000 feet at times.

Another thing that is disconcerting is the sudden changes of wind direction that one gets near the ground in the desert. On one occasion just after midday the wind, which was about ten miles per hour on the ground, kept changing 90 degrees in a few seconds--viz., from east to north and back again—and the smoke from a smoke-bomb, which was put out to give a guide to an unfortunate aeroplane trying to land,

covered a segment of approximately 90 degrees instead of blowing in a straight line. About two hours later the wind suddenly died down completely, and five minutes afterwards began to blow steadily from a point a little south of west. One also gets sudden gusts, I suppose due to a small eddy; these are also liable to cause landing troubles.

Above a height of about 1,000 feet above the ground there is a westerly wind, apparently permanent, between the Mediterranean and Iraq; the result of this is than an aeroplane will do the journey from Cairo to Bagdad quicker than in the inverse direction.

5. I might say that I had nothing whatever to do with the making of the route from Cairo to Bagdad, but have merely been over it like a sort of Cook's tourist. The total distance from Cairo to Bagdad as the machines fly is 833 miles, of which 467 is over the Arabian Desert. The main objects in starting it were, first, to have the means of supplying Iraq with aeroplanes by air from Egypt, instead of sending them round in cases via the Red Sea and Persian Gulf; secondly, to form the first stage of the air route from Cairo to India and Australia; and thirdly, to establish the means of quick communication between Iraq and Cairo, and so with England. Normally, a letter going from London to Bagdad travels via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, Bombay, Karachi, the Persian Gulf, and Basra, and takes between five and six weeks, thus making Iraq, from the point of view of communication, one of the furthest outposts of the Empire. The air route is altering all this. I have seen in Bagdad a London paper only nine days old. A pilot has arrived in Bagdad eight and a half hours after leaving Cairo, and an officer has arrived in London six and a half days after leaving Bagdad. A regular fortnightly mail service is now running in each direction.

From very ancient days a caravan route existed between Damascus and the Euphrates, running practically due east of the former. There is water on this route, whereas to the south of it, where the desert air route now runs, there is practically none, except after the rains.

The question then arises—Why fly across the southern part of the desert instead of continuing to follow the caravan route, as has been done on several occasions? The reason for that lies in the fact that under the Peace Treaty the northern boundary of our zone of influence comes a long way south of Damascus, and cuts the old caravan route about half-way across. We cannot fly military aeroplanes over other people's zone of influence.

6. With regard to the nature of the country, the word "desert" is somewhat of a misnomer. It is not a sandy desert at all, but most of it rather a steppe, which would probably be very fertile if there were more water. The surface is quite hard, and in many places is covered, or partially covered, with a sort of scrub which is, of course, all dried up in the summer. It rains, I believe, for about one week in the year,

and after that there is a large amount of grazing for camels. The desert lies high, being nearly all over 2,000 feet above the sea, in some places well over 3,000.

The desert is uninhabited as we should understand it, although after the rains a good many nomad Arabs wander over it, grazing their camels. At first there is a considerable amount of surface water, though this soon dries up. However, the camel food that has grown remains succulent for some time, so that the camels do not want to drink. The attendants live on camel's milk. They drink water when they can, but this is reserved chiefly for their women and children. I believe that they sometimes go for as long as two or three months drinking nothing but camel's milk.

Even in the summer there will be an occasional raid across the desert. The object of these is to steal someone else's camels. The raids are generally carried out according to strict rules. For instance, it is very wrong for a raiding party to kill any individual of the tribe whom they are raiding, although the raided tribe may defend themselves. When a man is killed a blood feud is started, but can be cancelled by adequate compensation.

The current rate of exchange, when I was out there, was forty camels per man. Again, if the raiders get off with camels belonging to a widow, she can run after them, and, using the proper formula, say she is a widow, and demand her camels back. I am told that this is generally done. One of the political officers told me that he was talking to a sheik and told him that raids were forbidden by the British, and asked why did they still go on doing it, pointing out that Englishmen never raided each other. The sheik thought for a moment, and then said : " Yes ; but you play football."

7. The first Air Force party to be sent across this desert was the car convoy. The object of this was partly to select possible landing-grounds, but chiefly to make a definite track across the desert which aeroplanes would follow. I have sometimes seen some criticisms of this track, and people say, why don't we fly straight across? Well, from the point of view of pure flying this would be the simplest thing to do, and if one did get a few degrees out of one's course one would simply go on until one met the Euphrates ; but unfortunately in this year of grace 1922, one cannot guarantee against engine failure in some form or other.

If an aeroplane comes down in the middle of this vast desert it is exceedingly difficult to find, even with the aid of wireless, the result being that, if there were no form of track, we should be bound sooner or later to lose pilots. However, so long as one has got a track and the aeroplanes follow it, a machine having a forced landing would be bound to be picked up, because even if the wireless did break down, rescue parties would be sent out within twenty-four hours from each

end, and they would follow along the track until they saw the damaged machine. Then steps would be taken either to drop water or other supplies, to land in the vicinity, or help in some other manner.

Up to June 25 of last year no European, so far as is known, had ever crossed this part of the desert from east to west or vice versa. People have, of course, been along the caravan route to the north, and others, such as Miss Gertrude Bell, Mosil, and Colonel Leachman had wandered over a large part of the desert, but mainly in a direction of north to south. It was, therefore, somewhat of a bold conception to decide to send off a small party to cross this unknown desert. The fact that it was accomplished successfully, I think, reflects great credit on those responsible for its initiation and organization, as well as the actual performers. The car party had many difficulties to contend with, especially during the first part, where a passage through lava had to be found. Final success was due chiefly to effective co-operation between aeroplanes and the cars, the former reconnoitring the route and bringing out supplies from Amman. On the outward journey six Crossley light tenders and three Rolls Royce cars belonging to the Machine Gun Corps were taken. All bar one vehicle made the complete journey to Bagdad and back.

A great many experiments were carried out as to the best method of marking the route, but it was eventually found that the wheel tracks of the cars themselves were sufficient in most places, each vehicle following closely in the tracks of the preceding ones. Over certain portions of the route it was necessary to use a sort of wide, shallow plough, and this was also used to make arrows by the side of the track occasionally. I don't suppose a car track of this nature would be of much value in a sandy desert, but it is certainly most effective between Amman and the Euphrates, and there is no real difficulty in following it from the air. One has to use one's brains a little bit—*i.e.*, sometimes one has to look two or three miles ahead, and sometimes one has to look almost vertically downwards. From the pilot's point of view there is a great advantage in having a continuous line of this nature to follow, instead of occasional marks such as bomb-craters, and it is rather fascinating to watch the little narrow line stretching away in the distance, the one thread linking you not only to civilization, but to food and water. Most of the track has recently been gone over again, and it will probably require re-doing once a year.

Before this car party started, the maps of that part of the world observed a discreet blankness, but now the route followed by the cars and some of the prominent points near it have been accurately fixed by surveyors. They made use of the stars for fixing their position at night accurately, and this method entails knowing the exact time. The chief surveyor took a small wireless set with him, and every night

about half-past ten used to set it up and listen in for the time signals from the Eiffel Tower, and thus checked his chronometer to a tenth of a second. There is something rather romantic about this, the operator in the centre of a great city working his sending key, and, all unknown to himself, enabling some stranger over 2,000 miles away to locate his position in a trackless desert.

8. Now as regards the journey itself. I won't say anything about the part from Cairo to Amman, because many people know that part of the world. The Dead Sea looks quite pretty from the air, and quite reminded me of the Italian Lakes; but the Jordan, at any rate in the summer, is disappointing, being a miserable, dirty little trickle; in fact, I quite sympathized with Naaman in not wishing to bathe in it.

Amman is a town with about 12,000 inhabitants, including a great many Circassians, who were originally sent there by the Turks to keep control over the Arabs. In olden days it used to be the headquarters of a Roman Legion. There are still remains of a Roman amphitheatre and of one or two temples, and when you go down to a bazaar in Amman you will probably find yourself on a stone which, when examined, is seen to be the capitol or base of a Roman pillar. Amman is at present the capital of Trans-Jordania, and Abdul, king of that part of the world, has his court in a big camp at Amman. The aerodrome here is very dusty, about 2,600 feet above the sea, and has higher ground around. It is an unpleasant aerodrome to get off from in a slow-climbing machine.

The first point out from Amman is Azrak, distance fifty miles. There is no village or anything there but water springs, which form a series of pools in the summer and a lake in the winter. The ground immediately round these pools is fertile, and the place forms rather a centre for nomads. The Romans had a fort here, the foundations of which are still to be seen, and the Persians built a castle, the ruins of which are still left. The water is beautifully clear and quite good to drink, so long as one takes it from near a spring. Where it has been evaporating in the pools it tastes very salt.

From Amman to Azrak the country is undulating and bare; in fact, one may say the desert begins a few miles east of Amman. At Azrak one begins to get into the first part of the lava country. There are masses of this lava about, but so far as is known there is no volcano. The lava appears to have welled up out of the earth through a sort of crevasse and merely flooded over the whole countryside. The Persian castle and the old Roman fort I referred to are built of lava.

9. From Azrak onwards one also comes across what are called mud flats. These are large areas of a sort of light yellow soil, which looks white and almost dazzling in the sun. They are perfectly level

and smooth, nothing grows on them, and some of them are several square miles in extent. In many ways they form an absolutely ideal aerodrome, the only drawback being that they are so smooth and level that it is very difficult to judge one's height; in fact, it is like alighting on a perfectly smooth sea. The surface is quite hard, and though it is cut into by tail skids, is but little affected by aeroplane wheels. These mud flats are probably formed of the matter which is carried down in suspension by streams during the rains—in fact, are the dry beds of shallow lakes. Some of them may, however, have a volcanic origin. They are covered with water during the rainy season; in fact, one or two were still wet in July, but the water is only about an inch deep, and the ground surface remains hard, so it is possible for aeroplanes to land without damage.

I spent a night on one of these mud flats owing to the fact that one of three machines in my flight had to land on account of engine trouble.

This formed another instance of the value of wireless in the desert. The machine that had engine trouble sent out a wireless message to say it would be forced to land. That was taken down in my machine and the message handed to me, and at the same time it was being received at Bagdad and Amman, and from the last transmitted to Cairo. So, in a few minutes, there was I, up in the middle of the air over the desert, Bagdad, and Cairo, all knowing that this particular machine was having to land, and why.

Several of these mud flats and other places have been marked as specially suitable for aeroplanes to land on, but no personnel, stores, or supplies are kept at any of the desert landing grounds.

After a bit of fairly open steppe country one then comes to the second lava outcrop about 110 miles from Amman. The lava here is much more continuous than it is close to Azrak, and it was here that the car convoy met with their greatest difficulties. It is a most depressing area of country to fly over, and it has quite a bad effect upon one's nerves—at any rate, some people's. I know I felt as if the end of the world had really come, and there was no one left alive except my pilot and myself, and that the sooner we joined the rest the better. The lava ends just before the landing-ground marked F on the wall map, and from there, practically, till one reaches the Euphrates, the country is open steppe. A peculiar thing about this lava country is that there are traces of some ancient civilization on it. There are several circles of lava blocks, which may very likely be the remains of houses, but, in addition, there are straight walls, which, from the air, look like the boundaries between fields; in fact, they are not unlike an open stone-wall country in England, such as that round Cirencester. I noticed these walls principally on the eastern edge of the lava.

The lava ends quite abruptly about 130 miles from Amman.

El Djid is a sort of half-way place between Amman and Bagdad,

and one constantly sees it referred to. It is marked on many maps; in fact, some people think that there is a large village, and even a town there. El Djid really consists simply of two wells, one of them about 160 feet deep, bored through solid limestone. Who made them I do not know. The water tastes very good.

There is another well at Rutba, some thirty miles N.E. of El Djid, otherwise there is no permanent water between Azrak and Ramadi.

10. On the occasion that I crossed the desert to Bagdad there was quite a gathering at El Djid, on July 20. There was the R.A.F. car convoy returning from the East, another car convoy which had been reconnoitring for a railway came down from the north, and my flight of three aeroplanes from the west—three independent parties all meeting at this poor little well in the midst of the vast uncharted desert. One couldn't help feeling that it was the beginning of its future conquest by the mechanical genius of the West. On this particular occasion the party that came down from the north told me that they had come across a sheik who had been wounded two days before in the course of a raid made on him, and suggested that, as this sheik had been friendly to the R.A.F. convoy at the time it was moving to Bagdad, it would be a good thing to fly him to Bagdad for hospital treatment. This was referred by wireless to Sir Percy Cox in Bagdad, who agreed, and so we decided to do it. A couple of Ford cars were sent off to pick up the sheik and take him to the landing-ground known as L.G. 4A. About four hours later I started off with three machines, and, just as we got over the L.G. 4A, we saw two little black dots hurrying along over the desert, these being the two Ford cars with the wounded sheik and a friend of his. We landed all right, put the sheik into one of our machines, the Vickers Vimy, and eventually got him to Bagdad in safety. What the sheik thought of it I do not know; poor man, he was not given much of a chance to object. Hustled first into a Ford car, then out of that into this strange-looking contraption of wood and canvas, borne for hundreds of miles through the air, lifted into an ambulance, and, before he knew what was actually occurring, he was lying on a bed in Bagdad hospital and being X-rayed. Somewhat alarming for a wild sort of child of Nature, who had probably never slept in a house in his life.

I was told at the time in Bagdad that this action would have a wonderful effect upon the desert tribes, as showing that the Air Force did not exist merely for destructive purposes, but also for helping and benefiting the population whenever possible, and further at any rate—in the case of that particular tribe they would be friends of the Air Force for ever.

There was a sequel a few days later which proved the truth of these remarks. One of our machines on landing at El Djid to fill up with petrol was damaged. A flight of six more machines was sent out

from Bagdad to take out spares and mechanics to repair it, and the whole party had to spend the night at El Djid. Just about sunset they saw five men on camels ride up and proceed to take up an outpost line round them. These five men remained thus on guard all through the night, and at dawn mounted their camels and rode silently away. It was found later that these were five men from our wounded sheik's tribe who, learning that the Air Force were in some trouble, had taken steps to ensure that they were not molested during the night.

I may add that the sheik has recovered and is now back with his tribe.

There appears to be a sort of natural fellow-feeling between the nomad Arab and the Air Force pilot, and I think flying rather appeals to the romantic side of the Arab's nature. Perhaps both feel that they are at times in conflict with the vast elemental forces of Nature, forces which could completely overwhelm them at any moment, were it not for the fact that Nature is on the whole tolerant to such puny little creatures as human beings. I came across a case of the same sort of friendly feeling occurring in the Sinai Desert and in Trans-Jordania.

11. About forty miles beyond El Djid there is a series of low flat-topped hills.

As one approaches the Euphrates, about twenty miles from Ramadi, one passes over a couple of bitumen pools, horrid, nasty-looking things.

The approved method of marking landing-grounds is for a man to stand on the landing-ground, holding one end of a rope 20 to 30 feet long. The driver of a car holds the other, and then with the first man as centre and the rope as radius proceeds to drive in a circle as fast as he can. He soon cuts through the top crust, and very soon a beautiful circle is made.

In the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris there are traces of the old civilization, chiefly in the way of canals, which are now dry. Nearly all the existing cultivation in that area lies close by the banks of the two rivers, and between them is practically a desert. So far as I can make out there is not much point in building canals at present in this part of the world, because if one did put more land under cultivation there is no labour to work it. One cannot import labour, partly because the climate is unsuitable and partly because the Arabs won't have it, so if one wants to make Iraq prosperous the only thing to do is to reduce the infantile mortality, which I believe at the present amounts to as much as 70 per cent.

Bagdad is a disappointing place—at any rate, approaching it from the air—being simply a glorified mud village and hardly distinguishable at evening from the desert.

The intense heat of the Iraq Plain in summer is very noticeable when descending in an aeroplane. At a height of about 2,750 feet one seems suddenly to enter an oven, and wonders for a few minutes how

one will be able to live in such conditions. The air blast on one's bare skin is quite painful.

12. As regards the equipment to be carried on aeroplanes crossing the desert there are certain things that are essential.

First, a supply of water and food for every individual. At present the military machines carry five gallons of water and ten days' rations per head. The rations by the way want to be suitable for the desert. Bully beef and army biscuit are not very appetizing; but things like dates, tinned fish, if it hasn't gone bad, and some form of thin biscuit are what is wanted, especially dates. A small medical companion is also desirable, and this should consist not merely of bandages, but contain a few of those medicines that one does want in the East—*e.g.*, permanganate of potash for water, phenacetin, and chlorodyne.

Then as regards the machines. Always take at least one spare wheel, some Very's lights, smoke flares for dropping from the machine to give wind direction on the ground, signalling strips for making signals to a rescue party in case one has trouble, picketting gear for the machine, propeller covers, a few small tools and weapons of some sort. Picketting gear is most important in the desert, because you never know when a sudden gust will not come up, and they are sometimes so violent as to upset a Handley-Page.

13. It is very important that a machine crossing this desert should be able to fly the whole way across, or at any rate between Ramadi and Amman, without having to fill up with petrol. At present, although a D.H.9A can fly from Amman to Bagdad, it cannot fly from Bagdad to Amman without refilling. This is, of course, on account of the permanent westerly wind. This means carrying petrol in tins usually slung on under the lower planes and then landing to fill the tank. Now a landing in the desert is apt to lead to trouble, largely on account of the vagaries of the wind. As a case in point, when Sir G. Salmond and I were flying back from Bagdad we landed at El Djid to fill up with petrol. The first of the three machines to land damaged its undercarriage, not badly, but it could not get off as it stood. We decided to leave it there and proceed with the other two.

Here again came in an instance of the value of wireless. We sent up one of the two remaining machines to despatch a message to Bagdad, 250 miles, giving orders with regard to salving the machine and personnel. The receipt of this order was acknowledged by wireless at once. Shortly after our arrival at Amman we heard also by wireless that the orders had been executed, and that six machines had been sent from Bagdad to take out a spare undercarriage, tools, trestle, etc. Unfortunately, one of these six also damaged itself; in fact, a good deal worse than the first machine. Well, if any attempt had been made to rescue that second machine, I suppose twelve aeroplanes would have had to come out, and then two of those twelve

would have crashed, and so one would have gone on in a sort of geometrical progression. However, the Officer Commanding, Iraq, wisely decided to cut his losses, and made no attempt to get back the second damaged machine, though, with the shadow of the super axe in sight, I might add that its engine and instruments were salved.

All this trouble was due to the necessity for landing to refill with petrol.

14. A journey across the desert is still somewhat in the nature of a military operation. There is always a good sporting chance of trouble with some body of Arab raiders, and the first thing one does if one has to spend the night in the desert is to get one's machine-gun ready. Small parties—*i.e.*, two or three men—cannot be left out alone at present, but have to be reinforced or brought back.

15. As you know, it has been decided by the Cabinet that the responsibility for the military control of Iraq shall devolve upon the R.A.F.

Without entering into a lengthy discussion on this, I should like to indicate one or two of the special advantages of air power in this connection. The normal course of any form of small war in which this Empire engages is roughly as follows:

Some tribe raids another under our protection, refuses to pay taxes, or eats a missionary. After due preliminaries and failure to obtain any apology, an expensive expedition is organized, and, after a lapse of some months, either gains or fails to gain its objective. Even in the former case the tribe that committed the enormity has probably forgotten all about it, and so the effect is not so great as might have been anticipated. The main difficulties are—

First, the need for a line of communication, which has to be guarded.

Second, the delay in starting, due to large amount of transport and troops that have to be collected and organized, mainly for the L. of C.

Third, the slow movements, even after the expedition is ready to start.

Fourth, natural obstacles met with—*e.g.*, deserts.

Now, provided the objective is within, say, 200 miles of their base, aeroplanes have none of these difficulties. They can act within a few days, in some cases within a few hours, of receipt of orders, and they want no L. of C. There must be a great saving not only in time, but in money and in life.

As a case in point, may I remind you of the Somaliland operations, January, 1920. The following is an extract from the despatch of the Governor of Somaliland, Second Supplement to *London Gazette*, October 29, 1920:

"Twenty-three days of active operations have sufficed to effect the final overthrow of the Dervish power. For this, credit is primarily due to the Royal Air Force. They exercised an immediate and tremendous moral effect over the Dervishes, demoralizing them in the first few days. Our casualties amongst troops were confined to three native ranks killed and eight wounded, and one of the Camel Corps was slightly wounded. Neither the R.A F. nor the Royal Navy suffered casualties."

Then, again, the rapidity with which aircraft can act may be the means not only of preventing a disturbance increasing and becoming a really serious affair, but of nipping it in the bud.

An interesting case was that of Colonel Jacob's Mission, which was interned at Baji, near Aden, in November, 1919. The local authorities estimated that a whole mixed brigade would be required to rescue this Mission, and I believe this had been actually asked for. It was, however, decided to see what moral effect could be produced by aircraft, and, consequently, two single-seater machines, with a total of eight men, were sent on the deck of a steamer, and landed on an island, the distance from which to Baji was fifty-five miles. The succeeding events can now be best described in the form of a diary :

*November* 26.—One machine flew over the neighbourhood of Baji. Colonel Jacob reported no good effect, rather the reverse.

*November* 28.—One machine flew over Baji and dropped a few bombs in a previously selected spot for demonstration purposes. Colonel Jacob reported excellent results of aeroplane demonstration and a great advance towards settlement.

*December* 12.—Mission was released without any troops being sent.

The following is an extract from the report of the G.O.C., Aden, on the occurrence :

"The effect of two flights by a single aeroplane over a hostile tribal area was so great that men, women, and children were filled with alarm, and brought to bear immediately the full weight of their influence against continued hostility to the Government."

I like sometimes to think of the number of women and children that were saved from becoming widows and orphans by those two little aeroplanes and their eight men.

I have sometimes seen criticisms levelled against the use of aircraft for this sort of purpose on the grounds that they are merely an instrument of terrorism, that bombing is necessarily indiscriminate, and even that any action we take amounts chiefly to bombing women and children. I think this is a most unfair statement to make, and, in any case, I fail to see that killing women and children by means of aircraft bombs is more cruel or reprehensible than killing them by means of shells from a gun. However, apart from that, I do not believe that aircraft really are going to rely entirely upon terrorism in

Iraq, but that they will have a distinct effect in pacifying and civilizing a semideveloped country.

There are the opportunities afforded by rapid communication. This will not only enable political officers to visit distant parts of the country at very short notice, but will also afford a means of conveying tribal leaders to the headquarters of the Government, and thus afford the opportunity of personal interviews, with all the benefits that accrue therefrom.

Further, there are the opportunities for doing direct friendly action to individuals in isolated districts. An instance of this has already been referred to.

Time alone can prove the wisdom or otherwise of the decision to make the R.A.F. responsible for the control of Iraq, but all the experience so far available shows that the decision is correct, and that it will result not merely in crushing opposition, but in preventing it, thereby saving many lives—lives not only of Englishmen, but of natives, too—and this, I know, is the opinion of those best qualified to judge on the spot.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham has given us a very lucid, interesting, and humorous account of his experiences, and he has shown that even in the desert there is a human side The only fault I find with his lecture is his modesty with regard to his own achievements and the achievements of the Air Force. That is characteristic of all brave men. I have been particularly interested in his closing remarks as to the effect of the Air Force, both in preventing disturbances and repressing them. About three years ago in the Punjab (April, 1919), the province of which I was then in charge, we were confronted with a serious outbreak of rebellion all over the centre of the Punjab. We had but few troops, the bulk of the army being still overseas, but a few days before the rebellion broke out four aeroplanes, by a happy chance, arrived from Quetta. The presence of those was, to my mind, worth four British regiments. On April 10 an outbreak of rebellion took place in Amritsar, and all the Europeans whom the mob could lay hands on were murdered. On the 12th the mob at Kasur—thirty miles off—tore up the railway, attacked a train, and attempted to murder all the Europeans travelling by it. They murdered two and seriously wounded four more. We were dealing with these outbreaks on April 15 when suddenly there was a fresh report from Gujranwala, the headquarters of a district on the main railway-line, forty miles north of Lahore. All communications by road, rail, telegraph, and telephone were cut. Messages were got through from an adjoining station to the effect that the mob had broken out and had attacked and burned all civil buildings and post offices, had torn up railway-lines and attacked the gaol. The few European women and children in the place had been hurried into the

fortified Treasury buildings, which were being attacked by the mob that was burning and looting everything around them. The lives of the Europeans were in imminent peril. This came on top of half a dozen similar reports, and I telephoned at once asking for military aid, but the reply was that all communications were interrupted, and that there were no troops to spare, even if they could be got there in time. Could we get assistance from Rawal Pindi in the north? We were informed there that they had heard of the outbreak, but they, too, could not send timely assistance. The position seemed hopeless, but I remembered the aeroplanes, and telephoned to the General: "Have you any aeroplanes left?" He had one; the others had been sent out scouting in other directions to see what damage had been done, but he had one left. I asked him to send that out to Gujranwala, make a demonstration, attack and disperse the mob who were looting and burning, and rescue the Europeans. I was glad to see it leave about 2 o'clock. It arrived at 3 o'clock, and found the rebellious mob in possession of the civil station. They had already burned the railway goods sheds and destroyed property to the value of £50,000. They had burned the English church, the post office, and were attacking the gaol with the idea of letting loose the prisoners, and the fortified building in which the few Europeans were taking refuge, defended by two British police officers and a small body of Indian police. That was the situation when the single aeroplane arrived. Within half an hour the situation had been completely changed. The aeroplane dropped a few bombs on the rebellious crowd, killing four or five and wounding twenty or thirty more. In ten minutes they had all dispersed, taking refuge in the city. It hovered about the place. The news of what had happened in Gujranwala was bringing in people from the neighbouring villages to join in looting and plundering, but a few warning shells dropped from the aeroplane drove them home. The aeroplane came back to Lahore at 4.30, and at 5 o'clock I received a message that all was well at Gujranwala. No further attempt was made to start a disturbance in Gujranwala. We got troops in late that night, but if we had had to wait for the arrival of troops and the restoration of communications, the Treasury buildings would have been burnt, the half a dozen Europeans murdered, and the rebellion would have rapidly spread.

This rebellion was accompanied by a general railway strike. At one railway junction, Sama Sata, in the Native State of Bahawulpur, there were about fifty Europeans and Eurasians connected with the railway works. All trains had stopped running; they were beleaguered on all sides. It was impossible to send troops—the nearest military station was over a hundred miles away—and the only means of restoring communications and saving these people from probable attack was to send an aeroplane. The place was in the middle of a desert, but the

aeroplane arrived and hovered around, and its mere presence had the extraordinary moral effect that the strike came to an end, and trains pulled up in the station were allowed to move out, and the relieving train bringing troops was allowed to move in. As to the effect of the four aeroplanes in that troublous week—one of the worst I have ever had to go through—I think four battalions would not have done what the four aeroplanes did in the time. I mention this as an example of the extraordinary value of aeroplanes, not only for suppressing, but for preventing, outbreaks. I am sure the knowledge that Government had at its disposal those aeroplanes, probably magnified by popular rumour into many more, prevented outbreaks throughout the length and breadth of the Province.

We have many gentlemen here well acquainted with the route described by Captain Brooke-Popham who have helped to make it, and I trust they will join in the discussion.

Major General Sir FREDERICK MAURICE: I am afraid I have had nothing to do with the route to Bagdad, but I wanted to say one word upon the last part of the lecture; that is, with reference to the extraordinarily interesting experiment now beginning of the control of Iraq and Palestine by the Air Force. It has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. There are many differences of opinion on the subject: there are those who are doubtful about its utility, and there are even those who maintain that it would be far better to abolish the Air Ministry altogether, and put the aeroplanes that the Army require under the War Office, and those the Navy require under the Admiralty. I differ from that view and for this reason. We are, as far as the fighting forces are concerned, in a period of evolution. There are doubts expressed as to the value of the battleship; there are doubts expressed as to whether infantry and cavalry will play in future wars the part they have played in the past. But amidst all these uncertainties one thing seems to me to be absolutely certain, that is, that no one can foretell what will be the power of the Air Service ten years hence. We must remember that the air traffic as we know it now is barely ten years old, and I am quite certain that it is vital to us with our scattered Empire to give this new service the freest possible development, and for that it seems to me a matter of the greatest importance that it should remain under the control of its own Ministry. (Hear, hear.) I am quite certain, and I say this with no disrespect to the War Office at all—I have been serving a good many years in the War Office—but I am quite certain if the War Office to-day had been in the control of the military part of the Air Service we should not have heard the romantic story of adventure that we have heard this afternoon from Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham. It is natural that in times of financial stringency men should stick to what they know and avoid experiments. I had that very much borne in upon me in regard

to the air in 1910. I had an opportunity of attending the first experiment in France of the employment of aircraft for military purposes. I had my first flight. I came back full of enthusiasm and made a report to the War Office stressing the enormous value of air reconnaissance for military purposes. A certain very highly placed official in the War Office sent for me and told me I was visionary; that aircraft were far too fragile to be used in war at all, that the airmen who were flying then had a peculiar bird-like sense, and that there would not be anything like sufficient of such people available for military purposes. That was in 1910, and we had to struggle against a great deal of doubt and conservatism to get what little Air Service we had at the beginning of the war. You probably know that the one aeroplane which actually discovered the German turning movement at Mons was shot down, and that that was the first indication to the Germans that the British troops were at Mons. If we had been in a position to send out six aoreplanes instead of one, our Expeditionary Force would have got away from Mons with comparatively little loss. This shows the vital importance of allowing the new service with all its technicalities to develop freely. Therefore I am very cordially in favour of this great experiment that is being tried. No one can foresee whether it will be completely successful, but it seems to me that the data are sufficiently good to warrant its trial, and I hope it will be allowed to develop under its own Ministry.

Captain ACLAND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen—I really did not want to speak this afternoon at all because I see so many distinguished people here whose views on the subject would be far more interesting and instructive than anything contributed by myself. However, I am glad to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham on his most excellent lecture, and to thank him for demonstrating to us what wonderful work can be executed by the Air Force, and how simple were the means which have given such very definite results. The laying of this air line undoubtedly required resource, imagination, and not a little personal courage, but the organization required was really on a small scale when compared with other pioneer enterprises which have been carried out in the past in opening up new territory. The result attained in linking up Cairo to Bagdad and bringing Bagdad into close touch with civilization is to my mind a lesson which should be pondered on, not only by administrators, but also by the commercial community.

It seems to me that by courageous and intelligent use of the air the development of communications is accelerated to an extent which is almost unbelievable were it not the fact, and I feel that a start once having been made it should be an axiom with us all that in opening up a new territory air problems should receive prior consideration,

and, if found possible, aerial lines should be laid down and allowed to develop to bring trade and eventually render clearer the policy to be followed in the ultimate laying of railroads, etc. Thus, as in the achievement which has formed the subject of our lecture this afternoon, there will be very considerable saving in time and treasure, and it is in this direction, with adequate support, that the Royal Air Force can be of untold value in peace, as well as a vital part of the defence forces of the Crown.

Brigadier-General W. B. CADDELL said: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—my remarks will be entirely personal. The lecturer is an old friend of mine, and I should like to congratulate him not only on his paper but on having escaped the fate of other great men like himself who crossed, or attempted to cross, the Nile, Jordan, Tigris, and Euphrates—those great rivers of history. You will doubtless remember Sennacherib, who travelled from Assyria to Egypt—he, unfortunately, met with and had the worst of an argument with the Angel of the Lord—and was smitten. Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham is to be congratulated on having avoided such a meeting. Then there was Alexander the Great, who actually crossed all those rivers, and though I am rather shaky as regards his history, I believe that he committed bigamy in Mesopotamia by taking a second wife while his first was alive; shortly afterwards he took a fever, and though warned to keep his bed, got up, drank two tankards of whatever the local drink was, ate two wild ducks, and—died.

The lecturer being a single man had the advantage over Alexander, in that it was a physical impossibility for him to commit bigamy. As regards the charges of over-drinking and over-eating, you have only to look at the lecturer to see how well he is.

Major BURTON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I hope you will be very tolerant, because I only heard of this lecture last night, and, as it was only at the beginning of it that I was asked to speak to you, it is absolutely "unseen" to me. I hope you will tell me when you have had enough, because I understand that inexperienced speakers generally go on too long.

I was mixed up with this affair in a very small way, and it will be rather an anti-climax, after hearing about this extraordinarily pukkah expedition, to be told about a very cut-throat business that took place during the early stages of the evolution of the Cairo-Bagdad Air Route.

In March, 1920, I was detailed to take a party about half-way across the Syrian Desert to the 40th degree of longitude, rather to the north of El Djid, to find out whether it were possible to select suitable landing-places for aeroplanes, and also to reconnoitre the desert for an oil-pipe line and a railway, besides making a route report—so it was rather a tall order for one technical man.

My small party consisted of Majors Yetts and Thomas, political

officers, and a matter of half a dozen Bedouin, on camels; we disguised ourselves, because it is wisest not to attract too much attention on the desert when you are a weak party travelling on camels. This disguise served except at very close quarters, and, when on the march, we could not have been distinguished as anything but Bedouin, for we were all three old hands at camel-riding.

All our precautions, however, availed us nothing, for, six days out, we were attacked by a raiding-party, which broke all the rules that the Air-Commodore has been telling us about. (Laughter.) He did not by any means exhaust them, for they are only supposed, for instance, to attack at dawn, whereas they attacked us at half-past ten at night. If you are provided with "safe-conducts," as we were, they are supposed to cease fire immediately he announces the fact, whereas ours, directly he stood up, was shot down and had his throat cut. Again, they are supposed to begin by firing over your heads, so that, if you have safe conducts, or do not resist, the matter is settled, either for or against you, in quite a gentlemanly way; these raiders, however, fired at our party direct, and in the first onslaught killed two and wounded two of the Bedouin. In a very short space of time they had collected all our belongings, and when they had loaded up and were driving off our camels, two of them returned and stabbed us, and I have no doubt they thought they had finished us off. Our position was, according to all human probabilities, desperate, but in a most extraordinary way, which it would take too long to describe this afternoon, we got away, and pushed on for two days to a friendly tribe, which had concentrated somewhat farther on. Before returning via the Euphrates, I was able to penetrate further, and got to Bir Molussa, which lies north of El Djid; this route had to be turned down, because it was too difficult for any kind of transport except camels, but I was able to report that there were indications that a better line was likely to be found further south. This line was taken up by Major Holt, and after he had explored part of it, this big caravan came over from Palestine and finished off the job.

Our party was, as a matter of fact, going down south after having finished this part of the reconnaissance, and was going to be transmogrified into a political expedition to visit Ibn Rachid in Arabia. With the object of propitiating him, we carried with us about two thousand pounds in gold and some valuable presents, and I often wonder whether information as to our assets leaked out in some way, and was the cause of the attack. The disappearance of all our camels and valuables prevented our going down there, and I heard afterwards that just about the time that we should have been arriving at his stronghold, he and all his family were blotted out by Ibn Saud, so we were very glad that the contretemps I have been describing prevented our going there.

As I said before, the story of how we got away is an extraordinary one—too long to tell you now—and I really scarcely understand myself how the chain of circumstances that got us out came to pass, only, like the authors of "450 Miles to Freedom," some of us prayed ourselves; and I heard afterwards that there were people who felt that our party was in great danger, and there was, consequently, a great deal of prayer going up in my family and amongst my friends. You may perhaps, some of you, disbelieve in the efficacy of prayer, but I may tell you that there is no other adequate explanation as to how we got away at all.

I have learned more about the Syrian Desert this afternoon than I knew before, and I am very pleased to have been present at this most interesting lecture.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—it is now my pleasant duty to propose a vote of thanks to the lecturer for the admirable lecture we have listened to. The lecturer has also had the advantage of bringing about the most interesting discussion which we have had the privilege of hearing. I am sure the very clear statement of policy General Sir Frederick Maurice has given us is one that would appeal to most of us as convincing, and as affording a complete refutation of the arguments which have been advanced for putting the Air Force under another department. That would be clipping its wings. We have had the pleasure of hearing from the last speaker another instance of the romance of the desert; indeed, this desert seems to be crowded with romance! The lecturer told us it was difficult to imagine there was anything left in the world but yourself and your pilot as you went across the desert; and the wonderful pictures of the desert he put before us were a reminder of the infernos described by Dante. But as long as we have men like the lecturer with stout hearts and high hopes, I do not think that we need be afraid that they will fail to overcome this or any other danger. I ask you to pass a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer for all the trouble he has taken, and the very interesting lecture he has given us. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks was most heartily accorded.

# THE CAPE TO CAIRO RAILWAY, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

BY MR. ROBERT WILLIAMS

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal Society's Rooms, Burlington House, W. 1, on Wednesday, April 5, 1922, to hear a lecture by Mr. Robert Williams on "The Cape to Cairo Railway, from the Point of View of African Development." Lord Carnock presided.

The CHAIRMAN first called on the Hon. Secretary to read the names of Members elected since the last meeting.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): The Council has to-day elected the following gentlemen as Members of the Society: The Right Hon. the Earl Winterton; Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E.; Lieut.-General Sir George Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert James, C.B.E., M.P.; Mr. L. F. Nalder, C.B.E., C.I.E.; Lieutenant Kenneth Strong, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now ask Mr. Williams to read his paper. I do not need to remind you that there is no higher authority on the subject with which he deals than Mr. Williams himself. (Applause.)

Mr. ROBERT WILLIAMS: It is very encouraging to myself and my fellow-workers in and for Africa to feel that your Society takes so lively an interest in the opening-up of what has been termed the "Dark Continent" as to invite me to speak to you on the Cape to Cairo Railway, from the point of view of African development. It is also appropriate for your Society to be interested in Africa, for the first explorers of Africa were undoubtedly Asiatics, and to this day practically the whole of Northern Africa is peopled by races of Asiatic origin. Had the great Sahara and Libyan deserts (an impenetrable ocean of sand extending across the continent from east to west, and 1,000 miles in width) not blocked the way, the central and southern parts of Africa would, in all probability, not have remained centuries behind the rest of the world in civilization.

Long before Vasco da Gama, the famous Portuguese navigator, in 1498 visited the East Coast of Africa, Asiatic adventurers had established themselves on that coast, and were engaged in trade with the natives. Indeed, Da Gama found an Asiatic pilot at Mombasa who

took him to India, thereby rendering him the first European discoverer of the sea route to that country.

According to Marco Polo, Chinese ships visited Zanzibar and Madagascar; in all probability they also visited East African ports, and these visits may account for the yellow-skinned Hottentots, so different in character from the negro.

The ruins of Zimbabwe, in Rhodesia—which I visited in 1891—are believed by many to be Asiatic in origin. Be that as it may, there is ample evidence to show that Africa received its first civilizing influences from Asia centuries before Europeans knew anything about the greater portion of that vast continent.

I will not enlarge further upon a subject with which your Society must be more fully informed than myself. My whole desire is to point out that whereas Asia is the home of very ancient civilization, Africa—with the ever marvellous exception of Egypt—is a continent, for the most part, as yet, uncivilized, and even in those regions where civilizing influences have been for some time at work she is as yet only in the dawn of her development.

In 1881, when I first went to Africa, there were only 300 miles of the Cape to Cairo Railway constructed—viz., the line connecting Cape Town with Beaufort West. In 1885 it was extended to Kimberley, and here for several years its progress was arrested for political reasons into which I need not enter. But even at this early date the dream had been dreamed of continuing this iron road for thousands of miles northward, through the vast and unknown spaces of Africa.

Rhodes died in 1902, when his railway had advanced only as far as Bulawayo, 1,362 miles from Cape Town and 3,600 miles as the crow flies from Cairo.

Shortly before Rhodes died I promised him I would carry his line forward.

The expeditions I had sent up in 1899 and 1901 under the leadership of my splendid colleague, the late George Grey, brother of Viscount Grey, with the object of discovering a mineral area of sufficient importance to draw the line northwards, had already revealed the great copper wealth of Katanga, besides important gold, tin, and diamond deposits.

I will not weary you with the story of the slow advance of the line to the north. I have told it often elsewhere. Suffice to say that in 1909 it at length arrived at the Congo frontier, and that, thanks to the co-operation of King Leopold and of his great financier, Monsieur Jadot, thanks also to the consistent support of his present Majesty, King Albert, the railway has now reached Bukama, on the navigable Congo, with the result that to-day one may travel from Cape Town, by train and river steamers running in direct connection with the trains, to Stanleyville, on the north side of the Congo State—a distance of

3,600 miles, of which 3,000 miles is railway—and to the mouth of the Congo River.

Meanwhile another transcontinental railway, traversing Africa from west to east, has been simultaneously coming into being. I refer, of course, to the Benguella Railway, which, with the co-operation of King Leopold of Belgium and of the Portuguese Government, I initiated some twenty years ago, and which, but for the interruption caused by the war, would have already been connected with the Cape to Cairo Railway. In about four years from now these railways will be connected. It will then be possible to cross Africa from Lobito Bay on the west coast to Beira or Mombasa on the east, or, at its junction with the Cape to Cairo line, to run southward to the Cape or northward towards Cairo.

Of the Cape to Cairo line there remain one or two small links to complete it and one big one. The small ones are along the Congo River, where steamers at present fill the gaps. The big link is the one between Stanleyville and El Obeid. This link will run over part of the Darfur Plateau and along the Nile Congo Divide.

It had long been my desire to arrange for the systematic investigation of the Sudanese side of this Divide in the hope that possible mineral discoveries would attract the Sudanese Railway southwards to complete this big link between the Cape and Cairo, and thus at last realize Rhodes' dream. The opportunity at last presented itself, and during the past year an expedition under Major Christy has been at work exploring this least known of all the great African Divides. The expedition has now returned, bringing with it a vast amount of information, much of it of a most encouraging nature. There are plentiful indications of yet another heavily mineralized zone, and I am hopeful—I cannot say more at present—that the further investigations we are now undertaking may succeed in locating deposits sufficiently large and rich to justify the extension of the Sudanese Railway southwards to meet an extension of the Uganda Railway on the British side of the Divide and to link up with the northward extension now being made from Stanleyville to the Kilo Gold-Mines on the Belgian side, and thus finally complete the railway between the two extremities of the Continent.

Those of us, therefore, who are alive ten or twelve years hence will probably witness the completion of the great trunk railway line from north to south, popularly spoken of as the Cape to Cairo Railway; and the other trunk line from Lobito Bay and Benguella on the west to Beira on the east, often termed the Benguella to Beira Railway, which, as I said, will be completed within about four years.

Now what does this portend for Africa, and not for Africa only, but for Asia, Europe, and all the world? I venture to say the completion of these railways will be followed by political and economic

effects of a very far-reaching character. To begin with, on account of its extraordinary geographical situation, Africa is the pivot on which turn all our trade communications with the East and with Australasia, whether by land or sea or air. All these routes must pass along one or other of the coasts of Africa, or through Africa itself from north to south or west to east. The African Continent is, in fact, a world highway. Nature has made it so. Those are important facts, but they are small when compared with the political and economic influence upon the world of a civilized, educated, and industrialized Africa. And Africa is rapidly becoming civilized and industrialized. Less rapidly, but none the less certainly, Africa is being educated.

Livingstone said that African civilization would come through commerce and industry. This is proving to be the case. The African native is gradually being changed from a warrior to a worker. He no longer comes—as I remember he used to come—to seek work at the mines armed with assegais. He no longer has the fear of being attacked and of having to defend himself on his way to work.

My personal experience of the native of Africa has been, perhaps, as extensive as that of any man. I have had thousands of them in my employ in the various diamond, gold, and copper fields of southern and central Africa, and in the construction of the Cape to Cairo and Benguella to Beira railways. I have travelled long distances with them all over Africa, from Cairo to the Cape, and studied them at close quarters. I have discussed the future prospects of the natives with Rhodes and with some of the greatest administrators and missionaries in Africa, and have witnessed the splendid results achieved by those missionaries, especially in the teaching of useful trades, and I have been struck by the ability of the African native in acquiring those trades. One has only to study the remarkable work of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, founded by the late Booker Washington, a liberated slave, to learn what a high level of industrial skill the negro is capable of attaining.

The following quotation from a speech by Booker Washington at the opening of the Atlanta Exposition is most applicable to Africa. Speaking of his race, he said—and this shows a mind of high and lofty order:

"In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress. . . .

"Nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling the load upward, or they will pull against you the load downward. We shall constitute one-third and more of the ignorance and crime of the South, or one-third its intelligence and progress: we shall contribute one-third to the business and industrial prosperity of the South, or we shall prove a veritable body of death stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance the body politic. . . .

"The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized."

These are the words of a liberated slave! Instead of the sixteen millions Booker Washington refers to as forming one-third of the Southern States of America, alter the words to 190 millions, and it will apply to Africa.

What then, I ask again, is to be the future of a civilized and industrialized Africa? Observe the progress already made. Sixty years ago Africa was practically an unknown Continent. Livingstone had just published the first of his journals, and was rousing the world to the horrors of the slave trade. Even in 1881, when I went to Africa as a young engineer, the slave trade was rampant in Central Africa, and cannibalism was rife up to very recently. The "red road to the West" as Livingstone called it, along which we are building the Benguella Railway, was littered from end to end with bleaching skulls and bones, less than twenty-five years ago. To-day the slave trade in Central Africa is extinct. The coming of the railways has blotted out this atrocious traffic. In its place have come the civilizing influences of commerce and industry. The African has already been taught in hundreds of thousands to work instead of to fight. Thousands of them have been trained to the trade of carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths; others drive locomotives, work the telegraph instruments, and perform other skilled jobs. Many are entering the colleges and passing out as surveyors, architects, and medical men. In short, the African is rapidly becoming civilized. He prints and edits his own newspapers. He is beginning to realize that he is somebody and the native of a very great land called Africa. A national self-consciousness is developing as the result of the railway and other industrial developments. And all this in a short sixty years!

What about the next sixty years? Africa contains the last but also the greatest reserve of raw material for the future requirements of the whole world. It also contains a vast reservoir of the most magnificent labour. Anyone who has had any experience with the native of Africa must admit that he is magnificent human material. He has many good points and many bad. We want to develop the good and eliminate the bad. The African negro is, I affirm, naturally peaceable, cheerful, almost always singing at his work, imitative, by no means devoid of ability, with the heart of a child, affectionate, with a keen sense of humour, and an unbounded respect for the white man of high character. The mere fact that for many years Livingstone went about scatheless, and that two of his servants voluntarily bore the body

of their beloved master hundreds of miles to the coast, at great risk to their lives, to deliver it up to the white man, gives a clue to the character of the native of Africa.

These natives are a gigantic force to reckon with for good or evil. The wise or unwise handling of the millions of natives who people this continent must inevitably have a far-reaching influence on the whole world. Take, for example, the thousands of instances where the black man is capable of doing skilled work. Instead of the white man dictating to the black man what he shall be allowed to earn, as is now being done on the Rand, I would urge the white man to allow the black man to earn the full amount which his abilities and training enable him to earn. All that is possible should be done to secure the black man's confidence in the white man's sense of fair play and fair dealing. I foresee real danger in any other policy.

The highest status to which the black man may aspire must be limited only by his education and ability. In our future relations with the African, our aim should be to refrain as far as possible from accentuating the colour bar, but emphasize the vital importance of showing him that harmonious working between all classes and colours is the true secret of success.

Speaking for myself, I believe that the black man in Africa will, for a long time yet to come, be unequal in efficiency to the white man as a skilled workman, or in any position where he will be called upon to manage his fellow-natives. I believe he will long need the guidance of the white man in both his industrial and political development. Nevertheless he has begun to feel his feet, and to think politically.

In a few years, when the two great trunk railway lines to which I have alluded shall cut the continent longitudinally and transversely from sea to sea, Africa will come well within the range of the globe-trotting tourist, and the black man will be brought into still closer contact with the white, and will beyond doubt develop still further those political aspirations which are manifesting themselves even to-day. Already there is heard a demand for voting powers and for self-determination. "Africa for the African!" is the cry. The catching phrase "Self-determination!" launched during the war and offered as a panacea for most political ills, has winged its way into the recesses of Africa. Whether self-determination will always succeed remains to be seen. Self-determination carried to its logical conclusion means anarchy—each unit doing what seems right in its own eyes. As a working political principle it is only practicable if the minority in any unit area is self-disciplined enough to subordinate itself to the will of the majority. And there seem to be races temperamentally unfit for so-called "self-determination" by reason of their inability to abide by the principle of majority rule. We need not travel as far as Africa to

witness this phenomenon. The demand for self-determination has, however, been created, has gone forth, and cannot be recalled.

What, then, should be our attitude to this coming claim for self-determination on the part of the African? I regard the position of the white man in Africa as that of a trustee for the welfare of the black. In fulfilment of this trust we must assist the African to work out his own salvation. This cannot be done rapidly, and it is doubtful whether it will follow Western democratic ideals. To be successful, democratic Government demands a high level of education, a high standard of political and municipal purity, and a greater degree of experience and self-discipline than the black man is likely to attain in many generations.

We must recognize, however, that self-government is the goal to which the more educated Africans aspire, and that it is no part of the white man's duty to repress that aspiration. That does not mean that we are to yield forthwith to any clamorous demands of a noisy minority of extremists, who are bent less on the welfare of their country than on obtaining an undesirable influence over the great uneducated masses of their countrymen, too ignorant to realize that they are merely dupes in the hands of ambitious, and often unscrupulous, agitators.

It is, unhappily, one of the defects of a democratic Government that it is so easily moved to hasty and ill-considered action by the clamorous demands of a handful of well-organized extremists. We have seen it over and over again in recent years in our own country and elsewhere. We may find the same thing occurring in Africa. Already Egypt, taught by ourselves what good government means, has now been granted the right to manage her own affairs. It remains to be seen whether this grant has been accorded as the result of a genuine demand by the whole Egyptian people, or as a concession to sectionary violence. The success or failure of this experiment will constitute a supremely valuable object-lesson in dealing with future claims for self-determination on the part of other, and perhaps less civilized, of the African peoples. We do not wish to see in Egypt any repetition of the dismal failures in self-government of Hayti, San Domingo, and Liberia. Hence the highest form of statesmanship at home will be demanded in dealing with the African during his growing political pains. We must prepare him for the difficult task of self-government by training him in the ways of law, order, and justice, of industry and commerce, gradually accustoming him to positions of responsibility, and creating in him a tradition of public service.

Our duty is to guide and not to hurry him along the road of self-development.

In the short space at my disposal I cannot do more than lay down these general principles. I feel greatly strengthened, however, in the views I have expressed by Sir Frederick Lugard's valuable treatise

entitled, "The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa," issued since you invited me to address you, and since I began to formulate my notes for that purpose. I would strongly urge everyone interested in Africa to study Sir Frederick Lugard's volume, in which, with ripe wisdom, and a wealth of knowledge gained by long experience as an administrator, the author works out in detail the problems, and indicates the lines on which the white man may co-operate with and assist the black in his upward path towards self-government.

I associate myself whole-heartedly with one piece of wise counsel given by Sir Frederick Lugard. "*Festina lente*," he says, "is a motto which the Colonial Office will do well to remember in its dealings with Africa . . . The danger of going too fast with native races is even more likely to lead to disappointment, if not to disaster, than the danger of not going fast enough. The pace can best be gauged by those who have intimate acquaintance alike with the strong points and the limitations of the native peoples and rulers with whom they have to deal."

I endorse every word of this, and hope that the Home Authorities will definitely resolve to be guided in every decision by the opinion of the responsible white men on the spot—by those, in short, who are face to face and in daily contact with the problems to be solved.

In my personal opinion, a step that we should promptly take is towards a Federation of British Africa from the Cape to the Nile, with railway connection all the way, so as to be able to co-ordinate as far as possible one policy towards the black races, and establish some leading principles to guide us in meeting any demand by those under our tutelage for self-determination. As General Smuts said the other day, "The white man in Africa is on his trial." From so eminent and sagacious a statesman these words cannot go unheeded. For this reason, as well as for many others, I would gladly see a movement towards the Federation I suggest.

The world has need of Africa, and *per contra* Africa has need of the world. She needs the world's markets; she also needs her own markets. The north will need the products of the south, and the south will need the products of the north.

To a steady development of her commerce and her industries we must look for the ultimate means by which she can, in Livingstone's words, "be introduced into the body corporate of nations." The great iron highways we are building are the arteries through which will pulse the new life to which Africa is rapidly awakening. They will be a great asset not only to Africa herself, but through the development of Africa to the whole world.

Sixty years ago the influence of Africa beyond her own borders was nil. What will her influence be at the end of the present century? It is conceivable that you may have a United States of Africa under

one flag or possibly groups of States under different flags, united in general commercial policy, and protected by a Monroe doctrine. This is no wild dream.

I ask you therefore to project your vision into the not-too-distant future and think out for yourselves the nature of the political influence in the councils of the world of an Africa composed of Federated States, an Africa seamed with railroads, an Africa in which vast industries have been established, and in which both white and black men are co-operatively interested, an Africa upon whose resources and whose labour the whole world in large measure depends.

I ask you to consider all these possibilities—I might even say *probabilities*—in view of the boundless natural wealth of the Continent, in view of Africa's geographical position athwart the highways to the Far East and to Australasia, and last, but not least, in view of her immense, prolific, and readily civilizable population. Having regard to all these elements of greatness, I ask you how otherwise are we to deal with the problems of African development than in the sense that I have indicated?

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Reginald Wingate, I am sorry to say, has been unable to be present to-day; but he had the advantage of seeing an advance copy of Mr. Williams' lecture, and he sent some notes to Colonel Yate, the Honorary Secretary, who will now read them.

Lieut.-Colonel A. C. YATE then read extracts from the following notes sent by General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B.

I much regret that I am prevented from leaving Scotland in order to attend the lecture of Mr. Robert Williams, of which I have seen an advance copy—and take a personal part in the discussion. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you would read out any extracts from the enclosed notes you think desirable in the circumstances. I recognize with the lecturer that as Africa received its first civilizing influences from Asia, so will future developments in Africa tend to bring these two great continents still more closely in touch with one another, especially when the great deserts and vast unknown spaces come to be bridged over for thousands of miles by that great iron road which is the theme of the lecturer, and I am sure all will have listened with absorbing interest to what he has to say.

From the material facts which Mr. Williams has placed before us, and from the large and wide views to which he has given such lucid expression, he has furnished us with food for thought in a variety of directions; but to me two points especially emerge:

Firstly, the modesty of the lecturer, who is so largely responsible for the wonderful transformation in the African continent during the last forty years.

Secondly, the vital importance of bringing home to the British

public, through such a lecture, the immense possibilities of Africa in the scheme of world development which Mr. Williams has so concisely summarized in its concluding paragraph.

In dealing with my *first* point, may I not say with justice that, although the name of Robert Williams is known throughout the length and breadth of South Africa, it is not as well known to the British public at home as it ought to be. Why is this? I think, on his side, it is due to modesty in his own great achievements as an Empire-builder, but on the side of the British public I think it is largely due to that selfish absorption in its own domestic concerns to the exclusion of the greater and more important interests of the Empire.

What proportion, I would ask, of the educated public have read that intensely interesting paper entitled "The Milestones of African Civilization," which Mr. Williams read before the Royal Colonial Institute in May, 1917; or his lectures at the Overseas Club on the Benguella Railway and Germany's future in Central Africa; and his sketch of Dr. Jameson; or his address before the London Chamber of Commerce in June, 1918, on German penetration in Central Africa; and, finally, his address in April last year to the African Society on the Cape to Cairo Railway?

I venture to say, without fear of contradiction, that the story of African development and the prominent part taken in it by Mr. Williams places him in the very first rank as a pioneer of civilization and administrative development.

One has only to read the discussions following on some of the papers I have quoted, to see what a high value our Belgian and Portuguese friends place on Mr. Williams' unique services in furthering the development of the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, whilst an American journalist—Mr. Marcosson, who recently travelled in Central Africa—pays a tribute to Mr. Williams' work which I cannot refrain from quoting. In his third letter to *The Times*, entitled "Wonders of the Congo," he writes:

"*British Enterprise.*—I entered the Congo at Sakania, which is on the border of Northern Rhodesia. It is the outpost of the Katanga, the most prosperous province of the colony. The Katanga is one huge mine, principally copper. The pioneer of Katanga exploitation was an Englishman, Robert Williams, the moving spirit in the construction of the Benguella Railway from Lobito Bay (Portuguese Angola) to the Katanga. Late in the nineties he sent George Grey, brother of Sir Edward, now Viscount, Grey, to the Katanga region on a prospecting expedition. There he discovered large deposits of copper, and also tin, lead, iron, coal, platinum, and diamonds. Williams organized the Tanganyika Concessions, which became the instigator of Congo copper-mining. Subsequently, the Union Minière du Haut Congo was formed by leading Belgian colonial capitalists, and the Tanganyika Concessions acquired more than 40 per cent. of its capital. The Union Minière took over all the concessions and discoveries of the British corporation. Within ten years it has grown from a small

prospecting outfit in the wilderness, 250 miles from a railway, to an industry employing at the time of my visit more than 1,000 white men and 15,000 blacks, with four completely equipped mines which produced nearly 30,000 tons of copper in 1917, and a smelter with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons of copper. A concentrator capable of handling 4,000 tons of ore per day is nearing completion."

With regard to my *second* point, the importance of bringing home to our people the immense possibilities of Africa in the scheme of world development, it is no easy matter for me to add one word to the admirable record and the sound advice on this subject given by the lecturer, but what specially appeals to me—and I think it must appeal to all interested in empire development—is the immense future opened out by the completion of the Benguella Railway and the final linking up of the Congo railway system with that of the Sudan—thus forging the last link in the dream of that great empire-builder Cecil Rhodes and his able lieutenant Robert Williams, who has so faithfully carried out his promise to his dying chief to "carry his line forward." As he truly says, if we are still alive ten or twelve years hence, we should see the completion of this vast project and the progress in African development which it implies.

Although the period covered by our lecturer extends to forty years back, I would ask you to retrace with me the salient points of the last *twenty-five* years only—for they are curiously interesting. Mr. Williams points out that the Katanga discoveries at the close of the last century formed another of those "milestones" of mineral deposits whereby the Cape to Cairo Railway would be advanced. Situated on the watershed of the Zambesi and Congo, the Katanga province of the Southern Belgian Congo is the greatest mineralized copper-belt known to the world. Slowly but surely the great iron spine advanced from the south, and though it took ten years to reach the Congo border, it arrived, in spite of every sort of difficulty and obstacle, financial and other. Simultaneously with this northward advance the Katanga copper-mines also caused Mr. Williams to initiate that other great transcontinental railway scheme from west to east—from Lobito Bay in Portuguese Angola—to connect up with the Cape to Cairo line at Katanga. It was clear that trade must follow the shortest route to the sea.* The completion of the Benguella line will

* On this point Sir Frederick Lugard, in his last publication, "The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa," is insistent. At p. 464, footnote 1, he writes: "The Cape to Cairo Railway can only be justified in so far as each section has a definite objective which offers reasonable prospects of being remunerative. Railways in Africa must lead by the shortest route to the seaport, and not along its length." This statement must be modified by an opinion which I heard expressed by Sir Reginald Wingate a month before this lecture, and by Sir Edgar Bonham Carter at the lecture—viz., that if grave danger threatened the British Empire in Egypt, or the Sudan, or the Suez Canal, or anywhere in that quarter, the Cape to Cairo Railway was a channel by which the Overseas Dominions could move forces to the aid of the mother-country.—A. C. Y.

mean a saving of close on 3,000 miles of transport, and provided the financial difficulties, which are in a fair way of being solved, are finally overcome, it is expected the railway connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean will be achieved within four years. This railway has been truly called the "master key" of Africa, and I think the term must have been coined by the Germans, for it will be remembered how keenly anxious they were to secure the concession, and how bitterly annoyed they were to find that Robert Williams had forestalled them.

I believe it is now generally admitted that when the main trunk line from *north* to *south* is completed, the feeders *east* and *west* will follow; but, as we have seen, many of these feeders are already made, or approaching completion. The great gap between the two terminals of the trunk line, Stanleyville and El Obeid, is something like 1,750 miles out of a total of 4,500 miles.

Mr. Williams has made a most important proposal as to how this gap is to be bridged, and I think he is probably right in urging that the prime need is now to extend the railway from the northern terminal further south, though, in all probability, once the route is finally decided upon, work from the south northwards will advance as well.

It is a curious coincidence that with the great activity in pushing the railway northwards, consequent on the Katanga discoveries, a similar activity, but arising from entirely different causes, resulted in pushing the railway southwards into the Sudan almost at the same moment. This is neither the time nor the occasion to describe the development of the Sudan railway system; suffice it to say that within the last twenty-five years the following railway construction has been completed:—

The Wadi-Halfa–Khartoum line, with bridges over the Atbara and Blue Nile (579 miles).

The Khartoum–El Obeid line, with a bridge over the White Nile (428 miles).

The Atbara Junction–Port Sudan line, with a branch to Suakin (305 miles).

The Abu-Hamed–Kareima branch (145 miles).

Thus El Obeid is in direct railway communication (just over 900 miles) with an excellent and up-to-date port on the Red Sea.

Clearly this situation has long been thoroughly grasped by Mr. Williams, and, true to his instinct, he has sought Nature's help to guide him in his selection of the various routes between El Obeid on the north and Stanleyville on the south, where best the gap can be bridged over, and the final link forged of the great north to south chain.

He has sought, and I think he must have found, that missing "milestone" in the Great Congo Nile Divide to which he refers. Is there not some connection between what he has told us regarding

Major Christy's expedition and the following telegram, which appeared in *The Times* of the 23rd instant, in a message dated Cairo, March 22?

"An extensive mineralized area has been discovered by prospectors of the Congo-Nile Syndicate, which belongs to the Tanganyika Concessions Group. The discovery is described as of alluvial gold, which is said to have been traced in several rivers. What is believed to be the source of the gold has also been discovered in the form of an auriferous belt of rocks extending several miles. An old working carrying copper and gold has also been discovered, with evidence of an ancient copper-smelting industry in the vicinity."

If this discovery prove to be the mineralized "milestone" which, magnet-like, is to draw the railway there, then it is clearly somewhere on the great Congo-Nile Divide, and it will imply that—as Mr. Williams says in his lecture—"the unfinished link lies between Stanleyville and El Obeid, and that the line will run over part of the Darfur Plateau and along the Nile-Congo Divide."

It is, of course, possible that subsidiary lines may connect Stanleyville with Rejaf, following the present motor-road connecting the important Belgian gold-mining area at Kilo with the Nile in that vicinity—thus turning the Rapids and Dufilé, and providing a trade route along the navigable Nile waterway to Khartoum, or to the nearest point on the Sudan railway system at Kosti. But should the recent mineral discoveries prove sufficiently large and rich to justify the extension of the Sudan Railway southwards, there is little doubt that the route to be followed will be as Mr. Williams describes; and clearly, through his prescience and indomitable perseverance, the wonderful dream of his great chief, Cecil Rhodes, is far nearer completion than any of us had contemplated.

If a quarter of a century has seen such progress in the once savage Sudan—where in that short space of time the revenue has risen from eight thousand pounds in 1900 to five million pounds in 1920, and the trade to close on twelve million pounds—and if the British Government has such faith in its cotton-growing possibilities as to guarantee a loan of several million pounds for its development, shall we question the accuracy of Mr. Williams' forecast, that in the not remote future we may have an Africa composed of federated States, seamed with railroads, where vast industries have been established and upon whose resources and labour the whole world may in a large measure depend?

How is this great result being achieved? Surely it is in the main due to that great iron spine which is now nearing completion, with its many arteries and vertebræ already stretching east and west to the two oceans washing the shores of Africa. This marvellous achievement is represented by the Cape-Zambesi express, the Rhodesia-Katanga extension, the Congo-Nile steamer, rail, and motor routes, the Sudan

steamer and railway services, the connection of Stanleyville with El Obeid—in all, a distance of nearly 7,000 miles. Then, forming a sort of cross with the north and south routes, the great transcontinental east to west connection is extending from Lobito Bay to Beira, with eventual through connections via Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam and with the Uganda Railway to Mombasa.

All honour, then, to the great men who have spent their lives and their energies—some, alas! have not lived to participate in the success of their undertakings—and all honour especially to Robert Williams, who, practically single-handed, has built up an organization for the development and transportation to the markets of the world of the rich treasures his vivid imagination has discovered for us in those great mineralized "milestones" which mark the various stages in the progress of African railways.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe Sir Frederick Lugard is present this evening. We should be very grateful if he would favour us with any observations. (Applause.)

Right Hon. Sir FREDERICK LUGARD, P.C., G.C.M.G.: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am glad to avail myself of the opportunity which your kindness has afforded me to add my tribute of appreciation of the great work which Mr. Williams has done in Africa during the past forty years. He stands almost, if not quite, alone, both in respect of the length of time during which he has been closely associated with Africa, and in the magnitude of the material developments of which he has been both the originator and the active agent in execution. By his great railways Mr. Williams has created an unrivalled record as the foremost pioneer in the development of Africa on the material side, and the paper to which we have just listened, so full of far-sighted suggestion and of sympathy with the people, shows that he is no less concerned with the civilizing and moral progress of Africa than with its material development.

We recognize to-day how important and essential a part railways play in the rapid material development of a country like Africa, whose exports consist solely of foodstuffs and raw materials, but perhaps their civilizing and educational value has hardly been equally appreciated. Mr. Williams has told us how at first the labourers employed in construction works come with their bows and arrows and spears, and how before long these are discarded. Wild, primitive savages learn to value the regular pay, which enables them to purchase in the camp market the little luxuries of cloth, tobacco, and meat. Volunteers come forward more eagerly, soon they learn to appreciate piecework, and gradually become more skilled. The railway workshop is the most potent institution in Africa for the spread of technical education, and the railway in its various departments offers hundreds, and even thousands, of openings to the youth of the Government and Mission

schools as clerks, signallers, telegraphists, guards, stationmasters, storekeepers and accountants, etc.

Though I cannot rival Mr. Williams' forty-one years of African work, my own experience of Africa is sufficiently long and varied to justify me in expressing a hearty concurrence in all that he has said regarding the character of the negro tribes and the incalculable importance of securing their confidence in the justice and fair play of Europeans. I endorse most heartily his view both of the ability of the African and of the limitations which for many a generation preclude the possibility of his being able to stand alone in industrial and political development. The striking quotation which Mr. Williams made from the writings of Booker Washington seems to echo and confirm the views I recently expressed concerning the Colour Question in the *Edinburgh*, and since the President of the United States did me the honour to quote them and to assert that they presented the true solution of the problem, I may ask your indulgence if I repeat them: "Here, then, is the true conception of the inter-relation of colour: complete uniformity in ideals, absolute equality in the paths of knowledge and culture, equal opportunity for those who strive, equal admiration for those who achieve; in matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own inherited traditions, preserving his own race purity and race pride; equality in things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and material." This, too, as I gather from his lecture, is the view held by Mr. Williams. I would, however, like to alter one word in his description of the new spirit which is beginning to show itself among the natives of Africa. It is, I think, rather a *racial* than a *national* self-consciousness, and its exponents advocate the prerogatives of race rather than those of tribal affinities.

Mr. Williams has not told us quite as much as I, at any rate, should have liked to hear about the more recent progress and the programme for the immediate future of the Cape to Cairo and the Benguella-Beira railways. I must confess that the latter interests me more than the former, for its object is to open up a fertile plateau abounding in vegetable products, to tap the wonderful mineral deposits of the Katanga district, and to provide a means of conveying them to the nearest seaport by the shortest and cheapest means. Of this great railway Mr. Williams was the originator and constructor. The story of its inception and the difficulties encountered by international rivalries is one of extraordinary interest. In the far future, when Africa becomes civilized and industrialized, internal railways as in Europe will, no doubt, become important and remunerative means of transport, conveying the products and manufactures of one region to another. Or, again, if another Great War should break out (which God forbid), it is impossible to forecast the rôle which railways in Africa, especially those which cross the continent from west to east,

may play; but to-day the great need of Africa is for railways leading from the centre to the seaports, and she has little need of a longitudinal north to south railway. Mr. Williams forecasts an extension of the Sudanese railways southwards from El Obeid to connect with the line from Stanleyville. It is possible that from the same point a line may some day extend to the Nigerian system at Lake Chad, and, as the "Niger to the Nile," may add one more to the alliterations (Cape to Cairo and Benguella to Beira) which seem to exercise a fascination for the financier.

Turning to what Mr. Williams told us of the connection between Africa and Asia, may I remind you that not Egypt alone, but the whole of Northern Africa, is populated by races which owe much to Asiatic origins, and if we accept Gibbon's dictum that "the use of letters is the principal circumstance that distinguishes a civilized people from a herd of savages incapable of reflection or knowledge," then we must admit a partial civilization to the Moslem States of North Africa, where for the most part Arabic is the language of culture. Mr. Williams referred to the Chinese ships which at one time visited the East Coast of Africa. They are mentioned by Marmol as early as the sixteenth century, and no doubt carried on a considerable trade in tea. Sir John Kirk described the excavations made at Kilwa, where three cities were found superimposed on each other. In the lowest of the three many Chinese coins were found, and much of the pale green Chinese earthenware known as "Celadon."

I thank you, sir, for the privilege of listening to your most interesting paper, and I heartily wish you continued success in your great projects in Africa.

Sir EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G.: Mr. Chairman, I join with Sir Frederick Lugard in thanking Mr. Williams for his valuable and extremely interesting lecture. The lecture covered so much ground that I find a difficulty in selecting matters for discussion from the many topics he so ably elucidated, and I propose to confine myself to three or four points affecting Egypt or the Sudan, countries in which I have spent many years. As regards the suggestions made by Mr. Williams as to the political future of Africa, while I think that we all here must agree with the greater part of those suggestions, I venture to select two points on which I do not find myself in agreement. The first is that the political arrangements which are now being attempted in Egypt cannot, I would suggest, in any way be regarded as a precedent for what should be done in the future with regard to more southerly parts of Africa. For the political relations of Great Britain to Egypt are entirely different from those to any other part of Africa. Besides, the Egyptians, racially, can hardly be regarded as Africans. Whatever their origin—a matter, perhaps, more in dispute than almost any other racial question—at least we know they have been very largely affected

by Arabian blood. Also they are Mohammedans, and possess a civilization which is largely Arabic in character, whereas the Southern Africans are pagans and in a much lower state of civilization. Another matter with regard to which I do not find myself in agreement with Mr. Williams is his proposal or suggestion for a possible future federated Africa. With regard to this I should say, *festina lente.* Africa is such a huge country ; it contains such different climates, such different geographical features, such different races, that I cannot see in it the basis of a future federation ; though no doubt the necessity will soon arise for arrangement between the different parts, on such questions as railways, customs, and other matters. Further, I should say that our experiences in other parts of the world, and especially in India, should make us very slow in trying to deal with the huge continent of Africa as if it in any way constituted a single political unit. (Hear, hear.) Dealing with the question of the railway, I have only a few remarks to make. Of course, to those of us who have lived and worked in the Sudan, it is a matter of the very greatest interest. The first object of those who were responsible for railway policy in the Sudan was to provide railway communication between the interior and the Red Sea, this being the shortest and cheapest route for the export and import of goods. This was accomplished by the opening in 1905 of the railway connecting the Halfa-Khartoum Railway with Port Sudan and Suakin. Subsequently the extension of the railway from Khartoum southwards was begun, and, as Mr. Williams stated, in 1912 Lord Kitchener opened the Khartoum-El Obeid Railway. El Obeid is distant about 430 miles from Khartoum by railway, about 1,000 miles by railway from Wadi-Halfa, and about 2,000 miles by railway and river from Alexandria. I need hardly mention that there is not yet complete through railway communication between Egypt and the Sudan: for there is still a break in the railway of about 200 miles between Wadi-Halfa and Aswan, along which one has to travel by river-steamer.

It is not without interest that the White Nile is navigable by river-steamer for a thousand miles south of Khartoum as far as Gondokoro. At one time it seemed likely that, as a preliminary stage in the construction of the Cape to Cairo Railway, the railway would be carried from the south as far as Gondokoro, or to some other point on the upper White Nile, where it would for the time being stop, and transport between that point and Khartoum would be carried on by river steamer. It is interesting, therefore, to hear from Mr. Williams that it is now proposed that the Cape to Cairo Railway shall join the existing Sudan railway system at El Obeid, and that only about 1,700 miles remain to be completed. The amount remaining to be completed is, therefore, a small amount compared with what has already been built.

I will conclude my remarks with a few observations on the utility of the Cape to Cairo Railway, considered from the point of view of the

Sudan. In the first place, it is obvious that, strategically, the railway will be of the very greatest importance. In the case of any disturbance in, or foreign aggression to, any British territory through which it passes, it will enable troops to be brought rapidly and easily from South Africa and the other territories which it traverses to the point in danger. Secondly, the railway will be of the highest value in facilitating the internal administration of the Sudan. There are places in the southern parts of the Sudan to reach which from Khartoum at present necessitates a journey of from a month to six weeks. The railway will enable the same journey to places through which it passes to be completed in not many more hours than the number of days now required. Thirdly, as regards the commercial point of view, I believe that it will be found that there is no great physical difficulty in the making of the railway when it gets into Sudan territory. It will, therefore, be cheaply constructed, and experience in the Sudan has been that, where you can make a railway cheaply, it is extraordinary how soon it will pay its way, even though the population through which it passes may be uncivilized and scanty. In this connection, it is relevant to point out that hitherto the Sudan has been developed, one may say, in a topsy-turvy way. For the northern part of the Sudan, which, because it is closer to the means of communication, has been developed first, is the more desert part. While in the north the Sudan is almost rainless, and vegetation is, generally speaking, confined to a narrow strip along the Nile, the rain increases as one travels south, until on the southern border there is an average rainfall of 40 inches a year, and the whole country is under vegetation. The completion of the Cape to Cairo Railway through Sudan territory will enable the development of the southern portions of the Sudan, which, from a commercial point of view, have hitherto been neglected, to be gradually taken in hand. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by again thanking Mr. Williams for his extremely interesting lecture. (Applause.)

Sir LEE STACK (Governor-General of the Sudan): Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have only landed from the Sudan in the last few days, and came here to listen, not to speak, but I would like to say how much I appreciate the opportunity of hearing Mr. Williams' lecture, in which he has developed his theory and practice of the route from the Cape to Cairo, and the transverse route from Benguella to Beira. It is interesting to me, because one of the big links, or the big link, is through the Sudan. The Sudan is as yet a poorish country, and we have not been able to develop our communications as fast as we would like to have done; but if the indications of mineral wealth which Mr. Williams has told you about in the Southern Sudan materialize, then the inducement for a railway south-westward from El Obeid is a very great one, and a further stage in bridging that

gap will no doubt be feasible. I also would like to associate myself with Mr. Williams' sentiment as regards the trusteeship the white man holds towards the black man in Africa. If we develop our possessions in the interests of the native, and not by exploiting him in the interests of ourselves, then I am sure our administration will be successful. You have heard a good deal about the Sudan from Sir Reginald Wingate and Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, so I will not say anything more about it; but I should like to thank Mr. Robert Williams for his lecture and express the great interest it has been to me.

Mr. DONALD MELLOR, F.R.G.S.: Mr. Chairman,—I must say I thank Mr. Williams for the lecture. I know what a splendid help he was to the late Cecil Rhodes, and I only hope that the railway will be constructed directly as shown according to the map on the wall. If so, I think it will be a splendid monument to Mr. Williams' courage, determination, and tact. From what I have read, I know that he has had unforeseen difficulties to face, and that no man who had not got what I may call a bulldog determination to carry on the work that Cecil Rhodes inaugurated could possibly have achieved the work that he has done up to the present time. When Colonel Lugard spoke, he expressed the wish that Mr. Williams might have mentioned more about the railway line. I should have liked to hear more also, because I believe, as regards the Benguella Railway, there have been a great many difficulties. Respecting the pushing forward of this line to the border and its continuation, it all depends upon the Belgian extension from their border to the Katanga district through Lulua. The success of the Benguella line depends on that. If this extension is not made the rest of the railway is no good for the chief purpose for which it has been built. I understand that there are several other schemes that have been broached lately for a line in the Belgian Congo across country for about 900 kilometres, which apparently is an offset against the Benguella line. As regards the line from Stanleyville, as laid down on the map, there have been several schemes for lines from this place in the direction of Lake Albert. I understand that one (the southern route) has been practically dropped, and that another scheme taking a more northerly route, making connection with the Nile (north of Lake Albert), which one of the last speakers mentioned, will replace it. Mr. Williams did not say anything about this; I hope he will not mind my mentioning it. I have worked out an itinerary from Stanleyville to Capetown. It is possible to travel from Stanleyville in accordance with a properly printed timetable to Capetown in twenty-six days, and from Capetown to Stanleyville in about twenty days, because one saves time when going down the river. I greatly appreciate Mr. Williams' lecture, and I should like to thank him for it. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN : I think we are all greatly indebted to those gentlemen who have taken part in the very interesting discussion we have had, and I have only one comment to make on Mr. Williams' lecture —that is, that to my mind it was a little too short. (Hear, hear.) Otherwise—composed as it was in such an excellent literary style, and enunciating such broad and statesmanlike views—it was a great instruction and great profit to us all to listen to it. I therefore wish to convey, with your permission, our very heartiest thanks to Mr. Williams for his excellent paper. (Applause.)

The LECTURER : Lord Carnock, ladies and gentlemen,—allow me to thank you very much for your kind reception. (Renewed applause.)

# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY DINNER CLUB

THE inaugural dinner of the C.A.S. Dinner Club was held at the Imperial Restaurant on Thursday, May 4. In the absence of Lord Carnock the chair was taken by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

Membership of the Club is limited to seventy-five ordinary members, and members of the Central Asian Society only are eligible for election. Candidates must be proposed and seconded by members of the Dinner Club, and ballotted for by the Committee.

The subscription is five shillings annually, diners paying for their own dinners. No guests, except those invited by the Club, are permitted.

The meetings are held at the Imperial Restaurant, Regent Street, on the first Thursdays in November, December, February, March, April, and May.

The acting Committee consists of General Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Edward Penton, and Captain G. C. Stephenson. The Officers and Committee will be elected at the next General Meeting of the Club, which is to be held on Thursday, November 2.

Members of the Central Asian Society home from abroad on leave are eligible as temporary additional members of the Dinner Club.

# CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1921

## Receipts.

| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subscriptions— | | | | | | |
| To 404 at £1 ... ... ... | 404 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| ,, 17 at 16s. ... ... ... | 13 | 12 | 0 | | | |
| ,, 23 at £1 in advance ... ... | 23 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | 440 | 12 | 0 |
| ,, Journal subscriptions—5 at 12s. 6d. | 3 | 2 | 6 | | | |
| 3 at 10s. 5d. | 1 | 11 | 3 | | | |
| | | | | 4 | 13 | 9 |
| Journal sales ... ... ... ... | | | | 4 | 17 | 4 |
| Miscellaneous ... ... ... ... | | | | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| Interest on deposit ... ... ... | | | | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| | | | | 457 | 12 | 0 |
| Balance at bank, January 1, 1921 ... | 66 | 12 | 8 | | | |
| Balance in hand (petty cash), January 1, 1921 | 0 | 5 | 4 | | | |
| | | | | 66 | 18 | 0 |
| | | | | £524 | 10 | 0 |

## Expenditure.

| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| By rent ... ... ... ... | 30 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| ,, general rate ... ... ... | 7 | 4 | 0 | | | |
| ,, water rate ... ... ... ... | 1 | 1 | 0 | | | |
| ,, salary ... ... ... ... | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | 88 | 5 | 0 |
| Journal— | | | | | | |
| By printing ... ... ... | 228 | 5 | 5 | | | |
| ,, reporting ... ... ... | 13 | 14 | 6 | | | |
| | | | | 241 | 19 | 11 |
| ,, hire of lecture halls and tips ... | 7 | 6 | 0 | | | |
| ,, lantern ... ... ... ... | 9 | 13 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | 16 | 19 | 0 |
| By office fittings ... ... ... ... ... | | | | 2 | 12 | 6 |
| ,, stationery, printing, etc. ... ... ... ... | | | | 15 | 8 | 9 |
| ,, dinner expenses ... ... ... ... ... | | | | 5 | 0 | 8 |
| ,, returned subscriptions ... ... ... ... | | | | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| ,, unpaid cheque ... ... ... ... ... | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| ,, stamps and postage ... ... ... ... | | | | 40 | 17 | 9 |
| ,, petty cash (teas, etc.) ... ... ... ... | | | | 15 | 2 | 5 |
| ,, bank charges ... ... ... ... ... | | | | 0 | 12 | 2 |
| | | | | 432 | 2 | 6 |
| ,, balance at bank, December 31, 1921 ... | 18 | 15 | 4 | | | |
| ,, deposit ... ... ... ... | 70 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| ,, balance in hand (petty cash), December 31, 1921 ... ... ... ... | 3 | 12 | 2 | | | |
| | | | | 92 | 7 | 6 |
| | | | | £524 | 10 | 0 |

Audited and found correct, *May* 11, 1922.

A. L. P. TUCKER.

C. B. STOKES, Lieut.-Colonel.

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# NOTICE

The first Meeting of the Session 1923-24 will be held at the Royal Society's Lecture Room, Burlington House, W., on Tuesday, October 10, when Major Arthur Moore will lecture on "Britain and Islamic Asia."

A misapprehension, it is understood, exists as to the admission of ladies as guests at the Annual Dinner of the Society. The Council wishes it to be known that ladies are admitted as guests at that dinner.

A. C. Y.

# PERSIA AND THE GREAT WAR

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, May 11, 1922, Lord Carnock presiding, when a lecture was given by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., on "Persia and the Great War."

The CHAIRMAN said: Before Colonel Yate reads out the names of the new members I should like to say that the Anniversary Meeting will be held in this hall on June 15 at a quarter-past four. I hope all members who can come will come if it is convenient for them, as we should like a full meeting. The Annual Dinner will be held on July 6, with Lord Peel, the Secretary of State for India, in the Chair; and Lord Ronaldshay, late Governor of Bengal, is to be the guest of the evening.

The SECRETARY (Colonel A. C. Yate): The Council has just elected the following twenty members: The Right Hon. Lord Inchcape of Strathnaver, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.; Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Kirkpatrick, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Major-General Sir Lee Stack, K.B.E., C.M.G., Governor of the Sudan; Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Sir G. S. Barnes, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.; Lieut.-Colonel Sir T. Wolseley Haig, K.C.I.E., C.B.; Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, K.C.M.G.; Colonel Bernard Green, C.M.G., T.D.; Colonel A. M. Moens, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Colonel G. Wright, C.B.E., D.S.O., late R.A.; Lieut.-Commander J. B. de Pouguet, O.B.E., R.N.; Major J. T. Avison; Captain V. Holt; Mr. C. P. Skrine, I.C.S.; Mr. E. G. Peel, Indian Political Department; Captain B. S. Thomas, O.B.E.; Captain A. T. Blackett, Palestine Gendarmerie, Mr. N. Calder; Mr. J. Milne; Mr. R. P. S. Waley, Royal West Kents.

The CHAIRMAN: That makes twenty new members since our last meeting, bringing up, I think, the total membership to over six hundred, which I think most satisfactory. (Applause.) I think it is hardly necessary for me to introduce Sir Percy Sykes to the audience here present, as anyone who takes any interest in Persia or the Mid-East must be fully cognizant of the very active and distinguished part which Sir Percy took in events which have occurred in recent years in those regions. I think there are very few who have studied so deeply the past history of Persia. You who have read his work entitled "The History of Persia" can testify to this, and I

doubt if there are any who are better qualified to be considered one of our first authorities on Persian affairs generally, because of his personal experience derived from a lengthy residence in the country, and the close contact which he maintained with the population. I think we are particularly fortunate in getting him here this evening to give us a lecture upon Persia and the Great War. (Applause.)

## THE LECTURE

To all except a few students it seemed unlikely that remote Persia would be directly affected by the outbreak of the Great War. If, however, the pages of history be studied, it will be seen that the master-mind of Napoleon, realizing that British power in the East was based on India, determined to invade that country across Persia. In 1800, in alliance with Paul of Russia, the scheme was matured, and in the following year the Cossacks of the Don received orders to invade India. They marched off without proper transport and totally unprovided with maps, but, fortunately for them, the death of the Tsar caused the scheme, which, at this period, was fantastic, to be countermanded.

In 1914, Germany determined to pursue the same policy through her instrument, the Turkish army. Operating like the spokes of a fan, with armies attacking the Caucasus in the north, Irak and Persia in the centre, and Egypt in the south, Turkey worked on interior lines, but, to some extent, British sea-power counterbalanced this advantage, troops being moved between Egypt and Irak as the situation required. Throughout the war Germany aimed at India, and had a single Turkish brigade reached Herat, the Amir of Afghanistan would, in all probability, have been forced to lead his subjects, reinforced by the warlike tribes of the North-West Frontier, to attack India. Such an attack would have constituted a deadly peril to the British.

The position of Persia at the outbreak of hostilities was unenviable. Powerless to protect her frontiers, she saw the troops of the belligerents in most of her provinces, and was unable to do more than protest. The ruling class, which was not troubled with any patriotic feelings, took advantage of the situation to make money from one side or, if possible, from both. Persia, indeed, suffered in her western and north-western provinces from the operations of Russian and Turkish armies, but she made much money out of the British, who behaved throughout as if they were operating in a friendly country.

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Russian troops marched across the north-west corner of Azerbaijan into Turkish territory, and drove the enemy back on Van. After a temporary withdrawal, they returned and held a strong position to the west of Lake Urmia until

the collapse of the army in 1917. We must now turn our attention to South-West Persia. Upon Turkey entering the war, a British brigade speedily arrived in the Shatt-al-Arab, and prevented the enemy from wrecking the valuable oil-refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, situated on the island of Abadan, a few miles below the port of Mohammerah. After the capture of Basra and the arrival of reinforcements, a brigade was despatched to Ahwaz to guard the wells and pipe-line. The Turks made strenuous efforts against these objectives, but were repulsed and driven out of Persian soil by a British division in the spring of 1915. The main effort of the enemy in Persia was inaugurated by the despatch of missions into Central Persia. These missions were composed of a few officers with experience of the country, who enlisted local robbers and drove out the unprotected British and Russian colonies. They murdered various officials and looted branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia. Established in the chief towns, they served as bases for other missions that were sent to Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and by the end of 1915 the British had been driven out and forced to seek refuge at the coast. In no case did the Persian authorities make any attempt to protect the Entente colonies. On the contrary, the Persian Gendarmerie, that had been raised by Swedish officers, was won over to the German side through them, and materially strengthened the enemy. In the north the position was satisfactory. As the enemy Ministers had made their legations into standing camps, Russian troops were brought into Persia. The representatives of the Central Powers attempted to induce the young Shah to throw in his lot with them, alleging that the Russians would storm Tehran and make His Majesty a prisoner. Ultimately this scheme failed, and the disappointed Ministers left Tehran accompanied by some deputies and grandees whom they had bought over. The Russian troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing the enemy parties, and by the end of the year North Persia was safe for the subjects of the Entente Powers.

The year 1916 opened with the advance of a Turkish force from Baghdad, to the neighbourhood of Hamadan, the plan undoubtedly being to support the German missions. The Russians were, however, at first able to drive the Turks back to their frontier. But the fall of Kut, in April, released large Turkish forces for the invasion of Persia, and a column 18,000 strong marched into the heart of the country, driving the Russians before it. At one time it seemed that Tehran would be captured, and a further advance made towards Herat, but the Russians took up a strong position to the north of Hamadan, and, as they received some reinforcements, the Turks were finally reduced to immobility. The importance of these operations was fully realized by the late General Sir Stanley Maude, whose despatch of April 4, 1917, ran: "The enemy's plan appeared to be to contain our main

forces on the Tigris, while a vigorous campaign, which would directly threaten India, was being developed in Persia."

To remedy the unsatisfactory position in South Persia, it was decided to despatch a mission, with the object of restoring order by means of a Persian force. I was appointed to undertake this task, and reached Bandar Abbas in March, 1916. My instructions were to raise the force, that was finally termed the South Persia Rifles, and as soon as we had landed we started recruiting. At first the difficulties we experienced were many, but, mainly thanks to a very fine young officer, Captain Ruck, a useful force was finally formed, which protected Bandar Abbas and the caravan route to the interior. Germans excel in the gentle art of making enemies, and before I had been long at Bandar Abbas I received letters from the leading notables of the Kerman province begging me to free them from their tyranny. This satisfactory state of affairs was reported to the authorities, with the result that a small force of 700 Indian troops was despatched to join me, and I was instructed to march to Kerman. Everywhere we were welcomed by all classes, and the Germans, who fled towards Shiraz, were, through my influence, arrested by the Chief of the Arab tribe and handed over to me upon my arrival in the winter.

At Kerman the British colony, which had returned with the column, settled down afresh, and recruiting was started for a brigade of the South Persia Rifles. From Kerman we marched to Yezd, where we were welcomed by the British colony that had recently returned. We here received the serious news of the Turkish advance referred to above, and marched to Isfahan, in accordance with the urgent appeal of the Russian Commandant, who reported that a Turkish column was marching on that city. It appears that the size of my force was exaggerated into a brigade, and that this fact caused the Turks to halt at a village some 70 miles from Isfahan, and, finally, to retire to Hamadan. After remaining some weeks at Isfahan, we marched south to Shiraz, which was to be our headquarters, thus completing a march of 1,000 miles through Persia.

The despatch of German missions to Afghanistan could not be a matter of indifference for us, and it was decided to form a cordon along the west frontier of Afghanistan, the Russians furnishing the necessary troops in the northern section and the British in the south. The question of communications was one of extreme difficulty, as from Nushki to the Persian frontier is about 500 miles, and northwards to Kain, where the Russian section began, was about 300 miles. At that time only camel transport was available, the railway-line not having been constructed, and it was the reverse of easy to supply even a small force at such a distance from its base. The Germans opened up relations with the raiding tribes of the district of Sarhad, and encouraged them to attack the caravans. So successful

were they that there was a risk of the Eastern Persia Cordon collapsing, at the time when Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer was sent to put things right. He attacked the Sarhaddis with a handful of men, giving out that they were the advance-guard of an irresistible army. When this bluff was seen through he was in a difficult position, but the opportune arrival of reinforcements changed the entire situation, and he was able to defeat, and then to make friends with, the truculent tribesmen. His book, "The Raiding Tribes of the Sarhad," reads like a story of adventure, and we hope that one day this Society may hear an account of these wonderful operations.

In March, 1917, the collapse of the Russian army commenced, and by the end of the year it had become a mob. The British Government was faced by the fact that the northern line of approach to India was now open. In other words, if the Germans could join hands with the thousands of their men who were in the prison camps of Central Asia, they would be able to form them into an army fit to undertake the invasion of India. The situation was desperate, and desperate steps were taken to meet the emergency. In the first place, a mission was despatched across North-West Persia with the Caucasus as its objective, the idea being to rally the Georgians and Armenians to resist the Turkish advance. Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, the leader of this mission, has given the Central Asian Society an account of the thrilling exploits of his force. Here it suffices to say that it filled the gap at a critical moment by denying the oilfields and port of Baku to the enemy for a period of six weeks. The feats of "Dunsterforce" must never be forgotten.

A second mission under Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleson was also sent across Eastern Persia to Central Asia, to prevent the Bolshevists from reaching the Caspian Sea from the east. This, too, if the remoteness of the war area be considered, was a remarkable piece of work, and here again the Society has heard a lecture from the leader of the mission. But we have not yet heard an account of how a few British naval officers and other ratings, under Commodore D. T. Norris, were able to hoist the white ensign on some merchantmen, and defeat the Bolshevist fleet. They did even more, for they dominated the Caspian. These three "sideshows" represent splendid achievements, and it has given me much pleasure to narrate them in the second edition of my "History of Persia." Indeed, they ran some risk of being forgotten.

To return to South Persia, during 1917 distinct progress had been made, owing to the arrival of a capable staff under Colonel F. E. Orton, and some reinforcements, while the capture of Baghdad reacted favourably on the situation. The position was, however, difficult. To begin with, the question of the Swedish Gendarmerie, who had arrested the British colony at Shiraz in the

previous year, had to be dealt with at once. It was in a derelict condition, and unless taken in hand would have broken up and gone off with arms and ammunition. While fully realizing the risk, I determined to take over the entire body, and, although the behaviour of the force was not satisfactory for some time, it was undoubtedly the best thing to have done; it finally behaved well, and did good work after the Armistice. Of greater importance was the hostile attitude of the powerful Kashgai tribe. For generations it had been accustomed to raid far and wide, and during the last two decades the Governor-General had been powerless to oppose its *Ilkhani*, who levied revenue, but kept it for his own use. The Arab tribes were weaker, but also addicted to raiding. We, on the other hand, stood for the restoration of order, and thus challenged the "right to rob" of these warlike tribesmen.

In March, 1918, the British retreat in France convinced the Persian Government that Germany was the winner of the World War. Consequently, the South Persia Rifles were denounced as "a foreign force and a threat to Persian independence and integrity." The Kashgais and other tribes were, at the same time, instigated to attack the British, with the result that there were serious mutinies in the South Persia Rifles, and, in May, the force of 2,000 Indian troops was invested in Shiraz. The Kashgais, who, with their allies, numbered perhaps 8,000 fighting men on an average, were attacked and defeated, but returned in greater numbers, and the position looked black, until the enemy fortunately cut the telegraph-lines. Free to act as the situation demanded, I was able to induce the Persian Governor-General to appoint the brother of the Kashgai Chief head of the tribe, with the result that, after an interesting display of Oriental diplomacy, part of the Kashgais broke away and joined the new *Ilkhani*. The Arabs also climbed off the fence and came down on our side. When the situation had thus improved, the column again attacked the Kashgais, who fled, pursued by their own tribesmen under the new *Ilkhani*. This ended the six weeks' investment of Shiraz, which proved the splendid fighting qualities of the Indian troops under British officers. It also proved how the British are everywhere true to type, for the Telegraph and Bank officials and their wives also rendered valuable services, which it is a pleasure to place on record.

While Shiraz was invested, a base was organized at Bushire by Major-General J. A. Douglas, and, in the autumn, road-making was started along the difficult route to Shiraz. There was practically no opposition, as, apart from the fact that the Kashgai Chief was a refugee, the whole country had suffered from the scourge of influenza. Consequently, progress was steady, and, in January, 1919, Kazerun was occupied, with the co-operation of a detachment from Shiraz.

Before the troops were withdrawn in the spring, a well-graded track had been constructed to Shiraz across one of the most difficult sections of country in Asia.

In conclusion, what would the results have been had these missions failed? There is the strong probability that the Germans would have been able to reorganize the thousands of their veterans who were in the prison camps of Central Asia into a powerful army. The existence of such a force on the northern frontier of Afghanistan would, undoubtedly, have induced the Afghans to join in an invasion of India, which we could not have met with success, unless large numbers of troops were withdrawn from other war areas. Furthermore, had the British force at Shiraz been overwhelmed, apart from the unfavourable effect in Persia, it is probable that a wave of fanaticism would have swept across Persia to India, and that the Panjab would have risen even before the Afghans appeared on the scene. Actually Persia benefited considerably from British operations. Communications were improved, order and security were re-established to some extent, and large sums of money were spent on the purchase of supplies, the hire of transport, and on wages. The Persian Government is unlikely to express its gratitude, but the thanks of the landowners, the muleteers, and, above all, of the peasants which we did receive, are of far greater value.

Lord LAMINGTON: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I imagine that most of us up to this afternoon, unless we have had the opportunity of previously hearing General Sir Percy Sykes, had a rather hazy and disconnected idea as to what took place in Persia during the war. Thanks to Sir Percy Sykes' lecture, I think we have now a clear and more collected thought as to events that occurred in that country. Of course, he has run over such a wide area, and over such a long period, that I dare say some of us would have liked to ask questions so as to supplement some of his remarks. For instance, how did those two German missions ever get down to Southern Persia if we had our force up by Ahwaz at that time, and the Russians were farther north?

The LECTURER: They got into Baghdad along the main road from Kermanshah, and came down to Isfahan.

Lord LAMINGTON: It was a most marvellous series of events, and we in this country ought to be proud of its having been achieved by our countrymen in Persia, not least of all by Sir Percy Sykes himself. (Applause.) As an old friend of Persia, a historian, and one with a sound knowledge of its people, he must have considerable satisfaction in thinking that he was able to conduct such a very wonderful campaign under such circumstances. For the circumstances were extremely difficult, and one can only think that there is

probably a benefit sometimes when you don't have too elaborate an organization. When you have no clerk at all, and are given a free hand, a man of the strength of character of Sir Percy Sykes is then able to do the great deeds he succeeded in doing. Not only Sir Percy Sykes; he very generously mentioned those others who played such an important part in the different missions that were sent to Persia, up to Baku in the north-west, and to Tashkend in the north-east. All those events are but seldom heard of by people in this country. What I imagine must be a sad thought to Sir Percy Sykes is that what he succeeded in doing in the political or military direction is the fact that it has been now wrecked. The very efficient body of the South Persia Rifles that he organized has had to be disbanded. We could not find the money, the Indian Government would not find the money, and, of course, the Persian Government could not find the money. Therefore that very efficient force has now ceased to exist. A sad thing it was to think what might have happened to those who had been so faithful to this country in trying to save their own country. Their enemies may be wreaking vengeance on them. It is deplorable that we have not been able to maintain that force, and by so doing secure permanent friends for ourselves in a country in which we are vitally interested. The constructive works, too, such as fine roads, will undoubtedly be neglected and fall into disrepair if order is not restored. I will not detain you longer, but everyone will agree with me that we are deeply indebted to Sir Percy Sykes for his brilliant achievements during the war; and we are very grateful to him for having come here this afternoon and delivered this lecture, which has been most informing, and which ought to give us a clear, connected idea of the campaign—of the several campaigns—that took place in Persia. (Applause.)

Sir Hugh Barnes: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel great reluctance in intervening in this discussion, because I am sure this audience must be rather looking forward to hearing the comments and personal experiences of some of those present who were active participators in the stirring events which Sir Percy Sykes has referred to. I, unfortunately, can only speak from the point of view of an onlooker. However, I may be able to supplement to some extent what Sir Percy Sykes has told you from the point of view of the Imperial Bank of Persia, with which I was connected during the war. I can certainly confirm entirely what Sir Percy has said as to the extraordinary intrigues and propaganda that were started by the Germans almost immediately after the war commenced. So immediate, so universal, and so well-concerted were the measures taken, that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that everything had been very carefully prepared before the war. No sooner had the Turks joined in than every German Consulate in the country became a

focus, not only for intrigue and propaganda, but for organized attacks upon every British interest; and the Imperial Bank of Persia, naturally, was one of the first and principal interests to suffer. Our headquarters in Persia, of course, are at Tehran, but the Bank has seventeen branches throughout Persia, and at one time no less than nine of these were in the possession of the enemy. The first to be attacked was Tabriz, nearest the Turkish frontier. Fortunately, that was very speedily succoured by the advance of the Russians. The next was Ahwaz down in the south, but in that case, also, our staff was very speedily able to return, owing to the despatch of a couple of regiments from the Basrah Field Force. Then the Turks attacked on the main trade route at Kermanshah, and gradually, during the first half of 1915, from Kermanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Isfahan—from all these places—the Bank staffs were driven, and with them our Consuls and the rest of the British residents. In November, 1915, occurred the occupation of Shiraz, under the superintendence of the German Consul, Herr Wassmuss, who succeeded in persuading the local gendarmerie and other insurgents to arrest the whole of the British colony, including Colonel O'Connor, our manager Mr. Ferguson, and his wife, and the rest of the staff and officers at Shiraz. The Germans then advanced to Yezd and Kerman, and seized our branches at both places. That was in June, 1916, but that was the high-water mark of the German effort. Kerman, as you have seen from the map, is not so very far from the Baluchistan border; and the—at that time—somewhat slow-going Government of India was at last moved to take action, and was persuaded to despatch Sir Percy Sykes to Bandar Abbas to raise a force of levies and to drive the Germans out. The enemy were not very numerous. They consisted of German Consuls, of some escaped Austrian and German prisoners, and a number of "catch-'em-alive-ohs" whom they had raised. You have heard Sir Percy Sykes' very modest account of what he accomplished, how he advanced from Kerman to Yezd, Isfahan, and Shiraz, and how all our Bank people gradually came back. But, as he has told you, there was a good deal of advance and retreat on the Russian line between Hamadan and the Mesopotamian frontier, and it was not until Baghdad was occupied in the middle of May or June, 1917, that we succeeded in regaining possession of all our branches. Nor was that the end; after the Russian revolution, when the Russian troops began to go back, the Turks again occupied Tabriz, and turned out our Consul and the Bank staff; and the Bolshevists, assisted by a gentleman called Kuchik Khan, who had started a little revolution on the shores of the Caspian, attacked Resht and imprisoned our Consul and the Bank manager there. These were released by the advance of General Dunsterville and his admirable force, and I remember hearing with great satisfaction that our Bank funds had

been saved, thanks to the gallant conduct of a little company of Ghurkas, who inflicted very severe losses on Kuchik Khan's so-called army. Those being the facts, I dare say you will be able to imagine the dangers and the discomforts and privations which were suffered by the members of the British colonies in all these different places, when they were driven out helter-skelter by the violent action of the Germans and their friends. For example, as you have heard, the whole of the Shiraz party were arrested and taken down to Borasjun and imprisoned there by the Tangistani tribesmen. The ladies were separated from the men and sent on to Bushire, where they stayed for eight months in acute anxiety as to what was happening to their husbands, who did not succeed in obtaining release until the following August. Mr. Ferguson lost all his property, so did Colonel O'Connor and the other members of our staff. The Kerman Consul and Bank staff had to find their way down in December to Bandar Abbas, in a very cold season of the year, through very difficult country, as Sir Percy's slides have shown you. The Yezd staff managed to find their way to Tehran. From Isfahan the whole of the ladies and children and officers, with very inadequate supplies and very inferior transport, had to march 200 miles through the Bakhtiari Hills until they found refuge with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's people at Ahwaz. I was naturally in very close touch with our people during that period. I never heard one single word of complaint from any of them, and it was marvellous the cheerful courage and fortitude with which all their privations were borne by our fellow-countrymen and country-women during that time. (Applause.) When I look back on the years of the war, it seems to me there were four notable things achieved in Persia during the war-time. First of all, there was Sir Percy Sykes' great achievement of recovering the south of Persia, driving out German influence, and establishing the South Persia Rifles. Then there was General Dunsterville's romantic adventure—of which we had an interesting account from General Dunsterville himself; then, General Malleson's expedition on the extreme east and the Turcoman border; and, fourthly, there was the construction at long last of that desert railway from Nushki to the neighbourhood of Seistan on the Persian frontier. Now, General Dunsterville's force and General Ironside's force, which succeeded it, have gone; so also has General Malleson's gallant party—which is only natural, considering peace has returned. Up to this time last year we were still in hopes that the South Persia Rifles might be saved; but, as Lord Lamington has pointed out, the urgent demand for economy has led to the British and Indian Governments refusing to continue their contributions. So, much to everybody's regret, the South Persia Rifles have been disbanded. Whether that will prove to be a penny wise and pound foolish policy it is too early to say; but if South Persia does fall into a state of chaos and disturbance, that will mean great

injury to British interests and British-Indian trade, and it is just possible we may have again to intervene, at probably much greater cost than we should have incurred by maintaining the admirable force which had been raised by British officers. At any rate, the South Persia Rifles furnish another remarkable instance of the extraordinary capacity of the young British military officer, not only to create efficient soldiers out of the most unpromising material, but at the same time to gain, not only their confidence, but their affection. (Applause.) The one achievement which still remains is the railway from Quetta into Persia. But the other day I was dismayed by reading a report from India which said that the Government were thinking of pulling up the rails and dismantling that line. I hope most sincerely that such a short-sighted and retrograde measure will not be adopted. For whatever happens to Persia, that railway is bound to be of great value in the future. If Persia obtains a period of peace and orderly government, trade will increase, and this line is the only effective land route by which Persia and India can trade together. Secondly, even if Persia falls into anarchy, and we have to intervene, this railway gives us at once the opportunity and the power of putting pressure on the Persian Government by the occupation of Seistan. Thirdly, if the Bolshevist or any other Russian Government ever again becomes aggressive, and we have to give our material support, either to Afghanistan or Persia, Seistan again is the strategical point to which we can send troops to support one or other. Fourthly, if you think of it, there is only a gap of some 400 miles which separates the head of this railway from the nearest point on the Russian Transcaspian line, and if that gap is ever completed, there will be practically railway communication between India and Europe. If we are to have, as we all hope, an era of universal peace for a long time to come, it is almost inevitable that that gap will be filled up. When I look back it seems difficult to believe that thirty years have elapsed since Sir Robert Sandeman died; but it is as long ago as that since he and I, when we were together at Quetta, used to plan for and dream of the time when Quetta would be the most popular place in India, because it would be the "jumping-off" place from which our countrymen would start on their leave home—if they preferred to travel overland by rail all the way to Calais. The only other thing I have to say is that at the time of the Armistice British prestige in Persia never stood higher. Not only had we financed the Persian Government, financed our own troops, and financed the Russian troops, but we had driven out German and Turkish influence, occupied Mesopotamia, and, in short, had won the war. Our prestige, therefore, stood very high indeed. I am sorry to say that at the present moment I cannot say that this is any longer the case. From all we hear—if we are to judge by the action of the Persian Government and the tone of the Press at Tehran—England and the British are most

unpopular. This has arisen mainly, no doubt, through active Bolshevist propaganda and expenditure, but also, perhaps, through mistakes of policy, which are now beginning to be recognized. There are some slight signs of a change, and I hope that before long we shall again see Britain and Persia as closely united in friendship as they have been in former years. (Applause.)

Sir EDMUND BARROW: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have no claim to talk on Persia as I have never been there, but I have been connected behind the scenes with Persia's affairs for a long time past; and as my old friend Sir Percy Sykes, whom I have long regarded as my mentor on Persian subjects, has forwarded to me his notes for the lecture to which we have had the pleasure of listening to-day, and has asked me to make a few remarks on the influence of Persia on the Great War, I have felt constrained to do so. Moreover, it is always rather a pleasure to make remarks and criticisms on what one's preceptor or mentor has told one, so I have jotted down a few remarks which I wish to make. In the first place, Sir Percy has referred a good deal to the influence of the Russians on the campaign in the early days of the war; and it is quite true that that influence had a certain effect. But, at the same time, I think that it is more probable that it was our position in Mesopotamia that most affected the course of events in Persia. In the early days of 1916 it was not so much the Russians, I think, who put a term to the German machinations in Persia, but the presence of the British in Mesopotamia. We were there in a position from which we could tread on the tail of any advance or movement through Hamadan and Kermanshah; and I am inclined to think that it was the otherwise unfortunate advance of General Townshend to Ctesiphon which caused the failure of the Turco-German movement in Persia. On that subject I must be careful as to what I say; but I think that what really stopped the Turks, and, indeed, caused their hurried retirement a few months later from Persia, was not the Russians, but the advance of the British from Kut towards Baghdad. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the marked influence which Mesopotamia and Persia reciprocally exercised on the strategy of the Great War; I have no hesitation in saying that it was the fear of Pan-Islamic influences on the Indian frontier, exercised through Persia and Afghanistan, which was the *ignis fatuus* that lured us on from Kut to Ctesiphon. The Press and the public attributed that ill-fated advance to an attempt to compensate for our failure at the Dardanelles, but I can assure you that the supreme consideration of the moment was the situation in Persia, and the menace to India which that situation involved at a period of dangerous military weakness in India itself. The lecturer has also told us how, later on in 1917, the Russian débacle laid Persia open to renewed Turkish penetration by way of Tabriz on the north-west and in the north-east, movements

which led to the Dunsterville and Malleson missions. I need say nothing regarding the former, as Sir Percy Sykes has commented on it so fully; but, as regards the latter, I would point out that, though it is true our enemies hoped to utilize against us the war prisoners who had been interned in Turkistan by the Russians, that hope proved fallacious. The prisoners were almost entirely Austrian subjects, and, for the most part, Poles, Magyars, Czechs, and other races who had little or no sympathy with either German or Turkish aspirations, and who, consequently, were a broken reed in Bolshevic hands. The ease with which a few hundred Indian soldiers of the 26th Cavalry and the 19th Punjabis defeated the Bolshevists in front of Merv a little later proves this. Nevertheless, I should like to say that the exploit of the Indians on that occasion merits far more credit and applause than it has ever got; it was a notable feat which added greatly to English prestige throughout Persia and Central Asia. (Applause.) Sir Percy has told us of the evil influence on Persia of the great German offensive of March, 1918, against our Fifth Army in France—how the Persian Government thought we were beaten, and how readily the Persians turned against us. This episode illustrates the importance of prestige in Oriental affairs. Our prestige had been shaken by a military disaster in distant Europe, and the East was once more gathering to join our enemies. Our hold on Shiraz, Meshed, and Bushire at that critical moment saved the situation; without those centres of resistance an acute crisis might have arisen at Kabul. Once again we were saved, for a time at least, by the influence of a sideshow; the threatened conflagration was damped down. Sir Percy Sykes concluded his lecture with an expression of sympathy for Persia. I am sure we are all sorry for the condition of things in Persia, and we must all condole with the unfortunate position which has now arisen. But in the East the unforeseen nearly always occurs, and I feel confident that Persia will be saved, as it has been before now, by some strong man. We have the example in old days of Nadir Khan, a Border cateran, who rose to power by his own strong hand, and who eventually raised Persia again to a position of great strength and influence in Asia, and, as you all know, the armies of Nadir Shah even reached Delhi; so I have some hope that a strong man may emerge out of that sea of corruption which Persia now is. (Applause.)

The Chairman: I think at this late hour, after the very interesting discussion which we have had, and the very valuable remarks which have been made by Sir Hugh Barnes, Sir Edmund Barrow, and Lord Lamington, I can do no more than ask you to join with me in tendering a vote of very hearty thanks to Sir Percy Sykes for the very lucid and graphic narrative he has given us to-day of the really marvellous events in which he, with his associates, participated. (Applause.)

# ANNIVERSARY MEETING AND ANNUAL REPORT

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, June 15, 1922, the Rt. Hon. the Lord Carnock presiding.

The Hon. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) read the Annual Report of the session 1921-22.

It not unnaturally occurred to me, before making my Report for the year which is just now drawing to a close, to reread my Report for the year which preceded it; and, as I did so, it struck me as a curious coincidence that the two final lectures of each Session, that of 1920-1921, and that of 1921-1922, should deal with the very remarkable Mohamedan movement which has been one of the most vital issues of the war. Last year Sir Michael O'Dwyer ably handled this theme from the point of view of the Indian Moslem and of India's Mohamedan neighbours. For this afternoon Sir Valentine Chirol has adopted a title still more comprehensive—viz., "Storm-waves in the Mohamedan World." The other great storm-wave of the moment is the Bolshevik, and I would fain detect a subtle force somewhere which might break the one upon the other. That solution of the problems twain we may perhaps leave to time, if not to our statesmen.

A triumvirate of Secretaries of State is an honour of which this Society may justly be proud, and still prouder if that triumvirate could move Islam to crush Bolshevism, or at least to checkmate it. Over and over again we have been assured that Bolshevism is at war with every Moslem instinct and prejudice, and yet the Turk dallies with them still, and may at any moment end the dalliance in a warm embrace.

The Allied Powers of the West of Europe, victorious in the Great War as they can claim to be, are now threatened by this joint storm-wave.

I think we must all realize from our study during the past few years of events in Asia Minor, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Egypt, that the position of Great Britain in the Middle East is a difficult and even a precarious one. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, speaking from the Chair, on October 20, 1920, spoke solemnly and earnestly to this Society on the importance of its responsibilities and

the possible wide scope of its work in this sphere of action. There can be no doubt about the presence in our ranks of the "galaxy of talent." The point that has not yet been worked out is the best method of applying that talent in the interest of the Empire.

At the end of last Session we were indifferently housed; but since then, thanks to the obliging attitude of the Royal Asiatic and the Persia Societies, we have acquired a more spacious office in which Miss Kennedy can find elbow-room, and our recently elected Honorary Librarian, Mr. Roland Michell, can find space for our books and journals. I think that this is just the psychological moment to remind you all that the Society wants books, journals, reviews, photographs, prints—in fact, everything that concerns its sphere of work. My experience during the past year, so encouraging in many respects, is tantalizing in this, that I know that the books of two very distinguished members of long standing were allowed to slip through our fingers—to slip through, so to speak, by just a few inches. One, I found, had just sold his surplus books, and the other had just given away a complete set of his copies of our Journal. I had to comfort myself with their assurance that "had they only known," etc., and the assurance was quite sincere, but "too late."

You will readily excuse me if I enter into no details regarding our lectures and lecturers. If you took the latter and passed their united careers in review, you would realize what a handful—you can count them on your ten fingers—of Britons can achieve. As for the lectures, the Journal is in your hands. The Journal, moreover, contains a good deal of interesting matter in addition to the lectures. The hall of the Royal Society and the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution have, during this Session, furnished us with admirable lecture-rooms.

We have increased the membership of the Society this year by 171, and among them are many men of high achievement and distinction. I mention no individual names. I am only going to say a few words of one member, of whom Lord Curzon specially spoke in October, 1920, as "brought up in the spirit and inspiration of the Society"—I mean Lord Ronaldshay, who for six years before he was Governor of Bengal was Chairman of the Council of this Society, or rather its President; for it was not till 1918 that Lord Curzon was invited to be Honorary President, and it was then that the title "Chairman of Council" was introduced. Lord Ronaldshay has recently returned to this country, and has been greeted by His Majesty the King in a manner which reflects the very high opinion entertained both by the Government of this Realm and by the Nation of his Lordship's success as an administrator at a time of exceptional difficulty.

When Lord Curzon spoke twenty months ago, the Central Asian

Society numbered over 400. It now numbers 600, most of them men in the spring or summer of life, many of whom may hope in their good time to rival, or even outrival, Lord Ronaldshay. The Council has invited Lord Ronaldshay to be a Vice-President, and to be the Society's guest at the Annual Dinner, at which Lord Peel will take the Chair. Four of the members of the British Legation at Kabul have just joined this Society, as well as some members of the recent Mission under Sir Henry Dobbs. We are thus well in touch with Kabul; and to Kabul to-day may, perhaps, be applied the term forty years ago, applied, however erroneously, to Herat—viz., "the key of India." I hope that the members of the Afghan Legation in London will understand that they will be welcome at our lectures.

I am not quite sure that this Society yet fully realizes the channels of progress and preferment that are open to it through our close connection with three great Departments of the Government, the Foreign, the Colonial, and the India Office. The Colonial Office suggests to me that we ought to be in closer touch with the institutions of His Majesty's Overseas Dominions. The "Anzac" destiny is bound in with ours. I have written to the Indian soldier whose name is indissolubly connected with the Australasians and New Zealanders who fought in the war, and have invited him, firstly, to join the Society, and, secondly, to indicate the channel by which we may get into touch with the "intelligenzia" of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand.* The Cape, too, will not be forgotten, and no one can bring us into touch with that better than Mr. Robert Williams, to whom the Society is already indebted for more than one act of kindness and generosity.

Early this year the Council decided that the Society should be given an opportunity, if it so willed, of forming a Dinner Club. A Subcommittee composed of General Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Edward Penton, and Captain G. C. Stephenson, with Sir Michael O'Dwyer as Chairman, was delegated for the purpose of bringing this project to maturity. The first meeting of this Club was held on May 4. At least fifty members attended. The unanimous opinion of all present was that the Dinner was a complete success, and it was felt that the Subcommittee had arranged everything admirably. It is proposed to continue these dinners during the coming Session, as announced in Part III. of the Journal of 1922.

* General Sir William Birdwood's reply reached me a few days after this Report was read. He wrote: (1) "I shall be glad to join the C.A.S."; and (2) "I think the best thing I can do is to send your letter to Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel, who commanded not only all the Australian and New Zealand troops in Palestine, but also the whole of Allenby's mounted division. I am sure that he personally will take much interest in such matters, and may be able to get others to do so."—A. C. Y.

Since my last Report we have lost fourteen members, three by death and eleven by resignation. Sir Frederic Fryer leaves behind him a deeply respected memory. The presence at his Memorial Service of Sir Charles Yate, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and Captain Stephenson, who represented the Society, was a mark of high esteem and sympathy which his family cordially appreciated.

Finally, we can look back upon this year as a year of good sound progress. Some geographers found their feelings seriously upset by the intelligence that "The Cape to Cairo Railway" figured on the Society's lecture list, and their protests against the association of Africa with the Middle East were strenuous. Students of the past, however, and up-to-date practical administrators of Egypt, of the Sudan, Uganda, and of North-East Africa, showed conclusively that Asia to the north and east and Africa to the south and west of the Suez Canal, that thoroughfare so vital to the unity of the British Empire, cannot possibly be dissociated. If the British power ever trembles in the balance on that Canal, the Anzacs and the Cape Colonists will flock to our support by that very railway, and by the subsidiary branches connecting it with the Indian Ocean at Mombasa, Dar-es-Salam, and Port Sudan.

The Chairman of our Council proposes to submit to you the following names for election:

*As Vice-Presidents:*

The Right Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

General Sir Charles Monro, Bart., G.C.B., etc.

*As Members of Council:*

The Right Hon. Sir Arthur H. Hardinge, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Fremantle, M.P.

The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The report which Colonel Yate has just read us shows us that the Central Asian Society is now established on a thoroughly firm basis. I am sure that we, its members, can look forward to a prosperous future, and I trust to an ever-extending field for its activities. The report has one or two omissions, omissions which naturally Colonel Yate himself was unable to fill. I allude to the great services which Colonel Yate as our joint on. Secretary has rendered to the Society, and to his constant and unremitting efforts to further our interest, both by procuring for us a large number of new members and also by arranging a series of most instructive and interesting lectures. (Applause.) The Members of Council have had ample opportunities of appreciating the value of Colonel Yate's services, and I am sure you will agree with me that we

owe him a great debt of gratitude. He has been most ably seconded in his work by his coadjutor, Captain Stephenson, who has also been very active in procuring for us a number of new members. I cannot too highly praise the untiring devotion which Miss Kennedy, our Assistant Secretary, has given to her varied and exacting duties. (Applause.) The financial situation of the Society, I am glad to say, is on a good basis; and this fortunate position is owing to the very careful and prudent administration of our funds by our Hon. Treasurer, Sir Edward Penton. (Applause.) We also owe our thanks to Mr. Mitchell, who has kindly undertaken the post of Honorary Librarian, and I hope that the collection of books, to which we have just received a very generous contribution from Lady Trotter, will multiply and expand under his guidance. I have now to submit for your sanction and confirmation certain appointments, or elections rather, as regards the Vice-Presidents and the Members of Council. We had, of course, the lamented death of Sir Frederic Fryer, which made a vacancy in the Vice-Presidents, and Sir Evan James has expressed his wish to retire from the post. We therefore in their places propose Lord Ronaldshay, late Governor of Bengal, and General Sir Charles Monro, late Commander-in-Chief in India. Of course, the Vice-Presidents are ex officio Members of the Council, and I hope the two gentlemen that I have named will also favour us with their attendance whenever they are able to do so. I presume I may take it that you confirm the election of Lord Ronaldshay and Sir Charles Monro. Then we have to elect four new Members of the Council to replace those who retire by rotation. Captain Ormsby-Gore retires, Mr. Tucker also retires, and Mr. Moon retires; but the Council would be grateful if you would sanction his re-election. As new members we propose Sir Arthur Hardinge, who was once Minister in Persia, also our late Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter—whose services in the Soudan and Egypt are well known to you all—and Colonel Freemantle, M.P. Is the meeting agreed?

The resolution was carried unanimously.

The Chairman: I am sure you will re-elect as our Honorary Treasurer Sir Edward Penton.

This was agreed to.

The Chairman: We co-opted as a Member of the Council since our last Anniversary Meeting Colonel Stokes, whose services in Persia have made him a very first-class authority on all Persian matters, and he is really a great addition to our Society. The Council did me the honour to ask me to continue as Chairman for another year. It was with diffidence I met their request, and I therefore solicit your suffrages in conforming with it. In about ten minutes Sir Valentine Chirol will give us his lecture. Meantime, I think that closes the business.

After a short interval the meeting was resumed, the business before it being to hear and discuss an address by Sir Valentine Chirol on "Storm Waves in the Mohamedan World."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The lecture which Sir Valentine Chirol has kindly consented to read to us to-day closes the session until we resume our autumn meeting. I do not think that we can terminate the present session in a more auspicious manner than in welcoming among us so distinguished and expert an authority on all Eastern questions—as regards the Far East, the Mid-East, or the Near East—as Sir Valentine Chirol. The subject that he is going to deal with this afternoon is one of the utmost importance to our Empire; and I know, as we all know, that Sir Valentine Chirol has devoted to it a profound and prolonged study. We will therefore listen with intense interest to what he has to say to us on so important a subject. (Applause.)

# STORM WAVES IN THE MOHAMEDAN WORLD

BY SIR VALENTINE CHIROL

The world is nowhere yet really at peace, but of the powers that fought us in the Great War, Turkey is the only one which has not yet bowed to the consequences of defeat. She asked for an armistice and obtained it, but peace negotiations hung fire. The situation was complicated by the landing of Greek forces in Asia Minor, originally sanctioned and desired by the Allies, and a stubborn resistance is still being put up, not by the Sultan's Government at Constantinople, but by a rival Turkish Government with its headquarters at Angora, which disposes of considerable military forces under the command of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, one of the ablest Turkish Generals, and has behind it a large measure of support from a population stirred up to an unprecedented degree of racial and religious passion by ten years of nearly continuous warfare. The Angora Government, composed largely of the same elements, formerly known as the Committee of Union and Progress, which plunged Turkey into the Great War in alliance with Germany, appeals both to the Mohamedan and national pride of the ruling race, and relies also on a more or less formal alliance with Soviet Russia, of which the mainspring is a common hostility, though on widely different grounds, to Western civilization. The most singular result of this renewal of Turkish resistance is the wild outburst of passion amongst a large section of the Mohamedans of India, who have not shrunk from the most lawless forms of agita-

tion in order to compel the British Government to reverse its policy towards Turkey as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed nearly two years ago, but still inoperative. There are about 66 million Mohamedans in India, a very important if relatively small minority in a total population of 320 millions, with great historical traditions, and forming the largest Mohamedan block in the world. Their sudden change of front in support of Turkey imports a fresh element of disturbance, not merely into a difficult political situation in India, but into the whole relations between East and West, already in a state of dangerous flux.

I thought, therefore, it might be interesting to place before you this afternoon a survey, however brief, of the history of those relations, with special reference to the part which Turkey has played in the Islamic world, and to the influence which our possession of India has exerted upon British policy towards Turkey.

Our minds are apt to be still dominated by Mr. Rudyard Kipling's saying that

> **" East is East and West is West,**
> **And never the twain shall meet,"**

as if the West were a planet set for ever on its own superior course and the East its satellite, ordained equally for ever to move on inferior lines that could not conceivably converge or clash. This may have seemed true in India at a particular time when Western ascendancy appeared to be widely acknowledged and deeply rooted there. But it was, I think, a somewhat narrow generalization, which has certainly ceased to be true, and over the long range of history has never been fundamentally true.

Our Western civilization, as far back as we can trace its origins, was hammered out from its very inception in constant contact, if often in violent conflict, with the East—*i.e.*, with so much of the Eastern world as the Western world then knew. West and East exchanged, not only heavy blows, but vital ideas. In peace and in war they acted and reacted upon each other socially and politically, morally and materially; and if we take a broad survey of the results, we must admit that on the whole the honours were fairly well divided. Greece and Rome, having withstood respectively the violent assaults of the Persian and Carthaginian East, gave birth to Western art and literature, to Western conceptions of public law and private rights. The Roman Empire, even more than the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, projected Western influence into the East, but from the East it received Christianity, which, though often obscured and perverted to unworthy uses, henceforth provided the ethical basis of Western civilization. It was Christianity, the gift of the East, that enabled the West to absorb, without irreparable injury to its better self, all the flotsam and jetsam—much of it essentially Eastern—with which

Europe was strewn after the invasions of the barbarians. There is scarcely one European nation in whose blood there is not some Eastern strain dating back to the welter of those ages. The ex-Emperor William himself, on one memorable occasion, exhorted his troops to remember their Hunnish ancestors, and Russia has never ceased to betray her Asiatic origins.

The sixth century, however, introduced an entirely new factor into the relations between East and West with the first emergence from the deserts of Arabia of the one great religion of the world which armed itself from its birth with a sword. So sharp was the sword of Islam wielded by the Arab followers of the Prophet that it carried them in the course of a century westward along the southern shores of the Mediterranean to the Pyrenees, and once even into the heart of France, and eastward through the outlying provinces of the old Byzantine Empire into Persia and the adjoining regions of Central Asia. The Arab conquerors never dropped the sword altogether, and there was almost constant warfare on the expanding borderlands of their vast dominions. But as they were brought into contact with the Western culture that had permeated many of the countries subdued by them, the receptive genius of their Semitic race yielded to its influence, and a *modus vivendi* grew up and took shape in a new Saracenic civilization, which under the Mohamedan Caliphs of Damascus and Baghdad, of Cairo and Cordova, kept the torch of ancient learning alight, when it was almost extinguished during the dark ages in Europe, until the Italian Renaissance kindled it afresh and with increased splendour in Europe.

Where during the four or five centuries which shed such imperishable lustre on Islamic history was Turkey? She was yet unborn. The Ottoman Empire only came into being in the thirteenth century with a new race of Eastern conquerors who picked up the Koran on their way from their heathen homelands in Central Asia to the No Man's Land, into which the slow disintegration of the Byzantine Empire and the more rapid decay of the Arab states successively carved out of it were converting a large part of Western Asia and South-Eastern Europe. With the growth of Turkish power, Islam fell under its blighting influence. For the leadership of Islam passed from a Semitic race intellectually highly gifted and with an innate capacity for progress to a Turanian race—virile indeed, but dull-witted, narrow, and rigid, to whom the Mohamedan creed appealed mainly as an instrument of domination based upon the sword.

The first Turkish wave of conquest, out of which the Seljuk Empire arose, never reached Europe. It destroyed Arab civilization in Mesopotamia and Syria, and the horrors which marked the capture of Jerusalem in 1076, in striking contrast to the reverence and generosity displayed by the Caliph Omar when the Arab followers of

Mohamed first entered the Holy City, stirred Europe to the fierce reprisals of the Crusades, which once more deepened the gulf between Christendom and Islam. It was only with the second wave of Turkish conquest that the Ottoman Turks, so called from their famous leader, Othman, who established himself as Sultan at Brussa within a few miles of the Sea of Marmora, first came to the front as a horde of mercenaries, upon whom their religion at first sat so light, that they were ready to hire themselves out to the highest bidders, whether Mohamedans or Christians. They served in turn the Mohamedan Seljuks and the Christian Emperors of Byzantium, and the Bulgars and Serbs who were already disputing its inheritance. One of the earliest Ottoman Sultans married the daughter of a Byzantine Emperor, and allowed her to retain her own religion, but had no scruple in breaking the alliance of which she had been the price. The Ottoman Turks crossed the Bosphorus as hirelings. They remained as masters. They made Adrianople their first European capital until they were firmly enough established in Thrace to lay hands upon Constantinople itself in 1453. Then, with a fresh momentum, the tide of Ottoman conquest rolled irresistibly forward towards Central Europe, and was only stemmed at last under the very walls of Vienna.

Not until the Ottoman Empire had been thus built up on the ruins, it should be remembered, of earlier Mohamedan states in Asia, no less than on those of Christian states in Europe, did the relations between the West and the East assume a character of irreconcilable antagonism, which the precarious continuance of commercial and even of political intercourse hardly mitigated until Turkey ceased to be a menace to European civilization and began to offer a tempting field to the ambitions of her European neighbours. It was not merely that the Turkish lust of conquest seemed insatiable, nor that with the incorporation of Egypt into his dominions in 1516 the parricide Selim I. added to the title of Sultan that of Caliph, which he wrung from a descendant of the Abbaside Caliphs who had found an obscure refuge in Cairo. This first attempt to convert the Turkish scimitar into the divinely appointed sword of Islam bore little visible fruit until our own times. The Turk was ready enough even to ally himself more or less openly with this or that Christian power against a common enemy—witness, for instance, the frequent co-operation of the "most Christian Kings" of France with the Ottoman Sultans against Austria. Nor did the Turk refuse to concede to infidels limited rights of trade and residence within his territory under the name of capitulations or under special charters such as that of the English Levant Company. But he remained a barbarian. He copied the splendour of Byzantium and excelled its profligacy. He borrowed freely from Arabic and Persian to build up a Court language less

primitive than his rude Central Asian tongue, but he contributed little to literature, nothing to science, and, plagiarizing the nobler arts of Persian and Arab civilization, he steadily debased them.

The first Ottoman Sultans were great soldiers and leaders of men and not devoid of rough, rudimentary statesmanship. It is claimed for them that they even displayed a fine tolerance in their treatment of the conquered Christian peoples, leaving them free to practise their own forms of religion under their own ecclesiastical authorities. There is, however, another side to that policy. The ruling race enjoyed *quâ* Mohamedans under the Sacred Law many privileges, and above all immunities from taxation, which would have lost their value had all the conquered peoples been compelled to become Mohamedans. It would have killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. The material interests of the ruling Turk were best served by tolerating large Christian populations to remain *taillables et corvéables à merci* for his benefit, and, as his power waned, his hand pressed more and more heavily upon the subject races whom he had originally despised, but now began to fear. He reverted more and more to Central Asian type under the thinnest veneer of borrowed culture. The cleavage between the West and the East, of which Turkey was for a long time the one fearful embodiment in the eyes of Europe, deepened as never before in history, until the barrier which she opposed to all beneficent intercourse between East and West was turned by the marvellous enterprise of Western navigators who opened up new ocean highways to another Eastern world hitherto almost unknown to Europe.

Nothing that the Turks ever did in the heyday of their power was to have such momentous consequences for our own race as their conquest of Egypt. For their possession of Egypt and their piratical sea-power all through the Mediterranean closed the last avenue through which Europe had kept up, mainly from Genoa and Venice, a precarious but lucrative trade with the mysterious countries of the distant Orient. The seafaring nations of Western Europe were driven to seek a way round over the hitherto untravelled ocean. The Portuguese were the first to turn the Cape of Good Hope, and they established the first European settlements on the south-western shores of India at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Spaniards and Dutch, French and English, joined in turn in the great adventure, and fought on land and on sea for the new markets of the Indies; but we outstayed all our competitors, and the East India Company laid, in pursuit of the trade denied by the Turkish belt, the foundations of a British Eastern Empire far greater than any over which even the most magnificent of Ottoman Sultans ever reigned.

The opening of new ocean routes to India and the Far East not merely outflanked the Turkish obstruction to intercourse with the

East, but it brought the West for the first time into contact with another East, alien indeed also, but entirely different from the East which Greeks and Romans had known or which had confronted Europe either in the dark ages when Islam had first sprung out of Arabia or in later times when the flood of Turkish invasion was rolling up the Danube. In India the West found itself in presence of a Hindu civilization more ancient and far more rigid than its own. Later on it was to force its way into contact with other Eastern civilizations, the Chinese civilization and the Japanese—widely different again, but not less ancient and peculiar; but, with the rapid development of British dominion, it was India that became the centre of stability of our own Empire in the East, and even of Western influence throughout the Eastern world.

It would be interesting to try to trace the impression which India made on the minds of the first adventurous Englishmen who settled on her far-flung shores. But they had come there solely to trade, and they stuck to their last. The Moghul Empire still held the greater part of India under Mohamedan domination, but it was already on the downward grade, and differed in many respects from the type of Mohamedan domination which Europe had come to associate with Ottoman rule. Islam had first reached India direct from Arabia in the seventh century, but only in the remote north-west corner, now known as Sind, and it was from the great reservoir of hungry humanity which supplied the Turkish conquerors of Western Asia and South-Eastern Europe that successive floods of Mohamedan invasion began to pour forth out of Central Asia, through the northern gates of India, in the eleventh century, and ultimately submerged the whole of India except the extreme south.

At first the Mohamedan conquerors had been like the Turks, mere barbarous raiders, to whom India, split up into a multitude of rival states and principalities, fell a facile prey. But in the course of time they yielded in some measure to a more highly civilized environment, and just when Queen Elizabeth was granting to her London "Merchant-venturers" the charter out of which the East India Company grew up, the latest Mohamedan dynasty to set up its domination on the ruins of its many predecessors was represented by a ruler of real constructive genius such as the Turks never produced. The great Moghul Emperor Akbar realized that, though the sword could achieve the political unification of India, Imperial unity could never be permanently achieved except on a national basis, and unless, therefore, the rigidity of Islam relaxed sufficiently to admit of a religious and social fusion with the enduring forces of Hinduism which still moulded the beliefs and customs of the vast majority of his subjects. With that object in view, he evolved a new creed compounded of Hindu as well as Mohamedan elements, in which,

like our Henry VIII., he would have combined the headship of a national Church with that of an All-Indian state. It is a singular coincidence that, whilst the Ottoman Sultan had picked up in Cairo the empty shell of the old Arab Caliphate, something of the spirit of fearless inquiry and freedom of thought which had quickened Islam under the Abbaside Caliphs at Baghdad, long before the Turks came and levelled the great city and its Arab civilization to the ground, should have been revived, if only for a brief spell, in the splendid Hall of Disputations at Fathehpur-Sikri, where Akbar conversed on ethics and religion with Christians and with Jews, with Hindu pundits and Mohamedan divines. But no other Mohamedan ruler of non-Semitic descent ever had the boldness to question the finality of divine revelation as contained in the Koran, and he was far ahead of his time and of his people, whether Mohamedans or Hindus. His creed did not survive him, though something of his broad tolerance survived under the Emperors Jehanghir and Shahjehan.

Under Aurangzeb, Indian Mohamedanism bore once more, like Turkish Mohamedanism, the deadening imprint of Central Asia. It was wrapped up more and more as its political ascendancy declined in outward forms and observances, in arrogance, intolerance and ignorance, whilst the masses, then, as now, only a minority, converted to the Mohamedan conquerors' creed, still clung to many of the superstitions and even to the caste prejudices which they were supposed to have abjured with Hindu polytheism. The Moghul court and the great majority of Indian Mohamedans professed the orthodox doctrines of Sunnism, as both Turks and Arabs do, but an influential minority were then, as they are now, Shiahs who regard the Sunnis as heretics. The culture of which their greatest rulers have left splendid monuments behind them was chiefly derived from Persia, whose language and literature and art were held in high honour by the Mohamedan ruling classes. Not until the second half of the last century was there any intercourse between the Mohamedans of India and of Turkey, beyond such as occurred during the pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and in occasional missions of courtesy exchanged between Delhi and Stamboul. In its first onslaught Islam destroyed the last remnants of Buddhism, and it swept away one Hindu kingdom after another, even to the great Vijiyanagar kingdom in the south, which only fell in the middle of the sixteenth century. But it never seriously shook the ancient social and religious fabric of Hinduism, and when Aurangzeb's gloomy fanaticism reverted to the older methods of oppression, the Mahratta Shivaji was already raising the standard of Hindu revolt against the decaying Moghul Empire, torn by internal dissensions and reduced to seeking aid from the new forces which for the first time in the

annals of India had reached her inviolate shores from Europe across the vast expanse of the ocean.

For more than a century trade had remained the only purpose and the sole interest of the Englishmen in India, who had gone there neither as conquerors nor as missionaries, but as traders. Even when they could no longer remain altogether indifferent to the reaction upon their trade of internal conditions which threatened to plunge the whole of India into chaos, the East India Company at home set its face sternly against any sort of interference in Indian quarrels which might compromise it with one or other of the warring factions, and above all against military intervention, which would swallow up the large profits of its one legitimate business—viz., trade. It was not till India became one of the chief theatres of conflict between Great Britain and France during their long struggle throughout the eighteenth century for the mastery of the seas, and the genius of Dupleix threatened the East India Company with destruction as the first step towards the creation of a French Empire in India, that the British people as well as the Company awoke to the fact that Great Britain would have to take up the inheritance of the moribund Moghul Empire or see it pass into the possession of her great European rival. The choice was quickly and effectively made. I need not dwell upon the expulsion of the French or the rapid expansion of British dominion in India, or on the steady transformation of the East India Company from a trading corporation into a great agency of Government subjected to the increasingly close control of the British Parliament and the British Crown. Within less than a hundred years from the battles of Plassey and Buxar, British dominion was firmly established over the whole continent from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, either under direct British administration or in virtue of treaties by which a large number of native princes and rulers gave their allegiance to the British Paramount Power in return for the maintenance of their local autonomy and dynastic rights.

It was whilst British rule was moulding India into a new shape that Great Britain lost her dominant position in another continent through the successfùl revolt of the Colonies that became the United States of America. No longer the foremost power in America, she became a great Asiatic power, and the axis of her foreign policy had to be shifted from West to East. For as soon as we awoke to the value of India, our rivals in the world also awoke to the fact that there might perhaps be found the most vulnerable point in our armour. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, his overtures to Tippu Sahib, the last Mohamedan potentate to defy British paramountcy in India, the schemes which he from time to time dangled before Russia for the invasion of India by combined

Russian and French armies, all came to naught. But the safety of India was henceforth a constant preoccupation of British statesmanship; and though British sea-power could be relied on to guard her shores against all attack, Russian expansion in the East pointed at least to the possibility of overland invasion across Persia and Afghanistan.

In the general scheme of international values, Turkey had in the meantime undergone a complete change. It was no longer her strength but her weakness that threatened to disturb the balance of European power. The decline of the Ottoman Empire had been as rapid as its rise. Not only had its European frontiers steadily receded after a succession of disastrous wars, but its subject races, whose sense of nationhood had never been entirely destroyed, were growing dangerously restive under the lash of the ruling race, more and more ruthlessly applied as corruption increased at Constantinople under effete and profligate Sultans and Sultanas, and anarchy spread throughout the provinces. The French Revolution and the convulsions through which Europe passed during the Napoleonic wars stimulated the spirit of revolt which Catherine the Great had been the first to encourage deliberately from outside. The Serbs rose in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and the Greeks, in the second, with greater success, since their War of Independence ended by the establishment of a sovereign state, small indeed and feeble, but the first one to be entirely detached from the Ottoman Empire. The Rumanians, whose fetters had always been looser, enlarged their autonomy. The dissolution of Turkey for the benefit of her subject races had begun.

British statesmanship, whose liberal traditions inclined it to favour these movements, was held in restraint by the growing dread of Russia, whose ambitions, embracing Asia as well as Europe, filled the British rulers of India with increasing alarm. England had the choice between two policies. The one was to wash her hands of Turkey, encourage the building up of independent states in South-Eastern Europe, and come to a definite understanding with Russia in regard to Asia. The other was to protect Turkey from dismemberment as a bulwark against Russian aggression on condition that the Turkish system of government should be completely reformed, and made tolerable for the Christian as well as Mohamedan subjects of the Sultan. Successive British Governments hesitated between the two policies. The Tsar Nicholas I. made important overtures to Lord Aberdeen for the liberation of European Turkey, on the understanding that neither power was to take permanent possession of Constantinople, and he offered Egypt and Cyprus to Great Britain in fulfilment of assurances already frequently given that Russia entertained no designs upon the British position in India.

But a masterful British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, profoundly distrustful of Russia, persuaded British Ministers that Turkey had really begun to tread the path of reform and progress. The Tsar's overtures were rejected, and we drifted into the Crimean War. The Ottoman Empire was given a new lease of life, and admitted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 into the comity of European nations. But the internal situation in Turkey soon drifted from bad to worse, and whilst spasmodic risings continued to take place amongst the subject races, the much-talked-of reforms resolved themselves into an orgy of foreign loans which landed the Ottoman Government in bankruptcy. By the middle of the seventies, European Turkey seethed with revolt, and two Sultans were deposed in quick succession by Palace revolutions on the approved Turkish model. A conference of the Great Powers at Constantinople in 1877 was rendered abortive mainly by the mutual distrust of England and Russia, against which Lord Salisbury, who was the British representative, vainly struggled for a time. Russia, whose expansion in Asia the Crimean War had rather stimulated than checked, once more took the law into her own hands, and the Russian armies finally reached San Stefano, close under the walls of Constantinople. Once more Great Britain intervened and saved Turkey at the imminent risk of another war with Russia. The treaty imposed by Russia on Turkey at San Stefano was revised at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, whence Lord Beaconsfield claimed to have brought back "peace with honour" as well as a defensive alliance with Turkey safeguarding her Asiatic dominions and handing over Cyprus to Great Britain as a military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.

During all those first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, when Great Britain had almost continuously befriended Turkey and twice at great cost to herself saved her, what had been the attitude of the Mohamedans of India? In 1832, one of them, Jaffur Shereef, wrote his well-known work *Kanoon-i-Islam*, or "The Customs of the Mussulmans of India, comprising a Full and Exact Account of their Various Rites and Ceremonies," which from cover to cover makes no single reference to the Turks or to the Caliphate of Constantinople. This is fairly strong evidence that they still knew nothing and cared nothing about Turkey. How indifferent they were to her fate and to British policy towards her was shown still more clearly when, little more than a year after the end of the Crimean War, waged to save Turkey, Mohamedan fanaticism joined hands with the reactionary forces of Hinduism in the great Mutiny of 1857. Not a thought had the Indian Mohamedans, who then raised the old cry "Din Din" ("Our Faith, Our Faith"), for the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph in far Stamboul, but only for the restoration of Mohamedan

rule in India itself, of which the old King of Delhi, a descendant of the Moghul Emperors, still perpetuated the tradition.

Not till more than twenty years later, when we were again on the brink of war with Russia in support of the Ottoman Empire, did anything happen to bring Turkey within the immediate range of Indian experience, and it is one of the curious ironies of history that Lord Beaconsfield, who had just made Queen Victoria Empress of India, should himself have unwittingly prepared the soil which the Caliphate agitation has recently sown with a rank crop of disloyalty, when in 1878 he despatched an Indian force for the first time into European waters in anticipation of an Anglo-Russian conflict. That spectacular demonstration was perhaps primarily meant to magnify the position of India in the Empire, but it was also meant to magnify Turkey in the eyes of India, and to arouse Indian Mohamedans in particular to a sense of brotherhood with the Mohamedan people in whose defence England was prepared to go to war for the second time with Russia. We did not, after all, go to war with her, and the Indian troops were recalled from Malta to take part in a protracted war with Afghanistan, which was to teach that other Mohamedan country, by other and very different methods, that we and not Russia were its appointed friends. Long before it was over, the pendulum of British policy swung again violently with the downfall of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration in 1880 and Mr. Gladstone's return to power. The great Liberal Minister, whilst in opposition, had passionately denounced Turkish misrule, for which the only remedy, he declared, was to turn the "unspeakable" Turk, "bag and baggage" out of Europe. In office he had to content himself with far less drastic methods of keeping, or trying to keep, the Turk under restraint. But the Disraelian policy as well as Disraeli, was dead when Lord Salisbury succeeded Mr. Gladstone in 1885 and frankly admitted that in backing Turkey we had backed the wrong horse.

Europe, on the other hand, had now to reckon with a Sultan of undeniable capacity. Physically a coward and living in perpetual dread of conspiracies such as he had himself owed the throne to, Abdul Hamid II. was an astute and masterful ruler, who, having abolished the sham Constitution by which he had tried to throw dust in the eyes of Europe before the disastrous war with Russia, proceeded first of all to restore the autocracy of the Sultanate, which had been overshadowed under his feeble predecessors by a powerful bureaucracy. During his reign the Sublime Porte became a mere appendage of the Palace. But his heart was soon set on bigger things. When he was a child a pious *fakir* greeted him once, it is said, as *Ameer el Muminin* (Prince of the Faithful), who would one day not only reign as Sultan, but also resuscitate as Caliph the

ancient power and glory of Islam. The prophecy may well have sunk deep into his superstitious mind. The Caliphate had been with most of his predecessors little more than an empty title. Abdul Hamid resolved to make it a living reality. In the revival of the semi-spiritual authority vested in the Caliph and its extension as far as possible to the world of Islam beyond as well as within his own dominions, he saw vast possibilities of compensation for the woeful loss of temporal power which the Ottoman Sultanate had suffered. That was the fundamental idea of Pan-Islamism as Abdul Hamid conceived it, and he carried it out with immense perseverance and resourcefulness.

Circumstances favoured him. True, the Ottoman Caliphate had never secured recognition from all Mohamedans. The Sherifian Sultans of Morocco regarded themselves as Caliphs within their own dominions. The Shah of Persia was a Shiah for whom the Sunni Turks were abominable heretics. The Ameer of Afghanistan styled himself King of Islam. The only religious movements which had stirred the dormant waters of Islam earlier in the nineteenth century had both been Puritan movements, and the Wahabees in Arabia, as well as the Senussis in North-Eastern Africa, had loudly denounced the corruption and licentious despotism of Constantinople. It was in the Sultan's name that Mohamed Ali, the great Pasha of Egypt, had driven the Wahabees out of Mecca, but he himself had not hesitated shortly afterwards to turn his arms against the Sultan, and his victorious armies had been stayed only by foreign intervention within ten days' march of the Bosphorus. Much more recently, the first Nationalist Movement in Egypt under Arabi had been anti-Turkish before it became anti-European. The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire had, to say the least, no love for the Turks, and even in the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, of which the Guardianship constituted one of the Sultan's chief titles to the Caliphate, Turkish authority was precarious and detested. Nevertheless, the psychological moment was not ill-chosen for Abdul Hamid's great enterprise. The world of Islam had been slowly aroused from its long torpor, not only by the intellectual and economic impact of the West, but by increasing fear of complete political absorption. It saw the independence of one Mohamedan state after the other shrink or disappear entirely. France was strengthening her hold over a large part of North Africa. Great Britain had occupied Egypt. Russia was spreading all over Central Asia. Persia was being squeezed between the Russian and the British millstone. Turkey was the one Mohamedan power left to hold up its head, even though a diminished head, against the inrush of the West. Was it not a sign of predestined salvation that a Sultan should have arisen who was prepared to give comfort and shelter to the whole Mohamedan

world in its dire distress under the broad mantle of the Ottoman Caliphate?

How broad that mantle was Abdul Hamid was at pains to show by collecting Mohamedans from all parts of the world around him at Yildiz Kiosk (the Palace of the Star). His confidential advisers and secretaries and spies were mostly Arabs and Kurds and Albanians, Mohamedans all, whether holy men or rascally adventurers, whom he found more receptive to the new gospel of Pan-Islamism under the ægis of the Ottoman Caliphate than his own Turks with their dull and narrow pride of race. Even the Prætorian Guard that garrisoned Constantinople and kept watch over his sacred person was chiefly drawn from the non-Turkish Mohamedan races of his Empire. He once appointed a Tunisian to be Grand Vizier, and after that warning to the Stamboul Pashas they were quick to understand that if they wanted ministerial loaves and fishes they could only get them as the humble instruments of their master's will, which, after he had once made a terrible example of Midhat Pasha, held every provincial governor equally in its grip. Under such a régime there could be no question of internal reforms such as the Berlin Treaty had prescribed, and least of all for the benefit of the Christian subject races. As far as European Turkey was concerned, he could exploit not only the jealousies of the Great Powers, but the bitter feuds of the rival nationalities, Greek, Bulgar, and Serb, who cut each other's throats in Macedonia as cheerfully as any Turk's. But when the Armenians in Asiatic Turkey invoked the Berlin Treaty against intensive Turkish misrule, he proceeded to adopt a yet more drastic policy—the sinister policy of systematic massacre, which his successors were to carry to still more ruthless lengths, and are still carrying on at the present moment—and he knew he could adopt it without much risk of chastisement. Germany had stepped into our shoes at Constantinople after the days of Lord Beaconsfield as the special friend and protector of the Ottoman Empire, and under William II. Germany had no scruples. The ex-Kaiser had made up his mind at the beginning of his reign that Turkey was a necessary "bridgehead" towards German world-dominion, and having practically no Mohamedan subjects of his own in the Greater Germany which he was building up beyond the seas, he could afford to look upon Pan-Islamism with complete equanimity, and even with favour, as a potential menace to those of Germany's rivals who had large numbers of Mohamedan subjects, and most of all, therefore, to Great Britain. So he sent out German officers to reorganize the Turkish armies, and German engineers to build the Hejaz Railway, which was to make the Turkish overland line of communication with the Holy Places safe against British sea-power, and served also as a splendid advertisement for the Caliph, whose agents collected subscriptions for its con-

struction from Mohamedans in all parts of the world. Whenever, too, the unseemly question of Turkish reforms was raised, German diplomacy could always be relied upon to throw the so-called "European Concert" at Constantinople hopelessly out of tune. To so understanding a friend Abdul Hamid could refuse nothing, and in return for the Baghdad Railway Concession the Kaiser not only paid a second state visit to Constantinople in 1898 and clasped the "Red Sultan's" hand, still dripping with Armenian blood, but proceeded from Jerusalem, where he masqueraded for a few days as a Crusader, to Damascus, and at Saladin's tomb paid homage to his friend and ally, the Sultan Abdul Hamid, whom 300,000,000 Mohamedans revered as their sacred Caliph. This public recognition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the only recognition bestowed upon it by any European power before the Great War, was the high-water mark of Hamidian Pan-Islamism.

It was just then that its influence made itself, for the first time, felt on our Indian borderland. India, with its 60 million Mohamedans, had not escaped Abdul Hamid's attention as a suitable field for Pan-Islamic propaganda, and as far back as 1884 a newspaper called the *Pek-i-Islam*, edited by a Punjabee Mohamedan dismissed from the Indian public service, was issued from the Sultan's printing press at Yildiz for secret circulation in India. But Abdul Hamid's emissaries made no substantial headway until in 1897 the folly of the Greeks gave him an opportunity of punishing a Christian nation single-handed, for the first time in the last two centuries of Turkish history, and the victories of his armies in Thessaly reverberated along the whispering galleries of the East to the greater glory of the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph. Then it was that Abdul Hamid's name came to be invoked in the Friday service in an increasing number of Upper India mosques, and fanatical *mollahs*, extolling the renewed splendour of the Caliphate, helped to stir up the North-West Frontier tribes to the great rising which cost us the protracted Tirah campaign. Still, though Indian Mohamedans began to take a pride in Abdul Hamid as a great potentate in the Mohamedan world, their loyalty to the British *Raj* remained unmoved. They had hitherto held aloof from the political movements which were already agitating the Western educated classes of the Hindu population—for one reason, because they had been much slower than the Hindus to avail themselves of the opportunities of Western education which British rule had opened up to Indians of all races and creeds. One of the few Indian Mohamedans of light and leading to recognize its value for his co-religionists, if they were not to lag hopelessly behind the Hindus, Seyyid Ahmed Khan, had founded with great difficulty and in the teeth of bitter orthodox opposition a remarkable Mohamedan college at Aligarh, in which he sought to reconcile the

doctrines of Islam with Western knowledge, and to train up young Mohamedans to be true to their faith and at the same time useful citizens, loyal to the British *Raj*. He died in 1899, when Indian Nationalism was still in its infancy, and some Indians were beginning to respond, however faintly, to Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda. One of the last things he did was to publish a reasoned refutation of the Ottoman Sultan's claim to the Caliphate, which, like many other Mohamedans, he denied on grounds of purely Islamic doctrine. His influence had been constantly exerted to dissuade his co-religionists from joining the Indian National Congress, in which he suspected a scheme to establish the political ascendancy of the Hindu majority over the Mohamedan minority, under the guise of representative institutions and self-government. His views prevailed for some years after his death, and even at the time of Lord Morley's Indian reforms in 1909 the All India Moslem League, founded as a counterblast to the Indian National Congress, pleaded hard and not unsuccessfully for special safeguards for the Mohamedan community against Hindu supremacy in the enlarged Councils as the well-earned reward of its unwavering loyalty to the *Raj*.

The Turkish revolution of 1908 had, however, by that time swept Abdul Hamid from the throne and driven Pan-Islamism temporarily into the background. Even in Turkey there had grown up a small school of intellectuals whom Abdul Hamid vainly persecuted and drove into exile, and the concessions in Macedonia which, in spite of German support, were ultimately wrung from him under pressure from Russia and Austria, and most of all from Great Britain, estranged from him the army, which he had always distrusted, and especially the purely Turkish elements in the army. From the beginning it was an essentially military revolution, though the Union of Committee and Progress which ruled in the name of Sultan Murad V., whom thirty years' detention as a State prisoner during Abdul Hamid's reign had reduced almost to imbecility, at first deluded Europe and the subject races of Turkey themselves into the belief that a new era of liberty and fraternity had dawned in the Ottoman Empire. Disillusionment quickly followed when the Nationalism of Union and Progress hardened into a policy of intensive "Ottomanization," which was only a euphemism for tightening the grip of the ruling Turk on all the non-Turkish races of the Empire, Mohamedan as well as Christian. For it did not spare the Albanian and Syrian Mohamedans, and against the Armenians it soon resorted to the old Hamidian methods of massacre, pure and simple.

Upon Indian Mohamedans the Turkish revolution had a twofold effect. The deposition of Abdul Hamid alarmed the more conservative elements. But a new school of advanced Mohamedans had grown up who, though many of them came from Seyyid Ahmed's

old college at Aligarh, had entirely forgotten his teaching, and were drifting towards the extreme wing of Hindu Nationalism, already in thinly disguised revolt against the British *Raj*. These Young Indian Mohamedans recognized kindred spirits in the Young Turks, and soon sought and found contact with them. Their opportunity came when the Italian conquest of Tripoli, the one province left to the Ottoman Empire in Africa, was followed by the Balkan wars, which ended in the partition of almost the whole of European Turkey. More rapid communications, more frequent intercourse, and above all the luxuriant growth of the vernacular press, had brought India much closer to everything that happened in Europe, and Turkey now occupied in the minds of many Mohamedans a place undreamt of even ten years before. The resounding blows dealt to her in such quick succession would not perhaps even then have produced such a deep impression had not Indian Mohamedan sentiment been just at the same period deeply wounded by an event much nearer home. Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal in 1905 had been welcomed by the Mohamedans because it created a new province of Eastern Bengal in which their political ascendancy seemed to be definitely assured. But the partition had been undone at the King-Emperor's Durbar of 1911, and the transfer of the capital to Delhi had not made up to the Mohamedans for the disestablishment of the recently created province.

It was easy for anti-British agitators to represent this as another blow dealt to Islam in India itself by the same British power that oppressed Mohamedan Egypt, was selling Mohamedan Persia to the Muscovite, and had instigated the Balkan conspiracy against the very life of Mohamedan Turkey.

The leaders of this group, amongst whom a young Mohamedan, Mohamed Ali, who had studied at Oxford and returned, like many other Indians, embittered by failure, soon came to play a very prominent part, started collecting funds from their co-religionists for the Turkish sick and wounded, and proceeded to Constantinople with ambulance parties which Government freely allowed them to raise. There they were, of course, warmly welcomed by the Young Turk, and returned to India well primed by the Envers and Talaats and their German allies. But in spite of a pro-Turkish propaganda of which the anti-British tendency was only thinly veiled during the first weeks of the Great War under lamentations over the folly of England in challenging the irresistible might of Germany, the enthusiasm with which the vast majority of Mohamedans, like the rest of their fellow-countrymen of all creeds and races and classes, responded to the call of the Empire in August, 1914, was not chilled even when Turkey threw herself into the war as the willing ally of Germany. During the four years' war Indian Mohamedan troops

fought shoulder to shoulder with the British, and not less resolutely against the Turks in Mesopotamia and in Palestine than against the Germans on the Western front where the Indian army filled, in the critical winter of 1914-1915, a gap which the Kitchener armies and the Colonial armies were not yet equipped and trained to fill. In India itself, where Germany had reckoned upon wholesale mutinies and risings, there were only a few local disturbances, promptly and firmly quelled, and in the most serious ones, in the Punjab, it was returned Sikhs from Canada and not Mohamedans who played the leading part. Mohamed Ali and his brother Shaukat were interned, as they refused to give any assurances that they would desist from aiding and abetting the King's enemies. Others who were less openly disaffected were left free to join hands with the Hindu extremists, and it was during the war that the All India Moslem League, which had now passed under their control, combined for the first time with the Hindu extremists of the Indian National Congress in a vehement agitation for full and immediate Home Rule. But most of them professed to be at one with Government in the vigorous prosecution of the war, and they never stopped for a moment the steady flow of Indian recruitment, least of all amongst the Mohamedan fighting races.

Not till after the war was over and Turkey had to pay the penalty of defeat in common with her European allies were there any signs of a revulsion of feeling—somewhat hesitating and shamefaced at first. Turkish war-guilt was too recent and flagrant. The Indian war prisoners from Kut had suffered like the British war prisoners at the hands of their Turkish captors. Enlightened Mohamedans felt that the appalling massacres of Armenians and the ruthless persecutions of other Christian races, and even of Mohamedan as well as Christian Arabs suspected of sympathy with the Arab revolt against Turkey, had blackened the face of Islam. They knew quite well that Turkey had been waging no Holy War, and had not been the sword of Islam, but of Germany.

The one incident in the war which had perturbed the Indian Mohamedans had been the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca against the Sultan. Some of them professed to regard it as a menace to the religious interests of Islam. Very astutely, therefore, the agitation in favour of Turkey was at once placed on a religious rather than a political basis. It was the Sultan's independence as Caliph that had to be saved, for the sake not so much of Turkey as of the whole world of Islam, and how, it was argued, could it be saved if he was not to recover his dominions, since any curtailment of the Sultan's temporal power would impair the spiritual authority vested in the office of Caliph? These champions of the Caliphate were not all men of undoubted Mohamedan orthodoxy or of unblemished character,

and many of them detested the British *Raj* even more than they loved Turkey. But they knew what they were about when they labelled the movement they were engineering the Caliphate movement.

The Allies' long delay in imposing definite peace terms, the renewal of Turkish resistance, the interposition of the Greeks, the stories of the excesses which some of their troops committed, played into the hands of the Mohamedan extremists, whilst the cosmic wave of post-war unrest was beginning to sweep over India too, until the Punjab outbreak, with its terrible tale of anti-European outrages and the tragic episode of Amritsar, provoked amongst Mohamedans and Hindus alike an unprecedented outburst of racial feeling. Religion, still a vital force in the East, is easily harnessed to racial hatred. It was to the religious traditions of primitive Hinduism that Gandhi, with his mystic fervour and saintly asceticism, appealed when he started his strange gospel of *Swaraj* which was to restore India to the simple life of the Vedic scriptures, and it was because he allowed himself to be convinced that in the Caliphate movement the Mohamedans of India were giving a splendid demonstration of their religious faith that he threw over it the Hindu mantle of Non-Co-operation against a Satanic Government and the whole Satanic civilization of the West. The Hindu-Moslem fraternization which he preached, and for a time with some measure of success, assumed no more singular shape than his own close personal association with Mohamed and Shaukat Ali, who, unaccountably released from prison, had become the recognized leaders of the Caliphate movement. I have seen Gandhi and Shaukat Ali together, and in the course of a long conversation with them nothing impressed me more forcibly than the contrast between the frail and gentle Hindu, clad in simple home-spun, consumed, his worshippers said, with spiritual fire, and the great hulking Mohamedan in his ample robes, embroidered with the Turkish crescent, who seemed to sweat "the flesh and the devil" at every pore.

One can understand up to a certain point the sympathy of India's Mohamedans for their Turkish co-religionists, about whom they knew very little except that they were their brothers in the faith, and their concern for the Ottoman Sultan, whom they had at last come to regard as the legitimate head of Islam. They were quite entitled to fasten on to the pledges given by the British Prime Minister in Parliament with regard to the Turkish homelands, and to press for their fulfilment without regard to any earlier pledges of freedom and protection given by the Allies during the war to the subject races of the Ottoman Empire. The Government of India itself would have been quite justified in seeking to impress upon the Imperial Government the danger of estranging Mohamedan religious sentiment, if the

movement had been guided and restrained by responsible and reputable Mohamedans. But it assumed a very different complexion under the leadership of such men as the Ali brothers. What manner of men they were, Sir William Vincent, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, has himself admitted, rather late in the day. "When I think," said Sir William Vincent only a few weeks ago, in the Delhi Legislative Assembly, "of the treasonable practices of those two men during the Great War; when I think of the secret support and encouragement given by them to the King's enemies, and when hundreds of thousands of British and Indian soldiers were daily risking and sacrificing their lives; when I think of the poor *Muhajirin* (Mohamedans whom the Ali brothers persuaded to emigrate in thousands out of an infidel-ruled India into a Mohamedan Afghanistan) whose bones lie about the Khyber and on the road to Kabul because they listened to these two men, who themselves never did a *Hijrat* (or holy pilgrimage) farther than Paris and London; when I think of the money extorted from the poor Mohamedans of this country and squandered in Europe and elsewhere, of which no recorded accounts have been published to this day; when I think, lastly, of the unfortunate Hindus dishonoured and killed in Malabar, and the Moplahs themselves, innocent in a way because misled, driven to death and ruin at the instigation of Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, and those who think with them, I marvel at the gross ignorance and folly of the Moslem population that recognized such men as leaders."

But may not one marvel equally at the supineness, to say the least, of a Government which so long tolerated the Ali brothers as the recognized spokesmen of Mohamedan India? They were interned during the war for notorious disloyalty, arrested again for treasonable correspondence with the enemy during the short Afghan war, and released once more without any guarantee that they would mend their ways. Yet Mohamed Ali was not only received by the Viceroy, then Lord Chelmsford, as the head of an All India Caliphate deputation, but was allowed to proceed in the same capacity to England, and plead the cause of Turkey before British Ministers in Downing Street. He got, it is true, a crushing reply from Mr. Lloyd George, but he returned to India with undiminished prestige to resume with his brother a lawless propaganda which constantly led to rioting and bloodshed; and when threatened with prosecution in the United Provinces, these two firebrands secured a further lease of impunity by inducing the present Viceroy, Lord Reading, then new to India, to accept, at Gandhi's instance, futile and obviously fallacious assurances as to the honesty of their intentions, until the formidable outbreak of Mohamedan fanaticism amongst the Moplahs of the Malabar coast and their own attempts to tamper with the

loyalty of Mohamedan troops at last brought their criminal activities to a term. Even then—such are the mysteries of the penal code—they escaped with a much lighter sentence, two years' imprisonment, than did Gandhi some months later, who was at least an honest fanatic, and, however paradoxically, always professed to abhor violence.

From whatever point of view one looks at the Caliphate movement, it is hard to understand the countenance lent to it by the Government of India, or for that matter by Mr. Montagu, as Secretary of State, to his own ultimate undoing, or to hold them free from blame for having helped to aggravate by their handling of it from the very beginning the difficulties with which they were confronted in the initial stage of the great constitutional changes in India, as well as the complicated problems of international policy with which the long-deferred Turkish settlement has confronted the Imperial Government. Gandhi's imprisonment has scotched the Swaraj or Hindu wing of Non-Co-operation. The imprisonment of the Ali brothers has hardly affected the Caliphate or Mohamedan wing, which has seen a substantial part of its programme publicly endorsed by the Government of India. The proposals made at the Paris Conference for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres have failed so far to arrest the Caliphate agitation. The Paris Conference, you know, proposed an armistice in Asia Minor as a preliminary to the withdrawal of Greece from the whole of Asia Minor and the retrocession to Turkey of a portion of Thrace sufficient to lend some strategical security to the Sultan's position in Constantinople, but it left untouched the actual *status quo* in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It is not, the Indian Caliphate organs declare, by any such proposals, which are merely a fresh insult to Islam, that the real independence of Turkey will be secured, but rather by the Turco-Soviet Treaties between the free peoples of Turkey and Russia who will stand and fall together; and Mohamedans will never be appeased until all trace of Western authority, civil and military, has disappeared from the Arab lands which were the cradle of Islam, to make room once more for the supreme overlordship of the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan. According to a telegram in yesterday's papers, the All India Caliphate Committee has once more declared in favour of "civil disobedience."

The Indian Mohamedans go, in fact, further in their demands for the restoration of the Sultan's authority in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire than the Kemalists at Angora. The latter base their resistance mainly on Nationalist grounds, and Pan-Islamism is merely a second string to their bow, just as it was for the men who ruled Turkey during the war, when Pan-Turanianism came to the front with its wild dream of an immense Ottoman Empire

that was to embrace all Asiatic peoples and countries with which the Turks could claim, in the past or in the present, the slightest racial or historical connection, including India on the strength of a common Turanian ancestry with the Moghuls and other Mohamedan conquerors who had once ruled over India. The Turkish Nationalists welcome, of course, the support of their Mohamedan co-religionists wherever it is forthcoming. But even when they themselves revert, as the rulers of Constantinople reverted during the war on a grand scale, to the Hamidian policy of massacre in order to exterminate Christian minorities, they are careful to explain that these have got to be eliminated, not on religious grounds, but because their existence threatens the safety of the ruling Turkish race.

Can the alliance between Turkish Nationalism and the Indian Mohamedans who have sought to identify the cause of Islam with it endure? The Caliphate movement is no doubt largely controlled by the same revolutionary and destructive forces which the extremist wing of Indian Nationalism represents amongst the Hindus. But for the bulk of Indian Mohamedans, conservative and law-abiding, who have been carried away by it, it doubtless stands for a great religious cause. It may be regarded as a form of religious revivalism. It may also be inspired, as some Hindus are beginning to realize, by a distant hope of restoring Mohamedan domination some day in India, when it shall have joined hands across Asia with a Pan-Turanian Turkey. But it lacks the essential characteristics of a Nationalist movement. It does not derive in any way from the sense of common nationhood which the Nationalists in Egypt or in Arabia claim to have imbibed from the West, and which is already beginning to stir more faintly the Arabs of Tunis and Algeria and Morocco. Wherever the people are Mohamedans, religious antagonism stimulates their impatience of alien political domination; but the one peculiar link that seems to connect Turkish Nationalism with Indian Mohamedanism, besides the temporary conjunction of a spirit of revolt against the British *Raj* amongst Indian Mohamedan extremists and Kemalist bitterness against England as the only one of the Allies who cannot apparently be bought off with economic concessions, is a certain affinity of temperament due to the common Central Asian origin of the ruling race in Turkey and of the conquerors who brought Islam into India.

I have already trespassed too long on your indulgence, and I have hardly or not at all touched upon many other noteworthy movements in the Mohamedan world. No one has, I think, made of them a more careful and exhaustive study than that which a distinguished American writer, Mr. Lothrop Stoddard, has recently published under the title of "The New World of Islam." The conclusion at which he arrives is that, take them all in all, these movements are

destined to regenerate Islam and to endow it with a vitality with which the West will have very seriously to reckon when it once more puts forth its united strength as a "new world of Islam." With all due deference to so competent an authority, I venture to think that neither history nor the conflicting character of many of these movements supports such a conclusion. I do not underrate the potency of the underlying sense of religious brotherhood amongst Mohamedans of different races and sects and schools of thought, nor the old militant spirit, seldom more than dormant beneath a surface of passive fatalism. But the brotherhood of Islam has never been translated into united action since the followers of the Prophet founded kingdoms and empires altogether transcending the modest limits of the primitive tribal state from which they emerged. Even when Islâm still bore the impress of its Arab origin, successive Caliphates rose and fell in strife and confusion. The Ottoman Empire was largely built up on their ruins, and surcharged Islam with the Central Asian stamp under which we have chiefly known it for the last six or seven hundred years. The outward observances of Islam have never effaced the difference between the Semitic mind, with its rich intellectual endowment and its potential capacity for progress, so brilliantly illustrated during the great period of Saracenic civilization, and the Turanian or Turkish mind, with its stolid obduracy to all the cultural influences which make up a vital civilization, and its inveterate tendency to relapse into Central Asian savagery.

One cannot view without some apprehension the muster of retrograde forces under cover of Turkish Nationalism at Angora and of the Caliphate movement in India, but it is essential to discriminate between them and the more progressive forces which over a much wider area, extending from Northern Africa to the Asiatic shores of the Pacific, are working, one must hope, towards a synthesis which shall bring East and West together in the interests of racial and religious peace, despite the profound differences that still divide them.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have listened with rapt attention to the brilliant historical sketch of Sir Valentine Chirol, who with his great knowledge and great ability has described the rise of Turkey to the hegemony of Islam, and also the later development of Pan-Islamism and its connection with Islam in India. I think most of you generally agree with the fidelity of his historical retrospect. If I may say so, there is just one point in which I think he has not done justice to the work of Islam in India. Islam came in undoubtedly as the religion of the conquerors, attracted by the wealth of India. But the Moghul

Emperors—at least, at the time of Akbar and his successors—did a great deal in India to establish the foundations of a regular administration, the foundations which we ourselves built upon and maintained. Also, the progress of Islam in India did a wonderful work for the lower and depressed classes in India by helping to raise their status. The fact that Islam in theory looks upon all Mohamedans as equal before God had a powerful effect as a solvent to the exclusiveness and rigidity of the Hindu caste system in India; and in these two ways, socially and administratively, Islam under the Moghul Emperors did a great work in India—a work which we carried on. I will say a few words about the development of the Pan-Islamic movement. It is curious to observe how the growth of the Pan-Islamic movement was fostered in her own interest by Germany as a means of causing embarrassment in the future to the British Empire; and it is curious to see history repeating itself, because at the present time Pan-Islamism, in so far as it is associated with the Angora Turks, is, if not encouraged, at least not discouraged by some of our recent Allies for perhaps exactly similar reasons—*i.e.*, as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon Great Britain and making her accept peace terms which would fall in more with the views of those Allies. As regards the Pan-Islamic movement in India, I agree with Sir Valentine Chirol's description of its origin by that astute diplomatist and politician, Abdul Hamid. He encouraged and developed it to prop up a shaking throne, and he found people ready to his hand in India to carry on this propaganda. But the movement in India—and I have seen it from the beginning—is really a fictitious one, which has spread, especially in recent years, because we did not adopt a firm or reasonable policy in dealing with it. We allowed free play to open rebels like the Ali brothers, and men like Dr. Kichlu, who returned from Germany to India in 1915, probably to act as a link between Germany and the Pan-Islamic movement—we allowed free play to these people to propagate their views and preach rebellion. In the circumstances it is surprising that among a credulous and ignorant people a movement which was represented as a religious movement, did not attain even greater success. To show how fictitious the movement was, I will quote the words of one of the leaders of the Pan-Islamic movement in India, Mr. Fazl Ul Hak, a member of the Bengal Legislative Council. Speaking at Dacca in December, 1920, of some of his brother-leaders, he said: "There are some of the leaders of this Caliphate movement who frankly confess to me that they do not care a brass farthing for the Caliphate, but that their whole object is to bring back the days of anarchist outrages and thereby pave the way for revolution in India." That momentous admission was made about eight months before the outbreak of the Moplah rebellion, and in a way it is prophetic. It

shows the object of these people is not to benefit Islam, still less to benefit Turkey; but to subvert British government in India. But the traditional loyalty of the average Mohamedan in India and his knowledge of the benefits of British rule enabled him to withstand the insidious propaganda which for years had been preached; and a wonderful example of Mohamedan staunchness and loyalty is the fact that during the war the Mohamedans, though only one-fifth of the population of India, supplied one-third of the combatant recruits who went to fight their battles against their Mohamedan foes. Another very significant fact is this. The Mohamedans of the Punjab contain some of the best fighting races; they form only one-sixth of the total Mohamedan population of India, about 11 millions; but they supplied 180,000 combatant recruits—that is, three-fourths of the total Mohamedan recruits raised in India. No people hold their religion more sacred, or are more careful in its observance. Hundreds to whom I spoke on their return from Mesopotamia and Palestine expressed their disgust for the Turks because of their laxness in religious matters. They rallied to our call, though we told them they would have to fight against the Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and they were proof against the attempts made on their loyalty. Later on, the Gandhi movement developed; and Gandhi for his own purposes associated himself with the Caliphate propaganda, and thereby gave it a very powerful impulse; but these same Mohamedans remained true to their salt. I think it is very important in dealing with movements of this kind to remember the old line of poetry, "The shallows murmur, but the deeps are dumb." We hear a lot of the Ali brothers and other fanatical and seditious "leaders," and see the whole Mohamedan press stirred up on behalf of Turkey; but really, below the surface, we find the masses very largely untouched by this propaganda, and still retaining their old feeling of loyalty and respect to the Government which has respected and protected their religion. If we handle them in the proper way and save them from these covert and overt attempts to sap their loyalty and subvert British rule in India, there need be no doubt as to their attitude to us. One remark I would like to make about the alliance between Gandhi and the Caliphate leaders, because that alliance has enormously increased our difficulties. Gandhi has given his benediction to the Caliphate movement, and the Caliphate movement has supplied the element of physical force which supplements the "soul force" on which Gandhi professes to rely. Sir Valentine Chirol has the advantage of having seen Mr. Gandhi—an advantage which Mr. Gandhi offered to me, but which I declined. I told him in April, 1919, when he wished to enter the Punjab, that if he did not go back to Bombay he would be arrested. He went back to Bombay, and for

three years remained unmolested, doing all the mischief he could. Sir Valentine Chirol thinks he is an honest fanatic. Many people think so; but, after many inquiries from people in very close touch with him, both British and Indian, I believe him to be a most astute hypocrite. My last authority is an old friend, a very advanced Irish Nationalist. I met him in India two years ago; he had come to India for a particular object, and to carry out that object he had to get into close touch with Gandhi and the extremists. He came to see me, and I said: "Tell me your honest opinion of Gandhi." "Well," he said, "I came to India with the highest idea of Gandhi, looking on him as a man of the loftiest ideals seeking to secure the regeneration of his country. I have been in close contact with him for a fortnight; I have seen him with the mask on—and it is generally on—but I have seen him also with the mask off. Now, if you would like to have my final view, that man is the most consummate hypocrite that has ever deluded a credulous people or fooled a cowardly Government." (Applause.) Personally, I prefer to this canting hypocrisy the open hostility of the Ali brothers, which is a thing you can deal with. You can meet it by the law, or, if necessary, by resort to force; and I prefer that to the covert treachery of a man like Gandhi, who has peace on his lips, but who has been responsible for the loss of thousands of lives. I think the audience showed its entire accord with the remarks of Sir Valentine as to the manner in which this very dangerous movement had been allowed to develop and to cause bloodshed and so much injury and loss of life and property in India. Nothing could be a more complete exposure of the methods of the Ali brothers, of the Caliphate people, than the speech of Sir William Vincent from which Sir Valentine quoted. I have never heard a more eloquent description of their misdeeds; but, like Sir Valentine, I marvel that these misdeeds have been so long allowed to go on unchecked. Probably those who have been in India more recently than I can tell us there is another side to the case, and that there was some reason for allowing rebellion to be preached openly and leading thousands of people to ruin and death.

We ought to try and derive from the very instructive lecture we have heard this evening some lesson for the future. There is no doubt we have got on the wrong side of a large part of the Mohamedan world—not so much the masses, but the political and vocal Mohamedans. We have to put ourselves right. I think we have pursued a wrong policy in the past. We have made in times of crisis promises such as we ought never to have made, and have held out hopes which we are now quite unable to fulfil. Now a large portion of the Mohamedans are thoroughly suspicious of us, and even the further concessions given to Turkey at

the various recent conferences do not seem to allay their suspicions, because there is a section of those Mohamedans which does not want a settlement, but is intent on bringing about rebellion and revolution. But the point I want to bring out is the view of the average Indian and loyal Mohamedan. At the end of the war, when the Paris Conference began, I was asked to ascertain the voice of the reasonable Mohamedans. I had kept in close touch with them during the war, looked to them to maintain peace and order and furnish recruits, and had my best friends among them. When I was asked to report on their attitude as regards the peace terms to Turkey, I wrote: "The view of reasonable Mohamedans is this: the Central Powers have brought ruin on themselves and their peoples by an unjust war. Germany and Austria have been broken up, their dynasties are gone, their armies and navies are shattered. Bulgaria will be shorn for the benefit of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania. Turkey, who threw in her lot with our defeated enemies, must be prepared for a similar fate. Indian Mohamedans, while having a sentimental sympathy with the fallen Mohamedan Empire, yet feel that she has brought this on herself, but that the shadow at least of the Turkish Empire should be retained to save the face of Islam. Indian Mohamedans are prepared for a British Protectorate in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and for autonomy in Europe, Palestine, and Armenia. What they want to retain is Turkish sovereignty for Constantinople—at least nominally—as the seat of the Turkish Empire, and over the Turkish provinces and Asia Minor. They would even accept conditions and limitations being imposed on that sovereignty in the interests of good government. But to eject the Turks from Constantinople and the small surrounding areas in Europe would arouse resentment and might lead to fanatical and anti-Christian feeling."

I think that is a fairly accurate summary of the views expressed to me by the Punjabi Mohamedans three years ago; it is practically what now, after three years' delay, has been proposed in the recent conferences. Had these terms been proposed when the question was first raised three years ago, they would have been accepted by all Mohamedans; but now suspicions have been aroused, charges of bad faith have been brought forward, and we have to try and re-establish confidence. That can only be done by openly stating that those terms are what we consider best in the interests of the Allies and of Turkey after we have taken into consideration all the services of Indian Mohamedans during the war. In making these concessions, we should state that they represent concessions to the feelings of reasonable Mohamedans, especially those who helped us in the war, and who have the best right to be heard; but that we are not going to allow the Mohamedans of India or anyone else to dictate to us what the terms of settlement shall be. (Applause.)

Sir GRAHAM BOWER: My Lord,—I have the misfortune to differ from Sir Valentine Chirol in his opinions of both Islam and the Turks, but I readily associate myself with the feeling of gratitude which I am sure animates you all towards him for his eloquent, cultured, and able exposition of the case against Islam and the Turks. To me personally his address gives great gratification because I feel now that I know the case against the Turks, which has been stated with a culture, a knowledge, and an eloquence that cannot be surpassed. It is impossible for me in the few words that I can address to you to rival that eloquence or to compete with him by presenting an equally able, intelligible, and cultured exposition of the case for Islam and the Turks. But I may at once say that I differ from him both in the aims and in the history that he sets forth. First, then, as to aims. He regretted that the Sèvres Treaty was the one treaty which had not enforced the penalties of the war. Here we come to the root of the matter. I hold that the aim of a war is not to enforce penalties, but to secure peace; and I have behind me every authority on war from St. Augustine to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Foch, who all declared the aim of war to be to secure peace, and if this is not the aim, war is not worth fighting. We were told during the war, "Never again"; we were fighting to secure peace. That was our aim during the war, and it should be our aim now. The test to be applied to every treaty made at Paris or elsewhere is, Does it or does it not secure peace? The next point I make is that the Turks have been indicted as conquerors in the past. True; but is there any other nation such an indictment could not be framed against? Have not the English done something in the way of conquest in their past history? Can you point to a single nation in Europe that has not at some time or other in its past history been a conqueror? What about England? What about France? What about Spain? What about Portugal? What about Germany? What about any country —Russia or any other? Have not all nations at one time or other been conquerors? If conquest is a crime, I am afraid England must stand in the dock. But there is another charge made against them; Islam and the Turks are accused of arrogance and intolerance. I deny that; I deny their arrogance and their intolerance. There is a book—I am at some little difficulty in addressing you, for although I am addressing the Central Asian Society, I am not sure that you know your Koran as you do your Bibles, and so you must pardon me if I make some reference to the Koran and quote chapter and verse. I will not assume that you know the Koran by heart. Now, the first point is the attitude of Islam towards Christianity, and on that point Mahomet himself is very clear. First as to the position as to Christ Himself; this is taken from the chapter entitled "The Table" from Sale's translation of the Koran: "And in the footsteps of the Prophet caused we Jesus the son of Mary to follow, confirming the law which

was before him: and we gave him the evangel with its guidance and light, confirmatory of the preceding law, a guidance and warning to those who fear God." Next we find in the chapter called "The Cow": "Verily those who believe, Moslems and they who follow the Jewish religion and the Christians and the Sabeites" (the Sabeit religion, I am told, was something like the Persian religion; they were something like the Parsees of to-day: they worshipped the stars and other heavenly bodies)—"whoever of these believe in God in the last day and doeth that which is right, shall have their reward with their Lord. Fear shall not come upon them, neither shall they be grieved." I do not know any other religion in the world which has such a tolerant attitude towards other and rival religions. And this is not merely an extract from a sacred book; you must remember that this book, the Koran, is not merely the sacred book of Moslems—it is the law, and Moslems observe the law—observe the law better and more faithfully than many Christians. Now, Mahomet may be said in his later years to have departed from this attitude towards Christianity. Well, at Medina, after the flight from Mecca to Medina, he found a Mohamedan thrashing a Jew; he stopped him, and he said: "Whoever ill-treats a Jew or a Christian will find me his accuser at the Day of Judgment"; and the sayings of Mahomet are almost as sacred as the word of the Koran. Now let us go a step farther. Mahomet died on the 8th of June, 632; Constantinople was taken on the 29th of May, 1453. Mohamed II., in taking Constantinople, recognized the Greek Patriarch as ruler of his own people in all matters relating to marriage, inheritance, and divorce. He practically set up an *imperium in imperio;* he gave the Greeks full freedom of religion, and he did the same with others, and the Turks have done the same to every ecclesiastical authority—to the Bulgarian Exarch, to the Armenian Catholicos—to everybody, in fact, at the head of a religion in Turkey. Philip Marshall, Professor of the University at Princeton, says the Patriarchs became even, in this sense, political authorities acting in place of the Ottoman authority, and to this extent may be considered as chiefs of their respective nations. The Turk granted an autonomy to each of the races of the people. Now, it is said that these nations have been oppressed. Who have been the prosperous people in Turkey? Who have made fortunes in Turkey? The Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, the Christians; the Turk has not made much of a fortune. It is true that he fails alike as a merchant, as a financier, and as a politician; and anybody acquainted with Eastern finance would not be disposed to blame the Turk very much if he fails to compete in Eastern finance or Eastern politics with the various practitioners of those pursuits. He is a soldier and an agriculturist. As a soldier he is a clean fighter; as an agriculturist he is an industrious and honest man. But it has been said that there is this feeling; what does it come to? He was

a conqueror long ago; he is no longer a conqueror. The Turkish question may be summed up in two lines:

> " Cet animal est très mechant
> Quand on l'attaque il se defend."

For years past the Turk has been on his defence—on his defence against Russia, against Austria, against Germany, against all the Powers trying to stir up trouble in the Balkans, in European Turkey and Asia Minor; and they are at it now. We know something of the difficulties made by foreign agitation in a neighbouring country. I fancy Sir Michael O'Dwyer is a full-blooded Irishman—I cannot claim that honour, I am only half Irish, but I was born in Ireland, and in my native country I know something of what foreign agitators can do. I know something of what American money can do in Ireland; and if you have not one but five nations stirring up agitation in your country, how are you going to carry on the Government? Then, by way of settling it, we have let loose the Greeks! Now, I may say this—I have been two years in Greece, and I say that if there is one race that is detested above all others by the Turks it is the Greeks. The Greeks are hated by the Bulgarians; they are hated even by the Serbians who are their allies now. It is as if you set an Orangeman to govern the South of Ireland; Sir Michael O'Dwyer can tell us what the result would be! If you gave the Orangemen leave to conquer Ireland, what would happen? What has happened in Turkey? I have got here—I will not trouble to read it, but I have got here the report of the Carnegie Commission on the Balkan wars. An impartial inquiry was held by an International Commission as to the conduct of the various races in the Balkan wars. There are extracts from the report of that inquiry which I dare not read to a mixed audience—I dare not. But the horrors were such that they left bitter memories behind them, and when the Greeks landed at Smyrna the Turks knew what to expect. What did they get? The report of the Inter-Allied Commission at Smyrna has been suppressed; the report of Commission after Commission has been suppressed. News has come to England which has not been published, but we get sometimes a little news from other sources. This is the report of the Red Cross Commissioner in the Peninsula of Ismid; it is not a Moslem document. The Red Cross is not a Mohamedan society, it is a Christian society; and what does this Christian Red Cross commissioner say? He writes, in French: "La mission est arrivé à la conclusion que des éléments de l'armée grecque d'occupation pour suivaient depuis deux mois l'extermination de la presqu'ile. Les constatations faites—incendies de villages massacres, terreur des habitants coincidences de lieux et de dates—ne laissent place à aucun doute à cet égard. Les atrocités que nous avons vu ou dont nous avons vu les traces étaient le fait de bandes irrégulières

de civils armés (tcheti) et d'unités encadrées de l'armée régulière. Nous n'avons pas eu connaissance de cas où ces méfaits aient été empêches ou punis par le commandement militaire. Les bandes au lieu d'être désarmées et dissipées étaint secondées dans leur action et collaboraient la main dans la main avec les unités régulières encadrées."

We have it on the authority of Mr. Toynbee that a large number of villages have been destroyed in Asia Minor. In Thrace 80,000 people have gone, and are refugees in Constantinople. Is it any wonder that the unfortunate Moslems are defending themselves with desperation against their enemies? Surely this is not the road to peace, to justice, to humanity; and if our war was not waged to secure peace, justice, and humanity, then the men who have died all over the world have died in vain. (Applause.)

Sir WOLSELEY HAIG: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will not trouble you very long. We have been favoured with a quotation from the Koran which is beside the point. I never understood the lecturer to say that Islam was intolerant: he said the Turk was intolerant. We know the history of the Arabs in Spain. They were tolerant, but the Turks are not. We have been told the Greeks are evil people. I did not understand Sir Valentine Chirol to say they were better than the Turks, but the Greeks did not massacre the Armenians, and the Turks did.

Major MELAS: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is indeed a great audacity on my part to attempt to talk to you, knowing English as little as I do. Being unknown to you, I must present myself as the ex-secretary of King Constantine, which post I resigned when His Majesty refused to fulfil his obligations towards our Allies the Serbs. I then went to the front, in Macedonia, to fight on your side.

As a Greek soldier I feel I must protest highly against what has just been said about the Greeks by Sir Graham Bower. I am sorry I did not know what would be said here, and therefore I am not prepared to answer, and there would be much to be said.

Concerning what Sir Graham said on the alleged and long in advance planned massacre by the Greeks at the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, which allegation is absolutely false, I could have produced a letter written in 1919 by M. Vénisélos to M. Clémenceau about that event. It has since been proved quite clearly that, on the contrary, it was a regular ambush of the Young Turks, encouraged by the intrigues of a certain Great Power who did not wish to see the Greeks occupy Smyrna. The Allies have proofs of it in their hands.

Received with rifle-shots fired from the barracks, the Governor's palace, and the adjoining Turkish houses, the Greek troops had to reply in the midst of a numerous crowd of people: 163 casualties were reported, 63 of which were fatal cases. Of the total number 78 were Turks, 62 Greeks, and the rest belonging to different nationalities.

All survivors were indemnified at once, and some Greek culprits severely punished, three of them even by death.

I ask you, can such incidents be compared with the known organized Turkish atrocities in cold blood, with massacres and deportations *en masse*, whose victims amount to hundreds of thousands during only these last five or six months? Can there be any comparison?

I have nothing here with which to answer the other allegations of Sir Graham Bower; I shall only say that he quoted from the Koran only one quotation which suited his views, whilst it is known that the Koran preaches the doctrine of war as a duty against all other religions.

About the Red Cross's report I do not know much; but as for the Carnegie one, I do know by whom and for what purpose it has been written.

I wonder how people can still be so mistaken, and how anyone can yet speak, at the very moment when such unheard-of crimes are committed by the Kemalists, in defence of those very Turks.

I only wished, my Lord, as a Greek soldier, to protest emphatically, and I shall always do so, against any comparison between Greeks and Turks.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour I will do no more than ask Sir Valentine Chirol to reply.

The LECTURER: I will say two words only. First of all, I entirely agree with my friend Sir Michael O'Dwyer as to the great part that the Moghul Emperors played in developing the administration of the country. I could touch only on one aspect of Akbar's constructive statesmanship, but I am quite aware that we owe a great deal to him in our system of revenue administration.

With regard to Sir Graham Bower's remarks, they were mostly, I fear, beside the point. I have never attacked Islam; what I deeply deplore is that the cause of Islam should be associated with the cause of Turkey. I think no greater mistake has been made by my Indian Mohamedan friends than to identify themselves, as they have done, with the Turks, who have acted as a blight upon Islam, and as a blight upon every country that has come under their rule.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are greatly indebted to the gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion. In a complex question like this there must be very divergent views, and we have had the various points of view very ably expressed. I do not know how we can sufficiently thank Sir Valentine Chirol for the most admirable, lucid, and eloquent address that he has given us. I think we have all been under the spell of his eloquence, and have highly appreciated the most informing review that he has given us of the whole of the problems in the Mohamedan world. (Applause.) Our most hearty thanks are due to him for his having been good enough to come here this afternoon.

# THE ANNUAL DINNER

THE Right Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay was the guest of honour at the annual dinner of the Society held at the Imperial Restaurant on July 6, 1922. The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, Secretary of State for India, presided.

Viscount PEEL, in proposing the toast of the guest of the evening, said he desired first to express both on his own behalf and on theirs great satisfaction that the President of the Society, Lord Curzon, was almost restored to health and would soon return to his duties at the Foreign Office. (Cheers.) He spoke as having been a humble member of the Central Asian Society for some years, and the name had always struck him as apt and showing admirable forethought. For the Society existed to attract attention to and study the great subjects of discussion the central parts of Asia provided. In the past few years those regions had provided abundant material for this purpose, and the Society had served the fare admirably. He was not quite certain what, in the view of the Society, Central Asia meant. He saw around him many distinguished Anglo-Indian soldiers and officials, and he did not think that when they embarked upon their duties and signed their covenants that they were under the impression that they were taking a plunge into Central Asia. But in the past few years the Society had discussed problems relating to India, China, Japan, Arabia, and Palestine, and at least on one occasion had gone outside the Continent of Asia altogether. Their guest had told him that though his original intention was to speak of some of the Himalayan gateways into Central Asia, he had been asked to go down into the plains of India. This being so he would say little himself in regard to India. But he would like to say that in regard to the problems of India he had been reading two notable volumes in the last few weeks. The first was the first volume of a history of Indian civilization by Mr. Chandra Das Gupta, a most competent man, whose second volume would compare the results of that philosophy with those that had been arrived at by thinkers in the West. The second work he had been reading was the vast history of India planned on a truly Cambridge scale in six gigantic volumes, the first of which he had been perusing. He had been told that it was difficult to collect the materials for this period because the Brahmans of old days were chiefly absorbed in things of the spirit, and were

detached from such external matters as wars, politics, or business. History had become a more and more extensive subject, and he thought a rather dangerous subject. He was not quite sure it ought to be taught in the schools at all—(laughter)—because people with political designs always were able to call ancient history in aid of their particular policy and ideas. He knew many cases in which the most destructive claims were founded on particular readings of historical discoveries and research, but he had never known any single national claim or policy which had been renounced because history in the past had pronounced most definitely against it. Their Chairman of Council, Lord Carnock, was a very distinguished representative of the old diplomacy. (Cheers.) He had confided to him just now that he was not an intense admirer of the new diplomacy. (Laughter.) In his day we used a great deal the phrase "spheres of influence," which Lord Carnock told him was a most useful diplomatic phrase for anybody or nation, and one that would cover almost any claim. For this reputable phrase we had substituted to-day the term "mandate," which nobody understood, though we had the great assistance of the League of Nations for the purposes of definition. In regard to another current phrase, it would be an interesting speculation to show the relation of "national homes" to the nations in which those homes were planted. (Laughter.) The subject would lend itself to much speculation and very learned analysis.

With their guest of this evening, just retired from a successful five years' Governorship of Bengal—(cheers)—he had three points of contact, and almost a fourth. He lived in London almost opposite to him; they were together for many years in the House of Commons; and in Scotland they each had for years an adjoining forest. Before going out to Bengal Lord Ronaldshay had travelled widely, observed carefully, and written voluminously. In the India Office Library there was a whole shelf which groaned under these gigantic works of their guest. He could assure him that they were perpetually consulted in the India Office, and that they formed the daily and ordinary reading of members of the India Council. (Laughter.) It would be interesting to hear what he had to say about India, but he was not sure it would not be even more interesting to hear what Lord Ronaldshay had to say of the changes he found at home after five years' absence. He found them much poorer than when he left England, with very heavy taxation and with their ranks thinned by the war; but he would also have found that we supported our difficulties by sustaining cheerfulness, and he found us in many ways little altered. The old thirst for honours seemed to be almost as strong as when he left five years ago. (Laughter and cheers.) He found us still talking with the same energy and enthusiasm as we

did twenty years ago about the reform of the House of Lords, and he found also the newspapers describing the House of Commons, in pre-war language, as a servile body. His Governorship had been passed in a time of extraordinary and exceptional interest in the history of India. It was one of his duties to introduce and establish the constitutional reforms in Bengal, those reforms of which many there to-night, including, he thought, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, had such a very high opinion. (Laughter.) He was the one man who could tell them exactly what diarchy meant, how it worked, and how convenient it was to have in your Cabinet some men responsible to yourself and others responsible to the elected Legislature. He had brought back with him a great reputation as a Governor, and he hoped many other activities in public life still stood before him. Recently he (Lord Peel) received a letter from a friend in India regarding a Governorship, and wrote: "Send us a Ronaldshay and then all will be well." For an individual in his own lifetime to be converted into a species was one of the most remarkable tributes that could be given to any man. (Cheers.)

Lord RONALDSHAY, who was enthusiastically greeted, said that it was quite true that when he received their kind invitation he had some doubts as to whether India came within the scope of the activities of the Society, and it seemed to him that it would be appropriate if he spoke of the Chumbi Valley and Sikkim and Bhutan, little known States which might claim to be gateways into Central Asia, and which ran along the Northern frontiers of Bengal. But when he mentioned his intention to a member of the Society it was received with such obvious disapproval that he asked what was expected of him. The answer was that he would be expected to talk about India.

They had heard a great deal in recent times of unrest in India, and he would be the last to deny that the relations between Government and the governed had not infrequently been the cause of considerable anxiety. During his five years in Bengal he was faced with two distinct movements, the object of which was the destruction of British rule in India. The first was the anarchical movement which worked secretly underground and which was consequently extremely difficult to deal with. The second was the more openly seditious attempt to overthrow the existing Government in India, which was known by its author as the Satyagraha movement, but which became more generally known to the public under the term of non-violent non-co-operation. This title unhappily it too often belied, for the non-violence was frequently conspicuous by its absence, and its activities were prone to break out in open violence. The first of these two movements had been in progress for some years when he went to Bengal. It had resulted in the assassination of a large number of

officials, mainly police officers, and also of non-officials, such as loyal headmasters of Indian schools and persons who had gone into the witness box and given evidence in anarchical cases. Attempts had been made upon the lives of the highest officials in the land, from that of a Lieutenant-Governor to those of a district magistrate and a district judge.

He claimed to be a man of peace, but no one responsible for the maintenance of law and order could very well sit with folded hands when faced with occurrences of that kind. It became obvious to him as soon as he reached Bengal that the paramount duty which awaited him was to stamp out, if possible, the anarchical movement. Their great difficulty was that they could not bring cases against these persons into court, for the simple reason that they exercised so great a power of terrorization that members of the general public were unwilling to come forward as witnesses and give evidence against them. Fortunately the war had produced in India something equivalent to the measure which in this country was euphemistically known as "Dora." The Defence of India Act, as it was called, enabled them under certain safeguards to proceed against and lock up persons with anarchical designs without first going through the form of procedure of a trial in the ordinary courts. During the earlier years of his time in Bengal it was his unfortunate duty to have so to intern rather more than 1,000 persons, mostly young men of the student class.

Of course the Bengal Government were violently and vehemently attacked both from the platform and in the press. They were told that they were a tyrannous Government cutting off in their youthful prime the lives of the flower of Bengal. No one was more conscious than he was himself that the action they were compelled to take was of a very drastic and unusual character which must inevitably excite criticism. But he and his advisers knew that they were proceeding upon evidence which was unassailable, and they expressed their willingness to submit every case of the young men interned under the provisions of the Act to an impartial tribunal. Such a tribunal was set up and consisted of Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, late Judge of the Bombay High Court, and Mr. Justice Beechcroft, of the Calcutta High Court. These learned and distinguished judges spent two and a half months investigating every case of internment, and this was what they reported: "The total number of cases examined by us is 806. In six of the total number . . . we have advised Government that there are not sufficient grounds in our opinion for believing that the parties have acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. In the rest we have advised that the parties have, in our opinion, so acted." The police of India were accustomed daily to abuse and vituperation of every kind from the Indian Press, but

he ventured to say that no police in the world under similar circumstances would have passed through such an ordeal with greater credit than the Bengal police did. (Cheers.) Some two years after the adoption of these measures anarchical crime in Bengal ceased.

Later, however, came the cult of so-called non-violent non-co-operation. Mr. Gandhi's object was precisely the same as that of the Bengal anarchist—namely, the destruction of British rule; but the movement was much more widespread, because Mr. Gandhi was shrewd enough to fasten on the many discontents which inevitably arose out of the aftermath of the great war. For instance, there was the Mohamedan grievance over the terms of peace with Turkey. More formidable still, there was the economic stress which the people in India, in common with every other people in the world, found themselves subjected to also as a result of the war. Mr. Gandhi and his followers were extremely shrewd in the efforts they made, with no little success, to capture the imagination and the sympathies of the uneducated masses. Therein indeed lay the great danger of the Gandhi movement. Many other political movements had risen and fallen in India in the past, but it was not often that a great political leader in India had succeeded to the extent Mr. Gandhi had in capturing the ignorant masses. The first of the cards played by his supporters for this purpose was the superstition of the average Indian peasant. Stories were circulated of the miraculous powers of Mr. Gandhi, until vast numbers of people actually believed that he was an incarnation of God. By way of example he would relate a story typical of the tales which were not only widely circulated but as widely believed. A villager in Bihar was invited by one of Mr. Gandhi's lieutenants to make a contribution to the non-co-operation war chest. He not only refused to part with his money, but he was unwise enough to say some sarcastic things about Mr. Gandhi and his programme. Later on, hearing of the supernatural powers which Mr. Gandhi was supposed to exercise, he became apprehensive, and in order to put himself right with the powers of the unseen world he invited a large number of Brahmans to a feast—a very ordinary way of purchasing immunity against divine wrath in India. The Brahmans came in large numbers, and the dishes were brought in. When the covers were removed, instead of the succulent delicacies which had been provided, the food was found to have been turned into blood. That story was told to a very large gathering of people in one of the open spaces in Calcutta, by a man who claimed that he was himself an inhabitant of the village in which this miracle occurred. That was one of many examples he could give of the stories that were told with the design of capturing the imagination of the masses.

Another card played was the economic card. Mr. Gandhi's followers preached through the length and breadth of the land the

imminence of a golden age when Mr. Gandhi would be king, when the British would be driven into the sea, and when neither rent nor taxes would any longer have to be paid. It was small wonder that he received reports from his officers in every part of the Presidency stating that this item in the non-co-operation programme was proving to be a singularly attractive one, and that there was a widespread tendency on the part of the cultivators to anticipate the date of the arrival of so glorious a golden age. His hearers might find it hard to believe that people could be so easily deluded, yet the fact remained that one of the most difficult problems with which he had to deal last winter was in persuading the peasant villager that he had still to pay his rent and his taxes; for it was firmly rooted in his mind that if only he could hold on a few days longer without paying them he would be tided over to this glorious era when rents and taxes would be no more. Another serious development of the past twelve or eighteen months was the formation of national volunteer corps to carry out the work of the non-co-operation party.

The non-co-operators did a great many foolish things. For instance, they were responsible for the Moplah rebellion, which, if it did nothing else, at least gave the Hindus furiously to think. But they reached the height of their folly when they decided to boycott the visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. He used the term "folly" advisedly, because, although it was true that by so doing they added enormously to the anxieties and work of Government at a time when these were sufficiently great, he could not imagine anything that was better calculated to consolidate opinion in this country against them than the decision to boycott the Royal visit. (Cheers.) They began with sanguinary outbreaks in Bombay city on the day of the arrival of His Royal Highness, and there were threats of similar riots in other parts of India to mark the Royal progress. The volunteer corps were enlisted by Mr. Gandhi and his friends in order to ensure the carrying out of this cheerful programme. Hence it was that he and his colleagues in Bengal were confronted with a situation in which there was no option but to act, to strike and strike quickly, and at the same time as hard as they could at the volunteer corps. Accordingly the Bengal Government proclaimed these corps to be unlawful associations. Many of the corps defied the proclamation, and Government had no option but to proceed against them. During the few weeks which elapsed between the arrival of the Prince in Bombay and his anticipated visit to Calcutta, it was his (Lord Ronaldshay's) most unhappy lot to have to cast into prison in Calcutta alone some 3,000 or 4,000 members of these volunteer corps. He did not deny that that put him into some difficulty. In the first place his jails very soon overflowed, and he was confronted with the problem as to where the overflow was to be housed. He was fortunate in securing

large warehouse accommodation in the growing docks of Calcutta, and in housing about 1,000 persons there. Still the arrested persons came, and he found himself compelled to embark on the construction of a prison camp capable of holding at least 5,000 people. When the Government once decided to take drastic action of that kind they knew that they had to see the matter through. (Cheers.) The mistake the non-co-operators made was in supposing that Government had not foreseen the difficulties which would probably arise out of the policy which had to be adopted. It had to be shown to the non-co-operators that they had made a mistake, and he was thankful to say that by the time he left India the non-co-operation movement had undergone a very remarkable slump. (Cheers.) So far as the Royal visit to Calcutta was concerned, he had no hesitation in saying that the real feeling of the people of Bengal found adequate expression. There was some little hesitation on the part of the rather timid Bengali to come into the streets on the first day of the visit, but they found that nothing terrible happened to them when they did come out. So the crowds grew, and they came in their thousands and hundreds of thousands. He was told by those who had seen the great pageant on the maidan in Calcutta which had been organized for the previous Royal visit at the time of the Durbar, that there was not one whit less of a crowd on the maidan to welcome the Prince of Wales than that which assembled to greet his father ten years earlier. (Cheers.) He did not wish to indulge in odious comparisons, but he might at least claim for the credit of Calcutta that in Calcutta alone of the three Presidency cities the entertainments organized for the reception of His Royal Highness were not added to by the unrehearsed *tamashas* which greeted him both in Bombay and Madras.

We should be guilty of poor statesmanship, however, if we were satisfied merely with quelling disturbances as they arose, and took no trouble to try to understand the underlying causes of such disturbances. Indian unrest was a very complex thing, which derived its power from many sources. One was the Mohamedan discontent, and it was very notable that while the Mohamedans were entirely absent from the earlier anarchical movement in Bengal, they became one of the most formidable elements in the troubles of the last two years. To the economic stress of those years he had alluded already. There was another cause which required close attention. It seemed to him that a fundamental cause behind the anarchical and the non-co-operation movements was the revulsion amongst educated Indians against the civilization of the West. It was difficult to explain adequately in a few words what was the cause of this curious revulsion, but it undoubtedly existed. He thought the real cause of it was that the Indian outlook upon life was different from that of the Western world. The Indian was a contemplative, thoughtful,

idealistic person—they might say a spiritual person; and he was desperately afraid that his own distinctive outlook upon the universe was going to be crushed out of existence by the successful, the aggressive, and, as the Indian would describe it, the materialistic civilization which came from the West. That undoubtedly was a root cause of the present Indian discontent. He would try to illustrate the difference between East and West by an illustration taken not from the field of politics, but from the neutral field of art. The Indian artist was essentially an idealist, and when he gave expression in his art to the idea of divine omniscience painted or made a figure with a thousand eyes; if he wished to give expression to divine power, he created a figure with four or more arms. The Western critic who missed the inner meaning of these things was apt to describe such productions as monstrosities. For instance, John Ruskin wrote that Indian art "wilfully and resolutely opposed itself to all the facts and forms of Nature, and that if it attempted to represent any living creature it did so under some distorted and monstrous form." Ruskin did not grasp the fact that what were to him "the facts and forms of Nature" were to the Indian mere appearances and therefore illusory, and that the Indian was not attempting to make a photographic reproduction of what he actually saw in Nature: he was striving all the time to grasp and give expression to the reality which he believed to lie behind the appearance. This illustration from the field of art gave some idea of the difference of outlook between the Indian and the European. It was the perpetual clash of these different outlooks upon life, exacerbated by lack of understanding on the one side or the other, which was going on in every field of human activity in India that was producing so much heat at the present time. Therefore it was a matter of great importance that the Indian and the European should try more than had been the case in the past to understand one another's point of view. So long as we were charged with the duty of governing India we must unflinchingly compel respect for law and order, but in so doing we could at least endeavour to make it clear that our whole object was the preservation of peace, and that we did not desire to impose upon the Indian people an outlook upon life which they themselves rejected, that we did not desire to convert the vast Indian population, with a great and far-stretching civilization of their own behind them, into nothing but imitation Europeans. (Cheers.) If we could succeed in convincing them that this was not our object we should go very far to remove the bitterness of feeling which undoubtedly had existed of late between the two races in the country. He was compelled by circumstances to take drastic action on frequent occasions against Indian extremists—action which might naturally appear to them to mark him down as one who was not sympathetic toward their legitimate

aspirations. But side by side with action of that kind, he never lost an opportunity to make it clear to them that that was not the case, and that he had a most profound sympathy with the Indian point of view and with the aspirations which her people very properly and very naturally cherished. He felt that he had not been without his reward, for some of those Indians who had regarded his appointment to the province with dislike and misgiving had now heartily associated themselves in movements to commemorate in some permanent form his tenure of office. (Cheers.)

He was most grateful to Lord Peel for his kind expressions, and was delighted to see him in the Chair at the Central Asian Society dinner, having himself been one of the original members of the Society, and having been its Chairman for several years. He hoped the Central Asian Society might long continue to enlist into its ranks eminent statesmen such as the Secretary of State for India, even if India did not strictly come within the geographical limits described by the term of Central Asia. He was glad to have been instrumental in assisting to some extent the recent remarkable expansion which had taken place in the ranks of the Society, for he was successful in securing as members a not inconsiderable number of highly educated Bengali gentlemen. He had no doubt that the Society would always be glad to welcome to its ranks men of all races and varied creeds, provided they showed a genuine interest in the problems which it was the duty of the Society to help to solve. (Loud cheers.)

Lord CARNOCK, in proposing "The Health of the Chairman," said that he was confident the Society was well advised not to restrict its vision to the region which could be strictly defined as within the limits of Central Asia. Were they to do so they would be but a small and dull Society, and would miss the opportunity of hearing such interesting addresses on India and cognate subjects as those with which they had been favoured that evening.

The CHAIRMAN, in returning thanks, said that it was in no spirit of criticism, but rather one of respect and admiration, that he had alluded to the extent to which the Central Asian Society had developed its range and outlook. In fact it was with a feeling of great satisfaction that he saw that they had burst the narrow bonds that seemed at first to confine them and had flown over the whole of Asia. (Cheers.) Lord Peel humorously added that according to the newspapers that evening he was not likely to have any further opportunity of visiting them as Secretary of State for India, for they reported very grave dissensions in the Cabinet, and that its end was near, whether or not members of the Government kept gloves on or took them off. (Laughter and cheers.)

# THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ

From a Correspondent in Baghdad

To understand fully the more recent developments in Iraq it is necessary to go back to the disturbances of 1920 and to trace briefly the changes which have taken place since that time. The events which led up to those disturbances and the history of the months from June to November, 1920, have been dealt with often enough, both in official documents and in non-official writings, to enable them to be passed over here, and the threads may conveniently be gathered up at the time when Sir Percy Cox arrived in the country as High Commissioner.

His first act was to take steps to lay the foundation of an Arab Government, and to that end he appointed a council to act as a provisional government until such time as the pacification of the country should be completed and it should be possible to hold elections to a national assembly. The Naqib of Baghdad was persuaded to become Prime Minister, and his prestige and the great respect in which he is universally held by both Sunnis and Shiahs did much to alleviate the council's immediate difficulties. Still, the road was by no means easy. Parts of the country were still in the hands of the military, and punitive columns were extracting rifle fines from recalcitrant tribes. In such districts British political officers still retained their executive powers, and the appointment of Arab executive officials was out of the question, while other parts of the country were almost completely out of hand. The Kurds on the north and north-east made no secret of the fact that they viewed with extreme disapproval any attempt to place them under an Arab Government, and the attitude of the Turks on the north-west frontier was not reassuring. In spite of these difficulties, however, a start was made, and Arab mutasarrifs and qaimmaqams were appointed to divisions and districts which were not in the hands of the military and where peace and order obtained. Later, as the military columns completed their work it was possible to appoint Arabs in all divisions and districts. In Mosul, however, it was not found possible to make the change for some months. A mutasarrif had been appointed to that division in the early days, but had been murdered on the day

of his arrival there, and though it is believed that there was no political motive behind this murder, yet the fact of its having occurred, combined with the attitude of the Kurds who form a very large part of the population of the Mosul division, and the activities of the Turks over the frontier and in the neighbourhood of Rawanduz, made it advisable to defer the appointment of another mutasarrif until the situation was clearer. In Hillah Division, too, though qaimmaqams were appointed to districts in May, 1921, it was the end of the year before it was found possible to find a person at the same time capable of performing the duties of mutasarrif of that troublesome division and willing to do so.

Meanwhile the home government's delay in forming a definite policy towards Iraq had led to unfortunate results. It was known that the existing government was only provisional, but it was not known whether the form of government to be set up finally was to be a monarchy or a republic, or even whether it was intended to have an Arab head of the state at all. There were some who considered it possible that there would be a national assembly and a Cabinet, but that the British High Commissioner would act as President of the Republic, so to speak. As a result neither the Arabs nor the British officers knew where they stood or what policy was to be advocated, and this it was which was largely responsible for the fall of Saiyid Talib Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, who had stood loyally by the government throughout the disturbances of 1920, though it must be admitted that there were few in the country who did not heave a sigh of relief when he went.

The Cairo conference did not do much to clear up the situation, and without instructions from home the High Commissioner was unable to give any indication of what was likely to happen. The first indication of any policy on the part of the British Government was the announcement that the Amir Faisal had sailed for Iraq, and Mr. Churchill's speech at home in which it was announced that the people of Iraq were to be allowed a free choice of king, but that the Amir Faisal appeared to the British Government to be a suitable candidate. The result was, of course, a foregone conclusion. Faisal was the British nominee, and Faisal was accordingly elected, as any other British nominee would have been. In order fully to understand subsequent events it must be realized here that Faisal did not come into Iraq on a wave of national enthusiasm, with the Iraqis clamouring for a king and for Faisal as the only suitable person to be king. It is as certain as anything can be that had Faisal not been the British nominee he would not have been elected. The justification for the action of the British Government lies, however, in the fact that there was no other candidate who could have commanded anything like universal support, and that the country was undoubtedly

looking to the British to give them an indication as to who was regarded as suitable. The Naqib of Baghdad was a very old man, not able to leave his home and possessing but little influence outside Baghdad, and it was not desirable to have as king a person whose span of life was almost run, and whose election made it certain that a change of king, with all the dislocation it entails, would have to occur in a year or two. The question of succession had to be considered also, and the Naqib's sons are not of the stuff that kings are made of and would not have carried the necessary weight. Saiyid Talib Pasha was known to be a candidate, but his past history was too notorious to make him acceptable to more than a very small section of the population, while the Sheikh of Mohammerah, though he might have gained the support of most of the Shiahs, would have carried no weight with the Sunnis, who form by far the majority of the population north of Baghdad and from whom almost all the officials in the country are drawn. He was further disqualified by the fact that he is actually a Persian subject. There was a possibility that the prestige of the Sherifian house might make Faisal acceptable to both Sunnis and Shiahs, and so help to drown feelings of religious antagonism in a sense of national unity.

Unfortunately Faisal, after his accession, did not act in such a way as to gain the confidence of the people as a whole and so consolidate his position. The blame, however, should not be laid on him alone. He brought with him from the Hedjaz three of the ringleaders of the disturbances of 1920, and a personal staff composed largely of the very persons who had let him down so badly in Syria and are now doing their best to repeat their success in Iraq. For some time after his accession it was obvious from his actions that he regarded himself as beholden to those who had risen in 1920, and under an obligation to reward them by such means as were in his power, while at the same time it was noticeable that this view of his received warm support from certain British officers with whom he was particularly intimate, stoutly though they denied doing so. This very naturally gave offence to the very considerable body of tribal opinion which had stood by government during the disturbances, and laid the foundation of the deep sense of distrust of Faisal as a king which now animates the tribes as a whole, though many of the sheikhs speak very well of him as an individual.

This same feeling was noticeable in the appointments made after Faisal's accession. Many of those qaimmaqams who had been appointed in the first place had been appointed either for political reasons or as experiments, and it was realized that a certain number of them would have to go as things grew more settled and as the work thrown upon the executive officials increased. Those appointed by Faisal's government were almost to a man extremists

and almost universally sublimely ignorant of the state of affairs in Iraq, and completely out of touch with the country and the people. Most of them, it was true, were Iraqis in that they came of Iraq families or had been born in Iraq, but they had been so long away from the country that they had forgotten almost all they ever knew about it, and had learned to view things from a Turkish or Syrian rather than from an Iraq point of view. Further, these men were all townsmen and ignorant of tribal customs and completely out of sympathy with tribal ideas and aspirations. These extremist effendis embarked on a policy of persecuting in every possible way the sheikhs who had stood by government, dubbing them "Ingliz" and not "Arab," and making things as uncomfortable for them as possible. The result of this is that the tribal leaders have been forced to unite against the townsman effendis and against the government which they represent, and the breach between townsman and tribesman is rapidly growing wider. It will now be clear, therefore, how Faisal has failed to consolidate his position among the tribes. Has he done any better in the towns? To reply to that question, it is necessary to consider Basrah, Baghdad, and Mosul separately. The other towns in Iraq are composed largely of tribal elements, and their views are controlled very largely by the tribes around them, while the holy cities of Kerbela and Najaf are guided largely by religious fanaticism and by the politics of Persia. Basrah is essentially a commercial city, and the Basrawi's politics entertain no thoughts of appointments to the offices of state or the favour of the court, but look simply and solely to the security of the communications of the country and the extension of trade connections. They realize that their ideals will most easily be obtained if there is in the country a strong government able to maintain order, and an army of occupation which will create a demand for imported produce. That being so, the Basrawi is strongly in favour of the retention of as great a British control as possible, while his natural jealousy of Baghdad serves to convert that desire into a thorough dislike of any Arab Government in Baghdad. Mosul was regarded for some time as the stronghold of the pro-Turk party, and there were many who thought, and not a few who hoped, that Faisal would gain no support at all in the northern town. Such thoughts and hopes received a rude shock, however, when the King paid a visit to Mosul in October, 1921. On this occasion he really made a favourable impression, and as a result the undoubted pro-Turk sentiments of many of the people of Mosul have been kept in check and Faisal has gained as a result. Baghdad exists for politics, and politics is almost the sole topic of conversation among Arabs who can read and write. As in other Eastern countries, education is regarded merely as a passport to an official appointment, and as a result the city is full of semi-educated persons clamouring

for appointments. These effendis at first welcomed Faisal with open arms. Promises were lavishly made by the new government that all foreign clerks would be dismissed and replaced by Iraqis, and there was opened up to the Baghdad effendi a vision of countless appointments waiting to be filled by Baghdadis, for it must be realized that where appointments are concerned the effendi regards Iraqi as meaning Baghdadi. All went well for a time. Gradually Indians were replaced by Iraqis in the government offices and the surplus effendis were being absorbed, when suddenly Faisal committed an act of folly which has destroyed for the time being whatever confidence the Baghdadis may have had in him. Whatever else the Baghdadi may be, he is certainly a constitutionalist and has very definite ideas regarding the prerogatives of ministers and their position vis-à-vis the King. When, therefore, five of the ministers resigned in April, 1922, as a protest against Faisal's continual interference in the affairs of the cabinet and his attempts to force his own views on them, their action was almost universally applauded and Faisal's action as universally condemned. It is likely to be a very long time before the King recovers to any appreciable extent the confidence which he has thus lost.

It will be seen then that during the past eight months the politics of Iraq have been largely centred around the person of the King, and it cannot be said that he emerges any too favourably from an examination of recent events. Signs are not wanting, however, that he now realizes this to some extent, and it is noticeable that he has recently been inclined to take a much stronger line with the extremist party and to work in closer co-operation with the High Commissioner. The burning question of the moment is the treaty which is being prepared between Great Britain and Iraq, and in Baghdad interest in the treaty is confined almost entirely to the question of the removal or retention of the mandate. The extremist party is making the most strenuous efforts to rouse popular opinion into demanding the removal of the mandate, whereas it is believed that the draft treaty contains no clause abrogating the mandate. The King appeared at first rather inclined to side with the extremists, but his attitude towards them has hardened very considerably of late. It is thought that any difficulties created by the question of the mandate will be got round by the adoption of some translation other than the word "intidab," which is now in use, and whose meaning is not sufficiently definite to be properly understood by the people of this country.

There are difficulties ahead, notably in connection with the Budget. A "Geddes Super-Axe" Committee has been appointed to inquire into the budgets of each ministry and try to reduce expenditure down to the amount of the anticipated revenue. The task will not be easy, but it has to be done as the home government has

declared that it will not give any grant in aid to make up any deficit in the accounts of the Iraq state for this year.

Reading this note must give the idea that Iraq is in almost desperate straits, and it is not to be denied that the past few months have been extremely critical. At the moment, however, there is justification for sounding a note of hope. The corner appears to have been turned, the situation seems to be more stable, and the fact that Ramadhan and the Id passed without any untoward occurrences gives some colour to the view held by many that the extremists have shot their bolt. The electoral law has now been published, and much depends on the result of the elections to the national assembly. Faisal has certainly been the central figure in the politics of the last eight months, but it seems likely that during the next eight months he will be considerably less prominent, and that events will centre more closely around the national assembly and the cabinet. If this is so, it will be all to Faisal's advantage, and he will have a much better opportunity of allowing his attractive personality to help him to worm his way into the affections of those with whom he comes into contact.

# SOME REMARKS ON HELLENISM

## WITH REFERENCE TO DR. G. N. BANERJEE'S "HELLENISM IN ANCIENT INDIA"*

By Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. C. Temple, Bart., C.B., C.I.E.

For the understanding of ancient Indian and Western Asian history the subject of Hellenism is of the first importance, and it says much for Dr. G. N. Banerjee's handling of it that his book has gone to a second edition in the year succeeding the appearance of the first. The subject is wide to a bewildering extent, and demands a matured knowledge of many of those studies that make up the " humanities." Dr. Banerjee has shown himself to be not afraid of tackling any part of it.

Taking Hellenism to be the spread of Greek culture, and the Hellenes to be the peoples who accepted the Greek mode of life, such culture could not be extended to India without contact, and contact between the Near East, as we know it, and the Greeks was early indeed.

The actual commencement of the ancient Persian Empire took place in the mid-sixth century B.C., at the time when India had not long emerged from the period without dates, and was the result of the defeat of the Median ruler of Ecbatana (Hamadan) by Cyrus the Great. The immediate consequence of this event was a coalition against Cyrus, consisting of Nabonidus of Babylon, Amasis of Egypt, Crœsus of Lydia, and the Spartans of Greece proper, which that master of affairs, military and civil, defeated in detail. The whole situation implies close contact between Greek and Asiatic, both Aryan and Semite, and African, which was even then no new thing, for the Median Empire had extended westwards to the Halys in Asia Minor. Then in the same century we have Cambyses with his conquest of Egypt and his adoption of Egyptian manners, and Darius with his conquest of the Ægean Islands towards the end of it. Thereafter there was a continuous struggle between Persian and Greek for the next two centuries till the arrival of Alexander the Great in the late fourth century B.C.

* "Hellenism in Ancient India," by Dr. G. N. Banerjee, Lecturer on Egyptology and Oriental History, Calcutta University. Second edition. Butterworth and Co. : Calcutta and London.

The nature of the Oriental armies and their commanders thus in contact with the West is material to the present argument. The Persian armies, led by the Achæmenids of the dynasty founded by Cyrus, was raised out of a manly, hardy, patriotic, and enthusiastic peasantry, thoroughly believing in itself and its leaders. After a time the inevitable decay in these moral qualities set in, and the Persian armies became manifestly inferior to the Greek, paving the way for Alexander's victories. On the initiation of Cyrus the earlier Achæmenid rulers thought and acted imperially. That is to say, their tendency was to behave humanely towards the conquered and to spread civilization. Darius was a born organizer, a believer in the destiny of his race, to which the great God, Ahuramazda, had given dominion "over this earth afar, over many peoples and tongues," whom he was pledged to govern aright and civilize. Indeed, at times he went too far in his concessions to local aspirations. Darius's system was to govern by satrapies, which were viceroyalties, each with its subordinate governments, and in the West there were city-states as well. Within the satrapies the subject races had much freedom of self-government, which created an immense variety of provincial administration, suited to local civilization, and indicated by every system of finance between the use of minted money and trade by pure barter.

The political effect of the Achæmenid Empire was to civilize, to improve communications, agriculture, finance, and trade, to foster industrial art, and to affect enormously the religion of the ancient world. The Achæmenids, like the Medes before them, were enthusiastic Zoroastrians, and their widely spread empire gave an opportunity for propaganda on an immense scale. The Zoroastrians, like the Brahmans, were natural missionaries, and in effective eclectic methods for diffusing their respective creeds, through priestly castes, there is not much to choose between them. Neither opposed the foreign gods, but both absorbed them: the Indian as emanations of his own Vishnu or Shiva, the Persian as servants of the Supreme Ahuramazda. But the Indian dealt with the peoples of a compact country, and so was able to dominate while absorbing; whereas the Persian dealt with a world-empire, and so was ultimately himself dominated through his absorption of the more gorgeous cults of the civilizations he encountered.

Now, it was Darius that first established direct contact with India, still in the sixth century B.C.—in the last two decades of it—not by way of conquest of set purpose, but by way of the natural expansion of a great empire in order to preserve the peace in its outlying provinces. In the same way, to the west he spread his dominions to Thrace and Macedonia and along the southern littoral of the Mediterranean to the territories of Kárta (Carthage). Such

armies, raised out of such a people, under such rulers, could not but seriously affect those with whom they came in contact, and Northern India must to some extent, from the earliest historic times, have become aware of Western Asiatics and their ideas and ways. The spirit in which Darius or his representatives worked in India is shown by the coasting voyage of exploration undertaken by Skylax of Karyanda from the Indus to Suez in 509 B.C., under his ægis.

In spite of his achievements, Darius received a severe check at Marathon in 490 B.C., and his successor Xerxes still severer defeats on the sea at Salamis in 480 and on land at Platæa in 479. But at this last battle Indian archers were present, and whatever may be the exact sense that we should attach to the term "Indian" here, this fact does argue more than a superficial contact between India and the West, even at that early date. From the time of Xerxes and his two crucial defeats the Greeks waxed stronger and the Persian power waned steadily, despite temporary spectacular successes, such as those of Artaxerxes III. (Ochus) in the mid-fourth century B.C., just before the final conflict with a united Greece under Philip of Macedon. But these were purely superficial victories, as they were won by Hellenic armies, under Hellenic generals (Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes), fighting for an Asiatic suzerain, to whom they were incontestably superior. So when the youthful Alexander succeeded to the aspirations of Philip—the founding of a Greek state out of the Persian (still Achæmenid) Emperor's Greek dominions—he found himself confronted by an empire, the helplessness of which before a Greek invasion had been abundantly shown, and throughout which Greek influence was no new experience.

Alexander was a Greek of the Greeks, saturated with Greek culture, a conscious world-conqueror for Greek civilization from the beginning, capable of carrying out his ideas, and only prevented from doing so to the full by being cut off at thirty-three, practically at the commencement of his astonishing career. So far as the Persian Empire was concerned, his influence was immense during his short life there, owing *inter alia* to his assumption of the dress and ceremonial of the Achæmenids, his establishment of autonomous Greek municipalities along his line of march, and the marrying of all his officers and some ten thousand Macedonians besides to Persian wives. He was Greek enough to follow the old Greek philosophic advice to be "himself the law," and to be officially proclaimed a god ruling by divine right, and eclectic enough to aim at the amalgamation of all his subjects rather than treat the Asiatics as servants of the Greeks.

At his death there were set up by his generals (*diadochoi*) the satrap or viceregal dynasties usual on such occasions in Oriental history, but within a decade of it one of them came to the front in the person of Seleukos Nikator, the only one of Alexander's generals

who had retained his Persian wife after his master's disappearance from the scene. He created and ruled successively from Babylon, Seleukia near by, and Antioch in Syria, an empire extending from Syria to the Indian borders, where he was checked by the great Indian pupil of Alexander, Chandragupta Maurya (Sandrakottos). But just before his death he extended his rule westwards to all Asia Minor and Thrace. Seleukos Nikator was a Hellenizer on a large scale, following Alexander's plan of founding Greek autonomous cities with country districts attached thereto under the suzerainty of the empire—a policy that diffused the Greek language, commerce, and civilization everywhere, as far east at least as the Indus, and created large and flourishing communities which attracted wealthy settlers, especially Jews, from foreign lands. His son and successor, Antiochos Soter, another great man, continued his father's work, and he it was who gave the Oriental Hellenistic civilization its form, as we know it, in the second century B.C.

But the Seleukid Empire had an inherent defect in the centrifugal tendencies of its numerous autonomous municipal centres, and these, combined with the attacks of outside enemies, made the lives of the later Seleukids one long battle for existence. Revolts, more or less successful, were rampant everywhere, leading up to the wholly or partially Hellenized Indo-Baktrian and Parthian kingdoms on the Indian frontiers, which played so prominent a part in ancient Indian history. Eventually the Seleukid, Antiochos the Great, came into conflict with the Romans in the beginning of the century before Christ, and from that time the empire was doomed, soon afterwards falling before the rising power of the whilom nomadic Central Asian Parthians, by that time a settled people of a high civilization and thoroughly Persianized.

Nominally Imperial, the Parthians held the country from the Euphrates to the Indus, but in reality they never created an empire, and ruled through vassal states of varying conditions of independence. They were also at continuous feud with Rome, and often proved a formidable enemy. Gradually their rule degenerated into a condition externally always on the defensive, while internally there was ceaseless civil war and strife. Local states within such an empire could not have been much interfered with. Politically and administratively the earlier Parthian rulers were thoroughly Hellenized in institutions, currency, and commerce, though in religion they were stalwart Zoroastrians. Some of them spoke good Greek, and on the whole their great service to civilization was that they acted as a buffer between Hellenism and the barbarism of the Central and Northern Aryan hordes for something like half a millennium—until well into the third century A.D. Nevertheless, the effect of their suzerainty was in the end to create a reaction against Hellenism, because Greek

culture and the Greek mode of life were inherently unsuited to a rough Oriental people of the Parthian and Central Asian type. So Hellenism gradually declined, until the destruction of Seleukia by the Romans sealed its fate. Then the Greek language gave way before the Aramaic of the Syrian Christians, and thenceforward Greek culture and literature were available to Persia only in an Aramaic dress. Hellenic influence fell away and finally passed out of ken under the great Sasanid successors of the Parthians. In the days of the Sasanids, who were Persians *par excellence*, were waged two exhausting struggles—Persia *versus* Rome, and Zoroastrianism *versus* Christianity—for four long centuries, until the advent of the Arab Caliphate of Baghdad produced the absolute ascendancy of the Mohamedan faith in Persia in the seventh century A.D.

Contemplating such a story as this, as I read it in outline with reference to Hellenism, of the lands between Greece and India, and of the lands within their respective borders in ancient times, one cannot but say that *primâ facie* the reciprocal influence must have been very great. How far that influence can be said to have been actually felt as regards India is the riddle that Dr. Banerjee has set himself to solve, so far as a solution is possible. He has not shirked his task, and considers it from all points of view—architecture, sculpture, painting, coinage, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, writing, literature, drama, religion, philosophy, mythology, fables, and folklore. The view is comprehensive enough in all conscience, and its study is history *in excelsis*. Such a width of view involves an enormous amount of varied reading, and, what is more, an unusual capacity for absorption and assimilation of what is read. Dr. Banerjee has grasped his nettles with an unflinching hand, and has honestly attempted to crush out of them all that they have to give him. He has his opinions, but he states his grounds fairly, and though experts may find what appear to them to be flaws in apprehension and deduction, yet he is so transparently honest and fair that his views and efforts cannot but command respect. He is not afraid of cross-examination, and gives his authorities in a series of admirable bibliographies attached to each section of his work. These are not always as complete as they might be, but at any rate one does know exactly on what he bases the faith that is in him. In this way he has produced a work that is a credit to himself and his University.

Dr. Banerjee would be the last person to hold his present edition to be a final say on his subject. No doubt further editions will succeed it, and perhaps he will therefore take the following suggestions into consideration. The relations and mutual influence of nationalities in contact, but situated so far apart as were the ancient Greeks and Indians, are subject to that general law of evolution, whereby an individuality progresses mainly on a line of its own,

subject to the influence of every other line with which it may come in contact. Therefore, in effect, in this case, Indian institutions and thought would eat into those of the Greeks, and *vice versa*, and what one has really to look for is, firstly, the extent and nature of the contact, and, secondly, on what points each has in actual fact definitely affected the other. It is in this way that universal fashions in thought and practice have from all time been set up from age to age. Looking through the ages historically, it will be found that among nations in contact common fashions in thought, practice, and industrial art rise up, prevail, and die out from one age to another, and that this is the result of contact, which has acted either directly or indirectly through an intervening body. Much that is common to them all in India, Persia, Greece, and Rome, in what we call ancient days, is due to fashions prevailing among nations of "Aryan" civilization from time to time. This, it seems to me, is a point that searchers into the effect and scope of Hellenism should take into serious consideration.

Again, what manner of antagonists were they that carried on the agelong struggles outlined at the commencement of these remarks—these Greeks and Romans on the one hand, and these Persians and Persianized Parthians on the other; these Hellenes of Persia and Afghanistan and these "Aryans" of India proper? In the dim past, as afterwards right up to modern times, the great overboiling caldron of Europeo-Asiatic humanity was situated in Central Asia. Thence issued horde after horde in age after age to the west, south, and east, and their great characteristic throughout was their power of dominating absorption. They adapted themselves with remarkable rapidity to any civilization with which they happened to come in contact, and to such an extent that they often themselves soon became its chief exponents. Thus they overran from time to time, under different names, the East, West, and South, but always with the same effect, wherever they were not quickly ejected. They overran, became absorbed, and leavened their absorbers with their own thoughts, practices, and arts. In the East they met the Chinese and their already established civilization. In the West they met at first what we may call the Babylonian, Semitic, and Hamitic civilizations, and then the Greek and Roman. In the South they met what again one may call the Dravidian civilization. And it must be remembered that none of these were even then anything but a complex of various still older civilizations, which we can at present only call aboriginal.

The very ancient irruption into the West and South from Central Asia we are just now concerned with was that of the "Aryans." Without going too much into detail, in Persia these immigrants met an existing Babylonian-Semitic culture and absorbed it into their own. This they carried across westwards to Greece and Rome, coming into contact in the process with Hamitic, Egyptian, Mediter-

ranean, and Germanic types of mankind, and eastwards to India, where they met a culture of Dravidian and Sinitic, and—shall we say also?—of a Kolarian type. Everywhere the dominating factor was Aryanism deeply imbued with the local leaven. So that when the titanic struggles between Greek and Persian and between Persian and Indian arose, we find the same dominating temperament on both sides, affected by almost every kind of national idiosyncrasy in Europe and Asia. There was, indeed, very much in common between Greek and Persian, Persian and Indian, and Indian and Greek, as well as much that was antagonistic. What, therefore, appears now to be the result of mutual influence may well have been but a common inheritance. This is the direction in which it seems to me that further research will lead us.

In view of the above remarks, the following conclusions drawn from his research by Dr. Banerjee in his Introduction (p. 26) will show how far he has been guided by similar ideas, and how far he may be inclined to develop them in future. Says Dr. Banerjee: "Greece has played a part, but by no means a predominant part, in the civilization of ancient India. The evolution of Philosophy, Religion, and Mythology has gone along parallel but independent paths. India owes to Greece an improvement in Coinage and Astronomy, but it had begun both; and in Lyric and Epic poetry, in Grammar, the Art of Writing, the Drama and Mathematics, it had no need to wait for the intervention and the initiative of Hellenism. Notably, perhaps, in the plastic arts and especially in the details of some of the architectural forms, classical culture has acted as a ferment to revive the native qualities of the Indian artists, without robbing them of their originality and subtlety. But in any case, the fascinating story of the Greeks in India is not only full of suggestion, but is also a most interesting chapter in the history of the development of ideas. The question is not of interest solely to the Indianists and the Hellenists, but likewise to all those who occupy themselves in tracing the evolution of general history, and to those who above all love to follow, even in their more remote expansion, the antecedents of our modern culture and civilization, the different phases of our national development and progress."

One is tempted to quote again and again from Dr. Banerjee's suggestive pages, but I will content myself with one extract from his description of Indian in connection with Greek medicine. He says (pp. 202-203): "Even in modern days, European surgery has borrowed the operation of rhinoplasty, or the formation of artificial noses, from India, where Englishmen became acquainted with the art in the last century. The Indian rhinoplasty has attained some reputation, because of its early introduction and because of its influence upon the plastic operations of European surgeons, such as Carpue,

Gräfe, Dieffenbach, perhaps even Branca and Tagliacozza. Although the skin of the forehead was used as a substitute for the nose in the operations performed in the eighteenth century by the Indian doctors, still the connection with the old method, where the skin of the cheek was used, could not be doubted. Dr. Haas declared Susruta's description of rhinoplasty [about the time of Christ] as an insipid modification of a similar description in Celsus (7, 9), and referred to a remark in Chakradatta's commentary on Susruta, according to which the whole of the description in Susruta is said to have been *anarsa*—*i.e.*, not genuine. But the references in Celsus have only a faint resemblance to Susruta, and Dallana, Jaiyyata, Gayadása, and others—*i.e.*, the oldest commentators—have recognized that portion of Susruta as genuine."

Dr. Banerjee is here possibly on debatable ground, but his remarks will, nevertheless, be of special interest to many, who, like the present writer, were *ex officio* interested during the late European war in the maxillo-facial hospitals, that did so much to make the future life of many an unhappy sufferer from the various fronts more bearable than it would otherwise have been.

# REVIEW

ON SECRET PATROL IN HIGH ASIA. By Captain L. V. S. Blacker, Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides. John Murray, London. 18s net.

This is a tale of strange post-war happenings on the far frontiers of Persia and Turkestan which for high adventure and hairbreadth episodes would have delighted the heart of Charles Lever—whilst retaining all the advantage of historical accuracy. Told in the language of the modern British officer, which, if not classical, is at least picturesque and sometimes most expressive, it deals with the progress of a detachment of Guides projected into that amazing theatre of confused military and political action, after the Armistice, which we know as Central Asia. It would have added much to our enlightenment if the author had been able freely and frankly to explain the meaning and object of the various "missions" which were despatched, like his own, to that remote region, and their relation to each other. But he warns us in the Preface that the time "is not yet ripe for a full and complete description of the events of June, July, August, and September, 1918, in Turkistan," which doubtless led up to the subsequent military alarums and excursions in which he played so distinguished a part. This is unfortunate. How many people have heard of the battle of Dushakh, for instance, where the 19th Punjab Infantry lost half their effective strength and all their British officers, whilst they and the 28th Cavalry swept 10,000 of the Red army off the field? Sir George Younghusband, in his Introduction, does not help us at all. He confines himself to a characteristic eulogy of his own beloved Corps of Guides. It is, however, not difficult to trace the threads of our vacillating policy towards Russia in Central Asia, and to detect the influence of the British Communist in assisting the spread of Bolshevism, until finally the whole energy of these missions was absorbed in the intricate business of preventing Bolshevik propagandists (including Afghans as well as representatives of nearly every Asiatic nationality outside India) from crossing the borderland into the Punjab. This, at any rate, was Captain Blacker's mission, and right well he and his detachment seem to have carried it out. The pursuit and capture of a band of Afghan propagandists, which involved much strenuous mountaineering and tough adventure in the roughest of

the Kuen Lun offshoots, is a thrilling tale, which, unfortunately, is badly illustrated by the War Office map at the end of the book. This part of the Kuen Lun has, in fact, never been satisfactorily explored or mapped. It leaves us to conjecture where those Afghans came from and what was their real objective. There is an easy pass from the eastern point of the Afghan province of Wakhan leading to the Taghdumbash Pamir and Tashkurghan, called the Beyik (? Payik), at the foot of which is a Chinese post (which consisted of a single kibitka and the keeper of a few bedraggled fowls in the days of the boundary demarcation), so that clearly the Afghan band was not so very far from its own boundaries when Captain Blacker dropped on to its trail. There was no room for propaganda so far—nor, indeed, was there any opportunity for mischief in the Kuen Lun. The propagandists were finally most gallantly run in at Yarkand, and there ended their abortive career. Not less entertaining and instructive were Captain Blacker's experiences subsequently on the northern Persian frontier. Indeed, the whole book is full of good yarns. One most satisfactory sign of the times is the thirst for geographical knowledge evidenced by the author and his Guides. All the map knowledge of Asia which we possess from Mesopotamia to the Chinese frontier, south of Russia and apart from India, is the result of the work of native surveyors of the Indian Survey Department working on the basis of triangulation carried out by their own officers or by such geographical experts as Deasy, Sir Percy Sykes, and (notably) by Sir Aurel Stein. Many of these native topographers have been army men, and many have earned distinctions for their courage and success, but I do not remember the names of any Guides amongst them. As much of this great extent of geographical reconnaissance has been gradually amassed under haphazard conditions, when such opportunities as campaigns, boundary commissions, etc., offered the chance, there is naturally many a wide gap still unfilled, chiefly in the regions of the Elburz mountains (Northern Persia), Badakshan (East of Balkh), Central Afghanistan (the Hazara country), and the Kuen Lun, although there is doubtless useful material not yet published which is still in the making. The Guides possess almost unique opportunities for exploration and reconnaissance, and from Captain Blacker's story they know how to use them to the best effect, working on such methods as modern geography requires. Both the topographers and their officers appear to be scientifically trained. This is a matter of lasting importance. Captain Blacker is much to be congratulated on obtaining permanently useful geographical results from his strenuous and most adventurous mission.

T. H. HOLDICH.

# OBITUARY

## SIR ALEXANDER M'ROBERT*

SIR ALEXANDER M'ROBERT, Chairman of the British India Corporation, Cawnpore, died on June 22, at Downside, Aberdeenshire, aged sixty-eight.

Before going to Cawnpore in 1884 he held the appointment of Neil Arnott Lecturer in experimental physics at the Mechanics' Institution, Aberdeen, and was Lecturer in Chemistry in Robert Gordon's College, Aberdeen. He was invested with the Order of Honour of Afghanistan in 1918. He was President of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce for nine years, and represented that body in the Legislative Council of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh for five successive terms. He represented the Chamber at the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire at Montreal in 1903, London 1906 and 1912, Sydney 1909, and Toronto 1920. He was pioneer of the movement for providing sanitary dwellings for factory workers in India, and had travelled extensively all over the world. Sir Alexander was an LL.D. of Aberdeen University and a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He received a Knighthood in 1910 and the K.B.E. in 1919.

## CAPTAIN ROBERT KEITH MAKANT, M.C.

Captain Robert Keith Makant, M.C., was educated at Harrow, where he represented the school both at cricket and football. The outbreak of war prevented his going up to Cambridge, and he joined the 1/5 North Lancs in October, 1914. After serving two years in France, where he won the Military Cross and a bar, he was wounded in 1917. In the early part of 1918 he was sent to Mesopotamia as A.D.C. to the G.O.C. 1st Indian Army Corps M.E.F. In April, 1919, he joined the Arab levies, acting in the capacity of adjutant at headquarters. The autumn of that year saw him nominated to the Kurdish levy at Sulaimani, South Kurdistan, and the work of organizing and training the force as second in command became the only immediate aim of his life. Handicapped by a natural inability to learn easily

* By kind permission of the *Morning Post*.

Oriental languages, he nevertheless took no advantage of interpreters, rightly judging that the surest way to gain the attachment of his men lay through direct intercourse with them. He lived in the strictest simplicity, and won the liking of both Kurdish officers and men by identifying himself with them in a manner which with another personality might have led to a loss of respect, but which with him had the reverse effect. He knew the south Kurdish country as well as any officer living, for it was his habit to spend days away hunting in the mountains with but a single orderly, living in the Kurdish villages and with their inhabitants, for whom he had a great affection.

The trend of political affairs in 1921 had almost resolved him to resignation, but his loyalty to his commanding officer, the late Captain FitzGibbon, M.C., and to the levy, induced him to return. On the death of Captain FitzGibbon he was for a time in command.

He was murdered on June 18 of this year by one of the most truculent leaders of a bad and treacherous tribe—for reasons which were probably purely political, and devoid of any personal consideration.

The Administration has lost in him one of its most loyal and efficient officers, and those who knew him and worked with him, one of their sincerest and staunchest friends.

E. B. S.

# LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED, JUNE AND JULY, 1922.

Acworth, Captain J. P., 28th Cavalry F.F., Leicester House, Portland Road, Hove, Sussex.
Bampton, Major J. A. H., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
Bampton, R. E. Fitzsymons, Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.
Birdwood, General Sir W. R., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.Gen., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
Bois, Captain H. E., Iraq Levies, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Borrie, David, E.I.U.S. Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Bower, Sir Graham, K.C.M.G., Studwell Lodge, Droxford, Hants.
Cadogan, Lieut.-Commander F., R.N. (ret.), Hatherop Castle, Fairford, Glos.
Channer, Captain G. O. De R., 7th Gurkha Rifles, Quetta, Baluchistan.
Dew, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Armine, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
Ditchburn, Major A. H., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Fagan, Sir Patrick, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Farrell, Captain W. J., M.C., Brookside, Newland Park, Hull.
Fraser, Major W. A. K., D.S.O., M.C., Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
French, J. C., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Gilkes, Captain G., R.F.A., G.H.Q. Allied Forces, Constantinople.
Greatwood, H. E., 123rd Outram's Rifles, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Bombay.
Hallinan, Captain T. J., R.A.M.C., 77, Southside, Clapham Common, S.W.
Harrison, Captain C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
McCleverty, Major P. H., 20th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S,W. 1.
Macdonald, Lieut.-Colonel F., I.A. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
Maconochie, R. R., I.C.S., British Legation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
Mann, Alexander, 64, Lancaster Gate, W. 2.
Milnes-Gaskell, the Lady Constance, 47, Pont Street, S.W.
Moore, Major Arthur, 9, Chester Terrace, Eaton Square, S.W.

Morland, Major W. E. T., D.S.O., M.C., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

Norris, Captain David, C.B., C.M.G., R.N., Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W.

Oatway, Captain S. H., 93rd Burma Infantry.

Oddie, Philip, M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.

Richards, Captain E. I. G., Army Educational Corps, School of Education, Wellington, S. India.

Ridge-Jones, J., M.C., Civil Surgeon, Sulaimani, S. Kurdistan.

Scott, Lieut.-Colonel N., C.I.E., I.M.S. (ret.), Eastcott, Hatfield, Herts.

Trotter, Miss Angela, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.

Trotter, Miss J., 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.

Vickery, Lieut.-Colonel C. E., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.F.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

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